Kenji Miyamoto

SELECTED WORKS

JAPAN PRESS SERVICE

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Kenji MIYAMOTO, Japanese writer and politician, was born on October 17, 1908, in Hikari City, Yamaguchi Prefecture. After graduating from the Tokyo Imperial University, he joined the Japanese Communist Party in 1931, and has been a member of the Central Committee since 1933. He was imprisoned from 1933 to 1945 for his political beliefs and activities; was General Secretary of the Central Committee from 1958 to 1970, CC Presidium Chairman from 1970 to 1982 and has been Chairman of the Central Committee since 1982. He has been a member of the House of Councilors since his election in 1977.

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Núcleo de Análise Interdisciplinar
de Políticas e Estratégias
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＊落丁，乱本がありましたらお取り替えいたします。

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

I joined the Japanese Communist Party in 1931. It was the only party that opposed the war of aggression and the dark rule of the Japanese absolutist Tenno (Emperor) system, although was declared illegal. More than half a century has passed since then. I was imprisoned in 1933 and spent 12 years in jail until the end of World War II.

After the war the JCP was able to carry on its activities openly, but the party again suffered repression in 1950, when US imperialism, which had kept Japan under military occupation, entered the war in Korea. The peace treaty concluded separately between Japan and the United States in San Francisco in 1951 did not bring genuine independence to Japan. The form of US imperialist rule over Japan changed, placing the country under semi-occupation, but the JCP was able to resume its legal activity.

When I joined the party, it had a membership of only some hundreds as a result of arrests and imprisonments of its members under the continuing repressions. The circulation of its journal amounted to several thousands at its maximum, and the party was not represented in elected bodies. Compared with that time, the party has now achieved an unimaginable advance, which is proved by such simple figures as its membership amounting to hundreds of thousands, the circulation of its journal reaching more than 3 million and a total of 3 thousand and several hundred members in the Diet and local assemblies. Needless to say, there is still a long way to go, in the light of the party's historic mission of achieving a socialist society.

Since 1933, I have been a member of the JCP Central Committee.

This edition for foreign readers contains my works selected from my writings from 1960 upto the present, covering period that began with the 7th Congress in 1957 and the 8th Congress in 1961, when the JCP elaborated the Party Program, establishing its general line based on scientific socialism and firmly took the path of independent development that corresponds to the reality of Japan.

For the convenience of readers, this book is divided into three parts.

First, writings on the history and aims of the JCP. Before the end of World War II, Japan was an imperialist state that continued the war of aggression under the dark rule of the absolutist Tenno system. The defeat and the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration brought Japan under total military occupation by the Allied Powers, with the US armed forces as the main strength, which represented a period that preceded the present. In these circumstances, Japan has been kept in subordination to the United States, in spite of being a highly developed capitalist country. This is why the immediate task seen historically is a people's democratic revolution by achieving genuine independence from US imperialism and defeating Japanese monopoly capital in subordination to the United States as its two tasks. The road to socialism in Japan will go through such a historic stage.

Second, on international activities of the party. The independent way firmly followed by the JCP against imperialism and hegemonism in any form is correctly linked with international solidarity. The activities for international solidarity include the struggles for preventing nuclear war and eliminating nuclear weapons which are the main subjects of "Road to Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" published in English at the same time with this book. The contents of that book, therefore, are not included in this book to avoid repetition.

Finally, a brief autobiographical record of my own is added.

There is no need to add further details, as this book will speak itself.

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I

History and Aims of the JCP

LESSONS FOR 40TH YEAR SINCE WAR END AND PIONEER ROLE OF THE JCP

Introductory Speech at the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee, May 14, 1985

Comrades, I appreciate the efforts you have made to increase Akahata readership by more than 100,000 since April. With the spread of upward trend through the whole party, the Akahata Festival held for the first time in West Japan was a great success, sponsored by the Central Committee. It is a pleasure for this Plenum to meet in these circumstances.

This year's Akahata Festival was one of the biggest political events sponsored by the party center. Another event of great significance during this period was an exhibition commemorating the 40th year since the death of comrade Shoichi Ichikawa. His words, "My true days, my true life began on the day I joined the Japanese Communist Party" are of tremendous value to the party in the present circumstances.

There have been a number of important events, international and domestic, taking place since the 9th Plenum in October 1984. During this period, almost ten whole-party meetings have been held, including the National Meeting of Prefectural and District Committee Chairpersons in January, and the Central Committee Presidium meeting in April. The party has accepted the guidance from these meetings, which set out policies for implementing the decisions made at the First National Party Conference, held in April, 1984, and the th Central Committee Plenum. The principal task of this Plenum is to preview our main activities during this period and lay down our future policy line.

LESSONS FOR 40TH YEAR SINCE WAR END AND POSITION OF THE JCP

There are various lessons to be learned here and internationally in this 40th year since the end of World War II, and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Party views were made clear by the Presidium meeting in April, and my new article included in "Road to Elimination of Nuclear Weapons", a collection of various works, also deals with this, an article which it was decided to publish after deliberations had been made within the party. I took up the same subject in my commemorative speech at the Akahata Festival.

World War II was an act of aggression committed by the anti-communist military bloc made up of Japan, Germany and Italy, but long before that war broke out, Japan was already engaged in a war of aggression in China, which acted as a trigger for World War II. Japan's role was part of the final episode at the close of World War II, which ended on August 15, 1945. A great many lessons are to be learned from these events.

The first lesson is that no recurrence of militarism, despotism and fascism must be allowed; it was this that extended the World War II of Japan, Germany and Italy to all parts of the world. This lesson is fundamental to the present, because of the danger of the revival of Japanese-style fascism, seen in the government's attempt to enact a political party law and a state secrets protection law.

Secondly, we must not condone aggression by imperialism and hegemonism against other nations. We have seen aggressions committed against Vietnam, Afghanistan, Grenada and other countries since the end of war, much to our sorrow and it

is going on again in Nicaragua. The United States has imposed an economic blockade on Nicaragua, with the result that US imperialism was increasingly isolated. It was denounced by all the 101 non-aligned countries, and fierce opposition has been aroused within the United States itself. When the Bonn Summit adopted the Political Declaration in support of freedom and democracy, Japanese Foreign Minister Abe expressed "understanding" of the US economic blockade, although it is an open violation of the elementary principle of national self-determination and democracy. The action offers very clear evidence of the hypocritical and deceptive nature of the Political Declaration on freedom and democracy.

In the third place, we must never allow the domination of military blocs to be restored, because it was the aggressive military alliance of Japan, Germany and Italy that led the world into World War II. It was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that took the initiative in the creation of military alliances after the war, followed by formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to act as a counter to NATO. A decision was made only the other day to extend the term of the Warsaw pact for another 20 years, conditioned on NATO also being maintained. The principle of collective security, which is set out in the United Nations Charter, is quite different from these rivaling military alliances. So a continued effort must be made to arouse public opinion here and abroad to demand dissolution of such military blocs.

The conservative forces argue that the Japan-US military alliance has been responsible for Japan not being involved in war since the end of the Second World War. But the truth is the opposite of this. In the US war of aggression in Vietnam, ended just ten years ago, Japan was made into the major forward base for that aggression, a very large-scale war using 2.6 times as many shells and bombs as those used in World

War II.

On the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

The most important task before us since the end of World War II relates to nuclear weapons. Just before the end of World War II, atomic bombs were used on Japan by the United States, leaving an indelible stain. There were only three nuclear weapons then, but now there are as many as 50,000, with total destructive power one million times more than the atomic bomb used to destroy Hiroshima. In the 9th Plenum, I said that the elimination of nuclear weapons is the way to end the nuclear arms race, and should be made a slogan of international solidarity. I also announced then that we had a plan to hold a summit meeting and sign a joint statement between the JCP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a plan that was realized before the meeting of this Plenum; the significance of the Joint Statement has been made clear on various occasions. Many opinions have been expressed here and abroad, evaluating it as an epoch-making event. On the actual scene of world politics, the joint statement of the US-Soviet foreign ministerial conference stated that the elimination of nuclear weapons should be the goal of the US-Soviet nuclear disarmament talks, something without precedence.

But the present rise of obstructions to foil the efforts for the elimination of nuclear weapons must not be overlooked. These include not only the adverse current seen in official US remarks about postponing the task of elimination of nuclear weapons to some indefinite future, but also a current that deviates from the policy set out in the JCP-CPSU Joint Statement. One evidence of this is what appeared in the most recent World Peace Council meeting, which Akahata has criticized in

articles written by comrades who participated in the meeting.

SOME THEORETICAL QUESTIONS

There are many things I would like to deal with, but should confine myself to some political and theoretical problems. The first is the urgency of the need to eliminate nuclear weapons. "Urgency" does not mean here simply that the task is of vital importance. The essence of this lies in our commitment, that faced with various kinds of obstructions and difficulties, this task of elimination of nuclear weapons must be raised in every relevant meeting as an urgent political activity demanding top priority. This is the spirit of the JCP-CPSU Joint Statement. In other words, it is not enough to refer to the "vital importance" of this task, thus implying "urgency", but we must take every occasion to raise this question as a matter calling for urgent action.

All members of the Japanese Parliamentary Association for the Promotion of International Disarmament, who belong to various parties, agreed on the urgency of this issue, but in the deliberations on the question of elimination of nuclear weapons in the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, this urgency was ignored or its formulation was "recast". This is a very serious matter, and naturally the JCP refused to support it. The change was a grave error in that it actually disregarded and shelved the urgent need for the elimination of nuclear weapons, a striking contrast to the most significant characteristic of the US-Soviet talks, when the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons was set.

On the question of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Star Wars Plan, as it's called, JCP Diet members have taken every opportunity to question the Government. The United

States is proceeding with its plan for the SDI, while the buildup of its nuclear arsenal goes on undiminished, aiming to tilt the strategic balance in its favor. The Japanese Government has expressed "understanding" on this, arguing that it has moral justification. But if the United States is in earnest about wanting to reach an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, it does not need arms to down nuclear weapons, because such arms would be used only if nuclear war breaks out; so the SDI would all the more be unnecessary if nuclear arms are banned.

Some parts of the world peace movement still talk about the theory of "equilibrium" or "freeze". It is understandable in its way that the Soviet Union, a party to the US-Soviet talks, should propose that nuclear weapons should be frozen while talks are going on. But faced as we are now with the serious threat of nuclear war, it is absolutely wrong for the worldwide struggle for prevention of nuclear war and the elimination of nuclear weapons to adopt the goal of a freeze at the present level of nuclear weapons or to maintain the present equilibrium of forces.

In this connection, it was a grave mistake for the recent WPC meeting to make opposition to the SDI its central and urgent task, also putting forward many ideas for actual support of all the present actions of the Soviet Union relating them to its role in World War II.

In efforts to mobilize world public opinion, we must do our utmost to rally all people, irrespective of political, ideological or religious beliefs. As the JCP-CPSU Joint Statement says, the full merits of such an angle can be seen only when the great aim of prevention of nuclear war and elimination of nuclear weapons is made the goal in establishing an international united front. This would take the lesson of the anti-fascist united front during World War II and apply it to the present

situation. It goes without saying that the "Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki" is of great domestic and international value in this context.

In these new and complicated circumstances, exchanges of opinions in various ways have been going on between the JCP and the CPSU. In February and March, letters were exchanged between General Secretary Chernenko and myself, in which we discussed how to implement agreements reached in the JCP-CPSU Joint Statement. After General Secretary Gorbachev took office, we received a letter from the CPSU Central Committee, expressing the CPSU view about World War II, and on how to implement the Joint Statement of the parties, confirming the observance of the agreements. After careful examination of this letter, we sent a reply frankly conveying our views. In it we proposed that the two parties should hold a summit meeting or high-level regular talks in the near future, as provided by the Joint Statement.

Let me take up the relationship between the two major international tasks of the party: the elimination of nuclear weapons and protection of the right of nations to self-determination.

Certainly, the advancing anti-nuclear weapon struggle for achieving its goal is not in itself an anti-imperialist, anti-hegemonist struggle, but these two struggles are closely linked because the struggle against nuclear weapons will undermine the foundations of nuclear blackmail, and in this way contribute to the advance of the anti-imperialist struggle.

The anti-nuclear weapons movements of the world are divided in their opinion over such questions as Afghanistan, etc. This makes it necessary to distinguish in practice between the anti-nuclear weapons struggle and the anti-imperialist, anti-hegemonist struggle. An example of this is seen in the JCP-CPSU Joint Statement, which was careful to avoid causing any confusion in the anti-nuclear weapons front.

Another current task, a focal point of international solidarity, is to support the Nicaraguan people in their struggle against various forms of US imperialist intervention, and to strengthen international cooperation for this. A JCP delegation led by Presidium Chairman Fuwa visited Nicaragua and expressed solidarity in action, and in our recent Akahata Festival, emphasis was placed on the Nicaragua issue.

Relationship between these Two Tasks in Japan

How should these two tasks be linked in the Japanese context? Japan is under the US nuclear umbrella, based on the Japan-US military alliance, which faces us with the danger of Japan being turned into a nuclear battlefield. It was therefore perfectly natural for the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement, at last year's World Conference Against A and H Bombs, to adopt the "Tokyo Declaration", drawing attention to the dangerous character of the Japan-US military alliance, stating explicitly that prevention of nuclear war and a total ban on nuclear weapons is the most crucial and urgent task, on which the very survival of the entire human community depends.

We can be sure that if the Three Non-nuclear Principles are conscientiously implemented it will be a heavy blow to the Nakasone Cabinet, which actually permits the principles to be infringed. This is readily understood from the initiative of Kobe City in refusing portcalls of any nuclear-armed US warship, a decision that had such a great international impact that it has been followed by the Governments of New Zealand and Iceland.

At the same time, it shows also that to obtain support from even those who are not critical of the Japan-US military alliance, and to establish the widest possible united front aimed

at preventing nuclear war and eliminating nuclear weapons are both possible and necessary.

To establish the widest possible united front, centering around the question of nuclear weapons, grasping correctly the relationship between these two tasks, and to raise the issue of the danger of Japan being turned into a nuclear battlefield because of the United States nuclear umbrella, are important questions to be grasped by all advanced peace activists.

ON RELATIONS BETWEEN JCP AND CPC

I want to take up the question of relations between the JCP and the Communist Party of China, on which Akahata of April 17 published an article entitled "What Hinders Restoration of Relations between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China?" This article was published because in March the CPC has listed the JCP as one of the parties with which it hoped to restore relations based on the four principles of "independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs", about which many people from various circles asked us questions. The article set out to answer such questions. Articles published in the past, as well as our April 17 article, dealt with the historical process and fundamental features of relations of the two parties, so I want to make only some supplementary comments.

The four principles cited by the CPC are good. But in order for these four principles to be truly honored by being observed, and for the severed relations between the two parties to be restored, certain distinctions must be made in line with the four principles. This is our position. It is possible that the Japan Council against A and H Bombs (Gensuikyo) may participate in a peace meeting in China in certain circumstances. Though this may be possible for the peace movement, it is impossible to extend it to the two parties so that relations can be resumed without certain distinctions being made.

Of course, as the JCP-CPSU Joint Statement shows, two parties can reach agreement on important tasks and cooperate with each other even when there are serious opinion differences between them. In the case of relations between the JCP and the CPSU, however, this resumption of cooperation was preceded by an admission by the CPSU of errors made, and the restoration and maintenance of the relations between the two parties resulted, long severed because of the Shiga problem. Since then, in spite of various differences of opinion, an agreement has been reached on the important nuclear issue. No such relations exist between the JCP and the CPC, which are still apart, so it is impossible for relations between the JCP and the CPC to go the same way as between the JCP and the CPSU.

Briefly I will mention some differences between JCP-CPC relations and the CPC and European communist parties. In the CPC-CPSU disputes, most of the European communist parties criticized the CPC and sided with the CPSU, which determined the subsequent relations between the CPC and the communist parties of Europe. But in our case we maintained autonomy toward both the CPC and the CPSU in bilateral disputes, indicating an important difference between the attitudes of the JCP and European communist parties. The truth of the matter is not to be found by agruing that the JCP should follow the way of European communist parties in restoring relations with the CPC, merely saying "let bygones be bygones".

During the days of the "Great Cultural Revolution" in China, the JCP leadership rejected the "anti-US, anti-Soviet united front" concept of the CPC, and refused to wage a Chinese-style armed struggle within Japan. Making these the pretext, not

only did the CPC openly attack the JCP leadership, calling it "opportunist" or "revisionist", but also, using the slogan, "There is reason for rebellion", it encouraged anti-JCP factional elements to unite and organize to try to overthrow the leadership of the JCP. It is clear that these factors led to the severance of relations between the two parties. It was necessary for the JCP to counter the CPC attacks to defend the independence of the Japanese revolutionary movement and the party; the JCP expelled from the party those who were working with the CPC as agents of hegemonist interference. During that period, we pointed out that the "Great Cultural Revolution", the underlying cause of the CPC attack on the JCP, had little in common with communism, which has proved to be true in the subsequent developments of history.

After many twists and turns, the present CPC leadership has had to admit that the "Great Cultural Revolution" was fundamentally wrong, as well as the external activities of the CPC during that period, admitting in general terms that it had committed the error of interference in the internal affairs of other parties. CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang said:

> "We also had shortcomings and mistakes...especially in judging and assessing the right and wrong of other parties in the light of our own experience and practice, which caused detrimental consequences to certain parties."

So, as viewed by communists, there appear to be no difficulties in principle for correction of past errors to allow the two parties to restore relations. On our part, we will not go as far as to urge the CPC to make clear who was responsible for the CPC's hegemonist interference in the internal affairs of the JCP from the time of the "Great Cultural Revolution".

The April 17 Akahata article made another important point which relates to the remnants of the hegemonist interference, the anti-JCP elements or anti-JCP groups, something which we regard as no small obstacle to restoring the relations of the two parties. The article I refer to dealt with the hegemonist argument in support of "parallel parties", which would allow relations to be maintained with the communist party of another country while still keeping relations with anti-party elements and groups in that country. The article pointed out that such a theory can never be considered to be compatible in the world communist movement with the norms governing relations between communist parties. A case in point is the Okuma clique that calls itself "Japanese Party of Labor". Claiming that it is "officially recognized" by the CPC, this group, a carry-over from the CPC interference in the internal affairs of the JCP, desperately attacks the JCP with its absurd claims.

The "parallel parties" argument can have nothing in common with communism; it is only an expedient for rationalizing hegemonism. To approve this theory would be to accept the pressure of the hegemonists. It is perfectly plain to the eyes of a party founded on communist principles, that to support a "parallel parties" argument is quite incompatible with the relations that should exist between communist parties. It is certainly not necessary to spend many words to say why.

However future relations between the JCP and the CPC may develop, we will continue to treat the anti-JCP elements and groups as remnants of hegemonism, recognizing them as very harmful to the revolutionary movement in Japan. It is still more important for us to place the emphasis on our own efforts to exclude such foreign-party followers, individuals and groups, as well as anti-revolutionary elements, etc. from the revolutionary movement of Japan, whatever the future relations between the two parties may be.

Let me add a few words before concluding on this question. If the JCP and the CPC follow the principles for normalizing relations, needless to say it will not mean their entering into

relations that allow the existence of "parallel parties". If they share this understanding I believe it will not be difficult for concrete measures to be taken to settle this matter.

It would be logical that founded on communism and acting on principle, a party can be expected to take principled action of its own will before it has to be urged to take such action. I would add that such a principled settlement of the matter will heighten the prestige and trust of the two parties, the JCP and the CPC, and prove to be a valuable example in international relations. But if we were to take an indecisive attitude toward this question, it would arouse doubts as to our communist position on principles, damaging to our own prestige. This is why I have taken the opportunity of this important plenary session of the Central Committee to set out the JCP position on this issue.

POLITICAL SITUATION AS ANALYZED BY 9TH PLENUM AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

I will next make some references to the domestic situation in relation to the analysis made by the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee, and subsequent developments.

The instability of the Nakasone Government as pointed out by the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee has been fully shown by subsequent moves, such as the backing of Nikaido for the premiership and the present situation of the Tanaka faction. Setting the task of overthrowing the Nakasone Cabinet and establishing a non-nuclear government, which we proposed at the 9th Plenum, has been clearly justified by such pro-nuclear actions taken subsequently by the Nakasone Cabinet as pro-US subservient moves: the striking increases in the military budget and approval of joint exercises with nuclear-bearing US warships.

During this period, developments of four political parties: the LDP, the SPJ, Komeito and the DSP, judging from their attitudes in congresses, have exhibited common characteristics marking a major step in the rightist orientation of Japanese politics in general.

The LDP says it is going to revise its political program. Prime Minister Nakasone is said to be counting heavily on this, a response to the "general settlement of postwar politics" that he advocates.

The anti-communist opposition parties made their positions clear in their respective congresses, ambitious to become new ruling parties. Komeito, in its congress, openly declared that it will certainly take the new opportunity to be a part of a coalition government, implying of course, with the LDP. The DSP has established an Action Program Committee to draft new political goals. The SPJ also set up a committee to study basic party questions relating to its party program, and so on. All are oriented to rightist revision of existing programmatic documents.

We must note especially that rightist-orientation was a common feature of the proposals at their respective congresses. One of the lessons of World War II is that the nation would eventually repeat such an error of prewar politics as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, if the present trend continues. As the only party to have consistently opposed such prewar politics, the JCP has the responsibility to clearly point out this possible danger.

Pursuit of Coalition with the LDP——Biggest Obstacle to Unity

In view of these developments among political parties of

Japan, we must show clearly what is the biggest obstacle to unity in the various movements in Japan. With regard to the question of unity in the movement against A & H bombs, criticisms have been made that the Japan Council against A & H Bombs (Gensuikyo) has put up with difficulties, blaming the JCP for its responsibility. Judging from the actual situation in the movement against A & H bombs and after analyzing the various currents, it is very clear that "pursuit of coalition" with LDP politics, advocated by the SPJ and General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) represents by far the biggest obstacle to unity for genuine progress and peace.

Similar developments in the Diet in terms of nuclear issues have been mentioned. Various currents have been introduced as anti-nuclear, calling for unity to be based exclusively on the elimination of nuclear weapons, which may seem somewhat reasonable at first glance. But the elimination of nuclear weapons they advocate turns out to be an argument for the elimination of nuclear weapons to be achieved at some indefinite future, with no sense of urgency. In this context, even Prime Minister Nakasone of the LDP says that nuclear weapons, "doomed with fatalism" according to him, would "eventually" be abolished. It shows that such currents can be equated with the LDP line, easily to be made into a government-sponsored campaign ostensibly against A & H bombs.

It must not be overlooked that within these developments, a certain mood is prevailing in which association with the LDP at day-to-day and political level appears to be nothing strange; we see trade union leaders (except those belonging to the Conference of Trade Unions for Promotion of a United Front (CTU-UF) playing golf with cabinet ministers or receiving the Labor Minister as a guest speaker in a May Day rally.

But such maneuvers can not always go smoothly. At the

Congresses of the SPJ and the DSP, there was a sharp contradiction between concerns and expectations of supporters and conscientious activists at local and branch levels on one hand, and such currents of leaders that have been increasingly inclined to the right in party management on the other. One of our important tasks is to make proper criticism of such orientation in the leadership; but we also need to pay close attention to the contradictions. At the bottom of Japanese politics there is always a serious contradiction between subordination to the United States and the genuine security of the people. For this reason we must be firmly convinced that we can raise the consciousness of good-willed supporters of such anti-communist opposition by a resolute struggle based on the true demands of the people.

At the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee, the party put special stress on the question of the people's living, and in the present circumstances we must remember, in the light of the lessons of World War II, that peace, human rights and defense of living are inseparable. If militarism becomes rampant, with infringements upon people's rights prevailing, and maneuvers to pass another Public Order Maintenance Law becoming insistant, arguments for defense of the people's living will be repressed without fail. The people of Japan are now living in anxiety accumulated under the shadow of many problems concerning wages, working hours, health insurance, pensions, taxes, public utility charges and so on; this is why the day-to-day struggle in defense of living is so important. We need to take a close look at problems of the people's day-to-day living and devote ourselves to defending and improving their lives, even while paying attention to the issue of international peace.

In relation to day-to-day activities of the JCP, the number of living consultation posts has reached the highest record of 15,397, with an increase of some 300 since the 9th Central Committee Plenum. The number of cases of consultation since the 9th Plenum is approximately 420,000, an increase of 33,000 on the corresponding period of the previous year. The figure amounts to 704,000 since the time of the 7th Plenum.

This situation clearly tells us that the party can be assured of making advances when the party, upholding the banner it has never hauled down, goes on this way. We need always to hold the clear conviction that the future lies with the National Progressive Unity Forum, now representing 4.15 million people.

I would like to add that, compared with prewar days when in spite of being imprisoned we were convinced that the despotic rule would certainly be overthrown, today's Japan offers far more positive factors that confirm that the future moves in the direction of genuine progress.

Dual Anti-Social Character of Soka Gakkai

Recently the civil court handed down a judgment on Soka Gakkai for its wiretapping crime. Many people were both astonished and indignant about it. At the end of last year, the JCP-Soka Gakkai Agreement was abrogated, an agreement that in spite of its valuable substance was repeatedly debased and made a dead letter by the insincere attitude of Soka Gakkai and Komeito, which began immediately after it was announced. At the 9th Plenum I said that to be faithful to history means that a dead letter should be buried, and we must point out in connection with the wiretapping case that Soka Gakkai, while publicly talking of morals, has been shown to have been repeatedly engaged in many anti-social actions, and has proved to be a dirty, shady, conspiratorial and hypocritical anti-social group.

Then to add to that, the organization, taking a threatening attitude after the truth became known, is trying to persuade its believers and supporters that it is a case of religious persecution and demagoguery. In this sense the character of the organization is doubly anti-social, the group acting as "fixer" in the reactionary reorientation of Japanese politics.

In that wiretapping case, I myself as the immediate victim filed the suit; it was not an incident that should be put aside as merely a temporary episode, but should be given serious consideration as evidence that justice has long arms, a fitting conclusion to the process of relations between the Japanese Communist Party and other parties, including Komeito.

Adverse Currents to Independent Development of Japan Typified in Okuma and Shiga Cliques

In relation to these political forces, references should be made again to the so-called Okuma and Shiga cliques, which I mentioned earlier. These elements claim to be spokesmen of the communist party of a specific country, the Shiga clique for the CPSU and the Okuma clique for the CPC. It is what they themselves claim, because it is quite another matter whether or not they can objectively act as spokesmen for the respective parties. They themselves are quite impotent, but the forces they speak for are powerful.

What they insist on is incoherent and unworthy. Before a meeting was held between the heads of the JCP and the CPSU, the Shiga clique unconcernedly said that the JCP confuses a "pistol" carried by "burglar" with one carried by a "policeman"; nuclear weapons possessed by the Soviet Union are the equivalent of a pistol carried by a policeman; that the JCP wholly lacks the class position in claiming that the weapon should be given up by both. The subjectivism of the clique clearly amounts to mental instability, because they think that their doctrine is sound and warrantable: the Soviet Union is

rightly possessing nuclear weapons while the United States alone should give them up.

The Okuma clique is indoctrinated in a different way. According to them, the JCP is to be blamed for joining hands with one of the nuclear superpowers; an alliance with non-nuclear weapons states or governments or even with middle-nuclear weapons states may be permitted, but an alliance with a nuclear superpower like the Soviet Union should be condemned. Such a doctrine is quite absurd of course. The worth of the JCP-CPSU Joint Statement is seen in the fact that the two parties, one of which is in power in a nuclear weapons state ranking with the United States, have declared that nuclear weapons must be outlawed, and clearly set out the course to abolish them. In terms of world politics, this carries great weight, compared with the desire expressed by the communist parties of some states that have no direct responsibility for abolishing nuclear weapons, in the hope that the nuclear weapons states will abolish such weapons. What I have said will show in broad terms the level of reasoning of such cliques.

Nevertheless the JCP seems to have been somewhat too tolerant and indifferent to these cliques, regarding them as merely insignificant. Their organ papers, however, repeatedly charge that the JCP is wrong and is disrupting political unity in Japan. So I have to emphasize here that it continues to be important that we expose the outstanding posture of these cliques; though their power is negligible, they distinctly typify the shameless adverse currents to the independent development of Japan.

PROPOSAL FOR PARTY EXPANSION CENTERING AROUND ORGAN PAPER

Let me talk about the question of party building. This time we have divided our report; I report on the international situation, which I have done, and some other issues that follow, and Chairman Fuwa will talk about party building and related questions, so this question will be presented in detail in the Presidium report.

Since the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee, activities of the party have advanced in various fields. Because the Central Committee stressed the need to carry out our tasks 100 percent, the education of new party members has been done almost 100 percent and 94 percent of party branches have discussed the resolutions of the 9th Plenum. Progress has been made also in stationing staff full-time at offices of district committees which are not strong. The extra issues of Akahata were frequently distributed 100 percent. As a major achievement, more than half of all party members have read well the long documents adopted by the 9th Plenum and understand policies and theories of the party deeply. This was stressed in the National Meeting of Prefectural and District Committee Chairpersons held in January; by that time some 20 percent of party members had read the documents, and by late March this had risen to some 60 percent.

We learned a lessons from the reason why only some 20 percent of members had read the documents. It was partly because the Central Committee had not made it obligatory for every party member to read all documents, so as to ease the burden on ordinary party members who have the duty to read all adopted documents. Corrections have been made on this point in the new version of "Guide for Party Branch Activities". This is a lesson for the Party Center to learn.

One of the basic problems of party building, revealed in the campaign calling for reading all documents, was that we have relied only on the active members who participate in meetings discussing the tasks we face, and that we lack comradely care and cooperation for those who cannot be fully active for personal reasons. Because of this, in the process of time, even the addresses of some party members have been lost in various districts and branches. This is bureaucracy at its worst. In the National Meeting of Prefectural and District Committee Chairpersons I said "We will make our party full of vigor with intellectual consciousness, comradely love and solidarity", and it is really necessary to do this.

As to the party organ-paper question, this Plenum will propose a big campaign of party expansion centering around the party paper. By the end of July, when the anniversary of the foundation of the JCP comes, we will advance as near as possible to the planned aim of 4 million subscribers. A lot of party organizations have decided to surpass before the end of May the level reached at the last Congress; we should realize this soon and come as close as possible to that figure of 4 million subscribers.

This was already proposed in the policy of the Presidium in April, and has been repeatedly stressed on several occasions in May, in the greetings and address of the Akahata Festival, for example. We have already made progress. At present it is important not to limit our activity for a few days for reading the documents of this Plenum, putting off the task.

Relationship between Reading to which Top Priority Is Given, and Party Expansion

Formerly, top priority had been given to reading the adopted documents so that we could break the long prevalent tendency of not reading party decisions, so that we could dash ahead in our tasks. This was not only significant but even necessary. But now more than 60 percent of members have read the documents. We are not satisfied with this figure, but at least it is a majority.

After this meeting, the adopted documents of the 10th Plenum of course should be read one after another. At the same time, activities to increase subscriptions for the organ paper, activity which began to advance from April, should not be left uncompleted. All party organizations and members must be fully informed of the critical situation of the paper and use maximum energy. We have the experience of having increased the readership by hundreds of thousands in two months by organizing campaign months, and now we must complete this task. It is necessary to tackle it with determination, realizing that failure would lead to defeat in the next national and other elections.

As regards reading the documents, it is still true that top priority should be given to their reading at any time and in any case. But without taking such a step-by-step position, such as for example, that reading should be concentrated into the first two weeks, practice and reading should go together. We will prepare such documents at this plenum that is suitable for this.

Ten Million Copies of Pamphlets Ordered Since the 9th Plenum

Since the Ninth Plenum, 9.38 million, almost 10 million copies of pamphlets have been ordered, which is quite outstanding. Some members of local assemblies are still inactive, and we should have all of them take this up.

Let Us Build a Party of Half a Million Members with Intellectual Consciousness, Comradely Love and Solidarity Both in Numbers and Substance

In establishing party life, all party branches and subbranches must not fail to bring in more than one new member by the end of July. It is important to gather new members from among workers in workshops, the young generation, young workers and students, and the weight of the young generation in the party structure will increase. While we do our best to build both numerically and substantially a half-million party membership, which has long been said, it is necessary for us to attach importance to quality as well as numbers. We will appeal to those who are qualified to be party members, and carefully judge them, not just accepting anybody.

Among party issues, let me talk about salaries of the full-time staff of the party. The long-standing policy and decisions of the Central Committee are to increase the salaries of the staff who devote themselves to the party, enduring hardships without seeking riches or honor, to the level of civil service workers. But this has not been realized yet. Although our finances are limited, we would like to begin improvements at Central Committee level. It would be good if we could do it nationwide at once, but we are not able to do this yet. We hope that the improvement in salaries will also be made at local level, responding to the central level.

JCP CONGRESS TO BE HELD IN NOVEMBER

For the Party Congress, items on the agenda are amendments to the Party Program and Constitution, the Central Committee Report, the adoption of resolutions, and the election of the Central Committee. The Congress is scheduled to be held in the latter part of November, with the exact date expected to be fixed in this Plenum session, because it would be too much for another Plenum of the Central Committee to be held just to fix the date of the Congress.

The content of the forthcoming Congress is expected to be rich because the party has played a very important role in both international and domestic politics, and has gained a great amount of valuable lessons in every field of party activities. We plan to invite fraternal parties to attend the Congress.

TOWARD VICTORY IN THE METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY ELECTION

Finally, I must make some reference to the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in July. This is quite an important national task, as was emphasized at the Akahata Festival, and every day the issue is taken up by Akahata. It is clear that the Tokyo Prefectural Committee, taking this important situation into consideration, has to make great efforts to establish wide and deep ties with the people of the Metropolis. I think that the electoral situation is really encouraging, which is understandable when we compare the role of our party with other parties. On behalf of the whole Central Committee, let me express our earnest wish for a great advance, criticizing the metropolitan government of Governor Suzuki and his ruling parties, strengthening our party's activities and driving our policies home. Let us advance in this important and meaningful struggle, with the whole strength and support of the party concentrated on it. In concluding my introductory speech, I express the hope that when the Congress meets it will be with this victory won.

(*Akahata,* May 16, 1985)

SIXTY YEARS OF THE JCP AND THE FUTURE OUTLOOK

Address given at the Foreign
Correspondents' Club of Japan
on June 30, 1982

Thank you for inviting me to speak here again before members of the Club and the board of directors. As requested by the organizer, I will speak about the sixty-year history of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), but of course it would be difficult to cover sixty years in fifteen or twenty minutes. But I will give you a brief sketch of our party history.

Among the historical characteristics of the JCP, different from other political parties in Japan, the JCP is the only party to have worked for sixty years under the same name, the Communist Party. The reason is that during the war all other parties, including social democratic parties, decided to dissolve themselves and merge into the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai) at its inauguration as a fascist organization. The JCP, working underground, carried on a resolute struggle against the war of aggression and the Tenno system, and refused to capitulate. At the end of the war the JCP didn't have to change its name.

In sketching the history of these sixty years I will divide it into three parts.

Despotic Monarchal Rule and the Basic Demands

The first period goes from the founding of the party in 1922 through 1945, when the war ended. As everyone knows, at that time Japan was ruled by the absolutist despotic monarchy that deprived the people of democracy and freedom. Any political party that criticized the Tenno system or held a critical view of the capitalist system was the target of fierce repression and persecution under the Public Order Maintenance Law and other repressive laws and regulations.

The demands put forward by the JCP at its founding can be summarized under three categories:

(1) Abolition of the Tenno system; establishment of universal suffrage for all men and women above 18 years of age, with freedom of speech, meeting and association.

(2) Improvement from the slave-like, miserable living conditions of the people, with a policy of redistribution of farmlands among the peasants, and the demand for an eight- hour workday; a policy of defense of the working people from expropriation by monopoly capital and the landowners.

(3) Withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Japanese colonies of Korea and Taiwan, and from China, a semi-colony of Japan; total liberation of all these colonies and semi-colonies, and ending of all overseas aggression.

Some of these demands represent the fundamentals of the undaunted struggle of the JCP during the Second World War.

Of course JCP activities were harshly suppressed. At that time the people could learn about the JCP only from press reports on repression. A well-known intellectual once compared the JCP in those days to the Pole Star, meaning they were able to know where they were standing only when informed about the JCP.

Hundreds of thousands of people were rounded up and imprisoned during this period of repression, and about two thousand people died from torture and illnesses in prison, many of them JCP members.

Demands and Hardships under US Military Occupation—Our Lesson

The second period covers about a decade from 1945 when the total occupation of Japan began after Japan's defeat by the US forces. This was the only foreign military occupation in Japan's history, during which time Japan's ruling circles became the junior partner of the occupying forces.

When the Public Order Maintenance Law was revoked, the JCP for the first time was able to come out into the open. In a very short time, the party was able to build an organization with a membership of more than a hundred thousand, with more than 30 members in the Diet.

During this period, the party strove through the Diet to have a new constitution establish the principle that sovereignty is vested in the people, the principle advocated by us from the very beginning. Calling for the full implementation of the Potsdam Declaration and for peace with all countries, the party fought against the plans to turn Japan into a permanent US base.

Just before the Korean war, the US occupation forces expelled all leading members of the JCP from public office and banned the party's paper, forcing the organization into semi-illegal status.

More unfortunately, the party leadership failed to take unamimous action to meet the situation, with the result that the party split, and one of the groups made a very serious error that can be traced to the influence of Stalin and Mao Zedong, adopting ultra-left adventurist tactics and isolating the party even more from the masses.

But there was a group within the party that opposed ultra-left adventurism and the party split, to which group I belonged. Only after suffering enormous damage was the party able to establish conditions for convening a new congress, to restore party unity and rectify party policy.

One important lesson of that serious experience was that whatever the circumstance in which the party works it must take the independent way, refusing to be influenced by foreign communist parties and leaders. This was really a most important lesson for us.

Into a Mass Vanguard Party

The third period is from about the time of the 7th Congress in 1958, and the 8th Congress in 1961, when the Party Program was established, until now, a period of more than twenty years.

In these Congresses the party made a complete analysis of the errors I have mentioned and adopted a new political line. It was in the 7th Congress that I became General Secretary. During this period the party consolidated its political and organizational structure, and in the course of its development undertook a wide range of important activities as a mass vanguard party.

Put briefly, the fundamentals of the Party Program are to achieve the complete withdrawal of US forces from Japan; to free Japan from the rule of Japanese monopoly capital and conservative circles, tied in as they are in subordination to the United States, and build a new democratic Japan.

As the way to achieve this, we are striving to build a united front comprising the great majority of the Japanese people, and form a parliamentary majority with a view to changing Japanese political life by implementing parliamentary democracy.

In the present conditions of Japan our immediate aim is not, and could not be, to achieve a socialist revolution; instead we are endeavoring to establish a democratic Japan and pass on

from there to socialism when the people agree with it, a revolution in two stages.

The socialist image we have for Japan in the future is a very Japanese one, which respects utmost freedom and democracy.

We will never seek any model of socialism in any other country, a principle we adopted and set out in our "Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy" at the 13th Extraordinary Congress. In that same congress we decided to replace the terms "Marxism-Leninism" with "scientific socialism", and "the dictatorship of the proletariat" with "working-class power".

Turning to the foreign policy of the party, we called for an international anti-imperialist united front during the US war of aggression against Vietnam. I myself went to China to discuss this with Mao Zedong, and then with Kim Il Sung and Ho Chi Minh.

We have also strenuously opposed hegemonism within the communist movement of the world. We were confronted with outrageous interferences by the CPSU leadership under Khrushchov, and with the CPC leadership under Mao Zedong during the "Great Cultural Revolution", interferences that we rebuffed both theoretically and politically, with complete success.

In the present political situation of the world, we strongly express our disagreement when necessary, in opposition to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and our disapproval of Polish happenings.

The international information review, called "Problems of Peace and Socialism", has been turned virtually into another Cominform, so we are positively demanding its termination.

What I have said explains the main features of the party history, divided into three periods. There have been many twists and turns and ups and downs, but on the whole, withstanding severe trials, the JCP has been tempered politically and organizationally and able to achieve a major advance.

The JCP with only dozens, or at best some hundred members in those prewar early days, has become an organization of real influence both in Japan and internationally, with its membership now at some 470,000.

Present Stage Achieved by the JCP

Let me give you some figures to indicate the present stage of development of the party, compared with when the party first took the independent line with the establishment of the Party Program in the 8th Party Congress in 1961.

Readership of Akahata, the organ paper, has increased from some 300,000 at that time to over 3,000,000 now, the greatest achievement of this kind by any communist party in a capitalist country.

We had only six Diet members at the time of the 8th Party Congress; the figure is now 41. Votes cast for the party in the general election increased from 1,160,000, a mere three percent, to some 5,800,000, about ten percent. The number of party members in local assemblies has increased from 818 to 3,656. The number of progressive local governments in which the JCP participates, was 14, with a total population of 7,600,000 then, and now it is 202 with a population of some 34,000,000.

There have also been major changes in the world situation during these sixty years, evidenced by the membership of the United Nations, compared with the membership of the old League of Nations, as well as great changes in the composition of the member states.

Some Prospective Views

What shall I say about our vision of the future? It is a very complicated situation in Japan, as everyone recognizes, as is

also the international situation. Nevertheless we keep on fighting as a true party of progress, carrying on the traditions of the past sixty years.

Let me cite some examples from actual political life. First, the Diet passed a disarmament resolution prior to Prime Minister Suzuki's appearance in the UN General Assembly Special Session on disarmament. The draft of the resolution referred to the elimination of nuclear weapons, but with "ultimate" as a modifier, meaning that the elimination of nuclear weapons need not be an immediate task. The JCP therefore insisted that the word "ultimate" should be dropped, an amendment that was endorsed by other parties, making the elimination of nuclear weapons an immediate task.

Another example is the question of summoning before the Diet the so-called gray officials involved in the Lockheed payoff scandal. Our party claims that this can take place under the existing law, and if this is not done, the chance could be lost forever. Only the JCP pressed for this, but today's press reports say that the other opposition parties in the House of Councilors have now agreed to the summoning of the officials without amending the law. These facts show the principled and pioneer character of the JCP.

The task of building a progressive united front, which I explained within the context of our programmatic perspective, is confronted with a major obstacle, because the Socialist Party of Japan is persisting in an anti-communist plan for a new Government. But we are not sitting idle, just looking at the situation, but doing our utmost to mobilize the broadest possible forces seeking to bring about a political change by whatever possible means. There are now some 4,100,000 people involved in an organization set up to discuss and try to find a way to establish a united front.

There is a SPJ-Komeito agreement that excludes the JCP, but this is doomed to fail. Strategically, a progressive united front is sure to be formed in Japan, and we are confident that a democratic coalition government will be established.

Destiny of Socialism in the World

Finally, I want to say a few words about what I see is the destiny of socialism in the world.

Unhappily, our party is in dispute with some other communist parties, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But because of the very existence of the working class and the search for scientific socialism going on all over the world, present errors will surely be overcome by the very people who committed such errors. I firmly believe in the restorative power of communism.

In the long perspective of the history of humanity, the first socialist country is only of recent origin; in other words, socialism is still at the formative stage in world history, so it would be a fallacy to assert that socialism has no future just because of certain current errors.

In fact Yugoslavia is in the forefront of the movement of non-aligned countries which are striving for abolition of military blocs, a clear manifestation of its dedication to peace.

Another example is seen in the recent Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly. Whereas the United States rejected the proposal for an agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons, and even asserted its right to their first possible use, both China and the Soviet Union called for an agreement to ban their use, declaring that they would not be first to use such weapons. It would seem to be a minimum step for a socialist country to do this, but this is an affirmation of intent.

We are realists. We see the complexity of the world situation and the correlation of forces, but we are also scientific optimists. The sixty-year history of the JCP confirms our conviction.

That briefly outlines our party history. Thank you very much for your keen interest.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

Asian Business Magazine (Hong Kong): I was very interested in the description of the general program of the JCP. I notice that the JCP wants to eliminate monopoly capitalism. I simply want to know in concrete and practical terms what the JCP would do to deal with the economy.

The Party Program covers a considerable number of pages, so I have just touched on it very briefly. Our immediate policy is for monopoly capital to be brought under control. Achieving the real independence of Japan by the withdrawal of US forces, and exercising control over monopoly capital, would bring into our perspective the nationalization of monopoly corporations in certain circumstances. But as this stage of development is not for a socialist revolution, there will be no nationalization of capitalist corporations or their transformation into a socialist form.

Even before any such transformation, that is, at this present stage, Japan ranks second in economic strength in the capitalist world. If this economic power is used to serve the best interests of the Japanese people peacefully and democratically, it will resolve many problems, we argue. For example, the budget today provides for subsidies for the big corporations, which are gaining enormous profits. This could be stopped and the money spent on education and welfare. In dealing with this question, our policy puts forward specific steps that could be taken at once with the present economic strength of the country.

More specifically, at this time the Japanese Government is increasing military spending, which the Government insists should be free of budget restrains. Both in the Diet and among the people we are demanding that this policy should be reversed.

N.R.C. Handelsblad (Netherlands): I would like to ask you a historical question. Can you elucidate from the reasons why your party, taking an anti-fascist stand, supported the Hitler-Stalin pact? And can you recall for us the thought that went through your head at that time?

Unfortunately, at that time the JCP leadership was unable to operate because of the repression, so no party statement was issued in support of that agreement signed between Stalin and Hitler.

I was in prison at that time and could learn about it only from the prison newspaper.

But we are now engaged in a historical survey of the international politics of that time, and of today. Our party Chief of the Secretariat, Tetsuzo Fuwa recently wrote a book entitled "Stalin and Great-Power Chauvinism". The English translation of this is available in our English Bulletin for abroad, which we will distribute to those who are interested to read it. He has made a sharp analysis of the foreign policy of Stalin at that time, to show that Stalin's exploit should be seen in relation to the struggle to overthrow fascism in the anti-fascist war, but Stalin's aberration was a departure from the principle of socialism, as was evident in those days.

The German-Soviet pact is positively criticized in this book.

Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong): Do you think there is any realistic possibility that there can be a coalition government in Japan during the 1980s as long as you and the Socialist Party continue to fight and refuse to make peace?

It is difficult to say in what year it could be realized.

But I want to say this: The Japan Teachers Union (Nikkyoso) which is under the influence of the Socialist Party, formerly supported the Socialist plan for a future government according to the SPJ-Komeito agreement. But in its current congress the union changed its attitude and gave up support for the agreement. This shows how political contradictions are sharpening in Japan. I think if the Socialist Party tries to seek support among the working class, they will have to learn the wisdom of the French Socialist Party and decide to work for a progressive united front.

But this is also related to how quickly the JCP can build up its parliamentary strength, and in this we feel a great responsibility.

McGraw-Hill World News (USA): You have mentioned that the Japanese Communist Party is against the Soviet action in connection with Afghanistan and Poland. I am interested in your observation on the recent announcement made by Washington that the United States is expanding economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, which include the trans-Siberian pipeline and the Japanese-Russian Sakhalin off-shore development poroject.

We have already made our view clear on the Afghanistan issue and on the Polish question, but at the same time we criticize the Reagan Administration for taking measures to squeeze the Soviet Union, such as restricting international credit, as emphasized ever since the recent summit meeting, as this means reinforcing the cold war policy, and a hawkish policy resisted by allies of the United States.

Wall Street Journal (USA): I am interested in what your reaction is to the industrial espionage case of IBM Ltd. Are you more critical of the monopoly capitalists in the United States in resorting to "sting operation". or are you more critical of the monopoly capitalists of Japan?

We are critical of both.

The New York Times (USA): Could you tell us the Japanese Communist Party's policy with regard to Japan's defense issue? If you have your own defense program, would you give its outline?

Talking about the Self-Defense Forces, I have to say that the Japanese Constitution prohibits Japan possessing war potential. The SDF is clearly an enormous war potential, so it cannot be approved. The Japanese Government insists that the Japan-US military alliance is central to the security of Japan. But the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO as well as the Japan-US military alliance, deviate from the spirit of true collective security as laid down in the United Nations Charter. These military blocs are working only to reinforce themselves. That is why we call for dissolution of these military blocs altogether in international politics. Reagan talks about the possibility of limited nuclear war in Asia, and the US concept is that conventional armed attack could be repelled with nuclear weapons; this policy is supported by the Japanese Government. This means that the Japan-US military alliance could lead Japan into nuclear war. As these moves are clearly

obvious, we are opposing both military blocs and the nuclear arms race. We are opposed to the Japan-US military alliance.

What is the way to defend the security of Japan? We must take into account that the Constitution of Japan bans possession of war potential, as I have said, but the policy of the JCP states consistently that every nation has the right to self-defense. So in the future, when Japan takes the way we hope to see it take, we will abide by that principle, following a policy of neutrality, and at the same time working specifically on security from the standpoint of self-defense.

Japan is being called on to reinforce its armed forces on the score of the threat of the Soviet Union. But Soviet actions in Afghanistan and in relation to Poland are confined to those places, which it sees as its own sphere of influence. There are no grounds for saying that the Soviet Union is likely to attack Hokkaido. Years ago, Takeo Fukuda, then Prime Minister, was asked by our party about the possibility of being attacked at any point; he replied that such a possibility is "three times ten thosand to one". Ten thousand times by three means that such a possibility scarcely exists. I have had many discussions with the Soviet authorities, and I am sure that although they have made mistakes of policy relating to their sphere of influence, they will never cross the waters to attack Japan. I am convinced of this in every way.

United Press International (USA): As a political party, does the JCP ever anticipate gaining power through the ballot box? If yes, do you have a target date; say, ten years or twenty years?

It is difficult to say. But at some time in the future we surely will. Our firm conviction is that both the world situation and the Japanese situation will change greatly.

Fortune Magazine (USA): You said that there is no such thing as resignation in communism. Would you elaborate on that; is this a life-time job, or could you be fired?

I'd like to say a few words to let you know our principled position on personnel affairs. Central Committee officials are elected by the party congress. The Central Committee elected by the congress establishes the supreme leadership. So none of the JCP members prior to the congress can talk about the personnel question as a private matter, be he a leading member or even Presidium Chairman. Different from other parties, the JCP has no factions. No one in our party tries to canvass for a post. This can never happen in our party. The fact is that all Communist Party members have a natural determination to devote their whole lives to the development of the revolution, and will do their utmost to carry out assigned tasks. That's all I need say on this question.

Financial Times (Great Britain): Could you give us your analysis of what might happen to your main opposition party, the Liberal Democratic Party, if the former Prime Minister and now independent member of parliament is convicted in the Lockheed trial. Secondly, do you think that if your father had not gone bankrupt you might have gone on to become the Prime Minister of Japan under the LDP?

The possibility of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka being found guilty is very strong. In my view, if this happens, it will be a heavy blow and result in confusion in the LDP, since Tanaka is the chieftain of the largest faction of that party.

As regards the second question, I think I was lucky that I was brought up in circumstances in which I experienced poverty and bankruptcy. However, as communism or socialism is

a science, and in my boyhood I was very sensitive and fond of reading, if the circumstances of my private life had been different I would have read books on socialism and grown up as a socialist, standing firm on the principles of socialism. The conclusion would thus be that I would devote my whole life to it, and choose the way of the Communist Party.

(*Akahata,* July 3, 1982)

PATH OF THE JCP STRUGGLE AGAINST THE SECURITY TREATY

Address to Central Committee Staff at Party Headquarters, July 13, 1960

I

As you all know, the struggle against the Japan-US Security Treaty developed on a great historic scale. Now that it has ended, how are we to evaluate it basically? The goal, stopping the revision of the Security Treaty, was not reached, and the Japanese and US Governments have exchanged the notes of ratification. Seen from this angle, some would consider that the struggle failed; this is what the Trotskyites say, blaming the failure on the JCP and the National Council against the Security Treaty.

But although revision of the Treaty could not be prevented, the historic struggle has resulted in a great and positive advance, including overall progress and specific gains won through the struggle.

From the failure to achieve a full victory we must, of course, learn the lessons on weaknesses of the democratic forces and the present balance of power, to serve for the further development of our struggle. In general terms, we should consider that the struggle brought great gains, an encouragement for the people to go on to a new stage.

First, Kishi found it necessary to railroad the bill through for adoption and ratification of the treaty, in the absence of other parties from the Diet, who all boycotted the session, including even the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which had been a main supporter of Kishi's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with its majority of nearly two thirds of Diet seats. According to a public opinion survey carried out by a daily paper, the people who demanded Kishi's immediate resignation amounted to 70% of all pollees. This shows that the very process of revising the treaty was a rejection of its validity as an international agreement, causing uncertainty in the United States about maintaining its military bases in Japan, even though the treaty will become effective. At the same time, the overwhelming majority of Japan's democratic forces have declared with conviction that they cannot and will not recognize the treaty, and are moving into the next stage of the struggle. This is how it stands now. In this sense, our struggle has done serious damage to our enemies and the US-Japanese ruling circles, who were able to exchange formal ratification only under the worst conditions. What we have done is to deal a considerable blow to the Japan-US military alliance, including the forced withdrawal of the US spy plane U2 from Japan. We are now able to carry our struggle forward with firm confidence that we will be able to unite the majority of the people in opposing the Security Treaty and win a victory in this. This represents the first of our gains.

The second is, of course, that we stopped Eisenhower's visit to Japan. This representative figure of US imperialism, leading the forces of world reaction, because of the people's opposition to its subordinate ally, had to cancel his planned visit, to which he had adhered up to the last moment. This was a major diplomatic defeat for US imperialism, unprecedented in postwar diplomatic history, a great victory for the Japanese people.

The third gain is the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi, forced on him right after the exchange of the Security Treaty ratifications, rejecting his stubborn claim that the Security

Treaty was opposed by only a certain small minority of the people, and did not represent public opinion. Kishi's plan, shared by the ruling classes of Japan and the United States, was to celebrate in a national festive ceremony the exchange of ratifications of the Security Treaty in the presence of Eisenhower, with the prospect that Kishi would remain in power for a long time as top contributor to the alliance. But the situation now is that Kishi is a used-up and worn-out figure of the past, with his career in politics terminated by the people's counterattacks.

The fourth point is the withdrawal of the U2 plane, just announced. From a number of US air bases surrounding the Soviet Union, U2s had been carrying out a wide range of aggressive activities, and the Japanese people were the first to force US imperialism to withdraw a U2 from one of its bases.

With these four major gains, we should recognize that this struggle was not only a major victory for the Japanese people's struggle, but an achievement in the forefront of the world struggle against imperialism and for peace.

What was the driving force that won such a victory?

In the present election campaign, the Socialist Party of Japan (SPJ) is claiming that it was the SPJ that organized the struggle. And the DSP is claiming that it is the only party with clean hands. Some are emphasizing that only men of culture and students struggled earnestly.

But, as the decision of the 11th CC Plenum of the JCP said, these great gains can not be attributed to any particular political party or group; it was primarily a victory of the people's united front.

Although the SPJ still refuses to recognize that neither the National Council for Prevention of the Revision of the Security Treaty at central level, nor a joint struggle organization at local level is a united front, we consider it necessary under

present circumstances to confirm that indeed a kind of united front does exist, because over so long a period and on such a major political subject, joint actions have been carried out, and organizations for the joint actions were established by the SPJ, the JCP, the largest trade union in Japan, plus a number of other democratic organizations.

Of course, this is not the national democratic united front as defined by the JCP, which should set definite goals for the immediate future, including national independence, peace, democracy, and the defense of living, and be based on the will for complete ideological and political unity. Nor has the relationship between the SPJ and the JCP been established as a direct common front. Even during this joint struggle, the SPJ has even claimed that its reason for participation in the joint struggle is to compete with the JCP and overcome it. This shows that the joint struggle is still far from being consciously formed as a national democratic united front.

It would not be correct, however, to regard it as only a temporary organization for the campaign. While we are now seeking ways and means to develop such joint actions further, some forces prefer to say that such actions were temporary; they want no protracted joint actions or united front with the JCP. We consider that the results of these one and a half years show that it really was the big united front which achieved such a victory. We now should recognize the highest value of the energy that brought into being such a long sustained united front, and our most important task for the immediate future is to defend and develop this united front.

II

What is the role played by the JCP in the struggle against the Security Treaty, a struggle based on a united front?

The latest policy documents and comments released by the

Central Executive Committee of the SPJ criticize the JCP, saying that it has always wavered, and its call for an anti-US struggle for national independence is bankrupt. They make reference to various issues, including the recent funeral of Michiko Kamba.

Some intellectuals have said that all "progressive political parties" in Japan lack able leadership, and should restart and rebuild their leadership. The latest issue of the monthly magazine, "Sekai", carries a special feature on the Security Treaty question. Reporting on a round table discussion attended by some professors, it says that frequent remarks were made that after all, political parties are not to be trusted. This represents a trend that emphasizes their lack of confidence in existing democratic political parties, in their assessment of the struggle. Another argument is that a revolutionary situation existed at that time. Though he takes rather a different position, the writer, Sei Ito, in an article appearing in a daily, said, "If a clear revolutionary leader had succeeded in mobilizing the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, the twenty or thirty thousand police could have been overwhelmed and a revolution carried to success. That was the situation." Mr. Ito opposes the Security Treaty, and his comment was well-intended. Yoshimi Takeuchi, in a contribution to the monthly "Sekai", under the title "Major and Minor Events", said that he and his friends very often assessed the situation among themselves, and worked out various plans. All agreed that "the progress of the current situation should be defined as a revolution", he says.

We should positively evaluate the fact that some people who work mainly in the cultural field rose to take an active part in the political struggle, for the defense of democracy and opposition to the Security Treaty after May 19. There is need now correctly to develop action among such people, who form part

of the democratic forces. The significance of the latest struggle is that it centered on the question of the Security Treaty; but the enforced adoption of the Security Treaty was accompanied by attacks on democracy, to suppress the people's democratic rights, directed toward the revival of Japanese imperialism and militarism. The outrageous railroading of the treaty revision through the Diet by Kishi on May 19 was not by chance. As a result, from the nature of this struggle it is natural that, besides those who opposed the Security Treaty in itself, some people who are devoted to the defense of democracy joined struggle, indicating a positive trend in the movement. We should not be surprised that such people have their own particular views. But if the erroneous idea that we are now in a revolutionary situation is spread by some of the intellectuals, and that the failure to achieve a victory for a revolution was due to opportunism on the part of the JCP and others concerned, this will do great harm to the development of unity in future struggles. It is an essential responsibility of a vanguard party to make proper criticism of such a view.

What then has been the policy of the JCP, and what are its fruits?

At the 6th CC Plenum of the party, we set out in considerable detail our policy and outlook on revision of the treaty. It was emphasized that the treaty was revised in conjunction with the US imperialist world policy of aggression involving the domination of Japan, turning it into a base for nuclear war, and making certain that Japan will remain in subordination to the United States, to be used in the same way as it does with West Germany. In this connection, it was pointed out that Japanese monopoly capital, by subordinating itself to US policy, is seeking greater profits and overseas expansion, while imperialism and militarism are being revived in Japan. In this context, the Plenum emphasized the struggle against the rationalization policy of Japanese monopoly capital, and recommended specific tactics to be adopted: to use the present relation of forces to the maximum in multiple ways; strikes, demonstrations, meetings, petitions and signature collections, the aim being to create a situation that opens the way to a general strike. In the course of this, we should clearly expose our two enemies, rejecting the sectarian right-wing splitting moves, that will try to turn such a united front into a tool of the SPJ, and at the same time fighting the plots of the Trotskyites to disrupt united actions by the use of their "leftist" phraseology. In this way we will enhance the unity of people in various ways with flexibility, and to the maximum. These were the lines set out by the 6th Plenum as principles for tactical guidance in the mass struggles.

The whole development of the struggle up to the most recent days proved how correct this was, showing that the party's role was a pioneering one in these tactical guidelines. For example, in petitioning the Diet, it was proposed that each voter should visit the Diet personally, not just sending representatives. This JCP proposal was adopted on April 26 unanimously by representatives of democratic organizations and their joint struggle bodies, after much discussion. At that time the only practical tactic put forward to gain access to the Diet was like what was seen in the 8th Joint Action on November 27. People went to the Chapel Center (a few hundred meters from the Diet building), where they came face to face with the police, and were either forcibly taken away one by one by the police or broke through the police picket line, climbed over their trucks and scuffled with them. In other words, the aim was to assemble in front of the Diet, come face to face with the police, demonstrate their power with the intention of breaking through the lines to get into the Diet. No other specific plan was proposed to enable the people to get access to the Diet building.

Talking of demonstrations, it was established practice up till then for democratic organizations to get together at any appropriate place and parade along the streets as far as Dobashi (near Shimbashi railway station), or before the National Railway Trade Union Headquarters (near Tokyo railway station). By reason of its purpose, a march should be planned to go in front of the particular target which is the object of the protest. This is why the JCP, following a meeting by the party, planned the march for the first time to pass immediately beside the US Embassy and before Prime Minister Kishi's official residence and the Diet building, up to the headquarters of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. The party received official permission for the march to take this course, which had never been used by any other organization during the ten and more years after the war. By its own independent action, the JCP showed how to direct a march before the target of struggle. This opened the way to the April 26 action, a mass parade organized for the first time to the Diet building for presenting a petition, an unobstructed march of more than one hundred thousand participants.

Until then it had been difficult to obtain the right to reach the Diet building, but as the situation developed, a way was opened for tens and hundreds of thousands of people to approach the Diet building in a demonstration, and carry on the action without restriction in the vicinity of the Diet building. This shows the leading role played by the JCP, in terms of tactics employed.

Another question was the calling of general strike. A general strike, though often referred to in one way or another, was scarcely considered possible for Japanese trade unions to put into practice. The JCP position was as follows: ideally, a general strike should of course be a sustained one, continuing untill demands are met; but this idea would be out of the question under current Japanese conditions, the JCP not having established leadership in the labor movement. In spite of this tremendous handicap, we have long been proposing in Akahata and on other occasions that a general strike should be organized even if only of short duration, striving energetically to achieve its aims. On the night of May 19, when ratification of the treaty was outrageously railroaded through the Diet, we were holding a Presidium meeting where two points were decided: (1) As the people's energy can not be brought into full play without a general strike of workers, contacts should be made at once through that same night to take the steps necessary for a general strike; and (2) a campaign of signature collection should be organized to involve the majority of the Japanese people, and to rally the broadest range of the people in accord with the advanced struggle of the working class. This policy was later adopted in the trade-union movement and by the National Council against the Security Treaty. On the question of duration of the strike, the JCP of course wanted it to go on as long as possible; in the case of the National Railways strike on June 4, for instance, the JCP tried hard but in vain to extend it till 8:00 a.m. Although the strike did not reach the level we had hoped, we strove to make it a success; it was the first time in Japanese history for railway traffic to be suspended to such an extent.

On May 15, a second general strike was held. Originally it had been scheduled for May 17, which through Akahata we said was too late and proposed May 15. In the Sohyo Congress held at Omuta, a JCP representative expressed the same view, and fortunately May 15 was accepted. The third general strike on June 22 was held on the initiative of the JCP which had proposed that it should be organized on or around June 18, or at the latest, during the expected visit of Eisenhower. It is true that the three nationwide general strikes be attributed to the

efforts of Sohyo and other trade unions which had actively participated in the struggle against the Security Treaty, but it is no exaggeration to say that the JCP played a positive role through its consistent political and organizational efforts to create an atmosphere for calling such general strikes.

The JCP proposed to the National Council a campaign for the collection of signatures, originally in the form of two petitions, one to the US and Japanese Governments, and one to the Diet.

The latter was adopted by the National Council, and it proved to be a most successful new creative move that would link the Diet to the people outside it in a massive way.

The JCP also proposed a struggle against Eisenhower's planned visit to Japan. An Akahata editorial at the beginning of March proposed opposition to the planned visits of Eisenhower and Adenauer to Japan. Our proposal was in no sense made after Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union has been cancelled due to the U2 incident, which had clearly revealed US imperialism's aggressive plans. Well before the U2 incident we proposed that Eisenhower's visit to Japan should be opposed because he was coming as the top representative of the US Government, promoting the Japan-US military alliance and increasing international tension, even though his visit to the Soviet Union on invitation was acceptable as representing friendship between the two countries. At that time, among the democratic forces in general, there were some people who alleged that they were not in a position to oppose Eisenhower's visit to Japan, coming as he was on his way back from the Soviet Union. Even the so-called leftists of the SPJ did not question his proposed visit.

Only the JCP challenged it specifically. Why did we do this? Because there was no change in the essential character of US imperialism and its policy of aggression and war, even if

Eisenhower was to hold talks with that socialist country. The essential character of US imperialism does not change, the U2 incident notwithstanding; Eisenhower's coming to Japan was to promote the ratification of the revised Security Treaty; in other words, to promote the military alliance for domination of the Japanese people and to support wars of aggression. From the people's point of view, he was the enemy of both peace and the Japanese nation. This is why opposition to the Eisenhower's visit was the JCP position from the beginning.

The aggressive plans of the United States were exposed to the eyes of all people by the fortuitous U2 incident, and at the same time the May 19 event revealed Kishi's intention of staying in office with Eisenhower's support. This series of objective lessons made those who had been passive on this issue realize that they would definitely be left behind unless they joined the opposition. The SPJ thus swung into line, and then the National Council at its national rally on May 21 also adopted a resolution opposing Eisenhower's coming to Japan.

As these events showed, our party was playing an important pioneering role.

III

We could list many other examples. In terms of how actions should be promoted, not only has our line been proved generally correct, but we have also from time to time proposed certain specific tactics to be used by the joint action organization, which was still a combined team, though temporarily. In this way the party strove to implement such tactics as would contribute to the progress of the joint struggle of democratic forces as a whole.

What we were most concerned about was to see that the united actions and the united front should follow neither of two currents; viz. the dangerous sectarian attempts aimed at

discrimination against the JCP in the National Council, allowing this body to be brought under the control of the SPJ, making it a mere nominal body lacking in substance, and the dangerous provocative policy always introduced by the Trotskyites, whose aim was to destroy the movement on the way; we had to overcome the danger of it being totally crushed.

I will take up the question of the Trotskyites later. No real concept of a united front has yet been established in Japan among the democratic forces. As regards the present situation, no scientific understanding has been reached as to whether the situation in recent days was really a revolutionary one or just a government crisis; what was the state of the balance of power that involved us all, or what the enemies were relying on. This is the reason for the wavering of the SPJ. For instance, after the 8th Joint Action, the SPJ proposed that Zengakuren be immediately expelled from the National Council; but then, on the contrary, after the June 15 incident, with rising public sympathy for the victims, the same party began playing up to Zengakuren. Many trade unions, of course, have no firm principled scientific standpoint to enable them to properly assess the situation and line. Within the joint struggle organization of Tokyo, there are those who sympathize with the Trotskyites. Some youth organizations, such as the Socialist Youth League, frequently followed the same policy as the Trotskyites. In these circumstances, some people of culture took a position similar to the Trotskyites, praising Zengakuren as the only group fighting, and condemning all others, including the JCP, as opportunist. This calls for consistent, systematic efforts to be made in mass actions in so far as the balance of power permits, to save the masses from suffering fatal blows that could lead the movement to prolonged devastation.

I have referred to four results from the latest movement, which can be considered positive. This presupposes that, after waging a struggle on such a big scale, the major part of the democratic forces could maintain their strength without loss. It often happens that although a heavy blow is delivered against the enemy, we also suffer a crushing defeat, requiring two or three years to recover from such a blow. This is not so in the present case. We achieved the results I have mentioned, while maintaining the strength gathered in the process.

It is true that the enemies are charging us with responsibility for the general strikes. Attacks are being made on us for the Hagerty affair. But these fall far short of any fatal blow on the main democratic forces. In such a big struggle the enemies naturally took all steps to try to counter us, but they have failed to deliver any decisive blow, because in this struggle we were not guided by a passing mood, but took into account the balance of power for the democratic forces and the limit of tactics that could be used in developing the mass struggle to an unprecedented level. The present high spirits of the democratic forces and their preparedness for the future struggle are mainly due to the considerable results achieved while preserving the strength of the main democratic forces.

For these reasons, we reject any assessment of this struggle that says it was a spontaneous uprising of the masses of the Japanese people, or that the participation of personalities of culture in the struggle was the main factor that led to its great expansion, or that democratic political parties, including the JCP, failed to put forward any policy in the struggle. With firm conviction, we emphasize that the JCP fully carried out its mission as a vanguard party. Without this conviction, we can neither develop the united front nor successfully carry out election campaigns in such a way as to do our duty as a vanguard party, nor can we build a really strong party linked with these mass struggles.

IV

Here is the final question about this struggle. Why did the struggle, so powerfully fought, fail to stop the revision of the Security Treaty?

In the policy for the struggle against the Security Treaty, the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee made it clear that there was some possibility of stopping the revision of the Security Treaty if the unity of the people could be greatly strengthened, the struggle developed to the maximum and everything done to turn the possibility into a reality. Why were we so careful in making a prudent assessment?

To stop the treaty revision was no easy task, and we never used a formulation in the Plenum decision that we could unconditionally block the revision of the Security Treaty; it could not be compared with the Police Duty Execution Law. No doubt this was also a grave problem, but the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty taken up by the ruling circles of both countries, if aborted, would not only cause the collapse of the Kishi Government but also deal a fatal blow to the Japan-US military alliance, in other words, the very San Francisco System. Their basic policy was therefore to carry through the revision by whatever means. Kishi, in spite of his wounds, was determined to carry through the effectuation of the treaty, and to stay in office till the papers of ratification were exchanged because the issue was of such vital importance, decisively affecting US and Japanese ruling circles, carrying far greater importance for them than the Police Duty Execution Law. The other reason is that the balance of power at that time, looked at calmly, was that nearly two thirds of Diet seats were in the hands of the LDP. In other words, the broad masses of the people were still under the deceptive influence of the LDP; moreover, they not only held a strong majority in the Diet, but also had the whole armed apparatus under their full control, including the US imperialist military forces and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, reportedly equipped with arms far stronger than the prewar Japanese military forces, in addition to the police. So far, no such balance of power has come into being as sabotages would take place in the armed apparatus in support of the democratic forces. They also keep the economic exploitation system completely under their control, and dominate the mass propaganda media as a whole, including newspapers, radio and television.

Under these circumstances, to claim that we would have been able to stop the revision of the Security Treaty without fail if we had fought on for half a year or one year, would be lacking in scientific grounds. What is the condition of the democratic forces at this time? The ratio of organized labor in all the working population is a little more than one third, and some half of the working class have yet to be organized. Farmers organized in peasant unions are only about 200,000, a ratio of about one in tens of all farmers. Moreover, on the labor front, nearly one million workers are affiliated with the anti-Soviet, anti-communist Zenro and Shinsambetsu, both of which are secessionist organizations, and the mainstream of the working class is under the leadership of the SPJ. Although a united front has been formed in the form of the National Council against the Security Treaty and organizes joint actions from time to time, the position of the JCP in it is only as an observer. The SPJ still stresses again and again that it refuses any joint struggle at political party level. The National Council does not operate as a core that would make it possible to closely rally the whole of the democratic forces around it.

In these circumstances the question was for us to achieve the broadest possible unity of the people, to the extent that would enable us to drive the enemies into a corner, employing all possible tactics of mass action. It would be far from waging a struggle, if we were to begin to say that the present balance of power made it impossible to stop the revision. To claim that we would be able unconditionally and without fail to stop the revision in such a brief period would be to fall into extreme subjectivism. It should be noted that the issue was whether the Japan-US military alliance, the backbone of the ruling system of the two enemies, would be nullified by the virtual stopping of the treaty revision, which the enemies were desperately defending. How could it be realistic in view of the balance of power to say that twenty or thirty thousand policemen could have been overwhelmed by demonstrations mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people, or that a revolution could have been successful by competent revolutionaries, if there were any such. This can easily be answered without my explanation. Certainly hundreds of thousands of demonstrators could favorably fight thirty thousand policemen, as far as the scene alone was concerned. But strictly speaking, two hundred or three hundred thousand demonstrators were not a politically organized power, fully consolidated with political and ideological unity. For instance, during the planning of the June 19 demonstration, the date when Eisenhower was scheduled to arrive in Tokyo, what were the opinions of the people? After the struggle against the visit of Hagerty, Eisenhower's press attaché, some activists with anti-communist tendencies were affected by the propaganda that the struggles were instigated by the JCP in line with its anti-US stand. Their proposal for the June 19 demonstration, the scheduled date of Eisenhower's arrival, was that no demonstration should be held at Haneda Airport, nor a demonstration along the route he was to take, and that the demonstrators should meet at the Jingu Gaien garden to go to Kishi's residence at Nampeidai, Shibuya Ward (a few kilometers from the Diet, Kishi's official residence, and US

Embassy area—ed.) On the very day of Eisenhower's arrival, they tried to make people walk in the opposite direction away from the airport and the US Embassy where he was to stay, turning their backs on him! This was the tactic planned by an influential part in the democratic forces, as if this was a matter of course for them. This was no surprise. All the time from about June 15, there were incessant efforts to turn demonstrators away by any means from a course near the US Embassy, convinced that a demonstration to the embassy would mean falling into the trap of the anti-US struggle line set by the JCP. On June 18, the demonstration course agreed on was to pass by the precincts of the US Embassy, and then they suddenly changed the course to avoid that place.

The SPJ itself explained to the party congress that their struggle against Eisenhower's visit to Japan was not an anti-US struggle, and even in these days they often repeat this, stressing how they differ from the anti-imperialist anti-US struggle of the JCP. Thus, the joint struggle organization itself is not a fully unified force in the political sense. After clashing with the police, and after occupying the precincts of the Diet or the Prime Minister's official residence for several hours, people would not be able to stand up to the police, but would be suppressed and dispersed by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces without the help of the US military forces. The power of the ruling class is not completely paralysed, nor have united revolutionary forces been established. It would be really subjective to judge that we are now in a revolutionary situation.

It is very important to understand clearly what a revolutionary situation is, based on Marxist-Leninist theory. As soon as a mass movement rises like a high tide, some would tend to think that this indicates a revolutionary situation, a typical attitude of petit-bourgeois subjectivism among people who do not understand the basic principles of mass struggles. Some

intellectuals have said that we are now in a revolutionary situation, and criticize the JCP for being opportunistic in not leading the way to a successful revolution. If a revolution were as simple and easy as this there would be no difficulties: perhaps every communist party in the world would have established a communist society easily in each respective country. But this was not the situation. It was indeed a government crisis, a crisis of government collapse. A government crisis can take place without a revolutionary situation, merely from some contradictions in the enemy ranks or a certain rise of mass movements. Of course the worsening of a government crisis may cause the government to collapse; in fact, several governments have been overthrown in such crises, but a revolution, which means the taking over of power by the people, is possible only when the people are strong enough to reach and retain power by defeating all enemy attempts at suppression, relying on the strength of the uprising people. This would be possible for the Japanese people if they secured power by completely overwhelming the Self-Defense Forces as well as any US military forces that would be mobilized against them; or by generating a situation where neither the US nor Japanese military forces could do anything to crush the people's power. In either of these situations, the forces of suppression would be helpless, and power would be maintained in the hands of the people, enabling the revolution to proceed and consolidate its victory. Without such an outlook for favorable development the occupation of the Diet or the Prime Minister's official residence could by no means be called a revolution.

But what did the Trotskyites do in spite of this situation? They persisted in the idea that what they were always striving for, including the June 15 event, was a revolution in what they called a revolutionary situation, and in this sense they wanted to overthrow the Kishi bourgeois Cabinet. They did not call the

Kishi Cabinet "bourgeois" in any casual sense, but meant that to overthrow his government would lead directly to a "socialist revolution that would overthrow the bourgeoisie". The statement of a leading Trotskyite, as reported by "Weekly Shincho", says that to overthrow the Kishi Cabinet would mean a breakthrough to a socialist revolution. According to this report, the tactics of the Trotskyite leaders included, in sum, forcible entry into Prime Minister's official residence and force him to broadcast at the point of a bayonet that he gives up ratification of the Security Treaty and opposes the visit of Eisenhower. This would have stopped revision of the treaty, he said. Evasively, the Trotskyites would try to explain that US military forces would not readily be called out, and that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces would not be difficult to deal with.

What would have happened if the whole Japanese democratic forces had been trapped by such "revolutionary" tactics? There can be no doubt. In spite of the existence of the communist and socialist parties, with considerable experience in movements, the democratic forces would have been involved in entirely silly Blanquism, an entirely absurd infantile riot, and would have suffered a disabling blow, followed by long days of helplessness. Then we of the JCP would have had to criticize ourselves ten times over, in spite of our experiences in ultraleftist adventurism, if we had been caught off-guard in the situation by underestimating the Trotskyite danger, allowing this error to plunge the democratic forces into dire straits.

V

Let me take up now the question of the June 15 event. Why did the Trotskyite leadership adopt the tactics of breaking through to the precincts of the Diet?

At that time the struggle against Eisenhower's visit had

reached a high point, and the leaders of the Trotskyite Communist League were deeply chagrined, saying that the JCP had potential power; that the party had induced the democratic forces little by little to finally join in the anti-US struggle. They were frantically trying to limit the struggle to the vicinity of the Diet building and the Prime Minister's office area. So they never sent Zengakuren demonstrators (those under their leadership) to the US Embassy when a great number of the masses were rising against the visits of Hagerty and Eisenhower to Japan.

It was evidence of political immaturity to consider that these tactics were either by chance or due to the error of oversimplification of the Japanese situation.

A feature of the Japanese Trotskyites, their true leading group, members of the Trotskyite International, is that they do not show themselves up in front, but those within the student movement are placed in the forefront; their tactics and anticommunist lines coincide fully with the lines of the Trotskyite International.

Their leaflet distributed on June 30 in the name of the Central Executive Committee of Zengakuren, in criticizing the JCP, says that since the U2 incident the JCP has been obediently following the changed policy of the Soviet Union; they were in this way aiming to mislead the movement toward chauvinism in opposing Eisenhower's visit to Japan. It was this in fact that revealed the betrayal by the Trotskyites, that they would never fight against US imperialism.

As I have said, our party had declared its policy of opposition to Eisenhower's visit from as far back as March, when Eisenhower's schedule was for a visit to the Soviet Union first.

Moreover, to call opposition to Eisenhower's Japan visit "chauvinism", seems to have nothing in common with the basic standpoint of the proletariat, but has an essentially common base with the statements of the US imperialists and Japanese reactionaries for welcoming Eisenhower's visit. Their role comes fundamentally to mean defense of imperialism.

To regard the actions of the Trotskyites as based on a simple political error would be very naive.

In the June 15 action also, they planned the breakthrough tactics in order to regain their influence, because they were becoming isolated in the general trend of the struggle directed against US imperialism. This was also a practical application of their own delusive theories of "revolution", which aimed to provoke cruel oppression by the Kishi Cabinet and arouse the sympathetic anger of the whole nation. Naturally, the people would be more concerned with the cruelty of the suppression than with the provocations of the Trotskyites. We also made a strong statement protesting the suppression.

Naturally, our statement was a strong denunciation of the Kishi Cabinet, but at the same time we pointed out that, while considering the victims, we could not ignore the splitting tactics and adventurism that were contrary to the lines of the National Council against the Security Treaty.

We do not fear sacrifices when conducting a justifiable struggle, as the 38-year party history of suffering shows. But the party feels as strongly as anyone the value of human life, and we mourn the young life lost during that incident at night on June 15, even though it was a Trotskyite life, which we see as a valuable life lost, and in fact a double victim. Of course, in our Action Policy we primarily protest the suppression by the suppressors, and will do our best to avoid any recurrence of such incidents that make victims by provocation and adventurism.

The way the Trotskyite leadership directs the fight is something more than a simple tentative over-action in an encounter; it is committed tactically, and differs from the

policy of the National Council with which they had got along; but they had been consistently opposing the lines of the National Council by provocative and splitting tactics. Clearly, if they are left to follow their own course they will do the same thing again and again, and, taking advantage of the sympathy received from the suppression, they would try to bring their tactics step by step into the movement. To deal with this, we considered it was the responsibility of the JCP to show that their breakthrough tactics had never been approved by the National Council as part of its policy.

In fact, they again proposed a breakthrough action on June 18, and made a provocative speech saying, "Today is the day of revolution". They made specific preparations for an adventurist breakthrough, but this failed because the breakthrough idea was not supported by a large part of the students, who had joined forces with the Trotskyites mobilized for that day, mostly members of the so-called Zengakuren, filled with anger at the suppression, although they did not support the Trotskyite tactical line. They rather opposed the breakthrough. The Trotskyite leaders were forced to adapt themselves to this, and divided their forces into two units, one for breaking through and one for non-breaking through; only the former unit was to carry it out. However, the SPJ and some university professors, fearing the possible results, persuaded them not to go into practice. But when the night was over, the people of the SPJ delivered speeches of appreciation to the students for agreeing not to carry their plan through. This was followed by a Trotskyite, the final speaker, who criticized the preceding speakers who had praised the students, pointing out that, just as the speakers had said, they would "advance over the corpse of Michiko Kamba" as the true way of mourning her death, to break through to the Diet. The Trotskyites are of course "consistent" with their own views, as we too are consistent.

In this way, the brutal bloodshed, the direct result of the cruel suppression, threw the US and Japanese ruling circles into a deeper self-contradiction, and forced by the pressure of escalating actions against Eisenhower's visit to Japan, the nationwide strike and demonstrations, the ruling circles had to call off Eisenhower's visit.

These circumstances show that the principled scientific standpoint is always important in assessing the significance of any struggle. In the Russian Revolution, Bloody Sunday, one of the triggering events of the Revolution, was caused by Gabon's provocation. Those who followed the provocateur were the well-intentioned masses. But Gabon himself was still a provocateur, who was later killed by the Russian workers. If Gabon had been killed on Bloody Sunday, would we treat him as a national hero despite his being a provocateur? Taking for granted that the case for Gabon was somewhat different from what took place here, I mean to say that it would not be correct to praise Trotskyites just because of the result. Even though over-suppression by the enemy may intensify the people's anger, no action at variance with the unified policy of the democratic forces, or obviously taken by provocateurs and induced by the over-suppression, can be justified by the anger, or change a splitter or a provocateur in the democratic forces into something else from that moment. If such legitimate distinctions are lost, any actions, the results of which win the sympathy of the masses, could be regarded as correct. Mixing up all these distinctions, the Trotskyites organized a campaign to win praise for what they did that day, as well as what they had done until that day, as heroic actions.

Unfortunately, a considerable part of the democratic forces failed to analyse these questions calmly at that moment. For example, the SPJ issued a statement immediately on the night of June 15, saying that they regretted the incident, which they

felt was quite due to their own regretful lack of control over the people. In spite of this, the SPJ praised Zengakuren almost as heroes as soon as the severe suppression aroused deep sympathy for the victim.

The SPJ also immediately expressed regret over the Hagerty incident on the night of the same day. We neither commented on the Hagerty incident as regretful in a bourgeois sense, nor did we unduly praise the Trotskyites. We never wavered right or left.

We focused our efforts on protesting against the suppression. Accordingly, after the incident the JCP Tokyo Metropolitan Committee organized a protest campaign against the brutal suppression, including a protest march along the course passing the Metropolitan Police Headquarters.

Nevertheless, our position is never to ignore the error of consistent provocative policies of the Trotskyites, demonstrating the consistency of the JCP position on June 18 when the Trotskyites pointed out the inconsistency of the adults.

VI

Finally, we may now think that this struggle against the Security Treaty has in a sense advanced as a historic struggle, as foreseen in the Action Program of the JCP, sooner than we had expected. Of course, the Security Treaty cannot be abrogated quickly. However, through this experience, the Japanese people gained a stronger conviction of their own democratic power in the broadest sense—energy for national independence, peace, democracy and the protection of life—and at the same time they gained confidence from having to the maximum possible extent cornered the enemies, showing that their fight could cause US imperialism to retreat. If we fight, we can expel the imperialists. If we build up real solid unity, the people can wield political power. The situation has given this conviction not only to the leaders of the democratic movements, but more or less to all enthusiastic activists. As a result, if and when the democratic forces can collect more than 30 million signatures of real support from those who have opposed the Japan-US Security Treaty, we will be able to form a democratic coalition government in opposition to the Security Treaty, and that, in no sense, in the distant future. To do this we need to fight more intensely and persistently in rural communities and among a broader range of workers. Although such a victory will not be easy, the latest struggle has taught us that the victory will at some time be won in the not-so-distant future, not so remote that we cannot talk about it. It has given us a more precise outlook for it.

In order to win the victory in such a great struggle, it is necessary for the JCP to become the leading force in such a struggle. It is true that in effect our lines have been realized in the latest struggle in some form or other, but the majority of the trade unions as a whole are still under SPJ control. In any struggle, the decisive power is in the hands of those who control the organizations. Since the great corps of the working people must remain united, and be precisely rallied, deployed, advanced and withdrawn in a unified manner in such a struggle, it will obviously be impossible to lead a historic struggle correctly unless the conditions guarantee that the JCP can give correct responsible guidance to the trade-union movement and mass struggles. In this sense, the party must become stronger and bigger, able to organize the masses and enhance their unity. The task set forth by the JCP 6th CC Plenum is understood to have been felt more sharply by the whole party through this experience in the latest struggle.

Now, in order to bring about a sharp rise in the decisive struggle as quickly as possible, we need to build stronger ties between the party and the people, for which we need a stronger and bigger party, able to endure the ordeal of the historic struggle until the day of victory. Although we still have many weaknesses, since the last Party Congress we have seen every evidence of progress in the struggle. The correctness of the outlook set forth by the 6th CC Plenum decision has now been proved. In view of all this, the Central Committee and all comrades of the party are now called on especially to unite in accordance with a concerted policy, the direction of which I have outlined. We must now do our best to go ahead in the correct struggle, and at the same time make the party stronger and bigger. At this moment we must make a decisive forward leap in the coming election.

(*Zen'ei*, September, 1960)

REPORT ON THE DRAFT PROGRAM

Submitted by the Central Committee to the 8th JCP Congress, July 25-26, 1961

I

The publication of the draft Program has elicited great responses. The overwhelming majority of the party organizations and members approve publication of the Draft, setting out the basic standpoint of the party since the 7th Party Congress. Agreeing that the prospect of revolution in Japan has been clarified in line with the draft, a large number of comrades along with many new members express wholehearted support of the political line of the party, with the draft as its theoretical formulation. as seen in the struggle against the Security Treaty and the results of party strength expansion.

Among democratic persons who joined the struggle against the Security Treaty along with us, support is also expressed for the revolutionary line of the party, which upholds the banner of unremitting struggle against the two enemies.

Fraternal party organs, including Pravda of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,introduced the gist of this Program, showing that the success of our Party Congress is expected in international solidarity based on Marxism-Leninism, just as the Political Report, the draft Program and the Reports on it were introduced by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of China and other fraternal parties immediately after our 7th Party Congress.

Our party celebrated the 39th anniversary of its founding on July 15, and in our history, this Congress has special significance. The revolutionary working class of Japan raised the banner of Marxism-Leninism 39 years ago, seeking the liberation of the working class and the people through the party, never yielding to suppression or terrorism in the very difficult conditions, and drew up the most scientific revolutionary program in Japan, following a very eventful path.

Though we had to endure many repressions, difficulties and troubles after the war, at the 7th Party Congress we formulated the basic political line suitable to the present situation in Japan, fighting against two enemies—US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital. The party was able to play an active advanced role in the great struggle against the Security Treaty, which was not only unprecedented in the history of Japan, but one wing of the frontline in the international struggle for peace and independence.

The party has succeeded in the outstanding work of doubling our membership. The draft Program submitted to this Congress not only correctly succeeds to and develops the valuable legacy of our past revolutionary program, but also reflects the results of the activities of the working class, the people and the party in the past three years, which is the reason why the results of our 8th Party Congress are claiming the attention of both friends and enemies at home and abroad.

The Government and the state apparatus of oppression are spreading reactionary slanders, and the bourgeois press encourages the attacks of the anti-communist rightwing social-democrats upon our Political Report and draft Program.

Shojiro Kasuga and other anti-party factionalists began disturbing activities against the party on the eve of the Congress, betraying both the decisions of our 7th Party Congress and their own responsibility. This shows that the dissidents are also revisionists in the organizational principle of the party and are betraying the revolutionary militant tradition of the party by reason of their petit-bourgeois individualism. Against them the party has already taken a resolute measure worthy of a revolutionary proletarian party.

No move of the whole reactionary forces and their agents can defeat the historical success of the Party Congress. There can be no doubt that this Congress will be a great success by the efforts of all the delegates expressing the wisdom and experience of the entire party in the Congress. The Congress will prove to be a lighthouse in the struggle of the working class and the people of Japan. It will be a banner of the most resolute and victorious struggle of the Japanese working class against US imperialism and the reactionary forces, centered on Japanese monopoly capital, and at the same time an answer of all party members to a handful of traitorous elements who attempt shamelessly to challenge and disturb the principles of the Marxist-Leninist party.

II

1. First I will make some comments on the process of submission of the draft.

The decision of the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee which adopted the draft Program says, "The 7th Party Congress of the Japanese Communist Party acknowledged 'the Political Program of the Draft Party Charter' as a draft to be continuously deliberated under the leadership of the new Central Committee. The Program subcommittee appointed at the Second Plenum of the Central Committee after the 7th Party Congress discussed the Program question 29 times, centering around the original draft entrusted to them by the Congress.

Then the 10th CC Plenum (April 5 to 9, 1960) and the 16th CC Plenum (March 1 to 13 and again 25 to 28, 1961) discussed the Program question on the basis of the report of the Program subcommittee. The 16th CC Plenum affirms the basic correctness of the Political Program of the draft Party Charter, and adopts the draft, which has been given necessary supplements and has been enriched in description, in conformity with the subsequent development of the situation, as the draft to be submitted to the 8th Party Congress."

The draft Charter of the Central Committee submitted to the 7th Party Congress consisted of the "Program" part and the "Constitution" part. The 7th Party Congress discussed the draft Charter, but did not reach a final decision particularly on the nature of revolution, etc. and the following decision was made:

> "1. To adopt the part regarding the basis of the Action Program of the draft Charter as the immediate Action Program.
>
> "2. To adopt (1)(7)(8)(10) of the Program part of the draft Charter as the preamble of the Constitution, and to combine this preamble and the Constitution text to form the Constitution of the Japanese Communist Party.
>
> "3. To approve that no final decision be made on the Program of the draft Charter as a whole but that it be adopted as the draft to be continuously discussed under the leadership of the new Central Committee. Simultaneously, to abolish the so-called 1951 Program.
>
> "4. To make the final decision on the Program part at the proper time in the future."

The Central Committee elected by the 7th Party Congress set up at the Second CC Plenum a Program question subcommittee consisting of 15 members, and this subcommittee has continued its discussion 29 times centering around the Draft submitted to the Congress. As for the Plenums of the Central Committee, the 10th Plenum (April 5-9, 1960) and the 16th Plenum (March 1-13 again 25-28, 1961) held discussions on it for 22 days and adopted this "Draft Program" and the above-mentioned "decision" of the 16th CC Plenum.

The outline of the process of the subcommittee and the Plenums of the Central Committee was already published in the special issue of Daily Akahata of June 27. Though it is impossible to give the full picture of the meetings held more than 50 times—29 subcommittee meetings and the Plenums lasting for 22 days—its basic content has been clarified.

At the subcommittee meetings and the Central Committee Plenums, the overwhelming majority of the comrades supported the basic standpoint of the Draft of the 7th Party Congress, except for some who opposed it in principle.

2. I will explain according to the order of description of the draft what necessary supplements have been added and amplified descriptions given in the draft Program prepared by the above process compared with the draft decided at the 7th Party Congress. Not a few words and phrases have been corrected and partial supplements have been added, but I will confine myself to the main points. While these supplements and amplified descriptions have been added in accordance with the development of the situation over the past three years, the basic stand and composition of the draft have not been altered.

1) With regard to the question of the present Constitution of Japan, new description have been added.

The opposition to the mal-revision of the present Constitution and the complete implementation of peaceful and democratic clauses guaranteed by the Constitution are the demands for which our party has consistently fought and the task to be

fought for also in the future. The reason why new descriptions on the existing Constitution have been added to the draft is to clarify the relation between the question of the frustration of the postwar democratic revolution and the existing Constitution in connection with the postwar political process, and to clarify in what sense we must defend the existing Constitution and at the same time on what points we are not restricted.

The Socialist Party of Japan and others uncritically appraise the existing Constitution and speak as if its defense and complete implementation will gradually lead to socialism. According to this view, when activities of the joint struggle body against the Security Treaty were resumed, there was a move to exclude opposition to or abrogation of the Security Treaty from the targets, on the pretext that defense of the Constitution is the central target of the joint struggle. From this point of view, the correct evaluation of the Constitution is an important question to be taken up.

2) The description of the substance of US imperialist rule over Japan, the analysis of Japanese monopoly capitalism and its role have been amplified with more detail and making clearer the two enemies and their mutual relations, taking the recent development of the situation into consideration. A clear definition has also been given to the San Francisco System.

On the substance of the San Francisco System there was much debate in the discussion on the draft Program, and it was necessary to define it clearly from that point of view. The draft clarifies the international aspect, in that US imperialism created this anti-Soviet and anti-China "peace" system to make Japan its military stronghold in Asia in its world war strategy, at the same time making it a system of subordinate alliance, war preparation, and maintenance of the oppression and plunder of the Japanese people, as is clear from the fact that Japan has been robbed of Okinawa (Ryukyu Islands) and Ogasawara

(Bonin Islands) and many military bases have been set up as the result of having been dragged into this system. We call it the system for maintaining the plunder because by this system the struggle of the Japanese people against the two enemies is suppressed, the exploitation and plunder through investments and other means of US capital in Japan are supported, and at the same time the exploitation and plunder by Japanese monopoly capital, the junior ally, are also maintained.

The term "system" is often used in the literature of the international communist movement like "the Versailles System", and the draft defines the San Francisco System clearly not only in the treaty or legal sense, but also in the sense that it has substantial meaning for Japan and abroad, and is the legal basis of that substance.

3) As the conclusion of the new Security Treaty is the most important political event in the three years since the 7th Party Congress, new descriptions have naturally been added. The character of the Treaty and its political and economic background have been repeatedly made clear in the resolutions and decisions of the Central Committee after the 7th Party Congress, and are also clarified in the Political Report to this Congress. So I will not repeat them; the draft defines them succinctly.

4) The part concerning the international situation is drafted in greater detail than the 7th Party Congress draft. Though the basic stand is the same, the new conclusion of the international communist movement shown in the Moscow Statement is summarized in adequate form in this part, and explains the position of Japan in Asia and the responsibility of the party and the working class of Japan in the development of the present international situation.

5) To that part of the basis of the immediate Action Program, necessary supplements have been added from the

experience of the three years.

In its opening sentences it says, "The party fights for the abrogation of the Japan-US Security Treaty and all other traitorous treaties and agreements, for the return to Japan of Okinawa and Ogasawara, for the complete withdrawal of all US troops from Japan and for the liquidation of their military bases." The struggle of the Japanese people during the past three years speaks for itself, and the central and local joint struggle organizations continue to develop with opposition to the Security Treaty as the central target, showing that the abrogation of the Security Treaty is an earnest demand, born of the present conditions in which the Japanese people are placed, and the serious contradiction between the US-Japanese ruling circles and the Japanese people; it is the immediate central political task of the Japanese people. In this sense, it has been taken up in the first clause on fundamentals of the Action Program.

The question of intellectuals, women, youth and students were dealt with in one clause in the former draft, but now have been separately described in independent clauses and in more detail, and supplements have been added.

On economic policies, while the demands concerning key enterprises such as the oil industry, etc. run by US capital have been made clear, now not only the transitory demand before or after the establishment of people's power "for transition to nationalization of the financial organs of monopoly capital and of the monopoly enterprises in the key industries" "by means of the people's control over the monopolies", but also a new task, "to fight for nationalization of certain monopoly enterprises and their democratic management in accordance with necessity and conditions".

6) A new description has been added in order to clarify the basic political attitude of the party in formation of a united

front.

Through the struggle of the past three years the party line on formation of a united front is developing virtually as a united front, rallying millions of people of member organizations in the joint struggle bodies against the Security Treaty. This has not yet grown into a National Democratic United Front, aimed at by the party, but in present circumstances in which a certain united front has been formed it is necessary not only to call for a united front, but to endeavor to advance the present united front and to develop it toward a National Democratic United Front. In this case, it is extremely important to clarify the basic political attitude of the party. As is stressed also in the Political Report, the draft therefore emphasizes that we must fight the tendency to obstruct a united front and its correct development, while calling widely for unity of the working people.

7) On the slogan for a Government, we have accumulated a lot of experience in the past three years and have put it forward in practical policies. One is the proposition for a democratic election administration cabinet, and another is the slogan for a democratic coalition government against the Security Treaty. As they are mentioned in detail in the Political Report, I will not repeat them, but the draft gives the question of Government a definite place in the Program on the basis of these experiences.

Judging from the present political line of the SPJ, it is difficult to immediately establish a united front with a clear anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly target. But as the reality of the anti-Security Treaty struggle shows, an agreement has arisen among the democratic forces, including the SPJ, and a united front has been formed in so far as they oppose the Security Treaty or defend peace and democracy, even though there are still many differences in its content. That is why we

now put up the slogan for a Government against the Security Treaty. At the same time, as the united front is further consolidated and solidarity of the democratic forces is becoming stronger, the situation in which a united front government could actually be formed will accelerate the establishment of a National Democratic United Front Government. The draft makes these points clear.

However, it does not follow that the draft assumes beforehand a stage-by-stage development, that it must necessarily go through the process from a united front government with a certain target to a National Democratic United Front Government. It has been established that it is necessary to fight under the essential slogan of a united front government in election struggles, etc. according to the actual conditions where a united front exists, and to fight for the establishment of such a government when the proper conditions exist. At the same time our basic goal is the establishment of a National Democratic United Front and a government based on it.

8) A new description has been added to the draft following the part that deals with the establishment of people's power. In this part, it clarifies the significance that the establishment of an independent, democratic and peaceful Japan by the people's power has in the social development of Japan, what the political and social content of a people's democratic state system would be, i.e. the whole political and social significance of this stage.

9) As for the character of the revolution, a new description has been added, that "the revolution which Japan confronts at present is a new democratic revolution, a democratic revolution of the people against the two enemies—the rule of US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital", together with some new supplements and expressions. These do not add any especially new content to the character of the revolution set out

in the 7th Party Congress draft, but have been added with the aim of enriching the whole description.

These are the main points of necessary supplements and amplified descriptions.

3. Now, a few words on the process of discussions on the draft Program since it was published.

The discussion of the draft Program by the entire party has been conducted as a whole on the principle of democratic centralism under the leadership of the Central Committee. In this discussion party organizations at all levels have carried out their task to correctly inform all party members of the contents of the draft and to discuss it in a democratic way. The discussion has centered around the basic themes of the draft, and at the same time from the standpoint of the basis of entire party practice over the past three years. This is because all party members have had the valuable experience of mass struggles and party building by participation in the mass struggles, such as the historical struggle against the Security Treaty, the struggle against the Police Duties Law, the Miike struggle, the recent struggle against the Political Violence Prevention Bill, and the success of activities in party building—doubling the party membership and rapidly increasing the readership of the party organs—all relating to these mass struggles. The first characteristic of the discussion of the draft is that the entire party discussed it in relation to these practical experiences. Secondly, as the development of the struggle against the Security Treaty clearly demonstrated, it was against the two enemies, so the revolutionary line of the struggle against the two enemies has become understood and is the conviction of the overwhelming majority of comrades, not merely in theory but in practice. Thirdly, the positive results shown in the historic

Moscow Statement, which brought together the wisdom and experiences of the international communist movement, and also by the events in Cuba and Laos, which without a shadow of doubt have shown the aggressive nature of US imperialism as set out in the Moscow Statement, i.e., through the new accomplishment of the international communist movement and the actual development of the international situation, the whole party has come to understand far better the appraisal of US imperialism which the international communist movement and we as a party constantly have stated.

In this way the great majority of our comrades in the whole party have expressed support of the draft, based on their conviction about the political line of the party since the 7th Party Congress. This overwhelming majority support given to the draft has not been won by the suppression of the opposing opinions which Shojiro Kasuga and his group, who have degraded themselves into subversive elements against the party, claim as the pretext for their betrayal and shameless attacks on the party; on the contrary, it is quite clear now that it is because of the correctness of the basic line of the 7th Party Congress and the confirmation in practice of the basic stand of the draft Charter through the struggle of the past three years. The present draft Program is its precise reflection.

Through the keen party discussions of the draft and the deep interest shown even outside the party since its publication, many questions and positive views have been sent to the party center. To reply fully to them, in the party organs we have published some explanatory articles and direct answers to questions. Among the views sent to the party center there are some modification proposals concerning individual descriptions in order to make the draft more complete, and in its support. We express thanks for those comrades who have made such proposals to make it a better draft. Though I cannot touch on the details here, such proposals, including those which have been submitted to this Congress will be examined and will be voted on and I hope the draft will be amplified even more by bringing in the highest wisdom.

In the course of discussion of the draft some comrades expressed opinions about how to discuss the Program. They said that it should have been continuously discussed by the whole party after the 7th Party Congress, in the same way as it was before the Congress.

As I have already said, in the 2nd Plenum the Central Committee appointed a Program subcommittee, which continued discussion of the draft for a long time, and the Central Committee itself also discussed it for more than 20 days in the 10th and the 16th Plenums. After such full discussion, the draft was drawn up as a proposal of the Central Committee and submitted to discussion by the whole party. This procedure is based on the decision of the 7th Party Congress, that the discussion of the draft be conducted under the leadership of the new Central Committee. This measure was taken from the viewpoint that it is important for the Central Committee to fully discuss it first, and to examine it in the light of practice, and at the same time, in discussing it, to maintain the unity of the Central Committee and the entire party. It is undesirable for the unity of the party and for the constant advance of the struggle to leave affairs as they were before the 7th Party Congress. This measure can be said to have been correct in the light of the development of the last three years. If the party center had not adopted this method, and had continued to discuss the draft for three years just as before the 7th Party Congress, the party would have been unable to fight the struggle against the Security Treaty and other big issues or to play an active role in them, and the expansion of party strength could not have been so successful.

At the same time, the Central Committee did everything for solidarity in spite of differences of opinion within itself on the Program. If there is disunity in the Central Committee, it will inevitably reproduce disunity in the lower organizations. This necessity being keenly felt, the Central Committee did everything possible, and ensured discussion for an almost unparalleled length of time, endeavoring to maintain unity and cohesion of the Central Committee. One of those who betrayed the party was given as many as 56 opportunities to speak in the 16th CC Plenum. Though the problem ought to be thoroughly discussed in order to draw up a certain political line, as there were basic differences of opinion we thought how important the unity of the Central Committee is, and made persevering efforts over again, and thus we succeeded in adopting decisions unanimously by the 13th CC Plenum. This was the main basis for the present rapid advance of the party. We are firmly convinced therefore that it was the proper step from the correct standpoint for the party center to have followed this line of considering the unity of the Central Committee and the party more important than anything else.

III

1. The composition and stand of the draft are based on the 7th Party Congress. In this sense the basic content of the "Report on the Question of the Program" submitted to the 7th Party Congress provides the explanation of the prototype of the draft, except for figures and changes in the situation which naturally should be corrected with the lapse of time.

As stated, the draft has been supplemented and the description amplified to meet the changes in the situation and the development of the struggle. I will refer to major themes, including these.

The historical description given in the opening part of the draft about the tasks of the prewar party is important in clarifying the postwar programmatic tasks. What is extremely important is that in prewar times the party set out the prospect of transformation from a bourgeois democratic revolution to a socialist revolution, based on the analysis of the situation in Japan, with the party as the vanguard of the working class, having overcome the repressions, difficulties and sacrifices made from its founding. One great result was that our party, as a wing of the international communist movement, creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to Japan based on proletarian internationalism. It was a correct combination of tasks to resolutely oppose the oppression of other nations and the war of aggression waged by militarist and feudalist Japanese imperialism, and the people's revolution to liberate the people of our own country from the dark rule of the military-and-police Tenno system, a correct combination of proletarian internationalism and patriotism. At that time, the social democratic parties and social-democratic theoreticians were struck in the bog of opportunism and legalism, and avoided the struggle against the Tenno system, mainly on the ground that Japan was a monopoly capitalist state. In addition, most of the right-wing social-democrats became active collaborators with Japanese imperialism's war of aggression against China and World War II, and were so politically degraded as to poison the people with bourgeois chauvinism and class collaboration. The course of history has shown that the prewar strategic prospect of our party was really scientific and revolutionary, worthy of the party of the working class.

Those who think that this part of the draft is merely the history of the party, and that the shortcomings of the party are not mentioned, or say that it is not necessary in the opening part of the Program, do not understand the programmatic

significance of the description in this part.

2. The major prerequisite for the correct understanding of the collapse of Japanese militarist and feudalist imperialism from the results of World War II through to the present is to give proper place to the changes that have appeared in Japan by developments in the international situation. It does not lead us to a correct conclusion just to analyze Japanese monopoly capitalism apart from this point of view. The correct approach to the historical and political process in postwar Japan is possible only when combined with the features of today that "world development is determined by the course and results of the competition between two diametrically opposed social systems" (The Moscow Declaration of 1957) and that the socialist system has entered the stage of history as a world system, and is evolving into a decisive factor in the development of human society.

At the bottom of the series of fundamental changes, such as the victory of the anti-fascist allied forces, the unconditional surrender of Japanese imperialism and its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces, the beginning of the military occupation-rule of Japan by US forces as the main part of the Allied Forces, the loss of former Japanese colonies, the dissolution of the Japanese imperialist forces, the loss of Japan's sovereignty, lay the process of reorganization of the war and aggression system of the imperialist camp, led by US imperialism, in opposition to the evergrowing development of the world socialist system headed by the Soviet Union. Based on its aggressive nature as the greatest postwar imperialist country, and taking advantage of its position as the main force of the Allied Powers, US imperialism has virtually placed Japan under its subordination and attempted to prevent and frustrate the democratic revolution of the Japanese people, making Japanese monopoly capital its junior ally and further strengthening the line of turning Japan into a US military base against the current of the development and consolidation of the socialist camp, such as the victory of the Chinese revolution, etc. It would be wrong to regard this situation as normal or accidental.

> "By means of the Treaty of Versailles, the war imposed such terms upon these countries that advanced peoples have been reduced to a state of colonial dependence, poverty, starvation, ruin, and loss of rights; for this treaty binds them for many generations, and places them in conditions that no civilized nation has ever lived in." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 31, "The Second Congress of the Communist International"*)

> "What distinguishes imperialism is the rule not of industrial capital, but of finance capital, the striving to annex not agrarian countries particularly, but every kind of country." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 23, "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism"*)

The development of the opposition of US imperialism to the socialist camp and its aggressive and expansionist policies toward Japan can not be separated. The collapse of military and feudal imperialism of Japan, the dissolution of the absolutist Tenno system and semi-feudal landlord ownership as a whole, some restrictions placed on the war-criminal monopoly capitalists, the reorganization and consolidation of Japanese monopoly capital to suit the United States in its rule over Japan, some restoration of the democratic movements of the working class and the people of Japan and the growth and consolidation of these forces inevitably led to the worsening of the contradictions inherent in prewar Japanese imperialism, a process which reflected the relations of force between reaction

and the people amidst the competition of the two world systems. Internationally, the forces of socialism, national liberation and peace have made a big advance and are moving toward establishing their superiority, but it is US imperialism which directly occupies Japan, and the Japanese monopoly bourgeoisie, restored to the ruling position in Japan under the protection of US imperialism, have become its junior ally, and do not hesitate to sell out the sovereignty of their own country in order to oppose the rise of the socialist system and the democratic forces here. The Japanese working class and people were deprived of freedom, suppressed and were not united enough to launch an organized and united resistance struggle under the brutal military-and-police rule during World War II, and though their strength was rapidly consolidated after the War, they were still relatively weak and had not grown into independent forces strong enough to accomplish a democratic revolution from below.

These were the correlations in the rule of Japan by US imperialism, the center of one side of the two opposing and competing social systems, the internal contradictions due to the characteristics of the stage of development of Japanese capitalism and the new changes in class relationships after World War II.

The revolutionary prospect of the Japanese working class at an earlier stage was for a democratic revolution of the people which would include abolition of the Tenno system, the establishment of a republic, radical land reform, thorough restriction and control over monopoly capital consistent with the basic slogans of the implementation of the Potsdam Declaration and then to develop it into a socialist revolution. But when imperialism trampled on the Potsdam Declaration, strengthened the policy of virtual single-handed occupation of Japan, made Japan a dependent country with Japanese monopoly capital as the core of Japan's ruling circles, the development of an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly democratic revolution, which includes the extermination of the feudal remnants, into a socialist revolution, was the strategic prospect newly proposed.

But the opinion existed and still exists in and outside the party that the revolution at this stage is essentially a socialist one, on the ground that at that time monopoly capital took state power into its hands. But to insist on such a theory of revolution for this reason even before the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty is to make a typical mistake in grasping the substance of the problem of power and revolution. At that time, the US imperialists took advantage of their position as the main part of the Allied Forces to strengthen their single-handed occupation, to carry out what was virtually all-out military occupation, and the machinery of government served mainly as the administrative supplement of the US occupation forces. The Japanese Government was placed under the complete command of the US occupation forces, and, though it had the aspect of administrative machinery to serve the interests of the reactionary forces centering on monopoly capital, it much more essentially served the interests of the US occupation forces and became a weapon to maintain that rule. That Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida expelled the communist Diet members on the basis of a single letter of General MacArthur, is one such instance. Japan's independence as a state was completely lost, and although the machinery of state power such as the Government, the Diet, the police and the courts were preserved, they are the state machinery functioning in the above relations. These are the machinery of the state in close subordination to the United States.

It is clear that only to aim at the overthrow of monopoly capital, the strategic core of the rule of US imperialism, the

virtual ruler, will not be dealt any substantial blow, nor can the working class and people acquire the power to rule Japan. Consequently the revolution theory that because during this period there was no direct military administration but also the suppressive government machinery of the Japanese ruling circles, there can be no national-liberation revolution such as is seen in classical colonies and semi-colonies, but not in developed capitalist countries; there is only an anti-monopoly socialist revolution, that has fallen into empty formalism.

Another argument is that because the democratic revolution has been accomplished in that the Tenno system and semi-feudal landlord ownership were abolished in the postwar process, though not completely, by reform from above, the coming revolution is a socialist revolution. The draft gives the following description about the dissolution of the Tenno system and semi-feudal land-ownership.

> "Although, so far as farm land is concerned, the postwar agrarian reform has basically liquidated the semi-feudal landlord ownership, it is only a compromising bourgeois reform, with extensive forestry land and wilderness untouched, with many problems unsolved in land relations and other economic and social relations. Nevertheless, it has developed commodity and monetary relations and expanded the domestic market. By allying itself with US imperialism and intensifying exploitation of the working class and masses, Japanese monopoly capital has been revived and strengthened, becoming the core of the traitorous reactionary forces.
>
> "The defeat in the war of aggression dealt a serious blow to the prewar absolutist Tenno system, but in reorganizing the Japanese ruling regime US imperialism has made the status of the Tenno in a legal sense into a kind of bourgeois monarchy. The Tenno has become a tool of US imperialism

and Japanese monopoly capital for their political and ideological rule and for the revival of militarism."

It is clear that the overthrow of the Tenno system and land revolution which the party put up before the war has ceased to be the central target of the revolution. But from the standpoint of the working class and people it is a flight of logic to disregard the reality and conclude that the democratic revolution is completed. The reorganization of class relationships in this period was brought about in the process of the establishing the rule of US imperialism over Japan, and monopoly capital has revived and is strengthened within the framework of subordination to the United States, and has emerged as the core of the reactionary forces. Prewar monopoly capitalism was an influential part of the economic basis of military and feudal imperialism, but after the War it was reorganized and strengthened to establish a subordinate alliance between the US and Japanese monopoly capital under the rule of US imperialism over Japan.

As we all know, criticism of US imperialism in this period was completely suppressed, and as the Japanese Communist Party clarified its attitude of struggle against US imperialism, the Central Committee of the party was declared illegal and Diet members belonging to the Central Committee were purged, and in spite of the promulgation of the new Constitution at that time, waves of despotic suppressive measures were used against the democratic forces by US imperialism.

Japanese monopoly capital cooperated actively in the rule of US imperialism in order to stop any democratic revolution, to sustain the position of the reactionary ruling circles and revive and strengthen the rule of monopoly capital. This placed before the working class and the people the task of a new democratic revolution aiming at complete withdrawal of US forces and genuine national independence through an all-inclusive peace treaty, the overthrow of monopoly capital and

the establishment of a people's democratic state by waging a thoroughgoing struggle for democracy against the two enemies.

This makes it clear that it is fundamentally erroneous to disregard the specific complicated process of history and think that the question of a socialist revolution was raised in this period just because the target of the prewar bourgeois democratic revolution had already ceased to be the main target.

3. The draft basically defines the conditions under which the San Francisco "Peace" Treaty and the Japan-US "Security" Treaty were concluded, the resultant changes, the significance of the San Francisco System, the forces now ruling Japan, features of the present stage of Japanese monopoly capitalism and the new Security Treaty concluded in 1960.

The view that Japan became basically independent through the San Francisco Treaty was on the whole refuted by the 10th CC Plenum. As the Central Committee has already published much explanatory material and literature setting out the reasons why Japan cannot be regarded as having become basically independent through the San Francisco Treaty, there is no need for me to repeat it, but I will touch on a few points.

The changes after the signing of the San Francisco Treaty are evidenced by the following: that Japan has been integrated in name and reality into an international anti-Soviet, anti-China and anti-communist system in subordination to US imperialism; that Japan has become a sovereign state in name only and the overall occupation by US imperialism has been replaced by virtual semi-occupation; that the administrative power of the Japanese government has been expanded; that the tendency toward militarist and imperialist revival of Japanese monopoly capital has been accelerated and that the semi-occupation of

Japan has been legalized through the San Francisco Treaty and the Security Treaty, the legal form of this status. These changes have certain important significance and it is necessary to correctly understand their new international and domestic implications.

But it would be a grave fundamental mistake to make a one-sided overestimation of these facts, holding that subordination to the United states has been reduced to a partial status, or that Japanese monopoly capital has essentially recovered its independence. It is proper that in this respect all members of the Program Subcommittee until the 10th CC Plenum refuted the view that Japan has become basically independent; they confirmed the state of semi-occupation by US imperialism.

In defining the present state of Japan, the draft says, "Though a highly developed capitalist country, virtually Japan is now a dependent state, semi-occupied by US imperialism." Against this there is a view that Japan is an independent imperialist country, and another says that Japan is a dependent imperialist country with part of its sovereignty infringed. The latter view in short is that Japan is basically an independent imperialist country and is only partly subordinated to the United States.

To understand the present state of Japan correctly, it is necessary to approach the problem on the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The first point is to take the stand of Marx in his "Theses on Feuerbach" that "philosophers have only **interpreted** the world; the point, however, is to **change** it."

Secondly, Japan must be understood as part of the historical world antagonism and struggle between the two social systems after World War II. The present stage of Japanese capitalism and its international position cannot be grasped dialectically in its entirety and in its development merely by analyzing

Japanese monopoly capital within those confines.

Thirdly, the essence of the Marxist-Leninist theses on imperialism and national problems must be creatively applied to the Japanese revolution.

Nobody can deny that though Japan is an advanced capitalist country its national sovereignty is seriously violated. Although Japan is a monopoly capitalist country, it has no colonies in foreign lands or military bases in other countries. By contrast, Okinawa and Ogasawara have both been colonized by US imperialism and there are US military bases all over Japan. No one can deny that in this respect Japan is expressly oppressed by another nation. In addition, in general terms, monopoly capitalism is the economic basis of imperialism.

What then is the essential definition of the present status of Japan as a whole?

> "That is why the focal point in the Social-Democratic program must be that division of nations into oppressor and oppressed, which forms the **essence** of imperialism, and is **deceitfully** evaded by the social-chauvinists and Kautsky." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 21, "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination"*)
>
> "In this age of imperialism, it is particularly important for the proletariat and the Communist International to establish concrete economic facts and to proceed from concrete realities and not from abstract postulates in the solution of all colonial and national problems." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 31, "The Second Congress of the Communist International——Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions"*)

If we see the matter historically and specifically, it will be clear that under the new circumstances after World War II Japan has been transformed from a militarist and feudalistic imperialist country into the opposite——a dependent country oppressed by foreign imperialism—and in this state of subordination Japanese monopoly capital is moving in the direction of a militarist and imperialist revival. With regard to the revival of imperialism, some people argue that an imperialist country, which has been extremely weakened as a result of a defeat and foreign imperialism's rule, is gradually strengthened and recovers its prewar strength and prestige and that such a conception is only a quantitative definition. According to this view, it is the completion of the revival of imperialism, unconditionally regarding monopoly capitalism as imperialism, that monopoly capitalism, which has been weakened by defeat and foreign imperialism's rule, recovers its productive forces till it exceeds even the former level in concentration and centralization of capital, recovers the freedom to carry out an imperialist reactionary policy, and its former weight in the world imperialist system is restored.

Lenin says a lot about imperialism. First :

> "Colonial policy and imperialism existed before the latest stage of development of capitalism and even before capitalism itself. Rome, founded on slavery, pursued colonial policies and practiced imperialism." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 22, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"*)
>
> "Imperialist wars also occurred in the period of slavery (the war between Rome and Carthage was on both sides an imperialist war), as well as in the Middle Ages and in the epoch of mercantile capitalism. A war is certainly imperialist if **both** warring sides oppress foreign countries or nationalities, and are fighting for their share of the loot and for the right to "oppress and rob' more than the others." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 26, "Revision of the Party Program"*)

Of course, in this case Lenin does not agree with the view that regards imperialism as a mere policy, forgetting the fundamental differences in economic and social structure.

Secondly, Lenin writes, "If it were necessary to give the briefest definition of imperialism, we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism" (*"Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"*), and at the same time he writes about this definition, "...imperialism can and must be defined differently if we bear in mind, not only the basic, purely economic concepts, to which the above definition is limited, but also the historical place of this stage of capitalism in relation to capitalism in general, or the relation between imperialism and the two main trends in the working-class movement!". *(ibid.)*

And in a separate paragraph he writes, "...the deepest economic foundation of imperialism is monopoly" (*ibid.*), and further, "Economically, imperialism (or the 'era' of finance capital—it is not a matter of words) is the highest stage in the development of capitalism, one in which production has assumed such big, immense proportions that **free competition gives way to monopoly**. This is the **economic** essence of imperialism." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 23, "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism"*)

Thirdly, Lenin warns against confusion of the economic essence with the political tendencies of imperialism.

> "Imperialism forces the masses into this struggle by sharpening class contradictions on a tremendous scale, by worsening the conditions of the masses both economically—trusts, high cost of living—and politically—the growth of militarism, more frequent wars, more powerful reaction, the intensification and expansion of national oppression and colonial plunder." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 22, "the Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination"*)

> "...the specific political features of imperialism are reaction everywhere and increased national oppression due to the oppression of the financial oligarchy and the elimination of free competition,..." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 22, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"*)

Fourthly, regarding dependent countries as a transitionary form in history, Lenin says,

> "...it must be observed that finance capital and its foreign policy...give rise to a number of **transitional** forms of state dependence. Not only are the main groups of countries, those owning colonies, and the colonies themselves, but also the diverse forms of dependent countries, which are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence, are typical of this epoch." (*ibid.*)

Also as regards the forms of dependency, he says,

> "The characteristic feature of imperialism is the division of the whole world, as we now see, into a large number of oppressed nations and an insignificant number of oppressor nations which, however, command colossal wealth and powerful armed forces. The overwhelming majority of the world's population, more than a thousand million, very probably even 1,250 million people—if we take the total population of the world as 1,750 million—or about 70 percent of the world's population, is accounted for by oppressed nations, which are either in a state of direct colonial dependence or represent semi-colonies, as, for example, Persia, Turkey and China, or having suffered defeat at the hands of a big imperialist power, have been made greatly dependent on that power by virtue of peace treaties." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 31, "Second Congress of the Communist International, 2. Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions"*)

This series of Lenin's definitions were written before and after World War I. Therefore, now that the world socialist system has been established and consolidated and an imperialist war is no longer inevitable, the real stand of Marxism-Leninism is to apply creatively Lenin's theses in a really scientific revolutionary spirit. Lenin's sharp foresight explicitly pointed to the example of a civilized country which fell into a state of colonial dependence when German imperialism was defeated in World War I. In Japan after World War II the continuance of much greater dependence is found. The fundamental reason for this difference is the establishment of the world socialist system and the advance of the forces of the people and progress on a worldwide scale following the victory of the anti-fascist allies, to which US imperialism, distinguished for reaction, war and exploitation, stands opposed in the center of the imperialist camp; the Potsdam Declaration only half implemented by US imperialism, a virtual single-handed US occupation established, occupation and semi-occupation that includes the colonialization of Okinawa and Ogasawara, part of Japanese territory, which has continued for fifteen years since the end of the war, and the maintenance of US military bases in Japan is set for at least another decade under the new "Security" Treaty. This means that Japan's subordination to the United States with military oppression as the lever lasts over a quarter of a century. In this condition a new, historically unheard-of situation has appeared, in that Japan, a monopoly capitalist country, has subordination to the United States as its political feature.

Military and feudal imperialism in prewar Japan was economically monopoly capitalism and semi-feudal landlord ownership, and politically a possessor of colonies and oppressor of other nations, and oppression at home by the military-and-police Tenno system. This Japanese monopoly capitalism has been reorganized into subordination to the United States since the war and meanwhile Japanese monopoly capital has proceeded along the path of revival and consolidation. Monopoly capital, based on relentless exploitation of the working people, received aid from US imperialism, stole state funds, forcibly carried out the expansion of equipment, "technological innovation" and capitalist "rationalization" and consolidated monopoly and centralization. Productive forces have far surpassed those of prewar days, and Japanese monopoly capital has launched the struggle for the division of markets including the export of capital. In this sense, the draft shows that "economically it is acquiring imperialist features." But economically Japanese monopoly capitalism is still held not only in financial subordination to the United States, but is also subordinate in the trade structure with US investments in Japan four times as much as Japanese capital export, and some key industries such as oil, rubber, aluminum, etc. are directly in the hands of US capital. Politically, not only has it not yet recovered the prewar imperialist position in respect of possession of colonies and the establishment of political and economic domination, but also in strong subordination to the United States, its national sovereignty has been seriously infringed and the independent development of the country has been obstructed. This manifests itself in a state of affairs unparalleled in modern history, that diplomatic relations with China which prewar Japanese imperialism invaded have not yet been basically restored, mainly because of subordination to the United States even fifteen years after the war.

Therefore the definition in the draft on the present situation of Japan is the correct application of Marxism-Leninism. In the light of the historical process of postwar Japan, it is not correct to regard the index of completion of the imperialist revival only as a quantitative definition; the criterion should be

whether Japan has completed its transformation from a monopoly capitalist country, with subordination as its primary aspect, to a politically or basically independent monopoly capitalist country, that is, a country with independent imperialism as its primary aspect.

This is also clear from the fact that the Moscow Statement, the programmatic document of the international communist movement, clearly states that the task is "not to allow the revival of Japanese militarism". Again, as a more recent instance, it is clear from the following in the Joint Statement of the Delegations of the Parties and the Governments of the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued on July 10 on the occasion of the conclusion of the Soviet-Korea Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. "The Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot be indifferent to the occupation of Japan by the US armed forces and the military machinations by the US-Japanese ruling circles against its neighbouring countries. Both parties consider that the aggressive US-Japan Treaty concluded in 1960 was a step to further sharpen the tension in the Far East. The security of Japan itself and the interests of peace in the Far East strongly demand that Japan free itself from the yoke of foreign occupation, remove the bases of the foreign troops and take the path of genuine national independence and peaceful foreign policy." As these clearly show, the international communist movement does not define Japan simply as an independent imperialist country, but always defines the revival of militarism in the state of subordination to the United States in the political life of the world.

The independent task of the working class is to change the world; the essential task therefore at this historical stage for the social progress of Japan for the sake of the people is to remove the basic obstacles that hinder the independent and democratic development of Japan.

> "...from the standpoint of the basic ideas of Marxism, the interests of social development are higher than the interests of the proletariat—the interests of the working class movement as a whole are higher than the interests of a separate section of the workers or of separate phases of the movement;..." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 4, "A Draft Program of Our Party"*)

In Japan this means to fight against and overthrow the rule of US imperialism and traitorous and reactionary Japanese monopoly capital, to accomplish national independence and to establish the democracy of the people. The practical task of changing the world makes the united struggle against these two enemies inevitable. Therefore, the Marxist-Leninist analysis and prospect of the past, present and future of Japan must necessarily be followed by the definition of the situation given in the draft. If one takes the position of only interpreting the present situation in Japan, it is not impossible to say that Japan is subordinate imperialism in the sense that imperialism economically is monopoly capitalism. But as I have already said, in our opinion the draft definition most correctly sets out the present state of Japan in the sense of grasping the present state of Japan in a revolutionary sense, based on the essence of Marxism-Leninism aimed at changing the world.

At the same time, as regards the revision of the Security Treaty, the Draft points out that the Japan-US military alliance creates a serious danger to peace in Asia. One must not underestimate the fact that this Treaty has not only turned Japan into a US military base, but also has the character of an aggressive military alliance which obliges the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to actively participate in a US war of aggression. One must not make light of the revival of imperialism, that is, the increasing possibility of aggression and oppression

against other nations. But even allowing for this, the nature of the present situation is that it would be difficult for Japanese monopoly capital to light the fires of a war of aggression by themselves, but it has such a dangerous role as a junior ally of US imperialism.

It would be merely mechanical to immediately draw the conclusion from Japanese monopoly capital's pursuit of maximum profits that today's US-Japanese relations have contradictions, antagonisms and struggles as their basic aspect. This does not correctly observe the real evidences of this law. As we have seen, while involving contradictions and antagonisms with US monopoly capital, Japanese monopoly capital has pursued maximum profits in the relations, centered on the postwar subordinate alliance.

The argument that Japan has already become independent as an imperialist state simplifies US-Japan relations from the law of uneven development, apart from the fact that the antagonisms and struggles between the two social systems are the basic contradiction of world politics, and naturally fails to understand as laws the present characteristic relations between US imperialism and its subordinate allies, the infringement by US imperialism on the national sovereignty of developed capitalist countries, the sale of sovereignty of its own countries by monopoly capital of the developed capitalist countries allied with US imperialism and so on, as the Moscow Statement clarifies. This does not understand neither the role and significance of the San Francisco System, nor does it grasp the real nature of US-Japan relations as a subordinate alliance. That is why it could not but distort the basis of US-Japan relations according to its own conception and dogma, as if it were based on antagonism and struggle between imperialist countries. Furthermore, without any scientific ground, this argument mechanically holds an arbitrary and contradictory view, that for the present the allied relationship is the major aspect. This is because facts are stubborn and they had to recognize the fact.

4. The all-round analysis of present Japanese society clarifies the main enemies, tasks, driving force, character and prospect of the immediate revolution.

1) The Draft puts it in these terms:

> "Those who basically rule Japan today are US imperialism and its subordinate ally, Japanese monopoly capital. Though a highly developed capitalist country, Japan is virtually now a dependent country, semi-occupied by US imperialism."
>
> "The road to socialism as the historic mission of the working class can be opened with certainty only through a revolution that overthrows the anti-national, anti-popular rule of the forces centering on US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, who bar this road, and that achieves genuine independence and the far-reaching democratic transformation of politics, the economy and society."

It is US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital that hinder the development of the present Japanese society; they are united in oppressing the working class and the people of Japan. The main enemies of the revolution are these two.

2) The central task of this revolution is a revolution to overthrow the oppression and rule by these two enemies. These two tasks are connected. As US imperialism by its aggressive nature maintains and supports the rule of traitorous Japanese monopoly capital in order to keep Japan in the sphere of its military, political and economic influence, the rule of Japanese monopoly capital will never be overthrown. And as Japanese monopoly capital is the social support and class basis of the

rule of US imperialism over Japan, we cannot with certainty expel and overthrow the rule of US imperialism over Japan unless the rule of Japanese monopoly capital is overthrown.

3) These two basic tasks are different from each other but at the same time they form one issue.

For carrying out these major tasks, the draft sets out the main points of the Action Program. Taken as a whole, these tasks have the character of independence and democracy.

The motive power and driving force of this revolution is the struggle and revolutionary solidarity of the workers, peasants and all other sections of the people oppressed and exploited by the two enemies.

The draft says, "The National Democratic United Front against the rule of US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital will be based on the alliance between the working class and peasantry under the leadership of the working class, and rally around it the working citizens, intellectuals, women, youth, students, minor enterprisers and all those who love peace and their fatherland and defend democracy."

The monopolies, by their traitorous role on one hand, and by their immense monopoly, centralization and political arbitration on the other, are a contradiction of the nation as a whole; they are in conflict with and antagonistic to broad sections, including minor enterprisers; the class that will take the core role against them is the working class. The formation of a National Democratic United Front centering on an alliance between the working class and the peasantry is indeed the class basis for the establishment of revolutionary power.

4) On the nature of the immediate revolution, the draft says,

> "The revolution which Japan faces at present is a new democratic revolution, a democratic revolution of the people, against the two enemies—against the rule of US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital."

> "The coming revolution of our country in the stage of monopoly capitalism has the mission to lay the foundation for the transition to socialist transformation that aims at the overall abolition of the capitalist system. Namely, it has the inevitability to successively develop from a revolution with the main tasks of independence and democracy into a socialist revolution."

First, the revolution is thus a two-step continuous revolution from a democratic revolution to a socialist revolution. The power to be established after the overthrow of the rule of two major enemies through this revolution is the democratic power of the people; i.e., the democratic coalition dictatorship of the people centering around the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. A democratic state of the people thus established is the condition that will guarantee transition to a socialist revolution.

By stationing its armed forces in Japan, US imperialism suppresses the Japanese people, and has turned Japan into a base for war and oppression against the socialist states and Asian countries. Under these circumstances some argue that the question is not what power rules, but who wields state power and as Japanese monopoly capital holds this power "the revolution to overthrow it is a socialist revolution". This is subjective thinking, which, from the first, assumes that the problem of power in a dependent country is that of a basically independent country, and from this forms a one-sided conclusion.

It is a groundless assumption that rejects the national-liberation movement in general to contend that to overthrow or drive out the rule of foreign imperialism cannot be the object of a revolution because revolution is but the seizure of power from the ruling circles of the country. It is also groundless to argue that a national-liberation revolution is possible only in a colony or a semi-colony but not in a developed capitalist country; this is a theory that denies that a developed capitalist country can become virtually a dependent country under the rule of foreign imperialism. It is also a mistake, both historically and theoretically, to insist that the economy of a developed capitalist country is a single national economy and that its superstructure is a single state power, and that in this case there cannot be what is virtually a dependent country ruled by foreign imperialism. It is a denial of the Leninist thesis on the aggressiveness of imperialism that a powerful imperialist country can invade, subjugate and economically annex not only an agricultural country but also a developed capitalist country.

The overthrow of monopoly capital's rule in connection with US imperialism's rule in our country is a democratic revolution to overthrow the government and power of traitorous and reactionary monopoly capital, the ruling circles of the developed capitalist country acting in subordination to the United States; this is different from a socialist revolution, which aims at the abolition of the capitalist system in general and at the abolition of capitalist private ownership as a whole. In the struggle for the establishment of a National Democratic United Front Government, the democratic forces will fight not only for the nationalization of enterprises run by foreign monopoly capital but also for the people's control and democratic management of the monopolies, and the nationalization of key monopoly enterprises of their own country. The Moscow Statement makes it clear that these controls, restrictions and attacks upon the monopolies are of a democratic nature. The Statement states, "...the struggle for peace, national independence, the protection and extension of democracy, nationalization of the key branches of economy and democratization of their management...All these measures are democratic by nature."

Needless to say, such control and restriction on the monopolies are a serious blow to them, and it is a serious question whether they can maintain their political and economic rule. Naturally, this is a blow to the economic superstructure of the capitalist system.

Will US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, suffering such a serious blow, make concessions willingly to the pressure and demand of the democratic forces for a change in policies while still maintaining their power? Of course, as many events in the world revolutionary movement show, foreign imperialists and domestic traitorous ruling circles have made concessions to the upheaval of the people's struggle and to their demand for democratic reforms. It is favorable to the advance of the working class and the people to win such reforms. The Political Report of our Central Committee, refers to this.

But to win these reforms, as Lenin said, is on the whole only a by-product in the revolutionary struggle in general. It is only reformism to accumulate reforms for their own sake and to lose sight of their relation to the seizure of power——revolution and their rightful place. Though people's control of the monopolies and nationalization of the key industries are demands that are democratic by nature, we cannot but expect strong resistance from the monopolies, as this is a serious blow to them as seen from the standpoint of seizure of power.

It is necessary to establish the democratic power of the people to ensure its realization. The people's control of traitorous monopoly capital, including the necessary nationalization of the monopoly enterprises, is one of the tasks of a democratic nature before a socialist revolution; democratic power is needed to ensure the implementation of these measures themselves.

When we consider the process of overthrowing the government of monopoly capital and establishing a National Democratic United Front Government, the question of power cannot be avoided. The formation of a national democratic cabinet on government does not yet mean the establishment of revolutionary power, but is a step toward power, the establishment of a bridgehead for power.

The formation of such a government is in itself a deep political crisis for the reactionary forces, and also an approach to a revolutionary crisis and the deepening of such a crisis. This national democratic cabinet or government will naturally consolidate the National Democratic United Front, defend the continued existence of such a government or cabinet from every attack of the reactionary forces, inevitably secure power according to the relations of force and to the situation, and aim at the establishment of a revolutionary government.

This power, of course, is anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly democratic power to drive US imperialism out of Japan and overthrow the rule of the monopolies, the central task. At the same time, the establishment of power and the fulfillment of anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly democratic tasks create the conditions for transition to a socialist revolution, a transitory stage toward socialism.

The argument that the overthrow of the rule of the monopolies will naturally develop into a socialist revolution, and therefore it is a socialist revolution, fails to understand the significance of the comprehensive fulfillment of the anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly historical struggle in Japan, the significance of the essential historical stage and the lack of understanding of the theoretical and practical course set out above.

This is a democratic revolution of the people, with the working class as the core. It is a new democratic revolution, an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly democratic revolution. It will be a victory of a wing of the world anti-imperialist united front, and historically is of world significance in building a powerful peace stronghold in Asia.

IV

In these three years the party has made great progress in the mass movements and party building. As the struggles against the Police Duties Law, the "Security" Treaty and the Political Violence Prevention Bill, and the Miike strike show, the party has fought for a powerful rise in the great mass movements with the correct outlook and has taken a big part in developing massive united actions of the people and rallying a united front. In these struggles, the working class and the people have fought courageously, with historical results such as the prevention of mal-revision of the Police Duties Law, the overthrow of the Kishi Cabinet, the prevention of Eisenhower's visit to Japan, the banishment of U-2 planes from Japan, the heroic struggle centered on the Miike coal-mine workers against rationalization and for defense of the democratic rights and the prevention of passage of the Political Violence Prevention Bill. Through these struggles, a united front organization——the national joint struggle body of democratic organizations, including the Communist and Socialist Parties, centering around the struggle against the Security Treaty, and local democratic joint struggle bodies amounting to some 2,000 throughout the country——was formed.

These struggles were a serious blow to the rule of US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital and caused serious uneasiness in the basis of their rule. As the resistance of the people in the biggest stronghold of US imperialism, the ringleader of world reaction in Asia, the struggles have also strengthened the international anti-imperialist united front and contributed much to peace in Asia and the world.

The Moscow Statement, the programmatic document of the international communist movement, pays a tribute to the Japanese people's struggle against the revision of the Security Treaty, and many fraternal parties throughout the world have encouraged and supported the struggle against the Security Treaty and other recent struggles of the Japanese people as an active contribution to the struggle against the aggressive policy of US imperialism and for world peace and the liberation of nations.

In his speech at the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party in June 1960, Comrade Khrushchov said,

> "You know very well that millions of the Japanese people have risen against the US invaders with contempt and hatred. In short, in the countries out of which the US imperialists have not yet been driven, the anger of the people is running high and the resistance is getting ripe. Everybody knows that a thunderbolt follows lightning.
>
> "Perhaps you know that the Japanese people continued a strong protest movement against the Diet ratification of the so-called Japan-US Security Treaty and President Eisenhower's visit to Japan and finally succeeded in making the Government call off its invitation to President Eisenhower to visit Japan.
>
> "The Japanese people slammed the door in face of the unwelcome guest from the United States and showed to the whole world their heated hatred against US imperialist policy and its agent in Japan, Nobusuke Kishi. The Japanese people are fighting to relax international tension and to put an end to 'the cold war' by fighting against the foreign military bases in their own territory. We hope the Japanese people will succeed in abrogating the unequal treaties and agreements imposed upon them..."

Comrade Mao Zedong said at a meeting with the delegates of the democratic organizations of Japan visiting China in May 1960 :

> "The new Japan-US 'Security' Treaty is intended to suppress the broad Japanese people and it is an aggressive military alliance treaty hostile to China and the Soviet Union and to the Asian peoples. It is a serious menace to Asian and world peace, and at the same time it will inevitably bring grave calamities to the Japanese people. The peoples of China and Japan, the Asian peoples as well as the peace-loving peoples all over the world, should all oppose this treaty...The Japanese people are now waging a gigantic struggle against the Japan-US military alliance treaty. In their struggle against the treaty, the Japanese people are daily raising their consciousness and the number of awakened people is increasing. The Japanese people have a great hope in their future. The Chinese people have firmly supported, now support and will support the just patriotic struggle of the Japanese people."

Many fraternal parties of the world have encouraged and supported the struggle against the Security Treaty and other recent struggles of the Japanese people as an active contribution to the struggle of nations against the aggressive policy of US imperialism and for world peace and national liberation.

Due to the relation of force between enemy and friend and to the present state of political and organizational growth of the democratic forces, the ratification of the revised Security Treaty and the dismissal of Miike workers could not be prevented, but the epoch-making significance of these historical struggles is not in the least lost on that account.

The Political Report of the Central Committee to this Congress makes a precise and detailed analysis of these struggles. What place should these struggles take in the programmatic outlook of the party?

The 7th Party Congress adopted the Political Program part of the draft Charter as the draft of the Congress, and left its final decision to the future, but this does not mean that all the theoretical and political issues discussed on the programmatic problem were left unsettled in the conclusion of the Congress. The main point left to be resolved was the nature of the coming revolution.

By reason of the agreement on the definition of the present situation and the tasks resulting from the discussion in the Congress, the Political Report, including the definition of the present situation, was adopted and the basis of the Action Program of the draft Charter was adopted as the "Action Program". There was also the condition for deciding the Political Program as a whole as the draft of the Congress.

The Political Report adopted by the 7th Party Congress describes the new features of the situation as follows:

> "During the past ten years important changes have taken place with the radical changes and development of the international situation as the background. Their main features are that the US occupation system in Japan has been replaced by semi-occupation by the United States and the San Francisco System whose content is the virtual dependent status of Japan, that Japanese monopoly capital has revived and strengthened while subordinating itself to the United States and that the democratic forces have greatly developed among the Japanese people. And the present domestic features are that US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, in spite of their growing mutual contradictions, have consolidated their connection, have launched attacks upon the working class and the people and that antagonism and struggles between reaction and the democratic forces have reached a new intense stage.
>
> "It is a serious problem that they are spreading among

> the Japanese an illusion that Japan has become a completely or basically independent country, by means of the switchover of the US occupation system to the San Francisco System, the postwar development of Japanese capitalism, the revival and consolidation of Japanese monopoly capital and their bourgeois nationalist policies."

In this way, while regarding the present stage of Japan as semi-occupation by US imperialism, the state of a country that is virtually dependent and has not basically attained independence, this decision says, "Japanese monopoly capital is heading for an imperialist revival."

On the enemies against whom the Japanese people have to fight, the Political Report to the 7th Party Congress says :

> "The party must point to the correct form of struggle against US imperialism which destroys the happiness and peace not only of our people but of all people, and against its followers, the reactionary forces centered on the traitorous monopoly capital."

These are the tasks in the struggle of the Japanese people against the two enemies. In discussing the Program in the Congress, though there were differences of opinion on the strategic target and the nature of the revolution, the course agreed upon by the overwhelming majority of both the Subcommittee and the Congress was that the struggle for national independence from US imperialism and the struggle against the monopolies are the two major tasks in the present revolutionary struggle. Therefore, as there was a certain course for agreement, the basis of the Action Program in the Program part of the draft Charter was adopted as it was.

This Action Program naturally emphasizes such tasks for national independence as breaking down the San Francisco System, the abrogation of all traitorous treaties and agreements, the return of Okinawa and Ogasawara to Japan, the

withdrawal of the US forces, the complete removal of the US military bases, as well as for world peace and the struggle against preparations by the US imperialists and the Japanese reactionary forces for a war of aggression. And the Report (1) on the Program question correctly pointed out that.

> "Though the nature of the San Francisco System is a betrayal of peace and the Japanese nation, monopoly capital intends to make some 'adjustment' according to the changes in the situation, leaving its nature unchanged, thereby to dodge the discontent and struggle of the people. Besides this, under the disguise of 'bilateralization' of the Treaty, monopoly capital is contemplating even a plan to impose on the Japanese armed forces the duty to move to a war in the interests of US imperialism."

As early as the struggle against mal-revision of the Police Duties Law, ahead of others the party pointed out the scheme to revise the Security Treaty. The basis on which the party quickly and clearly grasped the new attacks of the two enemies, sounded a warning to the people and advanced toward the well-known great struggle along with the democratic forces, was the fact that we followed the correct definition of the 7th Party Congress about recognition of the present situation, the struggle against the two enemies and the specific struggle tasks. It was the same as the basic stand of the draft Charter.

At the 3rd, 6th and 11th CC Plenums we resolutely pushed the upheaval and advance of successive mass struggles from the struggle against the Police Duties Law to the struggle against the Security Treaty. The premise for these policies was, of course, the grasp of the present situation and the course of struggle shown in the Political Report and the Action Program of the 7th Party Congress.

This is clearly shown in the following analysis of the nature of the revision of the Security Treaty.

> "The direction of the revision which has already been clarified is to evade the demand of the people for national independence by making some formal bilateralization, and in essence to make it more difficult for Japan to become independent. It is an extremely dangerous course not only in preserving the nature of the San Francisco System, a war and subordination system, but also particularly in militarily binding Japan more closely to the US strategic setup." (*The decision of 3rd Plenum*)

In drawing up these struggle policies, the Central Committee of the party has consistently rejected the view on the revision of the Security Treaty held by the Trotskyites and revisionists that Japan has become basically independent through the San Francisco Treaty, that the revision of the Security Treaty is a step of independent Japanese imperialism toward equality with the United States, and that the basic feature of the Japan-US relation is antagonism and struggle. This is basically incompatible with the basic political line of the 7th Party Congress of our party. The tactics based on this wrong view on the revision of the Security Treaty were inevitably "the one-enemy" theory which demands a struggle only against the Japanese monopolies. And precisely on this point, the Trotskyites, right-wing social-democrats and revisionists, in spite of their character differences, are in accord in opposing in practice the political line of our party.

We have resolutely continued the struggle against the two enemies, fighting constantly against the danger of these wrong views penetrating the party and the party leadership. Promptly putting up the slogans not only for the overthrow of the Kishi Cabinet but also the prevention of Eisenhower's visit to Japan, the party submitted them to the National Council against the Revision of the Security Treaty and succeeded in having them

made the common policy of the working class and the people of our country. The democratic forces staged big protest demonstrations at the US Embassy and against Hagerty's visit to Japan, to say nothing of the repeated demonstrations to the Diet and the Government. It was the uncompromising struggle of the Japanese people against the two enemies that forced Hagerty to admit that it was the biggest demonstration in the countries he had visited.

In the last three years we have witnessed the constant development of the heroic struggle of the people of Okinawa Prefecture, and the struggles against the missile base at Niijima, against turning Japan into a US military base, against turning Japan into a missile base and against nuclearization of the Self-Defense Forces. These are but a fierce struggle against US imperialism and reviving Japanese militarism. It is the struggle for national independence, democracy and peace.

For these three years the party has fought constantly, upholding the demands of the people of Okinawa Prefecture for independence, democracy and peace as consistent struggle slogans, relating these to the struggle against the revision of the Security Treaty, the struggle for its abrogation and the struggle against nuclear armament. In 1959, we took the initiative in the struggle against mal-revision of what is literally a slavery Comprehensive Criminal Law in Okinawa, that includes the brutal death penalty, making this the concerted voice of the democratic forces. The protest struggle of the people of Okinawa rose so high that the US imperialists had to announce its indefinite postponement. In spite of betrayal by the traitorous bourgeoisie and right-wing social democrats there, the people of Okinawa have fought consistently against US imperialism and the traitorous reactionary circles, their cry against the brutal and dark rule of US imperialism for return to the fatherland and against the nuclear armament has become louder and wider in its reach and is growing into one mass united action.

The present state of Okinawa under the colonial rule of US imperialism can never be transformed by demanding changes in the policies of the Japanese Government nor by the struggle against monopoly capital, as is claimed by "the one-enemy" theoreticians who regard the Japanese monopolies as the main enemy. In fact, the permanent occupation of Okinawa by US imperialism will be undermined only by a constant struggle against US imperialism by the people of mainland Japan and Okinawa acting as one body, aiming at the breakdown of the San Francisco System, including abrogation of Article 3 of the San Francisco Treaty under which the United States occupies Okinawa. When it is linked with the systematic struggle against nuclear war preparations by US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, including abrogation of the Security Treaty, the removal of US bases from Japan, and opposition to the entry of US warships into Japanese ports, naturally it can be developed into a patriotic and just solidarity action of the whole Japanese people.

Some consider that the struggle of the people of Okinawa Prefecture is an exceptional struggle, less related to the general situation of the working class and the people of Japan. They insist that they can accomplish a socialist revolution by overthrowing the Japanese monopolies as the strategic target since Japan has become an independent imperialist country, and the possession of military bases in Japan by the US forces is due to the voluntary intention of Japanese monopoly capital, and this does not prevent Japan from becoming a socialist country, even if Okinawa and Ogasawara are left in the hands of the United States, as was the case with Taiwan of China.

According to advocates of this argument, the return of Okinawa and Ogasawara to their fatherland and the abrogation

of Article 3 of the San Francisco Treaty, which is the day-and-night aspiration of the Okinawa and Ogasawara people, will never be achieved; it will allow US imperialism to stay safely in Okinawa and never enable Japan to take the path to socialism.

The fact is that even now there are tens of thousands of US imperialist soldiers in Japan, with command of the air and sea and military control of Japan, and that colonial rule of Okinawa and Ogasawara is maintained with the fundamental aim of turning Japan as a whole into a military base, preventing the voluntary, united and peaceful development of Japan and checking the liberation movement of the Japanese people. It is clear that the actual legalization of the systematic subordination of Japan to US imperialism is articles 3 and 6 of the San Francisco Treaty, which approve of the occupation of Okinawa and Ogasawara and the stationing of foreign troops in Japan.

It is by no means incidental that Prime Minister Ikeda, who was moved to tears to have been treated on an "equal" footing in the United States, did not demand the return of Okinawa and Ogasawara to Japan on an "equal" footing.

The struggle in Okinawa demonstrates the correctness of our political line and the basic stand of the draft Charter, and at the same time resolutely rejects the programmatic attempt to fundamentally reject the struggle against the two enemies and the breaking down of the San Francisco System. For this reason, this line of struggle is the only correct way to accelerate the liberation of Okinawa and Ogasawara and the liberation of Japan proper. I am happy to inform you as comrade delegates that the people fighting at the head of the democratic forces in Okinawa enthusiastically support the draft Program of our party.

The 3rd and 6th CC Plenums clarified the connection between the two struggles, for revision of the Security Treaty and against "rationalization" from the basic stand of fighting the two enemies. It became the party's basic policy in the Miike strike.

> "The struggle policy against 'rationalization' has been advanced by the party since the 3 rd CC Plenum. Today's question is how to clarify the mutual relation between revision of the Security Treaty and the rationalization offensive, and to understand the two struggles by unifying and developing them. The present rationalization offensive is to promote both the consolidation of the Japan-US military alliance in subordination to the United States and the revival of Japanese imperialism, keeping a close relationship with the revision of the Treaty." (*Resolution of the 6th CC Plenum*)

The upheaval of the struggle against the Security Treaty was in fact a great encouragement to the Miike workers, and strengthened the consciousness of solidarity throughout the country. The party strove to strengthen political and organizational fighting power by making the Miike struggle one of the joint tasks of the National Council of the Joint Struggle against the Security Treaty, and by correctly grasping the struggle against dismissal and rationalization in connection with the fight against the Security Treaty, aimed at strengthening on the spot the unity and cohesion of the Miike Workers. The party made it a consistent policy to strengthen the political and economic united action of all the workers, while developing the Miike struggle as a united industrial struggle of mine workers, and to make the Miike struggle one of the tasks of the National Council of the Joint Struggle against the Security Treaty. And it clarified the interconnection between the Japanese Government's energy policy of subordination to the United States and the question of revision of the Security Treaty and the San Francisco System, refusing to allow the

theory of the decline of the coal industry to be made a pretext for capitalist rationalization.

Only according to this policy was it possible to advance the continuous development of the Miike struggle more favorably and the nationwide anti-rationalization struggle in connection with the nationwide upheaval centered on the struggle against the Security Treaty. With regard to the first Fujibayashi mediation proposal, the party center expressed a correct attitude, and had the Convention of the Japan Federation of Coal Miners' Unions unanimously reject it and stick to the correct stand to the last when a defeatist policy was suggested that would leave the matter unconditionally to the mediators in the face of the second mediation proposal.

The Miike struggle, as the Political Report states, was an immortal heroic struggle even though it could not prevent the dismissals. It displayed indomitability and militant initiative to defend the life and rights of workers as a great mass struggle and mass movement. The main lesson from the struggle is that the greatest stronghold for defense of the life and rights of workers is to strengthen the mass struggle and united action, consolidate the national and local joint struggle bodies including the JCP, the SPJ and trade unions, and fight to expose the true color and policy of the two enemies—the real enemies of the working class and the people—as one wing of the whole people's task.

While talking as though they recognize the mass struggle and resistance struggle, some right-wing social democrats and revisionists in fact do not do much about defending the unity of the workers and people and the actual struggle; they go so far as to speak as if the lack of tactical leadership based on "structural reform" was the main defect. But this is completely wrong. Just take the Niijima struggle for example. It kept the fighting energy of the Miike workers so strong for such a long time and gave much encouragement to the working class of Japan that this kind of defeatist, opportunist tactical leadership that proposed a "political armistice"—the tactical line based on the "structural reform" theory in Japan—was not so influential in the Miike struggle.

The confidence that, judged from the work of the last three years the basic position of the draft is correct, was emphatically expressed in the whole party discussion by the overwhelming majority of comrades, who have fought for and expanded party strength.

The Central Committee presents the analysis of the present situation and the prospect of revolution in the draft, based on the examination of the work of these years of great struggles and the advance of the people and party, as the Political Report also makes clear.

V

Judging from the recent theoretical and practical development of the international communist movement we can also be sure of the correctness of the basic stand of the draft Program. In 1957, when our draft Charter was published, the historical Declaration of the communist and workers' parties of twelve socialist countries was published in Moscow, and the draft Charter was in basic accord with the Declaration on the analysis of the international situation, particularly the role of US imperialism, the immediate historical tasks of highly developed capitalist countries under the strong influence of US imperialism, and the possibility of peaceful transition in revolution. This can be found in the theses on the Program Question in the Report of the Central Committee.

In this respect, we should recall that an unsigned article on the Moscow Declaration published in "Communist", the theoretical organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stated about a series of program documents of communist parties including the draft Program of our party, "They are permeated with the spirit of creative Marxism-Leninism and have wholly adopted the concrete national and historical conditions and peculiarities." Our Central Committee, in preparation for the 7th Party Congress, learning more from the lessons of the Moscow Declaration and making use of it in the resolutions of the Congress, adopted a resolution in the Congress which unanimously supports the "Declaration" and the "Peace Manifesto" of the Moscow Meeting.

The greatest historical event in the international communist movement in the three years since the 7th Party Congress is of course the result of the Moscow Meeting of 1960, participated in by representatives of 81 communist and workers' parties.

The Central Committee Plenum of our party adopted resolution expressing full support to the "Statement" and the "Appeal to the Peoples of All the World".

Regarding the 1957 Moscow Declaration and the Appeal for Peace, the Statement said, "These program documents of creative Marxism-Leninism determined the principled attitude of the international communist movement on the most important issues of our time and promoted in a great measure the concentration of the efforts of the communist and workers' parties in the struggle to achieve common goals. They remain the militant banner and guiding star for action for the whole of the international communist movement."

As is well-known, the Moscow Statement of 1960 made an analysis that is fruitful in developing the 1957 Declaration, covering factors that determine the substance and features of our time, the main substance, trend and characteristics of the historical development of human society. The Statement gave a profound analysis of the general questions of war and peace, the new stage in the development of the socialist system, the struggle against colonialism, struggles in capitalist countries, etc., based on a summary of the struggles of these three years.

There is no need for me to repeat the parts quoted from the Statement, as I believe all comrades can well remember these important theses.

The powerful symphony running through these theses sounds the triumph of communism in the world, the victorious prospect of the world socialist system and the movements for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism. The Soviet Union, the most powerful stronghold for world peace, successfully carrying out the construction of a communist society, the rapid advance of socialism in the People's Republic of China, which dealt a shattering blow on the position of imperialism in Asia with its successful revolution, and the socialist countries forming the powerful socialist camp—we have the conviction and prospect of living at a time when this world socialist system is becoming the decisive factor in the development of human society.

At the same time, this does not make light of the fact that the fulfillment of the respective independent and important responsibilities for national liberation and revolution in their own country by the peoples and the vanguard parties of the working class, the Marxist-Leninist Parties which have not yet seized power, is extremely important in determining the direction of the development of human society. The Statement clarifies this.

> "All the revolutionary forces are rallying against imperialist oppression and exploitation. The peoples who are building socialism and communism, the revolutionary movement of the working class in capitalist countries, the national liberation struggle of oppressed peoples and the general democratic movement—these great forces of our time are merging into one powerful current that undermines and destroys the world imperialist system. The central factors of our day are the international working class and its chief creation, the world socialist system. They are an earnest of victory in the struggle for peace, democracy, national liberation, socialism and human progress."

The international working class and its creation, the world socialist system—these two occupy the center of the stage as the creative promoters of the development of human society. The Japanese working class, too, bears a serious responsibility as a wing of the international working class.

> "The Communist Parties decide on the prospects and tasks of revolution according to the concrete historical and social conditions in their respective countries and with due regard to the international situation. They are waging a selfless struggle, doing everything under existing conditions, without waiting until socialism triumphs, to defend the interests of the working class and the people, improve their living conditions and extend the democratic rights and freedoms of the people. Knowing that the brunt of the struggle for the liberation of its people from capitalist oppression rests upon it, the working class and its revolutionary vanguard will press forward with increasing energy in the offensive against the domination of oppressors and exploiters in every field of political, economic and ideological activity in each country."

It is the working class and its revolutionary vanguard, fully conscious of "the brunt" of the struggle for the liberation in their own country that they must bear, who can understand for themselves the features, content and trend of the development of human society of our time, and can work correctly by combining proletarian internationalism as a wing of the international working class and patriotism to fight for the happiness of the people of their own country.

The growth and development of the world socialist system are exercising an increasing influence in the struggles of the peoples for liberation, and are creating more favourable conditions for the struggle, in economic construction, and in foreign policy for peace and against colonialism. But we must keep in mind that the superiority of the forces of socialism and peace over imperialism and war on a world scale is one thing, but the inferiority of the forces of the peoples of unliberated countries to the ruling circles in each respective country is something else. Precisely because the reactionary forces wield power in unliberated countries, the people of such countries are not yet liberated, which means that the revolutionary struggle to completely change this relation of force rests upon the shoulders of the vanguard of the working class.

In the Political Report to the 7th Party Congress and in the draft Charter, the Central Committee, correctly and coordinately understood the prospect of change in the international situation making it more favorable for socialism, peace, national liberation and democracy, and that the responsibility for liberation of our own nation rests chiefly on the working class and the people and the efforts of the party, and theoretical, political and practical struggles carried out from this point of view. Consequently, as was shown by the struggle against the Security Treaty, the party made an important contribution to the advance of the working class and the peoples of our country and to the consolidation of the international anti-imperialist peace front.

In this respect the stand of the draft Program coincides fully with the content of the Moscow Statement.

The draft Charter, the Report on it, and the Political Report to the 7th Party Congress gave an analysis and estimate of the rule of US imperialism over Japan and its relation with Japanese monopoly capital. The analysis of US imperialism in the Moscow Declaration published two months later was basically in agreement with our analysis.

Since the 7th Party Congress, our Central Committee has repeatedly and consistently analyzed the relations between the two enemies—that Japanese monopoly capital has started out on the road of an imperialist and militarist revival by subordinately allying itself with US imperialism, and by trying to maintain its security against the mounting struggle of the peoples of the socialist countries and Japan, by its subordination to US imperialism. The Central Committee has shown that Japanese monopoly capital has not yet achieved its imperialist independence and is in a state of virtual subordination to US imperialism, though it has set out on an overseas expansion policy in subordination to US imperialism.

This confirms Lenin's prediction made before World War II that an imperialist country will be turned into a virtually dependent country of another stronger imperialist country as a result of defeat, and at the same time demonstrates by such historical and concrete developments of Japan that Japan's subordination to the United States is deep-rooted, as the many military bases and the present situation of Okinawa and Ogasawara show.

In regard to the most pressing problem of today, the issue of war and peace, the Moscow Statement pointed out that "US imperialism is the main force of aggression and war", and gave special attention to the problems of Japan and West Germany as war bases in East and West.

> "The US imperialists are busy reviving the hotbed of war in the East. Trampling upon the national independence of the Japanese people and contrary to their will, they have, in collusion with the Japanese reactionary ruling circles, imposed upon Japan a new military treaty which pursues

> aggressive aims against the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and other peace-loving countries."
>
> "In the opinion of Communists the tasks which must be accomplished first of all if peace is to be safeguarded are to stop the arms race, ban nuclear weapons, their testing and production, dismantle foreign war bases and withdraw foreign troops from other countries, disband military blocs, conclude a peace treaty with Germany, turn West Berlin into a demilitarized free city, thwart the aggressive designs of the West-German revanchists, and prevent the revival of Japanese militarism."

Of course the Moscow Meeting did not specially place the question of Japan on the agenda, but it clarifies, as a comprehensive analysis of international politics, the importance of preventing the revival of militarism in Japan, the most powerful war base of US imperialism in Asia.

Concerning countries under strong US imperialist influence, the Moscow Declaration of 1957 states:

> "In those capitalist countries where the American monopolies are out to establish hegemony and in countries already suffering from the US policy of economic and military expansion, the objective conditions are being created for uniting, under the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary parties, broad sections of the population to fight for peace, in defense of national independence and democratic freedoms, to raise the standard of living, to carry through radical land reforms and to overthrow the rule of monopolies who betray the national interests."

The Moscow Statement of 1960 makes this thesis more specific and sets it out as follows:

> "In some non-European developed capitalist countries which are under the political, economic, and military domination of US imperialism, the working class and the people direct the main blow against US imperialist domination, and also against monopoly capital and other domestic reactionary forces that betray the interests of the nation. In the course of this struggle all democratic, patriotic forces of the nation come together in a united front fighting for victory of the revolution aimed at achieving genuine national independence and democracy, which create conditions for passing on to the tasks of socialist revolution."

In the literature of the 7th Party Congress and the consistent policies pursued by the Central Committee since then, it has been made clear that although Japan is a developed capitalist country at the stage of monopoly capitalism, it is in a state of subordination to the United States, and in the programmatic prospect since the draft Charter the party has also made clear the path of development into a socialist revolution from a revolution on the central tasks of independence and democracy. The revolutionary line of the party coincides with the theses of the two programmatic documents of the international communist movement. These theses are significant as a new theoretical formulation by creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the new problem, that the achievement of a democratic revolution in a developed capitalist country creates conditions for a socialist revolution.

As regards a democratic revolution, the anti-imperialist anti-feudalist democratic revolution in colonies, and the democratic revolution against the absolutist Tenno system and for land and freedoms even in a developed capitalist country in prewar days have been considered typical. Of course some social democrats in Japan have stuck to their unrealistic dogma, that there can never be development from a democratic revolution to a socialist revolution, but apart from this, the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution has paid careful attention to the problem of stage-by-stage development and the continuous development of revolution since Lenin's "Two Tactics." In the new situation after World War II, the development from a democratic revolution to a socialist revolution was seen in those countries where the semi-feudal remnants of economic relations were not dominant and which had reached the stage of monopoly capitalism. One was the path from the national democratic revolution to the socialist revolution which started in 1945 in Czechoslovakia; that was the development of the democratic revolution against German imperialism and the traitorous, reactionary monopoly bourgeoisie into a socialist revolution. Another was the anti-fascist popular revolution of 1945 in Germany; that is, the evolution of a socialist revolution from the anti-monopoly democratic revolution. The experiences of these two revolutions are of great, universal significance as a creative application of Lenin's spirit by the working class in those countries according to their respective conditions, that "...the proletariat cannot prepare for its victory over the bourgeoisie without an all-round, consistent and revolutionary struggle for democracy." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 22, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination"*) Our party also creatively applies Lenin's teaching according to the conditions in our country. The epoch-making significance of the above-quoted thesis of the Moscow Statement of 1960 is that it assessed this as one of the programmatic prospects of the international communist movement.

As is generally known, while referring to the thesis of a country of the type in which the main blow is against the whole system of state-monopoly capitalism, if it will proceed from an anti-monopoly democratic revolution to a socialist one, or will proceed directly to a socialist revolution, is not defined by the Moscow Statement. This is a question to be determined by the parties of each respective country according to their own

historical and actual conditions. Therefore in interpreting this thesis, the interpretation that it exclusively means a socialist revolution does not hold good. This is clear from the fact that there is a party which poses the anti-monopoly struggle as a task of the democratic struggle, which marks a present historical stage, and in connection with the task to establish democratic power of the people, shows the prospect of proceeding to a socialist revolution from that.

VI

1. As for Shojiro Kasuga and other anti-party revisionists and divisionists, Daily Akahata has already published the detailed countercriticism of their attack on the draft Program of the party. Their attack follows completely the same note as that of those few revisionists who have been attacking the political line of the party for a year in publications outside the party. It has much in common with the attack of the right-wing current of social democrats on our draft Program. The anti-party factional activities of Shojiro Kasuga and some others are arrayed against the draft Program on various pretexts and hysterically pour out abuse and slander. There is no evidence of strength or firmness in their stand. On the contrary, it is footless wriggling of those who were isolated in the whole party work for these three years, who have betrayed the results of the international communist movement and are on the verge of bankruptcy.

The Political Report and Action Program adopted at the 7th Party Congress to some extent contained the basic theses of the draft Charter except on the question of the character of the revolution. Shojiro Kasuga and his followers approved the Political Report and the Action Program, or at least expressed an attitude of approval. After that, the Central Committee organized the Program Subcommittee that included him, and the discussion continued there. They also approved the following summary of the subcommittee discussion which was unanimously approved at its meeting immediately before the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee: (1) from the beginning, the view that "Japan is basically independent" had already been overcome in the 7th Party Congress and was not in question, (2) unanimous agreement was reached on the point that "Japan is virtually in a state of a dependent country, semi-occupied by the USA", (3) after discussion all members agreed that "independence is a strategic task", (4) through about twenty rounds of discussion, certain proximity of views was attained and the content of the discussion was deepened. In this sense the discussion made progress as a whole, (5) nevertheless while the majority of the Subcommittee supported the view of the draft Party Charter, a minority took the view that the next revolution would be a socialist revolution (6) the discussion made it clear as Lenin had pointed out that "Revolution is a problem of power", the key to solving the Program problem was how to grasp the problem of power, especially, of Japan.

At the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee not only Kasuga's theory but also Naito's and Hara's articles in "Unity and Advance" were criticized. Hara's view that at present the stage of revolution of all countries, including Asian and African countries, is a socialist revolution, was pointed out as an error in principle contrary to the theory of revolution based on Marxism-Leninism and he was compelled to express his willingness to withdraw his article. Naito also withdrew his view that through the San Francisco Treaty Japan has become basically independent. At the 10th CC Plenum, unity around the intention of the Central Committee made such progress.

Later, however, as Noboru Sato and others developed their

anti-party publicist activities outside the party, they discarded the stand they had unanimously reached at the meeting of the Subcommittee and degraded it to the same position as that of Sato and others. That the 16th CC Plenum lasted for more than twenty days shows that the party center guaranteed democratic discussion and made unparalleled efforts to reach a common view. But it did not succeed. This is because they were not only bogged down in the impractical formalism of the "Sato Theory", but also increased the danger of becoming fixed as a faction, taking advantage of the long duration of the Central Committee Plenum, keeping in factional contact with each other secretly under various pretexts from the party machinery and encouraging each other. Nevertheless, the Central Committee Presidium took such a positive attitude for the introduction of minority views at the 16th CC Plenum as to propose, on its own initiative, the measure already announced in the special issue of Akahata.

Most of them, however, made reverse use of this sincere, well-intended proposal of the Presidium and formed a conspiracy to factionally reconstruct their position which had been defeated in the 16th Plenum. The scheme was that, availing themselves of the guarantee for expression of their views, they would start an anti-party campaign of slander against the political line and practice of the party, such as never had been posed, systematically sharing roles. This is clearer now that they have openly revealed their factionalist nature for subversion of the party. There had already been whispers spread among a few members outside the party center that Kasuga and others had "won" the condition for expressing their views, or that the publication of Shojiro Kasuga's view would lead to a split in the party. If we compare this with the fact that other problems reported only to the Central Committee were spread by a few anti-party elements who later deserted the party, were punished by the party and took part in the anti-party activities of Kasuga and his colleagues, it is very evident that Kasuga was the center of those sinister anti-party activities. Moreover, the existence of a clear factional conspiracy among them was demonstrated by several "inexplicable" instances; Shojiro Kasuga and Rokuzaemon Yamada perfectly agreed with each other when in their written opinions they stressed problems that had never been posed in the discussions of the 16th Plenum; and ignoring the time-limit, Yamada informed Kasuga in advance of submission of his papers.

As clearly seen from the decision of the 16th Plenum, that in publishing the dissenting opinions, the views of the Central Committee would be added to it, the views to be expressed in these written opinions should have been limited to the content of their previous speeches or expressions centering around the opinions expressed at the 16th Plenum. Nevertheless, against the self-evident principle of democratic centralism and collective leadership, that functionaries of the central machineries should pose only such problems as are necessary for the entire party through the collective discussion of the Central Committee, most of them, Kasuga, Kameyama, Nishikawa, Hara, etc., attempted to misuse this chance to the maximum in order to pursue their selfish, factional design in defiance of the principle of whole party unity. Only on the major premise of maintaining party unity can intra-party democracy be assured on the principles of democratic centralism. Though foreseeing the danger of their divisionist aims, the party center planned to take and did take measures to publish some of their submitted written opinions as contributions to our organs in order to conduct the discussion as democratically as possible. Kasuga's written opinion on the draft Program was, on the whole, quite abusive and basically poor in content, but taking into consideration the fact that he was the chief opponent of the draft Program at the

previous Congress, it was decided to publish his view. Measures were taken to give pages in the August issue of the "Zen'ei," a special issue for the coming Congress, to the articles of Naito and Uchino as "theoretically" representing opposing views, though they contained considerable irresponsible abuse. When Kasuga was informed of these measures, he declined the offer and of course his article was not printed.

Judging from these facts, it was due to their own irresponsible actions of conspiracy that the decision of the 16th CC Plenum, which the Presidium of the Central Committee proposed on the principle of democratic centralism in order to conduct maximum democratic discussion before the Congress, had to be changed to the policy adopted at the 17th CC Plenum. Fundamentally, this is the responsibility to be borne by those who deviated from the decision made in the 16th CC Plenum and attempted to misuse it from the viewpoint of individualism as the first principle. By the decision of the 17th CC Plenum, the Central Committee rightly guarded the party center against their intrigue and against the error of liberalism. It is doubly deceptive to conceal their cherished ambition to disturb the party by misrepresenting the facts in order to falsify the present state of affairs, that they were not supported by the majority of the party.

2. What then is the anti-Marxist-Leninist nature of the "theory" of those who have degenerated into anti-party elements, now expelled from the party? As for this, since the party center's detailed criticism has been already published in the special issue of Akahata, I will just briefly touch on its characteristic features.

First, as shown typically by Shojiro Kasuga's article in the December 1957 issue of "Zen'ei", their views not only fail to understand the aggressive nature of US imperialism, but they even embellish it by actually placing undue, well-intentioned expectations on it. In his article he repeatedly gives a unilateral emphasis that US imperialism will not be able to reject the abrogation of the US-Japan Security Treaty, and the revision and abolition of the San Francisco Treaty if a democratic government demands this, and says that if a people's government is formed, "the removal of military bases, the withdrawal of the occupation forces and the return to Japan of Okinawa can be lawfully demanded and the US Administration will not be able to turn down such demands."

The developments in Laos and Cuba and the suppressive measures to interfere with the election of Mr. Senaga as Mayor of Naha, Okinawa, show that the imperialists do not so readily give up their aggression or intervention; it is an opportunist estimate of the aggressive nature of imperialism to assert a priori that the demands by democratic government before the acquisition of power "cannot be rejected."

As stated in the Moscow Declaration, this is opportunism rooted in a submissive attitude to the imperialist pressure, resulting from the failure to look straight at the true nature of the enemy, and evading the struggle against it. The establishment of people's power is indeed the fundamental earnest for the realization of democratic demands made on the United States.

Secondly, his view, as typically revealed in his "Zen'ei" article on revolution with peaceful transition as the only course, is a complete degeneration to the social-democratic view. Our party has consistently taken the same stand as set out in the Moscow Declaration, that realization of the possibility of peaceful transition accords with the interests of the working class and the entire people and with our national interests, and naturally strives to realize this, but also maintains the correct stand, that the course of the struggle does not depend on our intention alone but on the attitude of the enemy. In words, Shojiro Kasuga says that his theory "does not imply the necessity of peaceful transition", but actually he tramples on the thesis of the Moscow Declaration. His theory plays the role that while calling for anti-monopoly struggles in words actually fails to face up to the traitorous, reactionary, ferocious nature of monopoly capital, and unilaterally embellishes and beautifies it. Therefore, as for its source, this opportunism originates domestically from the influence of the bourgeoisie, and internationally from surrender to imperialist pressure. So he comes out with a thoroughly social-democratic "revolution theory", which insists that the expulsion of US imperialism is guaranteed without the establishment of the people's democratic power in a process from the establishment of a democratic united front government to a socialist revolution, or that a gradual, lawful, democratic piece-meal transition to a socialist revolution is guaranteed as "the only course."

Kasuga doubly and trebly exposes his anti-party, anti-class nature when he slanders the party's draft Program in his paper published on his desertion from the party, saying that the draft Program "follows the line of the program of 1951, the era of Molotov cocktail". Our party abolished the so-called '51-Program with due procedure, and this implies that the party does not accept the view in the '51Program that totally denies the possibility of peaceful transition. Our party knows, from the proposition agreed to in the international communist movement, the dialectics of class struggle, that the form of transition cannot be determined by the intention of the people's side alone. At the same time it goes without saying that the party strives to promote conditions to realize the possibility of peaceful transition by strengthening the unity of the people—by strengthening the united front and the party as a whole.

Therefore, to regard this draft Program in the same light as the '51 Program is evidently an ill-willed distortion, but the fact that he has gone so far as to do such a thing shows his degeneration into the complete social democratic theory on the one hand and, on the other, his mean intention to provoke the reactionary forces to suppress our party.

Thirdly, Kasuga, with his recent assertion that peaceful coexistence is the strategy of world revolution, poses as an enthusiastic supporter of the peaceful coexistence policy of socialist countries, while talking as if our party makes light of the peace struggle. The true aim of this abuse is nothing but smuggling in the Socialist Party's policy of "being friendly both with the United States and with the Soviet Union". It is nothing but a theory of compromise with the imperialist aggressors, under which the nations of colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries are invaded and oppressed by the imperialists, dissolves the national-liberation struggle into the peace movement in general, yet one-sidedly restricts their struggles and in reality preaches "peaceful coexistence" in the name of world strategy, leaving the present relations between the oppressor and the oppressed unchanged.

Needless to say, our party maintains that the struggle for peace is not only the world policy of the world socialist system, but also the primary task of all peoples. But the world strategy theory held by Kasuga and his followers to erase the strategic significance of the national-liberation struggle, tramples the Moscow Declaration underfoot in the name of petit-bourgeois pacifism.

Fourthly, he sticks moreover to the dogmatic position that the overthrow of monopoly capital is possible only by a socialist revolution and fails to creatively apply the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution to the reality of Japan. After all, in substance, he completely rejects the anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly democratic revolution, and the anti-monopoly democratic revolution stored in the treasury of the Marxist-Leninist revolution theory that has been tested historically and theoretically by the international communist movement. In words, the antimonopoly democratic revolution is something recognized, but in principle, the anti-monopoly democratic revolution as a historical stage is rejected by regarding the anti-monopoly democratic revolution as the first stage of a socialist revolution. From this comes the disregard of an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly democratic revolution as formulated in the Moscow Statement of 1960 as a type of the revolutionary struggle in capitalist countries, and the refusal to apply it to Japan.

Fifthly, he himself put his theory into practice, a theory that revises the organizational principle of the Marxist-Leninist party into a petit-bourgeois discussion club. In his article in "Zen'ei" he stated something that seems to be rational, that differences of view within the party are natural and help to vitalize the party, but the question is how to deal with them. This appears to have reason, but contains many obscure and misleading points. The existence of differences of opinion within the party does not justify an opportunist theory against the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The Party Constitution provides for reservation of opinion which implies that there may be differences of opinion. But this must not obscure the extremely important task and the possibility of a Marxist-Leninist party achieving theoretical and ideological accord through criticisms, thus overcoming views that are mistaken in principle. At the same time, on daily practical questions, accord should be reached through proper and necessary compromise and concession. Differences of view should not be fixed, but should be resolved in a practical principled way. Some anti-party elements, using the pretext of freedom of open criticism within and outside the party, are trying to justify their open attacks on the party in non-party publications, and distributing papers of criticism of the party within the party. This is revisionism trying to transform the party into a petit-bourgeois party contrary to organizational principles.

The Moscow Statement lists an attempt to transform the party into a petit-bourgeois debating club as one feature of modern revisionism.

Shojiro Kasuga and his followers are clearly taking this road.

What Shojiro Kasuga has insisted on and carried out through his repeated vacillations, in conflict with the principles achieved by the efforts of the whole party through struggle and in unity since the 7th Party Congress, betrays the revolutionary tradition of the party and the revolutionary movement of our country, as well as the position of unity in proletarian internationalism and patriotism.

3. Yamada, Naito, Nishikawa, Kameyama, Uchino, Hara, etc. who, following Kasuga, started activities to split and disturb the party and to destroy the 8th Party Congress, not only take over Kasuga's fundamental errors, but reveal an immense variety of unprincipled errors and kinds of opportunism. As for Naito and Uchino, their "theoretical" spokesmen, detailed criticisms have already been offered in Akahata, so I will confine myself to a brief comment on their views.

Firstly, in his article in "Unity and Advance", Naito subjectively formulated four possibilities of the international situation, and at the 10th CC Plenum his idealist schematism was criticized and he himself confessed to subjectivism in this combination. Nevertheless, in his recent article he repeats his schematic, one-sided view on the possibilities of preventing

world war and the danger of world war, and attacks the draft Program as eclecticism from that position.

(a) Unable dialectically to recognize the possibilities set out in the Moscow Statement, of preventing war and the danger of war of aggression, he considers that to point out the danger of war is eclecticism which denies the possibility of preventing a war and discourages the effort for this. This is alien to the dialectics of the struggle that strengthens the possibility of preventing world war by correctly looking at and combating the danger.

> "World war can be prevented by the joint efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national-liberation movement, all the countries opposing war and all peace-loving forces." (*The Moscow Statement*)
>
> "The broadest possible united front of peace supporters, fighters against the imperialist policy of aggression and war inspired by US imperialism is essential to preserve world peace. Concerted and vigorous actions of all the forces of peace can safeguard the peace and prevent a new war." (*ibid.*)

Incapable of theoretically understanding this position, they are confused.

(b) Truth to tell, the reason why he sticks to this error is that he tries to dissolve the struggle for the overthrow of US imperialism's aggression and rule in our country and for expelling the imperialists, into a diplomatic question, into international affairs or the world peace movement in general.

In his article in "Unity and Advance" Naito says, "the course to exclude the rule of foreign imperialism through the struggle for peace defense", that the "international affairs should be solved by democratic, peaceful methods" or that "even under the occupation, the exclusion of foreign imperialism's rule should be achieved by democratic and peaceful methods and the party should have laid down the basic line in that direction."

Here we see the kinds of errors in principle, such as the mechanical confusion of international affairs with the task of the revolutionary movement of the people of one country, and mechanical fusion of the possibility of preventing world war and the peaceful transition of revolution. This leads to "wait and see" opportunism, which virtually dissolves the struggle against US imperialism into expectations placed on the international peace movement in general. According to them, the policy of neutrality to break down the Japan-US military alliance is bound to remain the peace movement in general without the anti-imperialist struggle or expectation placed on change of policy by the monopolies.

(c) Unable to see correctly the connection between the struggle to strengthen the world forces of peace on one hand, and the world socialist system and revolutionary movement in each country on the other, Naito cannot subjectively realize that the development and consolidation of the world socialist system and the consistent pursuit of peaceful coexistence policy are the important mainstay of world peace, nor can he realize that the revolutionary struggle and the struggle for national liberation and socialism of the people of each country are heavy blows on the imperialist oppressors. Therefore the ground of his argument that US imperialism will withdraw before the establishment of people's power has its root-source chiefly in his wait-and-see attitude, which hopes that as the world forces of peace grow stronger the US imperialists will withdraw.

Secondly, in the same article, Naito says, "In reality Japanese monopoly capital is monopoly capital demanding 'imperialist independence', abolition of the occupation system and independence." This viewpoint is that monopoly capital's

pursuit of profits and increased productive forces are unilaterally or chiefly connected with monopoly capital's demand for independence. This fundamentally distorts the important characteristics of the capitalist world of today, which were stressed by the Moscow Statement; that is, US imperialism's infringement on the sovereignty of developed capitalist countries and the alliance concluded by the monopoly bourgeoisie of a capitalist country with US imperialism at the expense of the sovereignty of their own country is to oppose the world socialist system and the struggle of the people of their own country. Simultaneously it completely loses sight of the historical and concrete nature, the long range and depth of subordination to the United States, found in the relations between the United States and Japan after World War II. He is unable to take a general view of this aggressiveness, because he conceals and beautifies their treachery. That monopoly capital aims at overseas expansion of its own accord is connected with the maintenance of the allied relations of subordination to US imperialism. In conclusion, his view is in harmony with the keynote of the group of revisionists who, from the unevenness of the development of capitalism, infer that the basis of the present Japan-US relations is antagonism and strife. Here, his view is a theory not only of concealment and embellishment of the aggressive nature of US imperialism, but also concealment and embellishment of the traitorous character of Japanese monopoly capital.

Thirdly, Naito argues that independence means the recovery of the sovereignty of our country and the recovery of "existing" state power. According to him, the "existing" state power is the state power of monopoly capital. This is nothing but a theory of expectation placed on imperialist independence of the monopolies. It is nothing but bourgeois nationalism that cannot see the problem of power from the standpoint of the working class. The path of imperialist independence of monopoly capital leads to increased aggression and reactionary politics and cannot provide a real solution to subordination to the United States. That is why our party is fighting in opposition to the two enemies, to overthrow their ruling power, expel them and establish a new type of state power vested in the people, to establish a democratic state of the people. Taking this establishment of a new type of state power as denial of the existing state, they charge us with the theory of the fall of the state, because they base themselves on the bourgeois-nationalist anti-class theory of state power.

Fourthly, in his article in "Unity and Advance", Naito says that under the rule of the US occupation after the War, even before the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, state power was in the hands of the monopolies, so the character of the revolution was socialist, and an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly revolution is out of the question, and that class relations, the prerequisite to decide the strategy of revolution, suffered no change by the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty. Nishikawa also repeated the same thing in his article in "Unity and Advance". At a time when US imperialism, with its overwhelming ruling power, politically, economically and militarily ruled postwar Japan, when monopoly capital, to ensure its class security and pursuit of profits, followed a policy of subordination of its own accord, and when its machinery of suppression, while keeping the aspect of safeguarding its class interests, as a whole openly strengthened its role as auxiliary machinery of US imperialism, it is the typical error of idealist formulation of rule and power in Japan to maintain such a strategy of revolution. And his argument has fallen into conservative, mechanical dogmatism in asserting that in Japan the strategies of anti-imperialism and of anti-monopoly are contradictory and incompatible with each other. Though he

had to admit the bankruptcy of his theory at the 16th CC Plenum, he has fallen into a deeper error by trying to reconstruct his own idealist schematism by a new method, instead of reconsidering his error in a constructive way.

Fifthly, as for the question of how to grasp present Japan, in other words, when they analyze the society of Japan, they do not analyze it in connection with the features, trends and contents of our time and with competition and struggle between the two world systems, but can only grasp it in isolation, therefore abstractly, separated from the totality. From such an analysis they one-sidedly and formalistically dissolve the inner conradictions of Japanese society into class contradiction in general, and hence abstractly absolutize the direction of imperialist independence as the law of self-movement of Japanese monopoly capitalism. This metaphysical method hinders unificative elucidation of the present situation and the contradictions of Japanese monopoly capitalism in connection with rule over Japan by US imperialism, the mainstay of world reaction. This is a non-scientific attitude, incapable of comprehensively applying various Leninist theses on world imperialism to actual conditions of Japan. In the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and in the Moscow Statement of 1960, examples of practical analysis and prospect are given of capitalist countries under the strong rule or influence of foreign imperialism. The stand of our party's draft Program is completely in accord with the attitude of these analyses and the prospect of the international communist movement. That they all agree that the draft Program does not analyze Japanese society by the inner law of monopoly capitalism, is not only because they have lost the world vision, but because they obstinately stick to a firmly implemented idealistic grey view, that the rule of foreign imperialism is only a secondary factor. Needless to say, we do not argue that the rule of foreign imperialism will permanently continue as a law or that only the law of such rule controls the development of Japanese society. The defeat of world imperialism is historically inevitable, the same as is the rule of Japanese monopoly capital. The question is how to accelerate it by the practice of the world revolutionary movement and how to win the victory of the working class and the people. In this respect, their attitude is only a stand that will frustrate the effective defeat of the two enemies which hinder the development of Japanese society.

Sixthly, on the ground that state-monopoly capitalism is a stage of capitalist development that is bound to grow directly into socialism without any intermediate stages, they claim that the coming revolution is a socialist revolution. This is, practically, a mechanism that cannot elucidate why in Germany the anti-fascist popular revolution in 1945 started as a democratic revolution under statemonopoly capitalism. In prewar Japan, state monopoly capitalism also existed, but revolution took the course from a bourgeois democratic revolution to a socialist revolution. Of course it is not correct to indiscriminately deny the possibility in some countries of socialist revolution as the next historical stage. But they try to deny the view of the draft on the ground that state monopoly capitalism indiscriminately gives birth to socialist revolution. This is completely mechanistic. They hold such a mechanistic theory because they share the social-democratic view, that national liberation is not a strategic target but that revolution in a capitalist country is, of necessity, a socialist revolution, and on top of this because they do not see the meaning of political revolution. Moreover, they try to justify their view by quoting Lenin, but Lenin elucidates this problem under revolutionary-democratic power as follows: "Now, try to **substitute**, for the junker-capitalist state, for the landlord capitalist state, a **revolutionary-democratic state**, i.e., a state which in a revolutionary way

destroys all privileges and does not fear to introduce the fullest democracy in a revolutionary way, and you will find that, under a really revolutionary-democratic state, state-monopoly capitalism inevitably and unavoidably implies a step, and more than a step, towards Socialism!" (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 25, "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It"*)

Lenin says that under revolutionary democracy, nationalization of the monopolies is a step or more than a step forward towards socialism. The question is that the issue of the establishment of such a revolutionary-democratic power is the central question of the revolution in our country. They maintain, without thinking of the problem of power, that since state-monopoly capitalism is the highest form of socialization of productive forces under capitalism, the revolution under it should naturally be a socialist revolution. Here they prove themselves to be "imperialistic economists" who are incapable of subjectively grasping the problem of revolution as that of power.

Seventhly, they fundamentally share the view of the recent right-wing tendency of the Japanese social democrats which maintains as the pretext for rejecting an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly democratic revolution, that transition to socialism under state-monopoly capitalism is carried out through "structural reform". At the time of the 16th Plenum they could only passively defend the "structural reform" theory of the social democrats, but recently they have substituted their "socialist revolution through democratic reform" for "structural reform" and contrapose this to our party's draft Program. Their view is, in essence, that it will remove the anti-imperialist struggle from the strategic targets, that US imperialism will withdraw from Japan at the stage of a united front government under the monopolies' power, or even before that, and that it will be possible to execute the "structural reform" or "democratic reform" which transforms the structure of monopoly capitalism and proceeds to a socialist revolution. This is based on the prospect of inflicting a heavy blow on the two enemies and winning serious concessions from them without the establishment of people's power. In the final analysis, it has much in common with a sort of empty, gambling theory, which in the expectation of goodwill and concessions from the enemy power, theoretically denies the necessity to guarantee by democratic power the achievement of democratic tasks, a theory spread about by the right-wing trend of the social democrats of our country. At the same time, it agrees with the theory of socialist revolution through accumulation of reforms.

Moreover, they doubly misinterpret the passage of the Moscow Statement referring to "democratic reforms and the overthrow of the power of the monopolies", arguing that this is applicable to all state-monopoly-capitalist countries. This is firstly because they falsify the indisputably clear description of the Moscow Statement regarding the revolution in developed capitalist countries such as Japan under the strong rule of US imperialism. They are not in the least inclined to listen to the creatively formulated collective intelligence of the international communist movement concerning such a revolution. Secondly, unlike their interpretation, the quoted passage "for democratic reforms and the overthrow of the power of the monopolies" which they arbitrarily distort, does not at all mean mere accumulation of democratic reforms and exclusively a socialist revolution as a stage of revolution. The passage implies the establishment of democratic power by a thoroughgoing struggle for democracy, that is, the development of an anti-monopoly democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, as clearly shown by the practice of the world revolutionary movement.

Eighthly, even in their articles before they made their factional activities open, they had already abandoned their effort to be faithful to facts and logic and had gone so far as to unconcernedly make senseless abuses in attacking the draft. For example, Uchino attacks the draft, saying that it does not propose nationalization of monopoly enterprises, but, quite clearly in the "Fundamentals of the Action Program" of the draft, it is emphasized that after the overthrow of monopoly capital's rule, the party fights "to prevent the restoration of the political, economic rule by monopoly capital." He also uses abusive language, speaking as if the draft Program opposes the slogan against nationalization of monopoly enterprises on account of shares of monopoly enterprises owned by a large number of citizens, and that the stand of the draft is after all such a vulgar view. Availing himself of some deficient views expressed during the discussion of the Central Committee, he meanly draws a forced inference as if that is the stand of our party's Central Committee as a whole. They attack the emphasis laid on the struggle for independence from US imperialism as bourgeois nationalism, without basing themselves on Marxism-Leninism at all; thus they share the stand of some social democrats who slander the Draft.

What does this state of affairs mean? In an attempt to find new ground after the 16th CC Plenum, after their erroneous views were completely refuted and defeated in the discussion of the Central Committee; they are eventually compelled to degenerate from strained interpretations and abuse or the systematization of theoretically and practically deeper errors to counterrevolutionary, anti-class split and provocation.

Ninthly, Kasuga and others opposed the party line before they started open factional activities. At heart, they were opposed to the political line adopted by the 7th Congress. In the Central Committee they attempted first to prevent the materialization of the line of the 7th Congress by opposing, whenever possible, the proposals made by the Presidium. When this became impossible through the discussions of the Central Committee, they then took the attitude of reluctantly following the decision. But in the 14th CC Plenum, when the 8th Party Congress was close at hand, their true intention came to the fore. In the discussion of the drafts for the Congress at the 16th CC Plenum they were driven into the contradiction that it meant the failure of their "theory" to frankly recognize the positive result of the party leadership after the 7th Party Congress. Therefore, like Naito, they made a distortion as if the neutrality question, the question of a democratic coalition government, etc. were bankruptcy of the "Party Charter line", or drew water into their own mill by arguing that the anti-monopoly struggle was missing from the struggle against the Security Treaty. But in the 16th CC Plenum they were not able to make any further attack.

As a result, when the 16th CC Plenum made the decision to accept publication of opposition and reserved opinions, they, especially Shojiro Kasuga, used the publication of those opinions as an opportunity to directly call on the entire party, and to develop an intra-party situation favourable to them and launched a complete rejection and slanderous attack on the party leadership, none of which they had ever raised before. This is the clearest manifestation of the abuse and slander thrown on the draft Political Report in the latter half of Shojiro Kasuga's written opinion. In this, he irresponsibly charged that the party leadership was guilty of claptrap. Another example is Nishikawa's written opinion that denies and tries to nullify party activities in the postwar labour movement, and maintains that this led to the views in the draft. Hara's written opinion took up the question of the atomic reactor in Osaka, insisting that it was a decisive error for which the party center's guidance is responsible. Yamada, in his written opinion, takes up

the world strategy theory of peaceful coexistence, which he had never mentioned in CC Plenums, and suddenly, with Kasuga, began to speak as if the worst defect of the draft is that it has not taken up this matter.

Even though they opposed the party center's leadership, as they were members of the Central Committee, they should have submitted the problems to discussion by the Central Committee. In case their views were rejected after discussion, it was still possible for them to express their own views at the Party Congress, or before the Congress in some appropriate way or other. But since they abandoned this organizational principle of the Marxist-Leninist party and took up their own individual interests or of their factional group above everything else, they made nothing of the spirit of whole party unity and the principles of collective leadership. They did not realize that they were isolated from the overwhelming majority of the party because of their theoretical errors, defects in their party practice after the 7th Party Congress and their disloyalty to the party. On the contrary they went so far as to abuse the party, saying that support of the draft by the overwhelming majority of the party was brought about by the bureaucratic leadership of the party center. They are blind to the fact that by the advance of mass struggles and the rapid growth of the party in these three years, the overwhelming majority of the party is more strongly convinced of the correctness of the political line of the party set out in the draft Program. Such is the path that all anti-party elements cling to, when they degenerate from the party and class stand into petit-bourgeois individualism.

Tenthly, Lenin says, ".....every more or less 'new' question, every more or less unexpected and unforeseen turn of events, even though it may change the basic line of development only to an insignificant degree and only for the briefest period of time, will always inevitably give rise to one variety of revisionism or another." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 15, "Marxism and Revisionism"*)

This position of Lenin applies fully to the work of Shojiro Kasuga and his followers. They tried to make every new phenomenon into material for attacking the principles of Marxism-Leninism and their creative application to Japan. It is inevitable that, faced with the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty, J.F. Kennedy's appearance as US President and the "structural reform" theory of the Socialist Party, etc. they have deepened their revisionist confusion and vacillation. They were under the marked influence of Noboru Sato's theoretical works as a revisionist when they deviated into confusion from the unanimous conclusion at the Program Subcommittee before the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee.

They had no desire to learn from the two program documents of the international communist movement as they are, but stuck to intentional misinterpretations and sophisms, following the example of Sato, their theoretical predecessor.

Comrades,

So far we have seen the "theoretical" features of Kasuga and his followers, who have written a page of shameless treason and disturbance in the history of the revolutionary movement of the party. Here we see a weird combination of modern revisionism, dogmatism and divisionism. In the course of their subversive activities against the party based on petit-bourgeois individualism, they will increasingly diversify and differentiate their errors, but in their future can only be contempt from the party and other revolutionary workers, and the anti-class, counterrevolutionary catastrophe of their theoretical and practical contradictions.

Under the banner of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, we will destroy every opportunist counter-

revolutionary theory within and outside the party, together with the Japanese people fighting as resolute fighters against US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital. The basic standpoint of the draft Party Program has been tested in the unprecedented mass struggles based on the line of the 7th Party Congress, and in the entire party's struggles against revisionism, Trotskyism, and theories of the right-wing social democrats.

It is of great significance for the further advance of the party that the 8th Party Congress decides the correct Program with the support of the overwhelming majority of the party. A party without a program for revolution means a ship without a compass. With the Program, the party will be able to establish its theoretical, practical leadership as the vanguard of the working class, and consolidate the unity of the party in theory and practice.

The rich three-year work of the party, the political line laid down through it, the basic correctness of the party leadership based on it, the precious and great programmatic course and lessons of the international communist movement—all these show that the party has the conditions for deciding the Program. That is why the comrades of the overwhelming majority of the entire party are watching the 8th Party Congress in support of the basic position of the draft Program and in expectation of its adoption.

Decision on a militant program for the Japanese revolution will not only be a great weapon in the hands of the party, but also be a great contribution to the working class and people of Japan and the world forces for peace and progress.

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON DISCUSSION OF DRAFT PROGRAM

Made on behalf of the
Central Committee at the 8th
JCP Congress, July 27, 1961

On the Draft Program, many comrades have actively expressed their opinions, all of which are in support. These comrades, who include comrades with a long active career, a new comrade who joined the party only fourteen months ago, and those who could not support the Political Program part of the draft Party Charter at the time of the 7th Party Congress, have expressed enthusiastic support. They said that they reached this by learning from the experience of these three years and from the achievements of the international communist movement, and based on their firm confidence in the party center gained in the course of the struggle. They also say that they reached their position through theoretical reappraisal of the draft Program, supported by their confidence in the basic line of the party since the 7th Party Congress and the correct leadership of the party center. We are very glad that the draft Program and the Report on it by the Central Committee have been approved by all speakers.

There is particular satisfaction in the fact that the three comrades of the Central Committee who had been against the draft or had reserved their opinions, took a principled attitude toward Shojiro Kasuga and other anti-party elements, and have expressed positive support of the draft, enabling the Central Committee to present the draft Program to the Congress with complete unanimity. There is great significance in this. At the 18th CC Plenum these three comrades were united in support of

the expulsion of Shojiro Kasuga and his followers from the party for their anti-party acts. In our opinion, this is closely related to the fact that these comrades now stand in support of the position of the Draft. It clearly demonstrates that in case there are differences of opinion and complicated questions in the party, the attitude of a communist and the foundation of party unity is resolutely to defend the unity and principle of the party.

In our opinion these comrades themselves have proved that if we take the attitude, based on this unity, of listening to the majority of the Central Committee and to the sincere voices of the comrades representing the 100,000 members of the party, theoretical and ideological unity will be surely possible.

At the same time, the fact that the Central Committee has been able to come to the vote on the draft Program with complete unanimity shows that the Congress has done its best to win unity as firm as possible at this time. There is positive significance in this for the future advance of the party and for our future struggles to be waged under the banner of the new Program.

Moreover, as a large number of comrades from Hokkaido, Fukushima and other prefectures have said, what we all have been able to understand through the speeches of comrades is that the discussion on the draft has been actively conducted by a far greater number of branches than at the time of the 7th Party Congress. This means that the draft has not only been better understood, but also more fully discussed as the basis of that understanding. Conditions were guaranteed for all party members to take part in discussion. The discussion was correctly carried out on the principle of democratic centralism of the entire party. The reports of our comrades clearly show that what Shojiro Kasuga and other traitorous elements have been vigorously saying—no democratic discussion has been conducted and only those who hold the view of approval have been unilaterally elected delegates—is nothing but shameless demagogy and slander. On the other hand, our comrades' reports have clearly shown the conviction formed in the course of the struggle of these three years, confidence in the party center which has arisen from it and the conditions thus created for the entire party to accept the draft Program. In this respect, it is therefore our great pleasure to have been able to convince the entire party that the discussion of the draft Program has been correctly and systematically conducted on the principle of democratic centralism.

In the discussion, many positive opinions have been given on the importance of the problem of the struggles against revisionism. Many comrades have pointed out that those who stick to revisionism in theory and do not rectify their attitude of trying to put their own views above the party or the majority of the comrades will inevitably fall into revisionism, liberalism and dispersionism in the organizational principle. This is of extreme importance. In their speeches, many comrades stated that they tested their own views in the struggles of these three years. Irrespective of their views at the time of the 7th Party Congress, comrades who have taken such an attitude have willingly taken part in the whole party's unity in this 8th Party Congress today. But those who held wrong views at a certain period have not yet taken the attitude of testing their views in whole party practice, and modestly reflecting on themselves, but as has been clearly proved by those traitors, have eventually degenerated into class enemies, joining the opposite side of the class struggle.

Linking themselves theoretically with revisionism and dogmatism, a number of anti-party deserters have even gone so far as to join organizational liberalism and divisionism, or substituting a petit-bourgeois party for the vanguard party. It

is a characteristic feature of today that they are not only theoretically mistaken, but also tied to errors in organizational principle. On the contrary, as most of their speeches have shown, those comrades who at the time of the 7th Party Congress were skeptical and unbelieving on party activities prior to the previous Congress and could not be fully confident in the then party center, but stuck to the principle that a party member has to fight in unity, following the line of the Congress and the Central Committee, are now attend here as theoretically and practically valuable party members in unity. The Congress has given us such a lesson.

In this respect, a major aspect of the party in these three years is that an overwhelming majority of our comrades have proceeded in the direction of unity along the correct line, have fought the historical struggle against the Japan-US Security Treaty through their efforts and have achieved the result of our doubled membership. Some petit-bourgeois individualists have fallen off from the development of the entire party by sticking to their erroneous views to the end. This turning point has become clear in this Congress. The treacherous Shojiro Kasuga and his clique say that this is a re-emergence of the 1950 question, but the situation today is completely different from that of 1950, when the Central Committee was virtually in a state of dissolution under suppression by the enemy. Now a regular Central Committee elected by a regular Congress is at work, and the overwhelming majority of the party are united under the line of the 7th Party Congress and its Central Committee. Under these conditions, they have betrayed the party and are trying to continue their shameless subversive activities against the party.

It is a fundamental error for them to think that a time will come when their actions will be found to be unimportant. It is evident that they are anti-class traitors in practice as well as in theory whose cursed actions can never be erased.

They themselves wrote of "temporary secession from the party", but whatever they may think, in our opinion we must resolutely declare in the name of the 8th Party Congress that the common sense of the communist party and communists the world over and the common sense of the revolutionary proletariat of Japan will never forgive such shallow quibbling.

We must resolutely fight against them theoretically as well as practically, and march forward guided by the new Program. But at the same time, as regards future problems, we should take a correct attitude toward minority opinions in the party. As regards comrades who still take the attitude of reservation or opposition toward the draft Program due to inadequate theoretical and practical examination and consequent lack of full understanding of the line of the Program, we must talk with them in a comradely way, persuade them and correct their lack of understanding, and as long as they observe the organizational principle of the party and are ready to resolutely combat betrayal, a communist, if anything of a communist, should do this irrespective of theoretical and ideological views.

We must draw a sharp line between these comrades and those who violated the organizational principle of the party, deserted the party and are continuing factional activities. We must make every effort to correctly point out wrong views as a problem of theory and ideology and help them so that they may take a correct line and gain proper understanding. It would be wrong if we simply treated these comrades in the same way as those who degraded themselves into becoming anti-party elements only because their views on the problem of theory or the Program are the same as or near to the minority opinion which formerly existed in the Central Committee. So long as they are communists, those comrades who do not forget

the principle of unity and organizational principle will surely be able to re-examine their own views. I believe, therefore, that even after the adoption of our new Program we should clearly distinguish those comrades who have minority opinions from the anti-party elements and deal with this problem in the correct way.

I want particularly to call on these comrades through this Congress. I hope they will take part in the unity of the entire party, adhering to communist modesty, recalling the fresh determination with which they joined the party and studied Marxism-Leninism, with the determination to fight throughout their lives with lofty pride as communists, without being deceived by the demagogy of those who have now become nothing but a gang of shameful traitors. I should like to appeal to the entire party on this through this Congress.

As to the theses of the Program, I need not confirm them, as we are all in accord. A number of proposals have been made on various points while supporting the draft. We asked comrades for positive proposals so that the draft may be more perfect. We received various suggestions in the three months before the Congress. Among them are many proposals about words and expressions. We have tried to make necessary improvements with due consideration of all these suggestions. We explained and examined each and all of these concrete proposals in the Compilation Committee elected today at the Presidium meeting. Of these dozens of proposals, 24 were submitted to the Congress, while more than 40 were brought up before the Congress.

We made a careful study of each proposal and took up what should be adopted. Although a considerable number of them are terminological, we think it necessary to report them to the Congress for approval as they are related to the Program. They have been taken up in order to make the Program more perfect by adopting as many positive suggestions as possible. Mainly they consist of problems on words and phrases and of course do not affect the fundamental contents.

As to the form of the Program, you know that it was in the form of a draft Party Charter at the 7th Congress, of which that part on rules and the basis of the Action Program in the Political Program part were already adopted respectively as the "Party Constitution" and the "Action Program" at the 7th Party Congress. So it is proper, we think to submit this draft independently as the "Program".

Lastly it is our great pleasure that this programmatic conclusion which has formulated the experiences of the struggles of the party and people in the past three years as the Program is in complete accord with the line of the international communist movement, and is founded on the support and unprecedentedly great and strong unity of the overwhelming majority of our comrades.

A complex and stormy situation will be seen in the future of the party. Arm in arm with you comrades, we will march forward, led by this revolutionary line set out by the 8th Party Congress, and at the same time make strenuous efforts to creatively develop the line.

The problem of the Party Program, which has been discussed in the past four years, beginning before the 7th Party Congress, is now about to be fundamentally settled by dint of patient effort, courageous practice and honest examination made by the comrades of the whole party. Shojiro Kasuga and other traitors have left the party. Since they had such fundamentally treacherous ideas and unprincipled concepts about the party, their contradictions were sure to be exposed at some time or other. Now, through our struggles and Program discussion today, we have been able to clarify the character of their mistakes, to conclude the discussion at a higher political

and ideological level, and to consolidate whole party unity at a higher political and ideological level. Misfortune, we may say, has been turned into a blessing.

These are our concluding remarks.

(*Zen'ei* September 1961 extraordinary issue)

CONFIRMED BY FIFTY-YEAR TEST

Speech Commemorating the 50th
Anniversary of the JCP Founding
July 15, 1972

Comrades,

It is now half a century since 1922 when the Japanese Communist Party was formed. These 50 years cover a period of tremendous change in both Japanese and world history. We have a feeling of great satisfaction that the Japanese Communist Party has fought with great courage, its character formed by the severe ordeals endured in upholding the banner of scientific socialism, and is now observing the 50th anniversary with party strength at the highest peak in its history. On behalf of the whole party I pay respects from my heart to all those comrades who gave their lives in the great cause, supporting the party's ideals, victorious over every trial in this half century.

JCP'S ROLE IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

It would be impossible to go through all the recollections of this half century in a short time; it would be impossible even if we confined ourselves to just the important points. The Central Committee will soon be publishing in Akahata the "Fifty Years of the Japanese Communist Party". Ten years ago the history of "Forty Years of the Japanese Communist Party" was published, followed by "Forty-Five Years". The new publication will mark an epoch in that it will not merely complement them by bringing the story up to date, but will make a deep analysis of the whole period, based on the essence of fearless scientific socialism.

I realize that all our comrades will read it eagerly, so I propose to refer only to some important questions of this half century.

Characteristics of the Birth of The Japanese Communist Party and Its World Significance

My first point is the historical significance of the formation of the Japanese Communist Party. This event does not mean merely the formation of some political party or other. That a party, based on scientific socialism, as the guiding principle, was created for the first time in Japanese history means that a party has emerged in Japan to take an active part in the creation of Japanese history, its weapon being the theory of scientific socialism, representing the accumulation of human knowledge and wisdom, which began with Marx and Engels, and enriched by Lenin, the most advanced science of the human race. Scientific socialism——Marxisms-Leninism is the science of emancipation of the working class, those who bear the burden of production in the capitalist world, and are intensely exploited and plundered by the ruling class; they have the whole world to gain and only their chains to lose in breaking down capitalist production-relations and advancing to socialism. The party based on this principle can play the historic role not only of emancipating the working class, but also of liberating the peasantry and all other oppressed working masses. The

Japanese Communist Party has the fundamental character of a great revolutionary party opening the road to the future, armed with mankind's most advanced science and guardian of the fundamental interests of the workers, the peasantry and other broad strata of the people——master of Japanese society and their ultimate liberator.

Secondly, as the opening paragraph of the Party Program says, the party is the "successor to the progressive and revolutionary traditions of the Japanese nation". It is many long years since human history began in these islands. In the course of the passing of the ages since the class division of Japanese society began, the class struggle has been the basis of our history, reflecting the production relations at each respective stage. A prerequisite for the 1922 formation of the Japanese Communist Party and its confirmation of scientific socialism as the basis of social development, was the Japanese people's rich tradition which had pursued truth and progress, and carried the impulse and quest for the liberation of the oppressed classes. In all fields of Japanese history, politics, society, culture, arts and philosophy, there were a great number of events and people searching for truth, with keen enthusiasm and courage for progress and emancipation, even though they were unable to break out of the frameworks of era and class, and avoid ideological contradictions, errors, and immaturity in their awareness of nature and history. These events and people are not limited to the Social Democratic Party formed by Sen Katayama in 1901, the Movement for Democratic Rights even before that, or the peasant riots which broke out in many places during the Tokugawa Era. They include the wisdom and energy of all working people who, for example, created wonderful literature, art and music from earliest times. The Communist Party has emerged as a concretization and developer of all this, a genuine critical and revolutionary successor of all that is valuable in the history of Japan.

My third point is that with the emergence of the Japanese Communist Party, the working class, working people and all the oppressed, for the first time are able to participate ideologically and organizationally in the great historical mission for the emancipation of the people on a global scale. Of course, even before that, many advanced Japanese people turned their eyes toward the wider world, unwavering even before persecution under the fetters of dark feudalism. But the Japanese Communist Party is the first political party in Japanese history to open fully the new international perspective of world progress and peace, the emancipation of all oppressed peoples and mutual solidarity among the working class and people in all countries.

These three characteristics of the birth of our party confirm that the party's emergence is indeed of world-historic significance in Japanese history.

Most Advanced Force of Struggle in Modern History

Comrades, let us view these questions in the light of typical historical facts.

The draft program adopted at the time of the party's founding embodies four immediate demands in the political, economic, agricultural, and foreign policy spheres. They include the abolition of monarchism, an eight-hour work-day system, confiscation of the Tenno's and other parasitically-owned land, the transfer of tenant lands to the farmers, the ending of all intervention and the complete withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Korea, China and Sakhalin; and the perspective set out is from a bourgeois revolution to a socialist revolution. This program was more richly and specifically developed by the theses of 1927 and 1932.

The historical features of the prewar struggle can be summed up briefly in five points:

(1) A struggle for full realization of political democracy by overthrowing the absolutist Tenno system;

(2) A land revolution to distribute land among the farming population by breaking up the semi-feudal landlord ownership system;

(3) Improvement of the so-called colonial level of low wages and the hard working conditions of the workers and all working people;

(4) A consistent and resolute struggle against wars of aggression; and the complete liberation of Korea and other Japanese colonies. Internationalist solidarity with the peoples of countries fighting against Japanese aggression and colonial rule, and resolute support for the liberation struggles in such countries. Defense of peace, progress and national independence based on proletarian internationalism that calls for workers and the oppressed of all lands to unite.

(5) The unity of proletarian internationalism and genuine patriotism that will devote itself to the liberation of the people of one's own country.

Up till the end of World War II, the Japanese ruling class carried on intense exploitation and plunder of the workers and working people under capitalism, which developed to the stage of monopoly capital and engaged in barbarous imperialist wars of aggression, in addition to the people's rights deprived at home by the despotic politics of the military-and-police Tenno system. At the same time, the Japanese Communist Party was kept under completely illegal conditions for 23 years, but still continued the struggle as the all-out fighter against the ruling class, defying such white terror as frequent wholesale arrests under the Tenno-system government. The self-sacrificing heroism of our party members maintained their fighting

spirit under torture and years of imprisonment, and waged a struggle among the Japanese imperialist troops against the war of aggression, and for the liberation struggle of the invaded nation at the risk of their lives; these will be recorded as immortal in the Japanese history, as noble evidence of the wisdom, enthusiasm and courage of the Japanese people in those dark days.

These five points show that the Japanese Communist Party has played a specific role as the most advanced force in the modern political history of Japan. It is now fairly widely accepted that in fundamental rights, all people are considered equal. But the Meiji Constitution, Article 1, says the "Japanese Empire shall be governed by Emperors whose reign is unbroken for ages eternal." Only fifty years ago, the Tenno was literally absolutized as a "personal god" and placed on the pinnacle of rule in the bourgeois-landlord society. If one even secretly criticized the Tenno in a diary, he could be arrested and imprisoned for the crime of "lèse majesté". It goes without saying, that without great scientific conviction, foresight and courage in adhering to truth, no one could demand the abolition of the Tenno system and call for a people's republic in Japan at that time. When the entire ruling machinery of Japan was equipped top to toe with powerful and barbaric armed forces and police, when every organ of expression supported the Tenno system, when every bourgeois party sanctified the rule of the Tenno, and when even social democrats made a taboo of referring to the Tenno system, the Japanese Communist Party from its very inception went scientifically into the system of despotism, and consistently upheld the banner of opposition to the Tenno system.

When the war against China, the United States, Britain, etc. was declared a "holy war", and the Japanese people were called on to give their lives and massacre the peoples of neighboring countries, calling it "loyalty and patriotism", party comrades who cried out against the war of aggression were accused of being "traitors" and "public enemies", and even their families came under the hatred and pressure of the ruling class. Without the noble spirit of internationalism, it was impossible at that time to oppose the intervention in the new-born Soviet Union, to defend the Chinese Revolution, or to express solidarity with the Korean people in their struggle for independence.

At that time one became the object of intense oppression even to organize workers into class trade unions, and people were threatened with police sabers for even demanding reduction or exemption from farm rents, which were high enough to break the peasant's back; it was impossible without tenacious courage and revolutionary enthusiasm to strive for a better future and persist in organizing trade unions and peasant unions, to thoroughly fight for an improvement in the people's living standards.

The Japanese Communist Party courageously withstood the ordeals of those difficult days to carry out these valuable tasks. In the course and by the results of the Tenno Government's defeat in World War II, history demonstrated that this party was the only party that had a correct view of history; that only this party strove to open up the history of progress, showing that the party was truly patriotic.

During those days, the party as a whole maintained the correct strategic perspective for attaining socialism, by passing through a democratic revolution based on the scientific analysis of Japanese society. This reveals the practical significance of the party's revolutionary struggle. It was completely in keeping with one who was revolutionary only in words or a utopian socialist, while advocating socialism, to avoid the struggle against such serious historic obstacles as the absolutist Tenno-system, which was really standing in the way. But we

did not choose this easygoing way. It is not too much to say that the party has left its immortal mark in the modern history of Japan, in that, since its very founding, it has consistently maintained this correct strategic policy.

JCP's Role in Postwar History and Its Basic Line

Comrades,

Let us come to our postwar era.

After 1945, when the war ended with the Japanese Tennoist Government's defeat in the aggression and the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the imperialist US armed forces as the major part of the allied forces began the full military occupation of Japan. Then, in 1951, the Japan-US military alliance was formed under the San Francisco treaty, viz. the separate peace and, security treaty, and Okinawa being kept under full military occupation by US imperialism. The Japanese people have been kept by this San Francisco system under the rule of two enemies; US imperialism and its subordinate ally, Japanese monopoly capital. This condition remains basically unchanged even now.

The historical role and basic line of the party postwar can be summed up in general terms as follows:

The party fought for the complete democratic transformation of Japanese society, and after the 6th Party Congress in 1947, we demanded complete implementation of the Potsdam Declaration and an overall peace treaty to implement Japanese democracy and independence. But the US imperialists did their utmost to obstruct democratic transformation by using the war criminal Tenno, and reviving and strengthening monopoly capital in order to frustrate Japan's democratic transformation and keep it within the framework of the American-style socioeconomic order. In 1948, the party proposed formation of a national democratic front, based on an extensive program for Japan's independence, democracy and peace, for which we formed a broad association called the "League for Defense of Democracy", to which more than ten million people rallied. On the whole, those struggles for several postwar years, including the subsequent struggle for an overall peace treaty, do not lose their significance as advanced struggles compared with the actions of other political forces in Japan, in spite of the somewhat strategic ambiguity and shortcomings of the patriarchal, bureaucratic leadership, characterizing the party at that time.

In 1958, the 7th Party Congress was held after a lapse of 11 years since the 6th Congress in 1947, an Action Program and Constitution being adopted, a firm step toward self-reliant reconstruction and strengthening of the party. And, as is well known, after democratic discussion of the whole party over several years, our present Program was adopted by the 8th Congress.

Systematic Creative Development of Party Program

Since the adoption of the Program the party's advanced role has become clearer and greater.

First, it has been a consistent political mass struggle against the rule of US imperialism and its junior ally, Japanese monopoly capital, and for building Japan as a country of independence, democracy and peace. The party has consistently upheld this banner, with the perspective of completing the people's democratic revolution and its development into a socialist revolution.

Secondly, the party has worked tenaciously for the development of united action on common progressive tasks, and for the

formation of a united front at national and local levels in order to establish a national democratic united front, rallying workers, peasants, working citizens and other broad sections of the people. United actions have been directed toward such important political tasks as opposition to the revision of the Security Treaty, frustration of the Japan-"ROK" Treaty, support for and assistance to the Vietnamese people, a complete ban on nuclear weapons, opposition to the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, opposition to the Okinawa agreement, as well as countless mass struggles on wages, prices, environmental disruption, education and so on.

Thirdly, with its eyes not dazzled by the maneuvers of US imperialism, the leader of world reaction, aggression and war, the party has consistently stressed the anti-imperialist struggle, fighting against the attempts to boost the popular image of Eisenhower and Kennedy. In particular, in the struggle for the international anti-imperialist united front against the aggression in Vietnam, the party always took a clearcut initiative. While the split in the international communist movement created a serious disadvantage in the attempt to rally international anti-imperialist forces, we constantly developed positive and concrete actions, such as the proposal for a conference of anti-imperialist democratic organizations on five continents. This was based on a correct assessment that the Vietnam-Indochina issue was the sharpest focal point between imperialism and the anti-imperialist forces in international politics, and precise opposition to the US imperialist policy of defeating enemies one by one. As for the Nixon doctrine, dating from 1969, the party immediately made a scientific analysis of this and exposed it.

Fourthly, the party correctly linked proletarian internationalism and patriotism, to meet the new stage in the international revolutionary movement. Attaching importance to the standards of independence, equality and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs, the principle of the international communist movement after the dissolution of the Communist International, the party has consistently maintained and developed its self-reliant and independent position, combined with international solidarity. At the international meeting of 81 parties in 1960, where I took part as a member of the JCP delegation, the following definition was adopted: "All Marxist-Leninist Parties are independent and have equal rights; they shape their policies according to the specific conditions of their respective countries and in keeping with Marxist-Leninist principles." As this shows, the Marxist-Leninist basis of the Japanese Communist Party's sovereign independent position is so principled that no party can reject it. Anti-party elements, busy in the shameful role of subordinating the JCP to a certain foreign party, used slander and abuse on the position of the party, but their machinations have ended in complete failure. The present situation in the international communist movement makes it clear that it is impossible for any party to openly justify intervention in the internal affairs of another party.

To be self-reliant and responsible for the revolutionary movement in its own country, to advance and succeed in promoting the cause of the revolutionary movement in its own country, and to maintain solidarity with all revolutionary forces and anti-imperialist forces in the world on common international tasks—this is fundamental to correctly uniting proletarian internationalism and patriotism. This is of historical significance not only for the Japanese Communist Party; it has opened up a correct self-reliant perspective for the enormous energy of tens of millions of people, who will join the great work of building a new Japan.

Fifthly, these tasks are the historical role of the Japanese working class, and at the same time in accord with the

emancipation of all working people. Building a powerful mass vanguard party is an inseparable task for promotion of this lawful process.

Lenin said much about the particularly difficult conditions when a revolution starts in an advanced capitalist country. He referred to the extensively organized nature of culture and ideology of the bourgeoisie, the ruling circles in such a country. In Japan, where bourgeois mass media have developed on a huge scale, we attach much importance to the building of a powerful mass vanguard party and the development of the party organ paper in this. It is a very necessary line, because developed party journalism, based on the network of big party organizations, together form a powerful engine to move ahead with the revolutionary movement, and, along with mass organizations, form an enormous belt that links the party ideologically and organizationally with millions, even tens of millions of the people.

The population of Japan, numbering over one hundred million, includes a working class that represents 60% of the total, and if farmers and other working citizens are included, the overwhelming majority of gainfully employed people, totaling more than 50,000,000 are working people. The need is for the party to put down deep roots among these masses and build the mighty ranks of active party members, recognizing the party's pioneering Program and vanguard Constitution. The party must never be a small contingent of professional revolutionaries. On this consciousness, the party since the 7th Party Congress has worked out concrete plans to build a mass vanguard party, and at each Congress, has made plans for study-education activity to raise the political and theoretical level of all members, with the expansion of party membership and party organ paper circulation, and has stressed their importance as a field of activity calling for independent efforts.

As a result, members have achieved about a ten times increase in party membership and about fifty times in organ paper subscription, compared with just before the 7th Party Congress. Of course, such progress has not been won easily; there have been zig-zags, but the results have been won by a tenacious struggle in undertaking the task of party building. Prewar, the party membership never exceeded a thousand, but now our ranks number over three hundred times that. It is widely recognized not only that this party has the biggest membership among opposition parties, but that we are the only party that depends for its management funds completely on party dues, organ paper and periodical subscription fees, and clean contributions from party supporters, with not even one yen from monopoly capital.

We defined ourselves in the 11th Party Congress as "a vanguard party of the working class, as well as a genuine party of the nation and people" ("*Perspective of the 1970s and Tasks of the JCP*"). This definition is the lawful and creative developoment based on the theory of scientific socialism, because, viewing the real situation in which our nation is placed, we see that genuine national independence is necessary, and that our important task is to rally not only the working class but broad strata of the people to the national democratic united front.

In this way the party has entered the arena of history as a new type of vanguard party based on Marxism-Leninism, and as an important political force whose influence in Japanese politics is real.

One important characteristic of our activity in these 14 years since the 7th Party Congress till today is that we have developed this general line consistently, systematically and creatively. Another characteristic is that the whole party is united around the party center, which is loyal to the line of the

Party Program, has a wealth of theory and experience and has firm leadership ability, and the party has been managed with strict observance of the Party Constitution, and effectively combined collective leadership and personal responsibility on the principle of democratic centralism. The development of this general line was ensured by an uncompromising struggle against right and left opportunism and factionalism, which appeared with a changed situation or when the situation became complex.

So far I have viewed in broad perspective the characteristics of the historical role played by the Japanese Communist Party in the social development of Japan over the last half century. The party's appearance and development in Japanese history have the undoubted role of pushing Japanese society forward in progress, development and transformation, and at the same time contributing to the cause of world peace, and independence of nations and the unity of the working class and oppressed peoples of all lands. The positive aspect in this half century of party activity, as a party of scientific socialism and as a promoter of the law of history, is characterized by its principled, foresighted, creative, solid and self-analytical nature.

Scientific Analysis of Past Shortcomings And Historical Restrictions

Comrades,

The historical achievements of the party will never be lost, but we cannot look back over the past and claim that it is free of mistakes. We have made mistakes, sometimes even serious errors in our history of activity, and because of historical limitations both in Japan and overseas, our work has been marked by immaturity and restrictions. Based on our capacity for self-analysis, which is one of the characteristics of the party's development, I will take up this question. Lenin said that one who makes no mistakes, makes nothing. It would have no meaning to say that the party has made no mistakes, when we are facing an entirely new historic cause, as a party which has the responsibility of being a vanguard party.

Liquidationism came into the picture when the party had just been founded; Japan's revolutionary tradition was underestimated and sectarianism entered into united front tactics, as seen in the 1927 Thesis, in spite of its positive programmatic value; the sectarian trend arising from the "Social Fascism" theory, and over-estimation of the immediacy of the revolutionary situation, were both found in the 1932 Thesis, which nevertheless was an important historical contribution to the struggle against the war and the Tenno system; the seriousness of the struggle against the espionage and provocative policy of the ruling class was not properly estimated; the instability of the party leadership allowed immature adventurists like Seigen Tanaka and Sano, Nabeyama and Kazama, who surrendered to the Tenno system, to belong temporarily in the party's supreme leadership; there was no reconstruction of the Central Committee after the last member of the Central Committee was arrested in 1935——these were big obstacles to the advance of the revolutionary movement.

It would not, however, be correct to see all these errors as due to the JCP's own shortcomings and weaknesses. The party was a branch of the Communist International, and Comintern decisions were binding on the party. It was an obligation based on democratic centralism of the then international communist movement to carry out party activity on that line. The Comintern played a great positive role when the revolutionary movement in each country was still young and weak. Although the party was young and weak in those prewar days, it was able

to develop outstanding views on such questions as the Tenno system, wars, and the strategic outlook on revolution, a fact that was made possible only because it was a branch of the Comintern.

For a certain period when Stalin was playing a leading role in the Comintern after Lenin's death, a sectarian error arose in the Comintern in united front tactics and a one-sided assessment of the situation. Related to Stalin's mistakes at home, unreasonable measures were taken against leaders of other countries. Stalin was one of the great revolutionaries at home and abroad, which made his mistakes all the more serious. When criticisms were made on Stalin, our party did not support the complete denial of Stalin's role, but we did correctly take note of the negative results of his mistakes in the international communist movement.

In party activity during the 27 postwar years, the virtual dissolution of the JCP Central Committee, starting from MacArthur's oppression in 1950, confusion caused by the party split and the course of events in the following years, revealed the shortcomings and weaknesses which had existed in the party leadership, in spite of the general advance of party activity in the first five years after the war. In connection with intervention by some other parties, adventurist attitudes appeared in part of the split party. The serious mistakes made during this period were a source of pain and a blow to well-intentioned party members. Among other matters, what we must see as the most important lesson is that the virtual dissolution of the Central Committee led to liquidationist errors. This was caused mainly by patriarchal factionalism, which violates the firm rule that the most important thing is to preserve the unity and cohesion of the party. The decision of the 7th Congress, and the "Historical Lessons of the Postwar Development of the Party" in the decision of the 10th Party

Congress, are the important documents that analyzed past shortcomings and weaknesses. Using this opportunity, we must stress again the lesson that in spite of the brilliant history of our party, factionalism and liquidationism in various forms repeatedly raise their heads to obstruct our advance, irrespective of subjective intentions.

Since the 7th Party Congress, we have spared no efforts in analyzing the party's record and the realities. For the past ten and more years the party has therefore made a steady advance, fortunately fairly free of serious mistakes. Although the error made on April 17, 1964, was not a minor one, the circumstances were unusual, with quite a few important leaders away, and the error was immediately rectified.

We need the courage to learn from the party's mistakes and shortcomings. At the same time, in order as far as possible to prevent making mistakes, we must maintain a scientific attitude in party activity, to open up a new road without going astray.

Results Following 11th Party Congress and Present Achievements

Comrades,

The work of the party in the last half century is seen symbolically in the fact that the party is the only political party in Japan that has been engaged in the long-lasting struggle with the party name unchanged, the Japanese Communist Party. People compare it to the phoenix. But now the party not only records its half-century of history but has become a positive creator that exercises its influence on real politics in Japan. The 11th Party Congress held two years ago was of important historic significance, in that it clarified the party's present position and set out various tasks in all aspects. Taking the

events of the subsequent two years into consideration I would like to mention the following:

First, the Party Program's general line, the political, theoretical and ideological struggles developed on that basis and their records, contribute greatly to the outlook for socialism in Japan, and are unrivaled weapons for a progressive change of politics in Japan. For example, in the course of adopting the Party Program we analyzed and made clear two enemies that stand in the way of the Japanese people's future, to which most political forces paid no concern, to say nothing of making a correct analysis, viz., relations between US imperialism and its junior ally, Japanese monopoly capital, and the contradictions between these two enemies and the Japanese people.

Now however, as many public opinion surveys have shown, the majority of the people openly support Japan's neutrality militarily, and even the so-called opposition parties find it necessary to more or less point out the submissive nature of the Japanese Government to the United States. It demonstrates that the political perspective, which our party raised before any other parties, has now become a main issue in the politics of Japan. When we decided the Program eleven years ago, Okinawa and Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands were wholly occupied by the US armed forces. With the subsequent course of events, with conclusion of the Okinawa Agreement, the description in that part of the Program is already a thing of the past. But the fundamental character of our Program for building a Japan of independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and a better life for the people, and going on to socialism by an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly, people's democratic revolution against the two enemies, is demonstrating its increasingly vital importance.

Secondly, in the international field over these ten and more years, the party has made a positive contribution to Marxist-Leninist development in the international communist movement. We did not merely lament the split in the international communist movement and the unreasonable interference in our party, but resolutely counter-attacked and clearly defended the principles involved. The documents contained in the Party's Collected Important Articles, the 8th volume of which has just been published, not only records the proper attack we made to counter interference in the party, but is also a creative contribution to common theoretical, ideological tasks in the international communist movement.

Thirdly, as the following indices show that the present party strength is at the highest in its history; nearly 5 million people gave their support to this party in the elections to the House of Councilors last year; there are over 2,500 party members in local assemblies; there have been numerous victories of the progressive united front, in which we took part, for the election of heads of local governments; the steady monthly increase in party membership since the beginning of this year; a circulation of about 2.5 million copies of the party organ paper; party strength at the highest point in its history. These results come from the entire party taking part in the mass movements, attaching importance to the interests of the people, actively engaging in propaganda among the masses, giving proper importance to the various kinds of elections, and independently tackling the task of party strength expansion.

As the party's half-century history reaches the threshold of the next half century today, we share with you our great pleasure in being able to confirm these good results, as successors to the party's revolutionary tradition. In view of our great historical mission, the present point of arrival is only half way, but it is clear that it is an important step for the whole of the Japanese Communist Party to proudly take, and go on to the struggle of the coming half century.

The Central Committee of the JCP would like to express its heartfelt gratitude to all senior and present party members who have raised the party to this new pinnacle, enduring and overcoming all difficulties and hardships, and to all supporters and readers who have constantly given warm support in our party work.

TYING HANDS OF U.S. IMPERIALISTS

There are some remarks I want to make on important immediate issues.

The main international focus continues to be on the Vietnam, Indochina question. The characteristic of this situation, the keenest point of confrontation between the forces of aggression and the anti-imperialist forces, is that US imperialism under Nixon is using all kinds of latest weapons, including poison gas, to wage full-scale attacks, destroying dam embankments and engaged in genocide, against which the Vietnamese people are continuing their heroic struggles to defeat the aggressor by their intense war of resistance. Their indefatigable historical struggle, overcoming great difficulties, has dealt a real blow on the United States' policy of Vietnamization of the war, not only raising the pride of the peoples of Vietnam and all Indochina, but enhancing the honor of the whole anti-imperialist struggle.

At the press conference on June the 30th, Nixon tried to defend himself by claiming that the United States bombs only military targets. But this blatant lie has been clearly exposed not only by the on-the-spot news from the Akahata correspondent in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but also by photographs taken by Nihon Dempa News, and reports from other correspondents, including the Mainichi Shimbun representative. This has been eridenced by photographs of countless bomb craters in the dikes and banks. It is reported that the bombing done by the US over the last two months is as much as one year's bombing in President Johnson's days. This is how Nixon tries to force the Vietnamese people to surrender so as to keep South Vietnam a virtual colony of US imperialism.

Reality of Power Relations between the Anti-Imperialist Forces and the Aggressor Forces

Comrades,

How is it possible for Nixon to mine the waters of Vietnam, trampling on international law, that violates the right of vessels of foreign countries, including socialist states, to enter Vietnamese ports? Has Nixon the right to order and execute it like a world dictator, that vessels of any country can be deprived of freedom of the seas, to enter ports of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam? What has happened to the repeated theory that the imperialist camp headed by the United States is retreating day by day, while the socialist camp is getting stronger? Has this not become a common doubt among many people, who are seriously watching the situation in Vietnam and are filled with indignation at Nixon's outrageous and illegal genocide tactics?

There are two questions in this. One is what has happened in the relations between the anti-imperialist forces and the aggressor forces, and how they operate; the other is how to regard the relation between the Nixon doctrine and peaceful coexistence. In analyzing the international situation, our party did not proceed from such a simple theory that socialism and the anti-imperialist forces, being historically progressive, can steadily and directly win victory after victory; that the imperialist forces, being reactionary, lose battle after battle. The 11th Party Congress pointed out that the most important problem is that, during these three years, the disunity within

the international communist movement and the socialist camp, which should lead the anti-imperialist struggle, has grown worse, making the effective mobilization of an anti-imperialist united front impossible, and allowing more room for imperialist maneuvers. We have correctly charged that US imperialism has not changed its aggressive nature, nor has it voluntarily checked its aggression, even though US imperialism has relatively lost strength since the end of World War II. But if the socialist camp and the anti-imperialist forces of the world were to take a resolute attitude toward the US imperialist policy of aggression in different areas, and form a common front against US imperialism from that position, the historic superiority of the anti-imperialist forces, including the socialist camp, would be clearly seen, and the hand of brazen aggression against part of the socialist camp, such as the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which has continued for so long, would be stayed at once.

Seen from another angle, the central strategy of US imperialism now is to take advantage of the disunity in the international communist movement, the socialist camp and the anti-imperialist forces, and take effective action to acomplish its immediate aims in the aggression against Indochina. Nixon talks about his doctrine, but the essential point is seen in this: In his 1971 foreign policy report, he referred to the possibility of a new challenge to meet the multi-polarization of the communist bloc, and in his 1972 foreign policy report he states that measures should be taken to meet the situation of "the unity of the communist bloc being broken down" and that "some communist countries pursue" their own "national interests". These statements at least show clearly how Nixon sees the present condition of the international communist movement and how to make the most of it. US imperialism remains the ringleader of world reaction, and the main center of aggression and war. At the same time, compared with when World War II ended, its international status is relatively lower by reason of the emergence of some ten socialist countries, the advance of anti-imperialist and democratic movements on five continents, the relatively stronger weight of other capitalist powers, and the intensification of economic and military contradictions in the United States itself. In this situation, US imperialism, as reiterated in its foreign policy reports, still clings to its claimed leadership role in the world, and to its neo-colonialist ambition in Vietnam and Indochina, where they are now bogged down after Kennedy launched the aggression. It repeatedly claims as its obligation and the fulfillment of its "sacred commitment" to its "ally", and as the world-historic mission of the United States itself. The fundamental strategy of Nixon under these conditions is nothing but the application of the defeat one-by-one policy.

The Policy of Defeating Enemies One by One And the Minimum Obligation of the Anti-Imperialist Democratic Forces

Since the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee of the 8th Congress in October 1963, we have positively indicated this most important characteristic of United States' world strategy. People who are apt to be dazzled by the complex dual policy of US imperialism have not found easy agreement on this. Here in Japan too, due to the two-faced policy of US imperialism, talking about peace while continuing aggression, the error of lauding US imperialism when the United States makes a peace gesture has been repeated even among forces that call themselves progressive. The "post-Vietnam" argument, "the United States' complete withdrawal from Asia", Nixon's "full-scale conversion to peaceful-coexistence", or Nixon's "trip to

peace"——these all represent this error. But facts are always very stubborn. It did not take long for it to become evident that such views are not only false, but aim to hold others in his hand by the policy of defeating enemdes one by one.

This policy is not a new invention of postwar US imperialism; the bourgeoisie has always resorted to this when it wants to exercise effective rule. Back in 1918 Lenin said: "It is in the interest of capital to destroy its enemy (the revolutionary proletarian) bit by bit, before the workers in all countries have united (actually united, i.e., by beginning the revolution)." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 27, "'Left-Wing' Infantilism"*)

In order to ensure success of a particular task this policy uses the inevitable tactics of easing other hostile relations to a necessary extent. In short, this line is inevitably taken in order not to take on too many enemies at one time, but to concentrate the strength of aggression by confining it to the present burning target to achieve the objective. It follows that the dual policy of talking of peace and easing relations with others is an essential political, diplomatic, and, in one sense, military development in the basic strategy of the defeat one-by-one policy. It is true that this would surely engender at least temporary peaceful relations where tension is to be eased. The important question, the real touchstone for a Marxist-Leninist is, however, how to properly appraise this US imperialist line and how to deal with it.

Comrades, I am not saying simply that because US imperialism openly and shamelessly attacks and invades part of the socialist camp, all socialist countries should refuse diplomatic relations or business relations with the United States. Nor am I saying that no talks or negotiations whatever should be held with the United States. I also understand very well that in spite of the disunity of the international communist movement, the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries, communist and workers' parties of the world, and the anti-imperialist forces, have risen up in their respective positions to support and assist the Vietnamese people and have made a positive contribution to the Vietnamese people's anti-American patriotic struggle.

In today's situation however, as long as we are not complacent about what we have done, and have not discarded the scientific-socialist view that recognizes that the sharpest confrontation between the imperialist forces and the anti-imperialist forces in the world of our time is the Indochina, Vietnam question, we believe that we have the obligation of stressing the following as our minimum tasks:——it is a very common phrase——Never laud Nixon or US imperialism, and never take any step that would lead to such beautification. We do not say this only because US imperialism is an aggressor against our country, making Japan a semi-occupied country for a long time, with Japan now as a US foothold for conducting the war of aggression in Vietnam. They very point that we must make is this: the aggression of Nixon is not, by its very nature, an event in just one locality in Asia; it is an attack on the South-Eastern outpost of the world socialist camp, aimed at strangling the most powerful national-liberation struggle in the world at this moment. The Vietnamese people and the peoples of Indochina are not only safeguarding their own national rights, but have fought for a long time, at the sacrifice of their own lives, in a struggle of world-historic significance, for genuine world peace, for self-determination and independence of nations, and to safeguard the sacred existence of the socialist system itself.

The Nixon-Beautifying Theory and the Principles of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle

In the international communist movement, it is natural that the Vietnamese people's heroic struggle should be praised, and the Vietnam issue regarded as the present most important task in the anti-imperialist struggle. If this proper and correct understanding had been maintained, plaudits of Nixon would never have been heard. How does it stand now?

We all know how Nixon was welcomed in Beijing. A leader of the Communist Party of China, speaking about US imperialism, said "Every time they invade a place, it puts a rope around their own necks. They have already fallen in a great many sieges of the world's peoples." Nor is that all. Our party has often been abused and called an agent of US imperialism. Yet they welcomed Nixon, although he kept on saying that he would maintain the treaty with Taiwan, and this was accompanied by the bombing of the North Vietnam. In every sense, this amazed us, and the scene of Nixon's welcome was telecast to all the world through a space hook-up. Even if one defends this as only diplomatic business, the eyes of several billion people of the world could not be cheated. Later, US imperialism made much propaganda about the liberation forces of Vietnam being isolated, scattering in the battlefields great numbers of leaflets carrying the photo of Nixon and Chinese leaders talking together in the banquet hall. After heavier bombing and the mine blockade of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Nixon arrogantly boasted that naturally he would be respected when he visits Moscow. When he went to Moscow he made a speech on television, in which he had the effrontery to express sympathy for Tanya, a Leningrad victim in World War II, and he even prated about peace. We were not merely amazed at this; it was something we could not see without the feelings of pain and indignation. About this also, the US imperialists scattered leaflets bearing the photo of Nixon shaking hands with Soviet leaders, a mocking of the

Vietnamese people. Then the US officials bragged in the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June the 28th that they can now bomb North Vietnam without fearing what China or the Soviet Union may do. In an article by an American professor in the July 6 issue of Mainichi Shimbun, Nixon is credited with having achieved "wonderful results, even in the history of US diplomacy". Should we applaud these Nixon "results" as evidence of peaceful coexistence? Never. Neither the theory of scientific socialism nor the principles of the anti-imperialist struggle would allow us to do so.

The Nixon Doctrine and Genuine Peaceful Coexistence

You all know, as do many other people in many parts of the world, that on these questions, based on our consistent, definite and firm analysis, the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party has consistently criticized the US policy of defeat one-by-one, which is Nixon's real purpose. Some people, including the traitorous anti-party Shiga group, have overtly and covertly condemned our party as wrong. In view of the nature of this question, we cannot ignore their censure.

They charge that it is impermissible for the party to openly demand the withdrawal of approval of Nixon's visit to the USSR. They say that we do not understand the importance of peaceful coexistence between the two great powers, and that rejection would lead to the socialist great power losing the opportunity to criticize Nixon and curb US aggression.

In the first place, the question of Nixon's visits to China and the Soviet Union does not involve only the two nations concerned; it is an important international question, a fact which no one can deny. Any party which fails to express its own independent judgment on such an important international question as this is disqualified from bearing the responsibility of an revolutionary cause in its own country, and must be seen as unprincipled. If we are convinced by scientific analysis that Nixon's real aim is to defeat US enemies one by one, which the situation of the struggle actually developing in Vietnam, Indochina fully proves, it is our minimum international obligation to frankly express this conviction and our demand.

Secondly, the peaceful coexistence policy by no means calls for welcoming this aggressor. The statement of the meeting of 81 communist and workers' parties says: "The policy of peaceful co-existence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle, as the revisionists claim. The co-existence of states with different social systems is one form of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism." "The successes of the revolutionary class and national-liberation struggle promote peaceful co-existence."

Under no circumstances can it be compatible with welcoming the enemy of peace to "mobilize the masses and launch vigorous action against the enemies of peace", while Nixon is carrying on a mine blockade in disregard of international law, violating the freedom of the seas and the right of sea traffic, which come under sovereignty of the state, and grossly intensifying the bombing of a socialist state. Is it not a minimum duty in the correct mass-mobilization against the enemy of peace, that no opportunity to welcome him should be provided? Formerly certain people in the international communist movement acted as if they supported the peaceful coexistence line, by praising Eisenhower or Kennedy. Nixon's barbarous actions in Indochina is no different in nature from the war crimes of Hitler. Nixon even surpasses Hitler in that, with the progress made in scientific weapons, Nixon is using more cruel and effective methods of genocide. Different from Hitler, who had such powerful allies as Japan of the absolutist Tenno system and fascist Italy when he launched the war of aggression, the characteristic feature of Nixon's aggression is that he is forced to use a defeat one-by-one policy, evidence of the relative decline of the imperialist aggressor's status in world politics through these 30 past years. Nixon not only finds it suits his general interests to temporarily ease relations with certain socialist countries, while he still regards them as an "enemy", so that such socialist powers will not strengthen their confrontation with Nixon on the Vietnam, Indochina questions, the focus of Nixon's present aggression, but he also brazenly demands that such powers should exert their influence to stop the Vietnamese people waging a "reckless" anti-American struggle. Even if, with this intention, certain "peaceful" talks are held between US imperialism and this or that socialist power, for diplomatic, trade and military reasons, and even if mutual relations between them are eased within that scope, can it be regarded as in accordance with the spirit of genuine peaceful coexistence, and the genuine standards of Marxism-Leninism?

Comrades, we are sure it is not in accord. It is characteristic that the Shiga group and other submissionist say the same thing in order to attack our party. We can only regard them as having revised the true meaning of peaceful coexistence for the working class.

Thirdly, in the communiqués of both the Beijing and Moscow talks, different opinions are expressed in parallel on the Vietnam question, and a general statement on "peaceful coexistence" sums up their "agreement". But Nixon not only persists in his own position on the Vietnam, Indochina questions, but has even escalated the aggression after the talks were held; there is not the slightest change in Nixon's line. As for the general arrangement regarding "peaceful coexistence", the United States later declared that the agreement only expresses their amis and hopes but is not binding on them. Still, we know that after the talks, both the Soviet Union and China stated that they would continue to support the Vietnamese people's seven-point demands and render other support and assistance to Vietnam. This is but natural, and good. Nevertheless, both by word and action, Nixon and others show that they were encouraged by the fact that whatever escalation they made in the bombing of the North and the mine blockade, it did not prevent Nixon from receiving a welcome in the two socialist countries.

As we have seen, the attacks on our party by the Shiga faction and other submissive elements not only lack any foundation, but they themselves are the latest version of the imperialism-beautification argument, which refuses to look straight at the aggression of US imperialism. It is essential now that every kind of the Nixon-beautification argument be swept away, and that united action and a united front be decisively strengthened both here and overseas, giving assistance and support to the just struggle of the peoples of Vietnam and Indochina. The US imperialist Vietnamization policy has suffered a severe blow from the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people, and is facing disastrous failure. But US imperialism has not yet been conclusively defeated. The idea held by some empty theorists in Japan, that US imperialism itself is on the verge of collapse and for this reason Nixon made his "tours for peace", evidence of defeat and surrender, is nothing but subjectivism.

Vietnam: Touchstone for Anti-Impeiralism And Progressiveness

On the other hand, to be overwhelmed by US imperialism's barbaric attack on Vietnam, and think it better to accept a ceasefire in the present situation in order to reduce the sacrifices of the Vietnamese people, would also be a right-wing error. Some people belonging to centrist parties here in Japan are spreading the argument for "an immediate cease-fire", claiming that "in a quarrel both parties are to blame." Nixon tries to persuade public opinion with the slander about "stubborn Hanoi" creating sacrifices. Behind all this is a failure to understand historical facts; US imperialism intervened in Vietnam in open violation of the Geneva agreements, and tried to make the temporary military border a national boundary; it put up a puppet regime and boycotted united elections, trying to maintain its neo-colonialist rule in the South, arbitrarily continuing military oppressions; this ignited, the sparks of the national liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people developed as a righteous cause. Vietnam has always been one. The Vietnamese people in the South and the North have the absolute right to help each other wherever they are to achieve their own national liberation. It is therefore burglar logic of the aggressor to try to justify the US bombing and mine-blockade on the pretext of "lawful counterattack" against the "aggression from the North". We have repeatedly called the struggle of the peoples of Vietnam and Indochina against US imperialism a just struggle, because it is firmly based upon an adequate logical and historical foundation.

The hardships of the Vietnamese people are not light, but firmly upholding Ho Chi Minh's last injunctions that there can be no peace without national liberation, the Vietnamese people continue to fight for the final defeat of the aggression, in which the strongest imperialists of the world are striving to the utmost. The question of how resolute is one's solidarity and support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people, and how it

is implemented, in other words, how clear an attitude one takes toward US imperialism and the Nixon doctrine, is the real touchstone for testing the revolutionary character of the international communist movement. It's the touchstone for all the antiimperialist forces of the world to show what genuine anti-imperialism is. Here in Japan also, it is the touchstone for determining what is genuine progressiveness.

Comrades, let us again strongly and firmly declare at this very special ceremony in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the JCP that our support is always with them until final victory in their just struggle is won.

Whatever brutal attacks Nixon may make and whatever foxy maneuvers he may try, he cannot deceive eyes of the people seeking the justice. The recent International Conference in Stockholm for support of the Vietnamese people, following the Paris World Assembly in February this year, is an active reflection of this. Here in Japan, upholding the demand of the abrogation of the US-Japan military alliance, let us strengthen our struggle, including the struggle to stop the transportation of munitions, lifting our voices higher with the demand, "don't turn Japan into a stronghold for the aggression in Vietnam; go home, US forces, out of Japan." We resolutely oppose the plan of the US and Japanese Governments to cooperate in persuading the Japanese people to welcome Nixon to Japan. On these questions, the Japanese Communist Party will do everything possible to develop united struggles of all the democratic forces.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESSIVE UNITED FRONT

I will take up next the political situation here and the outlook for a progressive united front.

Reactionary Nature of Tanaka Cabinet And Its Attitude to China

The change from the Sato Cabinet to Tanaka is only a change of representative players within the same Liberal Democratic Party. The change cannot be regarded as just a switch to popular politics; Prime Minister Sato was not called "Ei-chan" (popular and intimate first name usage), by which he wanted to be called, but is replaced by one called in a friendly way "Kaku-san" (from Tanaka's first name). It would be unreal of course not to expect some changes in the situation. What we see is a new measure of the reactionary forces to counter the falling in popularity of the LDP, resulting from the people's disappointment and criticism of LDP politics in subordination to the United States, and serving the interests of monopoly capital. In the international arena the new Cabinet is trying to recover popular support by putting on a new face, such for example as its attitude toward China in accordance with the Nixon doctrine, the latest strategy of US imperialism. What should be the criteria by which to determine the attitude of the democratic forces toward this new Cabinet?

First, this Cabinet is truly a follower of the same line of subordination to the United States, with continued support of the US imperialist war of aggression in Vietnam, and keeping the US-Japan military alliance intact.

Secondly, looking at Tanaka's idea of "remoulding the Japanese Archipelago", we find no evidence of the desire to resolve urban problems, environmental disruption, etc. by exercising democratic control over big monopoly enterprises, the main source of these problems. Its plan is merely to expand big enterprise activities to local cities and villages, changing the

ratio of industrial production between the Pacific coast region and the rest of Japan from the present 7-3 to 5-5 by 1985. It is reported also that in the meantime Japan's industrial production will nearly quadruple the 1970 figures. This means that production by profit-seeking big enterprises and the resultant environmental disruption will increase by a multiple of three in the Pacific coast region and seven in other regions, amounting to total environmental disruption of the Japanese archipelago. If Tanaka puts up a pretense of popularity with some sort of reformist policy, such as an increase in loans of down payments on house construction by the Housing Finance Corporation, it will only mean to follow economic policy to serve the interests of monopoly capital.

Thirdly, as evidenced by the reappointment of the Director General of the Defense Agency and the appointment, as Minister of Education, of the most reactionary Constitution-mal-revision advocater, who took an out-and-out anti-communist and anti-Democratic Youth League attitude during the university troubles, this Cabinet is in no way better than the Sato Cabinet as regards political reaction and the revival of militarism.

Fourthly, the Cabinet has already proposed a conference with the heads of three opposition parties but not the Communist Party with a policy aimed at splitting the progressive forces, which, of course, will be continued.

Considering all these points, we should not have the slightest illusion about the reactionary nature of this Cabinet.

Following Prime Minister Tanaka's talk about wanting to normalize relations with China, a "quick response" of welcome is reported from China. It is objectively possible to bring about the restoration of relations between Japan and China, so long as no fiction is made of the representation of China and no especially hostile policy followed, even if the Japanese

Government is not progressive. In the situation of Nixon adopting a rapprochement policy toward China, and being welcomed in Beijing, the LDP Government calculates that by following Nixon it will gain in political stability both in Japan and overseas. In consideration of the coming general elections, the Liberal Democratic Party eagerly wants to offer the opening of the inter-Governmental negotiations on the Japan-China question as a major "attraction", in spite of the many complex contradictions relating to this within party policy. The attitude of our party to this issue is perfectly clear. We have demanded and will continue to demand that the Government should fundamentally give up whatever argument it has to support the "two Chinas" policy and adopt a principled attitude. Although the Hatoyama Cabinet was a reactionary cabinet, which attempted to bring in a minor constituency system, to regard affirmatively the Hatoyama Cabinet's correct diplomatic measure for restoration of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations, and at the same time to criticize the essentially reactionary nature of the Hatoyama Cabinet, are in no sense contradictory. What we must carefully avoid is any illusion that this rather belated but natural measure is an important indicator that can hide the essentially reactionary nature of this Cabinet. We have pointed out that the tendency among certain parts of the democratic forces to attach higher importance to the restoration of diplomatic relations with China than the Vietnam question is not correct. This should always be kept in mind when the democratic forces fight for genuine progressive politics in confrontation with the new Tanaka LPD Cabinet.

Consolidation of Progressive United Front and Its Obstacles

Comrades,

In the new development of the political situation, efforts to consolidate the genuine progressive united front are even more urgent. The International Theoretical Symposium we held to mark the 50th anniversary of the party's founding attached the importance to the united front question. The recent decision on the Communist-Socialist common program in France also has international significance. The democratic coalition governments of Chile and Sri Lanka face many complicated difficulties with different meanings. Of course, this demands of us not a retreat from the idea of a coalition government baesd on the united front, but more energetic struggles and research on how to achieve it.

In Japan, the characteristic of this question is that although united action that includes the Socialist Party and the Communist Party at national level has been carried on from time to time, the action lacks stability, and in addition, there are many obstacles to its consolidation as a lasting united struggle, in other words, a united front. The Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito, as anti-communist centrist parties, often try through SPJ-Komeito-DSP cooperation to get the SPJ to completely abandon the idea of including the JCP in any joint struggle of opposition parties. Anti-communism is still kept in the SPJ program, and its various manifestations further complicate the question.

But the fact is that the Socialist Party of Japan at present has more in common on policy and demands with the JCP than with any other political party. We have consistently regarded the SPJ as an important colleague for united action and formation of a united front. Since the 7th Party Congress, we have never held the theory that the main blow is against the social democrats. We do not think that the development of our party is a rival to the democratic advance of the Socialist Party. From the bottom of our hearts we hope that by a positive attitude to what is indicative of a genuine progressive united struggle, the SPJ will take the road, independently and actively, for formation of the progressive united front at national level, which the present situation in Japan demands, and refuse to yield to the maneuvers of the Government, the Liberal Democratic Party or the anti-communist centrist parties, and without being taken in by the policy of some foreign interventionists trying to isolate the JCP.

At the same time, I want to call emphatically to the leaderships of the DSP and the Komeito, that they overcome their old fashioned prejudice on communism, calling it "totalitarianism" or a "philosophy of hatred", and abandon such a non-progressive position as to reject in principle a united struggle that includes the JCP. The fact is that the JCP for the last half century has fought most resolutely for peace and people's democracy, against the absolutist despotism of Japan, and against totalitarianism of Hitler and Mussolini. Does not history clearly show this? These centrist parties are eager to make contact with the socialist countries of Asia and their respective parties, and try to present this as a new indication of their progressive stand. But if their prejudice against communism is consistent, such an approach cannot but be seen as temporary and time-serving.

The return of Governor Yara and the victory of the democratic forces in the recent election for the Prefectural Assembly of Okinawa, and the victory of the local united struggle in the Saitama gubernatorial election, show that the people's call for an effective united front is spreading rapidly like a wild fire throughout the country. Over 30 million people, one-third of the total population of Japan living in 5 prefectures that include Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka, and in 47 cities and 46 towns and villages, are already living with progressive local governments in which our party is either a governmental party or the

recommender of these government heads. If we include the united front temporarily established for the local elections, these political battles are fought by a united front of democratic forces that include the JCP, covering regions where more than 60% of Japanese voters are living. These are very important political aspects that symbolize the future of politics in Japan. Even though the SPJ turned its back on forming a local united front, the coalition of our party and other bodies and organizations in Furukawa City, Miyagi Prefecture, defeated a conservative candidate. This is another example that explicitly speaks of the broad way for progressive politics demanded by local residents. Whatever new countermeasures US imperialism and the LDP Government may take, the sharpening of the contradictions between the US-Japanese reactionary forces and the Japanese people is inevitable. The attack on the foundation of the Liberal Democratic Party, political agent of US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, comes from continuous progress in the people's awakening, which is arising from the policies of exploitation and plunder, war and aggression. It must surely drive US imperialism out of Japan and undermine the foundations of Japanese monopoly capital, US imperialism's junior ally, and its political agent the Liberal Democratic Party, and make for a great advance of the genuine progressive forces to replace them. The political forces that go against the great advance of history will surely be screened out however much they claim to be progressive and anti-government; the judgment of history will be passed upon them by the workers and working people demanding real progress and by the forces of genuine peace and democracy.

For the purpose of organizing this national and democratic energy large-scale, we must fight persistently hand in hand with all the democratic forces. To do this, our party must fight at the head of the struggle to strengthen the unity of action with the various mass organizations to serve the common interests of all strata of the widest range of people, thoroughly defending the daily interests of the working class and all the people. We must provide devoted service in all important political and economic struggles, for consolidation of trade unions and unity of the trade union front on a democratic class basis, fully defending the peasants' struggles for land and production, consolidating farmers' unions and rural workers' unions, and attaching importance to the agricultural cooperative movement and its democratization; we must defend the business of small enterprisers and peaceful industry, now being sacrified to the inroads of US capital and goods and the Government's economic policy in subordination to the United States, and under the pressure of monopoly capital, and defend intellectual freedom and the living standards of the intellectual and students. In particular, it is important for us to continue sober and systematic activities among the working class and in establishments and workshops to strengthen the unity of the trade union front from the class standpoint. In these struggles it is necessary for us to consult the working people fully, even those who support not only the SPJ but also the Democratic Socialist Party and the Komeito; our position is, by the Party Program, that all working people are brothers and sisters; we must let them understand that their genuine interests lie in the class consolidation of trade unions and class unity of the labor front, and break down the forcible urge to support a particular political party.

For Great Advance in Coming General Election

To unify and develop the National Democratic United Front at central and local levels in the specific conditions of Japan, it is important for the party to make a great advance in elections for the Diet and other assemblies. When the Marxist party called itself the Social Democratic Party before the name of Communist Party was adopted, Lenin called parliamentary activity based on socialism, social democratic parliamentarism. What we call popular parliamentarism is the development of Lenin's definition to accord to present Japanese conditions. Our members in local assemblies now total more than two thousand five hundred. This is a four times increase since the 7th Party Congress. Maintaining deep ties with local residents, these members are not only defenders of the people's daily interests, but are making a significant contribution to the progress of the local self-governing bodies, while at the same time playing an important role for the formation of the local united front. This is made clear by the role played by our assemblymen groups in the struggle to return progressive governors in Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka and elsewhere. If the seats of Diet members of our party were doubled——I am not saying as if this were easy——it will certainly create quite favorable condition for speeding up united actions and forming a united front at national level.

It is reported that the Tanaka Cabinet will dissolve the Diet and hold general elections this autumn or within this year. Comrades, on this glorious occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Communist Party, let us achieve the great adrance of the party in the coming general elections so as to organize the progressive united front on a national basis.

VICTORY WITHIN NEXT FIFTY YEARS

Persevering with "Two-Legged Activity" For Advance

Let me refer to the immediate questions in party building.

In the Big Campaign for Party Advance to commemorate this historic 50th Anniversary, we have made remarkable progress; party membership has steadily increased and organ paper subscription has risen to about 2.5 million, a new peak in the history of the party. In the two months of the campaign, more than half a million new Akahata readers have been added, along with a steady increase in party membership. These activities have demonstrated the unflagging energy of the party and its capacity for militant action. It has been made clear again by this that the Handbook for the Improvement of Organizing Activity published last year was an important aid in mobilizing the energy of all party members. But, as the communiqué of the recent 7th Plenum of the Central Committee reports, it is also clear that there is no room for complacency about these results, because of the high demands imposed by the historic mission of the party in the present situation; and we must be conscious of the Three Year Plan of Party Building, drawn up by the party in response to the decision of the Congress. Ahead lies the great task of building a democratic coalition government backed by a powerful united front as soon as possible, and go on to the people's democratic revolution. There is no special magic for this task. The only way is to perseveringly carry on our activities in the two big fields, the mass movement and party building, based on the general line set out in the Program and more recently in the decision of the 11th Party Congress. The report of the Party Central Committee to the National Activists' Conference in August 1960 called activities in these two big fields "two-legged activity", now part of the well-known vocabulary of the party. "Two-legged activity" is common to both tasks, which develop when the party works positively with a correct policy.

The 11th Party Congress set out the party's tasks in every field of mass movements. Succeeding to the pioneering tradition displayed by the party in the class-based trade union and farmer's movements, the anti-war struggle, the youth movement and the cultural movement in prewar days, plus the positive activities of the party in the struggles for independence and peace, and struggles for safeguarding the people's living in postwar days, we must march forward now in the various fields of the mass movement. The explicit task of the mass movement is to defend the vital interests of the masses, fight for immediate political, economic and cultural aims, and promote the development of the mass organizations themselves. Our devotion to the mass movements will enable the party to deepen its ties with the people and broaden their support for the party by their own experience.

In mass movements, it is especially necessary now for the party to engage in positive propaganda on questions of special interest of the masses. It is necessary to expose the illusion of the new LDP line being put about by the Tanaka Cabinet, and contrapose to it our party's progressive policy specifically on the people's vital questions. The party must now strengthen mass education to disseminate educational activity such as mass courses for workers, peasants and citizens all over the country like a vast network, to explain clearly the relation between scientific socialism and the better life and liberation of the people, and propagate correct theories and policies. It is true that the people's universities organized so far are playing an important role, but we can never be content with only this in future mass education activity.

As regard party building, the other of the two legs, after the 11th Party Congress, we have added many precious experiences and learned many lessons.

It is an important and consistent aim of a vanguard party to have every member develop to a high political and theoretical level. It is a great achievement in party history to have had the study movement on decisions of the 11th Party Congress expand more than ever before, that 80% of the whole membership read the far-from-short reports and resolutions, and that 96% of all branches discussed them. We have always placed importance on the study of such politically and organizationally important literature as the decisions made by the subsequent CC Plenums, and other important literature; for example, the Handbook for the Improvement of Organizing Activity, and the Handbook for Organ Paper Activity and Membership Expansion. As the party moves forward on the road to the new half century, it is an important premise for the building of the party to strengthen our ranks politically and ideologically by more devoted theoretical studies by all members.

To Increase Party Strength For 50th Anniversary

Comrades, the 7th CC Plenum called for maximum efforts to achieve the target of the plan for the first half of the third year by today; it set before us the perspective of further endeavors for establishing and reaching the targets for the commemorative July, and to go on building party strength through the end of this year to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the party. The Plenum pointed out how important it was for party organs to set month by month targets for the remainder of the year and reach them with resolute determination. Why does the party center keep emphasizing the need never to be contented with small successes, and to take no respite after having won the fine subscription increase of more six hundred thousand from the time of the last Congress, and by over fifty thousand in two months? The whole party efforts have led to an unprecedented advance in party history, but the situation and the lessons learned demand that we must continue to march ahead.

Firstly, party membership expansion, which may be called the hub of party strength expansion, has led many thousands of advanced people to join the party ranks week by week, the ranks of the party expanding and strengthening daily. This is an encouraging and satisfying phenomenon. But the 11th Party Congress set targets for further efforts. Because the membership must be increased in accordance with the standards of admission——approval of the Program and Constitution——it is necessary for any person who wants to join the party to study them in advance, and to be recommended with responsibility by others who know such a person's circumstances well. This calls for special systematic preparatory activity to be carried out extensively. Let us make this commemorative year in particular a year of rapid advance in this respect. Around the party, there are naturally many people who can join the party voluntarily and work properly. So, on behalf of the whole party, I call on such people wholeheartedly on this 50th anniversary of the party's founding, to link their lives with the great progressive and revolutionary tradition of the Japanese Communist Party and march forward to the construction of a new Japan, side by side.

Secondly, while organ paper subscription has reached nearly the two million and several hundred thousand which was indicated by the last Congress——if it now is 2.5 million——we have not yet reached the targets for the first half of this year in the Three-Year Plan set by the whole party. If we are to complete the Three-Year Plan, including these tasks, more efforts are needed. The direction of the 7th CC Plenum is to advance with determination to carry out the major part of the Three-Year Plan as far as possible within this year, considering that the party strength expansion from the 10th to the 11th Congress was only 10% in party membership and 20-25% in paper subscriptitn.

Thirdly, in this movement for the party advance, by the activities of local assembly members and many other comrades who said they would try to increase subscription by two or three, there are many examples of valiant efforts. But in the rate of complete reading of the two Handbooks for party strength expansion, in some prefectures there is still an unused potential ranging from 30-40% to 50-60%.

Fourthly, our past experience has shown that, if we relax and rest after making an advance, it becomes a retrogression and decline in subscription and leads to weaknesses in party building. The decision of the 11th Party Congress says that positive and independent expansion activity is the decisive factor in stopping the 3-4% so-called natural decline in subscription, and achieving a positive advance every month.

Eliminate Opportunist Tendencies In Party Building

Comrades, now is the time to further develop the results of the campaign for advance in commemoration of the 50th anniversary, and to strive for new peaks. In order to do this, definite political and theoretical determination and the perspective of our leadership at all levels, party center, party bodies and other levels, branch committees, etc., are the key to success. The Central Committee has consistently stressed this and emphasized the need for resolute determination to eliminate opportunist tendencies in party building. This opportunist tendency has been apparent at various times, virtually ignoring or neglecting the iron rule established through many trials and struggles since the 7th Party Congress; the iron rule that not only two-legged activities but independent planned endeavors are essential to advance party strength. It takes various forms, including the "again?" argument, "stage" theory and "wall" theory. Having heard these words, you will perhaps respond that you are already aware of such things. Yes, it must be so. The important thing is for the party to deeply consider now what kind of error this is, and how it affects the past and future of the Japanese revolution.

The graph of party strength expansion since the 7th Party Congress makes it clear that party membership and organ paper circulation do not follow smooth rising curves. In no country is there an even and broad road for the revolutionary movement. While the party strength expansion as a whole shows rapid growth from the time of the 7th Party Congress, there are many cases of a slow rising curve and then a decline from the new peak, if we carefully examine each period, especially as it affects circulation. In 1969 when it was repeatedly reported that a dissolution of the Diet was imminent, though the circulation was falling, plans for a recovery in real earnest were not made immediately. Although the political influence of the party was broadened last year, made clear by our score of nearly five million votes in the House of Councilors election, the highest in party history, our independent efforts to expand party strength during the election period were deficient and the circulation fell. In spite of the appeal of the party center for continued expansion the position was not rectifield and when the party center launched an expansion campaign, evidences of the opportunist tendency I mentioned were seen in part of the party. At the starting point of the present movement for a great advance this was no exception.

The "wall" theory means that we must first tackle the mass movement and broaden the party influence, because the political influence of the party is facing a wall, causing a decline in the circulation. The "stage theory" is not very different; it maintains that it is a pressing daily duty to expand ties between the party and the people through the mass movement, though it does not flatly reject the plan and significance of independent efforts for party expansion. And the "again?" argument means passivity that sees only a repetition of a yearly event. But when a circulation decline appears, if we are worthy of being a vanguard party, we should immediately tackle it seriously and take positive measures on a whole-party scale as well as on the local scale.

Such tendencies are all wrong. For instance, the fact that the party won nearly five million votes in the House of Councilors election last year is not just the result of election propaganda, but is a combined result of the daily ties between the party and the people, and certain progress in the mass movement and party building. This undoubtedly shows extension of the party's political influence, compared with the 3.6 million votes won in the previous elections to the House of Councilors. Engels called votes gained in an election a "barometer of maturity of the working class". It can easily be seen that when the circulation is falling in spite of our broader political influence, the tendency results from a failure to independently and positively tackle the task of party strength expansion, which shows no proper effort is made. The "wall" does not exist as claimed by these erroneous tendencies; the tendencies themselves are the wall within the party, hampering independent struggles to increase party membership, and it is necessary to break down this wall. In such a case, the opinion that the mass movement must come first, whatever good intentions it comes from, is a major mistake, because it neglect independent, concrete and positive response to the demand for party strength expansion. The error of the so-called "stage theory" is not that it generally stresses the importance of the mass

movement. The error lies in losing sight of the connection between the mass movement and party building, both in theory and practice. Of course, we have many important tasks in the mass movements. Naturally, in every field of the mass movement there are progressive aspects, as well as some weaknesses to be overcome. The Standing Presidium has often spent two or three times as much time on questions of the mass movement than on party building in its meetings over these two months, during the Big Campaign for Party Advance in Commemoration of our 50th Anniversary. We must still fight at the head of the political and economic mass struggles in various fields. At the same time, the "wall" theory, which cannot correctly find the cause of the circulation decline in contrast to the broader political influence of the party, is nothing short of the passivity that evades the struggle to overcome the difficulties by an independent effort at party building. In the recent Big Campaign for Party Advance, these erroneous views have been shown to be bankrupt in both theory and practice. Many of our assembly members have reached the goal of increasing the readership by one hundred. This remarkable heroic activity provides good evidence that our political influence based on daily activity has so far not been properly organized and left over. I stress this not because such tendencies are deep-rooted within the party, but because, in the face of the complicated task of party building, it must have an important place in our succession to the party's revolutionary tradition, for the leadership at all levels from the Central Committee to branch committees, to bravely and confidently win through, with definite political and theoretical conviction in facing the difficult situation of the party in the future.

Strengthen Party Ranks and March on to Victory

Comrades,

The fact that the party has emphasized over the past two or three months in Akahata and in other ways the need to overcome opportunism and factionalism has claimed the attention of various circles. We have made clear on various occasions what the political and theoretical point at issue is. As I have already said, the party has defeated strong great-power chauvinist interventions of some foreign forces during these several years. This has helped to forge party strength and make us politically and organizationally a more powerful party. At the same time, the political decline of various anti-party factions in submission to foreign forces, and the suicidal outrages of the "Red Army" group and other Trotskyites and submissionists, have rightly or wrongly made us accustomed to their slanders and anti-party maneuvers. One result is that non-vigilance has become more common on the possibility of opportunist tendencies appearing within the revolutionary movement and within the party, as changes take place in the situation and different circumstances. This is not good. Merely to get used to "peace within the party" could weaken theoretical sensitivity and the militancy of the party.

Various petit-bourgeois views have flooded the scene about the wide unfolding of the Nixon doctrine on the international scale, taking advantage of the disunity in the international communist movement, the convulsive situation in Vietnam and Indochina; and here, in the political struggles around the Agreement on Okinawa. This situation makes it possible for such views to infiltrate and influence parts of our three hundred thousand member. The inevitability of the emergence of opportunism was pointed out by Lenin, who said: "Every specific turn in history causes some change in the form of petit bourgeois wavering, which always occurs alongside the proletariat, and which, in one degree or another, always penetrates its midst...This wavering will inevitably occur until the taproot of capitalism is cut." (*Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 33, "New Times and Old Mistakes in a New Guise"*) The pseudo-revolutionary empty arguments of the Trotskyites were scattered about in the struggle around the Agreement on Okinawa. Had we neglected and not defeated it in time it would have exerted a dominant influence on the youth section of part of the industrial unions, and their empty argument would have crept into part of the mass organizations fighting on our side; there is nothing strange in this.

The main characteristic of such opportunism is that both its right and left manifestations arise from underestimating the aggressiveness of US imperialism——the most effective touchstone to distinguish between the revolutionary position and opportunism, as has been tested in the international communist movement. The Declaration of 1957, when the unity of the international communist movement was still maintained, said, "The existence of bourgeois influence is an internal source of revisionism, while surrender to imperialist pressure is its external source." This needs to be remembered now.

It is a lesson from the history of our party that opportunism will combine with factionalism if it is not nipped in the bud. That is not all. Factionalism, which takes various theoretical forms, is often motivated by petit-bourgeois egoism. We should also calmly note that it may come from a base individualistic aspiration, alien to communism, for maintaining one's own leading post in a mass organization or an organ. It is important in training a party cadre that, if the person continues to work only in one field for too long a time, proper training from the entire party viewpoint will be lacking, and the field of vision will tend to become narrow, and many defects will appear as inability to frankly and properly define the important tasks of the whole party, contraposing activity in the one field to the activity of the whole party, when the activity in that one field is not spotlighted. If a person is in charge of one field for too long, the tendency is to regard activity in that field as a private matter, and forget that it is a task given by the party.

The party has a wealth of experience in the struggle against submissionist factions backed by big-power chauvinist intervention. Since factionalism does not always take the same form, however, a militant alertness is necessary, to nip factionalism in the bud, the attitude that from force of habit regards the mass organization or party body as a private domain.

The reactionary forces and their agents, who are always attempting to weaken the party, are ready to take advantage of even the slightest trouble within the party, to stop our advance. But whatever may be said, based on Marxism-Leninism and the principle of democratic centralism, our party will always defeat opportunism and factionalism in any from, and forge the ranks of the party into greater power, and march forward on the highroad of the revolutionary movement.

* * *

Comrades, in the party emblem recently adopted, you see a cogwheel and an ear of rice firmly placed on the "four banners". The "four banners" indicate the great perspective of the general line of the Japanese Communist Party, viz., 1) the banner of the people's democratic revolution against imperialism and monopoly, 2) the banner of the national democratic united front, 3) the banner of building a politically, ideologically and organizationally firm and powerful communist party, and 4) the banner of an international united front for national liberation and peace, in opposition to imperialism, headed by

the United States. Let us firmly uphold these "four banners" over the great world of the broad motherly masses of the people, including workers and farmers, and make every effort to win the achievement of our perspective! Let us win the victory of a new great democratic revolution as soon as possible in the Japanese Communist Party's second half century opening today!

Glory to the future of the Japanese Communist Party in building a new Japan!

(*Akahata* July 17, 1972)

ON THREE FREEDOMS

Speech at the JCP Speech Meeting in Sapporo, Hokkaido (Makomanai Sports Center) on June 2, 1974

On behalf of the JCP Central Committee I warmly thank you for attending this speech meeting with such a large company.

The Japanese Communist Party holds speech meetings in many places in Japan, but this meeting is really the first time that the Chairman of the Presidium and the Chief of the Secretariat of the JCP are both present in the one meeting.

As Tokyo is the seat of the Central Committee such a thing can happen, but in the provinces, this is the first time in Hokkaido. The reason is because the Central Committee has come to appeal to you to return without fail Comrades M. Iwama and S. Ogasawara, these fine candidates for the coming House of Councilors election, giving them your understanding and support.

As you have already heard, today there are fine speakers present who have talked about policy questions very extensively and in detail. The Chief of the Secretariat in particular dealt with the general question, so what I have to say is in the nature of concluding remarks.

Substance of LDP's "Defend Free Society"

In this election, the Liberal Democratic Party cannot squarely confront the Japanese Communist Party on such points of policy and state administration as, for instance, the price question, the agricultural question, the coal industry, the Japan-US military alliance problem, education, etc. Therefore, the LDP is forced to play its trump card, that although the Japanese Communist Party pays service to all, when it comes to power it will maintain a dictatorship, deprive the people of freedom and seize the people's property. So centering on this, I would like to talk mainly about the position of the Japanese Communist Party.

On the question of freedom and democracy: As you know, in the present election campaign, as in the last one, the LDP shouts "Defend Free Society". And Prime Minister Tanaka who visited Hokkaido the other day openly said in his press interview that after the House of Councilors election a minor constituency system with a single Diet member will be introduced.

While talking of "Defend Free Society", the Prime Minister has brought out this infamous minor constituency system which would enable the LDP to hold 80% of the total seats in the House of Representatives with only 40% of the votes of the people. This positively establishes the true color of this slogan "Defend Free Society", which is, with this deceiving propaganda to keep the LDP dictatorship forever.

Friends, of course the question of freedom is important—freedom for the people, freedom for organizations and freedom of speech. In contrast with the LDP, however, we think of the question of freedom more seriously and more broadly.

Is "Freedom to Live" Observed?

The first is freedom to live.

What is most important for people is the freedom to live. This is fundamental. Does the LDP administration ensure this freedom to live? By the LDP's policy of destroying agriculture which has been mentioned on this platform, actually 400,000 farmers had to abandon their farms in this Hokkaido over the last 8 years. They could no longer carry on their farming. The May 12th issue of Akahata carries a letter from one such woman. The husband of her friend has been in bed from a traffic accident for a long time. She went to visit that house to inquire and found that they had nothing to eat but rice and fish meal. This is what a traffic accident victim faces due to LDP misrule. Japanese capitalists are making the world's biggest profits, thanks to the "high-rate growth" policy. As a result the people are suffering from the world's highest rate of price-hikes. Ten thousand yen when the Tanaka Cabinet was formed is now, after two years, worth only 7,400 yen. What about environmental disruption? The number of environmental disruption patients designated last year is 13,000 in one year alone. The number of traffic accident casualties totaled 8,910,000 in the last 10 years. What about housing? Thirty to forty percent of the total households in Japan, that is, 8-10 million households, are troubled about housing. This is definite evidence that the Japanese people are not really guaranteed freedom to live, with cultural and healthy living supposed to be guaranteed by the Constitution.

In contrast, what is the "freedom" advanced by the LDP in its "free society"? The land cornered by big business in Hokkaido––freedom of vicious business, freedom to corner land––totals 120,000 hectares. A handful of big businesses control the Japanese economy. While the total number of juridical business persons in Japan is 960,000, 60% of total capital is under the control of businesses capitalized at over one billion yen. The number of such businesses amounts to only 0.1%, about one thousand. A handful of giant businesses control also its center to make huge profits. This is the actual condition of the Japanese economy. Friends, although the LDP talks much about "freedom", we should, first of all, examine if it really guarantees freedom to live.

The JCP Attitude toward "Civil, Political Freedom"

Second is freedom of speech, assembly, press and association, freedom of ideas, creeds and beliefs and freedom of fair election and the guarantee of parliamentary democracy. This is also very precious. The LDP and its followers, the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito say that the JCP does not observe freedom. But have a look at the past, present and future of the JCP. The Japanese Communist Party came into being 52 years ago. Japan at that time was under total dark politics. Today many women are present at this meeting. At that time no woman was permitted to attend this sort of meeting. Naturally women had no right to vote. At that time it was forbidden openly to form a communist party. Any law could be enacted by the Tenno's decree. One piece of red paper drove all of you into a wrong war, and actually three million Japanese people lost their lives. At that time it was only the Communist Party that demanded sovereignty vested in the people, against terrible oppression and pressure. It was only the Japanese Communist Party that insisted that the war of aggression was wrong and cried out against the war of aggression without fearing imprisonment. In view of those facts, it is indisputable that only the Communist Party is the party that fought, from fifty years ago, for democracy, for sovereignty resting with the people, freedom of ideas, creed and faith, and for peace.

Then what about the present? At present the Japanese Communist Party takes the line of forming a united front of democratic forces and for a coalition government with your support through elections. Even when a democratic-coalition government with JCP participation is formed, the activities of opposition parties will naturally be fully guaranteed. If in an election the democratic coalition government side is defeated, it will become an opposition party at once. This was formally decided by the party congress and the JCP repeatedly states it. Even in a socialist Japan of course we will ensure civilian, political freedom and fully guarantee the freedom of activity of opposition parties, even if they criticize socialism and speak against it. We have repeatedly said this.

LDP Freedom——"Sovereignty Resting With Financial Circles"

What about Prime Minister Tanaka? When he went to Kyoto during the last by-election there, he said that if there were a party similar to the LDP he would hand over political power to it——so long as that kind of party is not formed, political power can never be handed over. Friends, the people themselves decide political power by the results of election. As I have mentioned, the JCP proposal for a democratic coalition government states that we will become an opposition party if we are defeated by an election. Prime Minister Tanaka does not say this. He said that when an anti-communist opposition coalition he likes grows into a party which is not so different from the LDP,——this means not a shift in political power but only an agent of the LDP——then he will think over a shift in political power. This is already "sovereignty resting with financial circles", which tramples on the sovereignty of the people, and one may safely say that this is nothing but a "fascist disease".

When we say that the present JCP policy is to form a government peacefully by gaining your confidence in a fair way

through election by peaceful means, and not to carry out a coup d'état or violent revolution, they say that foreign examples show that revolutions in China and the Soviet Union are armed ones, that the Soviet Union did not allow Solzhenitsyn to publish what he wrote, therefore the Communist Party says nice things, but when it seizes political power everything will be the same as in those countries. This is their supposed trump card. Here is an important point. The Japanese Communist Party is a sovereign independent party. Whatever big socialist nations there may be, the Soviet Union or China, and even if communist leaders of those nations intervene in JCP affairs, we will resolutely refuse this, as we have done for the last 10 years. It is an attitude resolutely taken by us, that the road to making the Japanese people happy is what Japanese progressives think for themselves, and that no foreign party or foreign socialist country has the right to interfere.

Mankind's New Trial——Political Reform In Advanced Capitalist Countries

An important aspect is that most of the socialist states which have come into being were countries of backward social conditions. For instance, China was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society which did not have a parliamentary system. Many military cliques were confronting each other. The Chinese revolution was carried out in such a country. Consequently it took the form of armed revolution. Russia was a capitalist country but with a backward economy. There was a parliamentary system under an emperor called the Czar, but the parliament was merely nominal. It does not stand to reason to cite those countries as examples and attack us on the score of our policy. We have an electoral system and a Diet. Political parties have their own policies on which you pass judgment, and Diet members are elected as well as heads of municipalities. This is the system we live under. There is a big imbalance because no correction of the fixed number of seats for each constituency has been made, as required by law. So that in some constituencies the number of electors represented by one Diet member is 4 times as many as in other constituencies. One vote becomes only a quarter of what it is in other districts. The value of one vote cast by an elector is out of balance in relation to the population. Nevertheless, in spite of these defects, we do have an electoral system and fight on the basis of policy. This is what politics is in an advanced capitalist country such as Japan, and Prime Minister Tanaka is attempting to change this system into a minor constituency system, because the LDP has suffered one defeat after another.

This takes place not only in Japan. The other day the French Communist Party and Socialist Party jointly fought the presidential election and was able to come very close to victory with a narrow margin. In France, too, they say that the new government fully recognizes freedom of activity of opposition parties and will have no censorship and fully guarantees freedom of individuals and collective organizations. They repeat this. This is true not only in France but also in Italy and Britain. It is a new test of mankind to carry on new politics in such an advanced capitalist country. In contrast to this, they bring out examples of countries that moved into socialism under vastly different conditions and say that our case will also eventually become the same as such countries. This proves how very weak and faulty their reasoning is.

Question of Freedom and Principles of Socialism

What then does scientific socialism, the principle of communism, think of this freedom? As you know, the communist party takes Marxism-Leninism as its theoretical basis. Marx and Lenin did brilliant work in building a new society. We study the best of their work. Marx says that when freedom of the press is lacking, all other freedoms become illusory. Freedom of the press is as important as that, he says. He also said, "It won't be that freedom is not precious for a person", and Lenin said, "There can be no victorious socialism that does not practice full democracy."

Leaders of Komeito say that socialism advanced by the JCP is entirely different in spirit from democracy in Europe. But friends, this is false. Scientific socialism, the communist position we advocate, respects everything of value that has been given birth by mankind—through thousands of years of our long history. There is a famous phrase from Abraham Lincoln that says, "Government of the people, by the people and for the people". Such a democratic position, French enlightenment thought, and the thought of respect for human rights—to develop all these ideas further, and thereby to solve the problems of poverty, unemployment, war and other issues fundamentally—this is our idea of progress.

Consequently our position is that we take up everything—respect for human rights and a representative system to administer the state by choosing representatives by elections—all of which mankind has created in past history—and make them really the people's property. It follows that respect for freedom, respect for democracy, not in mere lip service, but really freedom to live and freedom to defend our own thought and conscience—this is our natural demand that comes from the bottom of our hearts.

That is why, as I have said, our JCP members, even when they lost their lives under police torture and cruelty in prison during the period of severe persecution, gave their lives with the same pride in which we defend Japan's freedom and peace, and devote ourselves to the fatherland.

LDP Destroyed "Freedom of the Nation"

To proceed; important in the question of freedom is the issue of freedom of the nation.

The Japanese nation has the right for the Japanese people to decide the affairs of the Japanese people and of Japan, not letting a foreign country interfere, not to allow a place to be built in Japan which violates Japan's political rights, such as a military base of a foreign country. This is what to be a really independent country means. We must also restore territory taken by a foreign country, Japan's own land, through negotiations. This is also one of our national freedoms. How are things from this point of view? The predecessor Government to the LDP Government, that is, the Liberal Party Government, concluded the "Peace" Treaty in San Francisco, USA. It abandoned the Chishima (Kurile) Islands under Article II of the Treaty. The Liberal Government signed the Treaty which states that the Chishima Islands do not belong to Japan. This should be called a betrayal of national freedom.

That is not all. According to Article VI of the Treaty, it concluded an agreement that acknowledges the stationing of foreign troops in Japan, under which the United States concluded the US-Japan military alliance and still has nearly 160 military bases in Japan. US forces occupy vast areas up to 49,500 hectares. In Hokkaido, too, they have a radar base in Wakkanai. Japan's sky and sea are still actually controlled by

the US fleet and US air force. The party and the government which accepted this situation are really a party and government that trample on national rights and freedom. In contrast, we of the Japanese Communist Party have demanded that the article by which the Chishima Islands were abandoned be abrogated. I, myself, when I attended a CPSU Congress about 10 years ago, had talks with the CPSU leadership to demand that Etorofu and Kunashiri, which were Japanese territory from the beginning, and which Japan did not take by war, should be returned to Japan when the Japan-US Security Treaty has been abrogated and Japan has become a peaceful country. Eventually an agreement was reached on this. The Japanese Communist Party that defends the workers' and working people's interests, at the same time is a party that defends the proper rights of the nation. Based on the nation's proper aspirations, we therefore demanded this when no other opposition group had said a single word to the Soviet Union on this matter.

To Defend the People's Property— A Matter of Course

Friends, the question of freedom must be viewed from these three points. What the LDP is actually doing under the slogan, "Let's defend free society", is to depict the JCP as an enemy, a horrible and dangerous enemy, while covering up the LDP's own true character that deprives the people of these three freedoms. To direct the people's attention away, the LDP is propagating that the JCP will eventually seize the people's property and land.

But you don't have to worry about that. One step in the economy to be taken by the JCP is to control in the interest of the people major companies that hold huge several or tens of billions of yen as capital, arbitrarily boosting the prices of their products and engaged in vicious business, to prevent them from making huge profits. We will stop them recklessly raising prices, restricting sales and land-cornering. Needless to say, we guarantee and will guarantee the people's properties completely—lands, houses and deposits—gained by their work.

Especially, we respect other businessmen, farmers and fishermen and their personal business. It is a groundless rumour the LDP circulates that land will be nationalized as soon as socialism comes into existence. Take as an example, Poland, one of the socialist countries. Although some dozens of years have passed since the revolution in Poland, over 80 percent of farmers still have their own farms. We introduce cooperative farming only when farmers are willing to do this, considering that collective management serves their interests better than individual management, or regarding collective use of tools and collective work as serving their interests. It has nothing to do with JCP policy to forcibly introduce cooperatives by depriving farmers of their land and fishermen of their tools.

Friends, in this election campaign the LDP is talking about this and that, but ultimately, it resorts to anti-communist attacks in order to describe the JCP as the worst enemy. In which case, I hope that you will resolutely refute such demagogy, asserting that the concept of the JCP on freedom is not what the LDP talks about, but has more extensive and comprehensive contents, and that the JCP is an absolute defender of freedom.

Which Party Is the True Defender Of Freedom?

Friends, as concrete and actual politics in Japan has demonstrated vividly in these ten and more years, the Zaibatsu (financial circles) have made huge profits under the "high-rate growth" policy. Under this policy, they have boosted the prices of their products and curbed wages of workers so as to gain bigger profits. Furthermore, they have expanded their plants and equipments in order to make these profits still bigger. Herein is the reason why the Japanese economy has made the most rapid progress in the world. This "high-rate growth" policy is the worst, and has deprived the people of their right to live and their freedom to live. The JCP is the only party that has consistently opposed the laws underlying this "high-rate growth" policy, including the laws for promoting the building of new industrial cities and for promoting the relocation of industries and special districts and many other related laws. These laws were supported by the Democratic Socialist Party, the Komei Political League and Komei-Kai, both of which were Komeito's antecedents, and even by the Socialist Party. This is unfortunately true.

The history of these ten and more years—there is no need to cite the history of these fifty years—shows clearly enough that only the JCP has struggled consistently for freedom to live.

Friends, I regret to say that there is no united front yet. The JCP called on Komeito, and also on the Socialist Party, to form it. Both parties, however, made no response to this call. In Kochi Prefecture alone, a JCP-SPJ joint struggle has been formed. Although it is only a partial one, it is good in itself. However, now that a united front is not yet formed, that is to say, no proper step has yet been taken to replace LDP politics, what party has the correct people-oriented idea on this question?

In no sense do we have such a mean spirit as merely to speak ill of, slander and abuse other parties. Frankly speaking, we continue to hope that the SPJ will grow into a reliable party that will form, as in France, a united front with the JCP, and that we will be able to win the national election in the same way as we won the gubernatorial elections of Tokyo and Osaka.

From this standpoint, we will continue to make the proposal to the SPJ. But in the present situation, when neither the SPJ nor Komeito responds to the JCP proposal for a progressive united front, the advance of the Japanese Communist Party, I am sure, is the key for a change in Japanese politics—the Japanese Communist Party that is most feared by the Liberal Democratic Party and is calling most eagerly for a progressive united front.

Great Advance of the JCP for a Dawn in Hokkaido

Based on this, we will continue to call on the SPJ. For the present, however, neither the SPJ nor Komeito is ready to respond to our call. In these circumstances, I am convinced that a progressive change in Japanese politics will pivot on a great advance of the JCP, the most earnest advocate of a progressive united front, about which the LDP is most disturbed.

We regret to say that, particularly in Hokkaido, the LDP and the SPJ had long maintained a compromise on the policy of "high-rate growth" for Hokkaido, called the Third-Term Comprehensive Development Plan of the prefecture. This is a stern fact. Comrade Tada may have told you that only after a JCP Diet member had been elected and begun showing that the plan was harmful to the people of Hokkaido and other parts of Japan, did the SPJ withdraw its approval of the plan. In the final analysis, I believe that as more JCP members are elected to the Hokkaido Assembly and to the Diet, only then will the way be shortened to the dawn of a progressive Hokkaido that

will end the former collusive politics between the LDP and the SPJ.

This is the first time in lecture meetings organized by a political party for this meeting hall to be fully occupied by the audience. You have shown both political interest and far-sightedness. In concluding my speech, may I ask you in all earnestness to give your judgment in the coming July 7 election to ensure the victory of the two wonderful candidates recommended by the JCP, so that the day may come as soon as possible when the Three Freedoms, which I have just said are essential for human beings to live, will be realized.

(*Akahata*, June 8, 1974)

TURNING POINT IN HISTORY

Link between Scientific Socialism and Religion

Contribution to the October 1975 issue of "Bungei Shunju" supplemented by the author

Seicho Matsumoto as Go-Between

On October 21, 1974 Seicho Matsumoto called Fumio Yamashita, Chief of the Culture Department of the JCP, with whom he was acquainted through his work, and asked him if he would meet him as soon as possible. They had known each other for a long time through their work. Without loss of time Comrade Yamashita called on Mr. Matsumoto, who asked him to ascertain if I would be willing to meet Soka Gakkai President Daisaku Ikeda, indicating, to my surprise, that Mr. Ikeda was not unwilling.

From a discussion he had with Minoru Omori through the weekly "Shukan Gendai", I learned that Mr. Ikeda was interested in the Japanese Communist Party and myself. In an NHK TV program when I talked with Daizo Kusayanagi I was asked if I would like to meet President Ikeda, to which I replied that I would be quite willing to do this at any time he felt like it. But I had no intention to take the initiative in bringing this about. When a certain newspaper (not Mainichi) asked JCP Secretary Tetsuzo Fuwa if I would agree to the suggested talk with Mr. Ikeda, hinting that the latter was willing, my answer was affirmative, but that was all. This kind of suggestion comes from a person who acts as a go-between, who tends to make it appear that both parties are quite willing, so I did not take the suggestion very seriously.

In addition, Komeito, for which Soka Gakkai is the support organization, since 1973 had been expending much energy in attacking the JCP, evidenced by propaganda campaigns to stigmatize our party as one that did not observe "the three principles of the Constitution", viz., people's sovereignty, fundamental human rights and peace, using this pretext for its refusal to take part in a joint struggle to form a coalition government that included the JCP. In fact, in the 1970 Kyoto gubernatorial election, Komeito teamed up with the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Socialist Party. In the Kyoto gubernatorial election in 1974, the LDP, the DSP and the rightwing faction within the Socialist Party of Japan, with Komeito support, did everything possible to overthrow the Ninagawa local government, which had actually been formed by the action of the united front which included the SPJ and the JCP, and had produced many good results as a progressive local government for twenty-odd years. In a speech he made in Kyoto in April 1970, Komeito Chairman Takeiri stated emphatically that he would "destroy the JCP", a statement that reminded one of the atmosphere prevailing during the war. Naturally, we strongly countered this attack. I criticized Takeiri's speech, charging that it revealed the potential fascism in Komeito; and in the Kyoto gubernatorial election in 1974, I again pointed out that the conservatism of Komeito was really deep-rooted.

Soka Gakkai and Komeito have recently been talking about the separation of politics and religion; but with Komeito backed by Soka Gakkai as its major support organization, and with Soka Gakkai declaring that it will continue to support Komeito, I thought the suggestion of a talk between Mr. Ikeda and myself may have been conceived by journalists, and did not think it a feasible idea. But when I learned more of Seicho Matsumoto's suggestion, I found it was not just a Matsumoto pipe-dream, and with several preliminary steps suggested, his plan began to sound more feasible.

I had been acquainted with Mr. Matsumoto since we had a magazine discussion some ten years earlier, and I have been seeing more of him since April 1974. I have come across him in waiting rooms for election campaigners, and I had a standing conversation with him at the celebration party for the JCP anniversary on July 15; but he did not mention the proposed talk with Mr. Ikeda. I know many writers, but Mr. Matsumoto, a novelist with an excellent knowledge of history, is outstanding in his farsighted and broad grasp of current and future trends in Japan, and in penetrating behind-the-scenes maneuvers. I knew that he was on friendly terms with Mr. Ikeda, but even when he suggested in passing that I meet Mr. Ikeda on some occasion, I never thought of asking him to act as a go-between.

Just five years ago, when the problems caused by Komeito and Soka Gakkai in relation to freedom of speech and publication were drawing to a close, Mr. Matsumoto enthusiastically suggested to me that I have a talk with Mr. Ikeda, saying that Mr. Ikeda was not persisting in his anti-communist attitude. Although I appreciated Mr. Matsumoto's honest intention to attempt a reconciliation between the two parties, I declined to offer because I felt that the time was not yet ripe. I considered it would be ill-advised to hold talks behind the scenes when the two parties were openly involved in heated controversies about the problems of freedom of speech and publication; if we negotiated behind the scenes before any clear conclusion was reached it would only lead to confusion among the public.

Uppermost in my mind when I heard of Mr. Matsumoto's proposal was of course Komeito's persistent anti-communist attitude. As long as Soka Gakkai continued to support an anti-communist Komeito, nothing definitely progressive could

be expected from the proposed talks with Soka Gakkai, even if only a personal talk with the Soka Gakkai president.

Yet we had not failed to notice some changes in Soka Gakkai after it had had to face up to the speech and publication issue. There is no need for me to mention again the circumstances surrounding this incident, but the truth and evaluation of the problems was not whether to approve or disapprove of them; the problems focused attention on the close links between Soka Gakkai and Komeito, especially the connection between the planned establishment of national ordination seat and the Constitution, leading to a nationwide controversy with all the opposition parties. Much heated debate took place between Komei Shimbun of Komeito and Seikyo Shimbun of Soka Gakkai on one hand, and Akahata on the other. Eventually, at the Soka Gakkai Central Convention in May 1970, Mr. Ikeda warned that they should never repeat the same mistake, making clear that they were going to give up the idea of establishing a national ordination seat, emphasizing at the same time that they would not persist in a stubborn anti-communist attitude. I expressed my view on this at that time; while indicating some problems, I paid attention to his good sense as a man of religion. He made an impression on me when he took a rather progressive position on the subject of separation of religion and politics. He treated the issue as something from which he should learn and be wiser, without brooding over it with lingering resentment. As for the separation of religion and politics, it was wise of him to decide to give up the planned founding of national ordination seat; but regarding Soka Gakkai's continued role as the support organization of Komeito, I pointed out that this was a problem yet to be resolved.

After this incident, although Komeito revised some of its Buddhist theological terms in the party platform, We could not overlook the fact that Soka Gakkai was a Komeito support organization, since in everyday life, and especially in the general elections, they constantly attacked the Japanese Communist Party. Nevertheless, we could not but take note of his new assertions made two years ago at the Soka Gakkai Headquarters General Assembly. He said that Soka Gakkai would continue to stand by the masses, and that ideological differences would not prevent it from defending other organizations attacked by fascists. He also asserted that Soka Gakkai was a cultural body for peace, as well as a religious organization; they intensified their struggles against nuclear weapons, with the slogan for a total ban on nuclear weapons. Following his trips to China and the Soviet Union, Mr. Ikeda acknowledged that socialism is a forward step in history.

We considered that if Mr. Ikeda's attitude, judged from these statements, reflects the stance of Soka Gakkai, we should regard Soka Gakkai as also showing progress.

Although on one hand suspicious but on the other somewhat hopeful, at a meeting of the Standing Presidium we decided to agree to the suggested preliminary talks, and conveyed our answer to Mr. Matsumoto.

How the Agreement Was Reached

I had detailed reports of the seven preliminary talks that occupied more than twenty hours from late October through late December. One party is a religious organization believing in the Buddhist doctrines of Nichiren Shoshu, and the other a political party whose theoretical basis is scientific socialism—Marxism-Leninism, communism. With these obvious differences as a precondition, and starting from the relationship of the two parties in an attempt to find common grounds, we thoroughly discussed a wide range of questions of interest to both parties. The JCP interest lay in whether it was possible

for Soka Gakkai to hold a free and independent relationship with the JCP in line with the progressive course of history, without being constrained by moves of Komeito. In international affairs, especially with regard to the United States war of aggression against Vietnam, we were interested in whether Soka Gakkai would equate the role of the United States with the Vietnamese people, who were struggling against it. On this point, however, it seemed that there was no need to continue controversy.

With views exchanged and all points discussed, an agreement was reached. At first we thought we should make some arrangements to issue a joint communiqué after my talks with Mr. Ikeda, and hold a joint press conference, because if realized, my talk with him should be openly published. But if we could reach an agreement valid for ten years, it would have much more stability, so we agreed to this. The agreement, formally approved by the responsible organs of both parties, was signed by Koichiro Ueda and Isao Nozaki on behalf of the respective organs.

With this agreement as the background, it was arranged for Mr. Ikeda and me to have an informal talk. In his interview with "Sunday Mainichi" and in an article for Tokyo Shimbun, Mr. Matsumoto has given details of our talk, including the atmosphere, but on the special request of the editorial staff I will present some points of interest to the reading public.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon on the 29th of December 1974, I called on Mr. Matsumoto. When ushered into the drawing room, I found Mr. Ikeda talking with Mr. Matsumoto. It was my first meeting with Mr. Ikeda, but the agreement had already been made and we had nothing difficult to negotiate, so our talk ran comfortably and frankly. We had no alcoholic drinks, but enjoyed coffee, cake, and fruit.

Mr. Ikeda revealed that this was not his first time to see me;

to my surprise, he told me that he was in the audience listening to my election campaign speech twenty years earlier, and three of us burst into laughter. Mention was made of the idea of creating a new phase of history with the next two or three decades in view. Now that we had a worthy agreement, I said, we should respect it, and keep faith. Mr. Matsumoto had joined us in our talk in the meantime, and our scheduled two hours seemed to pass very quickly. Before we finished, the four persons who had taken part in preparing the agreement, waiting in an adjoining room, came in, introduced themselves and exchanged greetings. We talked together until taking leave.

The final version of the agreement was approved by the Standing Presidium of the JCP, which held an emergency meeting before ratification of the accord, which was then reported to a meeting of the Presidium on January 15, in which all supported it, and added some positive comments. At the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee on January 17, I reported the substance of the agreement, which was unanimously approved, along with the measures taken by the Presidium on the question.

Naturally, the agreement was intended for public release. The representatives of the two parties agreed that the timing of its release would be decided by consultation between the two parties. I thought it should be published as soon as possible, but I regret to say it was some time before it was made public.

As regards the planned public talk by the two of us, newspapers and magazines enquired directly and indirectly of the JCP about its feasibility, but even by late December nothing definite had materialized. In January, for the first time in two and half years I met Sanyū Gomi, chief of the editorial department of Mainichi Shimbun, who had been transferred to Tokyo from Osaka. He suggested that we take "Civilization" as the

subject of my talk with Mr. Ikeda. It was nothing concrete; just one suggested topic among many. Mr. Gomi told me that he had been acquainted personally with Mr. Ikeda for many years; then, a little later, he made a formal request and informed that Mr. Ikeda had agreed. So finally, my talk with Mr. Ikeda came about through Mainichi Shimbun.

While Mr. Gomi was the political department chief of that daily, the program "Asking Each Party About Its Security Policy" took shape, and our discussion was chaired by Mr. Gomi. There were only five JCP Diet members at that time, in the House of Representatives. As a minority party, the JCP commanded surprisingly small space in the press when it made statement, compared with the SPJ and others, a situation generally taken for granted, but in this program, apart from treatment given to the LDP, which was more favored, other parties were treated equally without discrimination based on their parliamentary numerical strength.

This was both logical and reasonable, because in this project, the leader of each party was asked questions by all the other party chiefs, and taking into account the prevailing atmosphere of those days, this was a farsighted approach. The project won the Newspaper Association Prize for the year, and the experience confirmed my impression of respect for Mr. Gomi as a farsighted journalist, though practically we take different political positions. We had been requested to "talk on life", irrespective of ideology and aims, not referring to political issues. Naturally, this limited its scope, but it was much to the credit of Mr. Gomi that our talk materialized in this way.

The Substance of the Agreement

The substance of the agreement is quite specific and clear. Some fundamental principles are clearly set out on important mutual relationships, and the measures to be taken for our common objectives. This is seen in such expressions as, "the character and aims of respective organizations and their movements", "recognition of each other's different stances", "taking for granted that neither will violate the other's independence of organization and movement", seen in broad perspective as "for the sake of Japan's future, for world peace, and above all in the interests of the all-important Japanese masses, the people".

On mutual relationships, three points are made:

First, "we shall do our best to promote mutual understanding while respecting each other's independence, so that we can establish mutual trust."

Second, "Soka Gakkai will not take a hostile attitude towards scientific socialism——communism, while the Japanese Communist Party will unconditionally defend freedom of religion, including freedom of the propagation of religion under whatever system."

Third, "we will keep faith with each other", neither abusing nor slandering the other, "respect negotiations under all circumstances" and "solve all problems between the two parties through consultation."

This means that we will do our best continually to promote mutual understanding and friendship. This is possible fundamentally because of the second important, epoch-making, point. Naturally this does not preclude any possibility of frank exchanges of views and honest mutual criticism before the people, as the two organizations are open to the public.

Our common ground and objectives for Japan's future and world peace from a broad standpoint are as follows:

First, we will continue always to support the cause of the people. This states our obvious determination never to support or have anything to do with reactionary power not serving the interests of the people.

Secondly, our objectives in common are "to get rid of social injustices and promote the welfare of the people" and to strive for "lasting world peace", especially for a total ban on "nuclear weapons, which threaten from the very root the existence of the human race...by reason of our common recognition that in Japan trends towards neo-fascism exist, we will both exercise wisdom to prevent this, and resolutely oppose any fascist attacks that would deprive the people of democratic and fundamental human rights, trampling upon freedom of political activities and religion."

Here briefly but clearly expressed are the fundamental attitudes of the two organizations held in common towards matters of life and death for the survival of the people in present-day Japan and in the world.

The fundamental common objectives of the two thus made clear are central to the agreement, the embodiment of the agreement's grand basic principles, "for world peace, and above all, for the sake of the all-important Japanese masses, the people." This point shows vividly that the keynote of the agreement is to move history in the progressive direction, not merely to establish non-hostile relationships between the two organizations.

Thirdly, the question of how the two organizations should deal with their common objectives is stated clearly in the words, "according to their own beliefs and ways", "in line with their own positions" duly respecting the independence of their respective organizations, "make mutual efforts" to "cooperate with each other" and "keep faith with each other."

Fourthly, it was decided that the term of the agreement would be for ten years; at the end of the term, "in view of the obtaining new situation, talks would be held to reach another agreement in order to move mutual relationships a step further". This reveals the positive determination and perspective of preserving cooperation and friendship between the two organizations on a long-term basis.

As the above shows, the substance of the agreement as a whole is quite clear, and essentially there is no possibility of it being misconstrued if read without prejudice. Underlying the wishes we have in common for Japan's future, which lie at the very root of the agreement, are not merely concern for the two organizations, but also a basic national consensus on serious problems for the safety of the human race all over the earth, and the security of the Japanese people. Even if the problems are not set out in so many words, the overwhelming majority of the people can agree as long as they live on this earth, they are Japanese people, and they look life's realities in the eye, and do not hesitate to seek a better future irrespective of their fields of activities and occupations, and whether they believe in God, Buddha, or neither.

The Danger of Japanese-Type Fascism

In the past these prospects were often expressed independently by the two organizations in their own activities; they were not asked by either of the other to add something new that either of the two had lacked. In other words, insofar as we stand firmly for the people, both organizations have put into words the common desires of the people. This is why, generally speaking, informed public opinion has welcomed this agreement, with a wide varieties of repercussions. It can be agreed with by any organization, political, popular democratic, or religious, so long as the organization works for a better future for Japan and is not narrowly concerned with preserving its own organization.

But there are currents toward a new form of fascism

evident in Japan; in politics it is common knowledge that such currents aim at emasculating parliamentary democracy and revising the Constitution by changing the electoral system, aiming especially to introduce a system of small constituencies. This is shown by the work of the LDP Constitution Study Group, and the persistent moves, both open and secret, to introduce such a system. We all know that all of a sudden a bill to introduce an election system by which the LDP, with 40 percent of the votes, could win 80 percent of the seats, was to be placed before the Diet; this led a wide range of democratic organizations, including opposition parties, to rise up in widespread struggles very quickly, and although it did not take part in the joint organization for the struggle, Soka Gakkai made its attitude public, that it opposed the planned small constituency system.

The Japanese Communist Party has pointed out that these intensified reactionary moves indicate the danger of Japanese-type or postwar Japanese-type fascism. Fascism does not mean only what was created in Hitler Germany or Mussolini Italy, with absolute governments formed by absorbing other political parties into the fascist party, or, as in Japan prewar, by unification into the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai).

Seen historically from the social standpoint, fascism is that brutal form of rule which monopoly capitalism and its agents have recourse to in order to maintain power when its foundation is weakened by the expanding basic contradictions with the interests of the people. In present-day Japan democratic forces have put down fairly strong roots, and independent organizations are working actively among a fairly wide range of the people; the LDP cannot put forward a bill for revision of the Constitution and force it through the Diet because it does not command a two-thirds majority, a situation which has obtained for many years, and the leaders of the reactionary forces have to take account of the fact that if they overtly tried to re-introduce the violent rule of prewar Japan it would mean digging their own political grave by a general offensive of the people. For this reason, on the pretext of seeking a stable political situation, they want to revise the electoral system, even while maintaining a nominal parliamentary system and government by political parties, but in substance perpetuating the rule of the forces serving monopoly capital and faithfully preserving the Japan-US military alliance. As the LDP Constitution Study Group has made clear, the design is to achieve an absolute dictatorship by giving over-riding power to the Government in time of emergency. This danger did not completely disappear with the exit of the Tanaka Government. In the last session of the Diet, the Miki Government succeeded to a large extent in curbing freedom of the press in election campaigns and has never weakened in its keenness for a small constituency system. The difference between the Miki Government and the Tanaka Government is only in the new tactics of "dialogue and cooperation" the former is using to reach its cherished desire, with the backing of the first opposition party.

The other important element in our agreement is the clarification of the relationship between scientific socialism and religion, and our determination to promote mutual understanding. As a matter of fact, Soka Gakkai has always regarded communism as its mortal enemy, and the Japanese Communist Party for a considerable time has regarded Soka Gakkai as the same kind of anti-communist organization as Komeito, although naturally we stand for the principle of freedom of faith. In every election the members and supporters of the two organizations have inevitably been hostile toward each other. If this hostile relationship can be switched to a better understanding in accordance with the agreement, it will really mark

a new epoch. This is what I meant by what I said in my speech at the 53rd anniversary of the JCP: "If this can pave the way for tens of millions of members and supporters of the two organizations to take an attitude of mutual understanding and friendship, instead of prejudice and hatred, it will be valuable for Japan's peace and for democratic development." In Yomiuri Shimbun of July 13, Mr. Ikeda said that religion and scientific socialism "can coexist. And we should strive for that." This means more than merely legal coexistence, and should not remain merely negative self-preservation through mutual non-invasion. Mutual understanding and cooperation in expectation of achieving a certain national consensus— these are the two main elements of the agreement. In order to consider this matter more deeply, I will take up the relationship between scientific socialism and religion.

Scientific Socialism and Religion

The theory of scientific socialism or communism aims to bring together the totality of knowledge so far created by human society, acknowledging the direction of the law that runs through the progressive stages of societies, for the furtherance of which human classes and masses are striving. It takes in the development of human society through feudalism to the capitalist system and the perspective to a socialist society, evaluating the concepts of people's sovereignty, representative government, and fundamental human rights created by modern society as important levels reached by the human race. Freedom of speech and press, the right of assembly, association and religion, are naturally the target. The law of progress takes the road to socialism because in capitalist society human liberation is suppressed and exploited by capital, and only by abolishing the exploiting system and achieving social liberation can such a society be realized. The kind of such a process will depend on each country's history and social condition; we have no ready-made prescription. In Japan, for instance, ever since prewar days the Japanese Communist Party has set the target of a bourgeois democratic revolution to be achieved first, not aiming directly at a socialist revolution. Then postwar, the JCP has set its aim on the achievement of a people's new democratic revolution at this historical stage, and has worked for a Japan of true independence and neutrality, peace, democracy and better living. It is striving now for the establishment of a democratic coalition government by the unification of political forces centered on progressive objectives that can be agreed on.

Attaching high importance to democratic demands, the JCP has formulated a platform in its Program, which says, among other democratic demands, "It opposes any attempt to change the Constitution for the worse, and demands and fights for the complete implementation of the peaceful and democratic provisions of the Constitution"; for this it has been struggling. Articles of the Constitution that embody peace and democracy cover freedom of religion, the separation of religion and politics, and the prohibition of religious education by the state and its agencies, all definitely laid down in the Article 20.

The agreement we have made includes the expression "We unconditionally defend freedom of religion, including freedom of the propagation of religion under whatever system"; but this is not the first time we have mentioned freedom to propagate religion. Back in 1946, when the enactment of the new constitution was on the political agenda, in the proposed draft constitution formulated by the JCP we said, "In order to guarantee to the people freedom of religion and conscience, the separation of religion and state, and religion and school education are assured; freedom of religious worship and propagation as well as freedom of anti-religious activity is also guaranteed", clarifying freedom of missionary work. In the proposed platform for a democratic coalition government, the words, "guaranteeing freedom of religion and religious activities" naturally include freedom to propagate religion.

What then is the theoretical consideration and evaluation of religion in scientific socialism? Scientific socialism as created by Marx and Engels, and developed by Lenin and others, was not regarded in their lifetime as a panacea to serve all times and conditions, but was merely a theoretical cornerstone in building a structure for the liberation movement. In addition, scientific socialism today, one century after the death of Marx and half a century after Lenin, naturally must embody all the positive and creative developments of the theory from the truly rich experience of the world communist movement. Great as are the theoretical achievements of Marx, Engels and Lenin, they themselves warned that their theory should not be dogmatized as a panacea, since they took it for granted that their theory would be developed in a creative way in the changing historical situation, forming thus its theoretic features.

In his "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law", Marx says about religion: "Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people." (*Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. 3*) This expression, "religion is opium" was used by Lenin in his article on religious matters; and in this country it has been used as if it were the typical expression of the communist view on religion. But in the days of Marx and Lenin, which formed the background to this expression, both Germany and Russia were premodern states with an absolute despotic system. It should be borne in mind that the religious organizations which contentedly reigned as "state religion" tried to put the people's social awakening back to sleep, in confrontation with the struggle for social resolution of people's sufferings in such states, by preaching endurance in this world in the name of God's order, thus serving the social purposes of reactionary rule. The word opium, as mentioned by Marx, should be considered in relation to other expressions, such as "the protest against real distress"; it is clear that it was not intended as a basis for despising religion, but it reflects the criticism of religion for serving such purposes.

It is true that in their writings there are not a few critical expressions used, such as the struggle against religion, used in the philosophical and ideological sense, but nevertheless they continued to advocate freedom of religion. Marx and Engels, for instance, rejected as foolish the demands of the Blanquists for prohibition of religion, and in the policy on religion Lenin's assertions were more thorough. They all clearly recognized the historical background and social basis from which religion has rightly arised. Philosophically, they made no compromise with the religious concept of a world created by God, but they saw it as more important that people of religion are also people of this earth. It was therefore a fundamental principle that workers, peasants and citizens and the wide range of people should not be opposed to each other because of religion, but, regardless of religion, be united in their struggle for social progress and the ending of exploitation. Marxism gives an important place to the philosophical outlook, but from the practical standpoint, the JCP platform does not include any acknowledgement of atheism. Similarly, while the Japanese Communist Party requires members to stand for the platform and rules of the party, it does not ask for any theoretical grasp of the details of religion. After the war, the party admitted the Christian clergyman Sakae Akaiwa to party membership, and

my article, "Mr. Akaiwa and the Standpoint of the Communist Party", set out our views.

Among the originators of scientific socialism, Engels, for instance, comments on the history of primitive Christianity, which should again be noted.

He said, "The history of primitive Christianity poses noteworthy links with labor movements in modern times. In its birth, Christianity rose from the movements of the oppressed... Both Christianity and working people's socialism preach that liberation from slavery and poverty is at hand. Christianity puts this emancipation in the life to come, while socialism puts it in this present world, in the changing of this world." He then proceeds to introduce Renan's words: "If you like to think of the earliest Christian organizations, look at a local chapter of the International Workmen's Association." Primitive Buddhism asserted equality in opposition to the caste system with the Brahmans at the top, and it is said that primitive Buddhists led a primitive communist egalitarian life in the community of Sangha, as proved by the late Yoshio Senoo, a progressive Buddhist from prewar days in Japan.

Science and Religion to Serve Peace

The hardships suffered during the Second World War brought about mutual understanding between scientific socialism and conscientious religionists.

In the religious history of modern Japan, two points are to be noted. One is the prewar union of religion with politics. Although with the qualification "provided it does not disturb peace and order and does not conflict with the duty of a subject", freedom of religion was in principle, guaranteed, and there was no persecution of Christians like there had been in the Tokugawa era, but Shintoism was made virtually the state religion. During the war of aggression, the Public Order Maintenance Law was enacted, mainly aimed at suppressing communists, but with the escalation of the war the target was expanded to include those who "showed disrespect for the dignity of shrines or the Imperial Family". In police questioning, people were asked as a loyalty test, "If Jesus and Emperor were walking side by side, which would you greet sooner?" The Emperor was regarded as an incarnation of the Deity. It is noteworthy that numbers of religious organizations and persons of religion were persecuted not because they opposed the war of aggression, but because their religious beliefs conflicted with the Public Order Maintenance Law. Naturally, after the end of the war, great importance was placed on the separation of religion from the state, as well as religion from school education, which is responsible to the state and local autonomies, and the Constitution establishes the separation of religion from politics.

The other point is that the majority of religious organizations and religionists could not protest openly against absolutist Tennoism as the political system, nor the atrocious and inhuman war of aggression; some even tried to sanctify the war of aggression in the name of religion. The Great Japan Buddhist Association, organized in 1941, held Buddhist services on the home front in October that year, and in February 1943 held a Buddhist service for defense of the country at the Imperial wish. In April 1943 the Japan Christian Order held a Christian Assembly in accordance with the Imperial wish, cooperating in the war and in subservience to the absolutist Tenno system, until finally, on the basis of what had been done, religious organizations were merged into an organization to serve the state.

After the war, in self-examination, a review was made of the fact that, except for a few religionists, the whole religious

world was swept up into the militarist current. Professor Emeritus Hakugen Ichikawa of the Zen-oriented Hanazono College, for instance, acknowledges in his book "Religion under Japanese Fascism" that "anti-communism and holy-war-ism" were the "two main pillars upholding Imperial Zen-Buddhism". When the struggles of conscientious Christians known as the "German churches' struggles" became known, this self-criticism was seen as even more urgently relevant to the conscientious people.

In postwar days a great number of religionists took an active part in the movement against A- and H-bombs, and worked to bring about unified action among religious organizations for the cause of peace. Lessons were learned from the submission to militarism in the course of the Second World War. Not satisfied with abstract thinking about satisfying the souls of religionists and believers, religious organizations have tended to become more concerned and more responsible for human affliction in life's realities, supporting human rights rather than offering requiems while standing by the establishment; this indicates a new era in the religious world, not limited just to Japan.

In the Catholic world, the new tendency in the Pope's encyclical is about talk and cooperation with all conscientious people, including atheists. In Pope John XXIII's famous encyclical "pacem in terris" (peace on earth) is found the following statement:

> "Today one colossal work is imposed on all conscientious people, the work of reconstructing social relationships on the basis of truth and justice, love and liberty...
>
> "True, too few people devote themselves to this work. Yet for their contribution to human society I offer public commendation and recommend that they strengthen their beneficent activities. At the same time, I dare hope that

other people, especially believers urged by love and duty, will join them in large numbers. In society today all Christians have the duty to be a glowing fire, the force of love, the leaven for the masses."

This attitude does not presuppose refusal of joint action with communists, who may be atheists. Talks between Marxists and Christians have been established as new progressive trends both in Japan and in Europe. In "Catholic Graph" (December 1972 issue) JCP Standing Presidium member Korehito Kurahara had a talk with Bishop Eikichi Tanaka.

It is also a new phenomenon of historic importance that Christians in various countries, and Buddhists, especially in Indochina, who took part in the anti-US struggles for the liberation of their countries, are taking an active part in the struggle and joint front for national liberation. The other day I watched on TV the Vice-Premier of the Laotian Government, General Secretary of the Patriotic Front, holding an assembly for a joint struggle with many Buddhists, on the score that the ideals of Buddhists and communists are the same. It is to be hoped that this will become a common event in many parts of the three countries of Indochina.

For religion to become active not merely for the world to come or the future life but for the happiness of the common people and the independence of the masses in real life, as important religious activities in this world, is a vigorous revival of the ideals of primitive Christianity and primitive Buddhism in this new era, isn't it?

In their religious activities, aren't religionists and innovators of religious organizations functioning as leaven among the masses struggling to achieve a worthy human society, instead of heaving mournful sighs or uttering mere words of protest?

In such changing circumstances, no small number of religionists have begun to see communism and communist

movements in a more open way, and communists and communist movements have begun to take a more open-minded attitude towards religionists. There have been, it is true, some historical cases in a few socialist countries of phenomena which we cannot approve from the socialist standpoint, but in many of them, religious beliefs and religious freedoms are flowering in broad popular currents of the masses, as they cooperate voluntarily in building socialism. In capitalist countries, for example in Italy, communists and social democrats fought by the side of Catholics in anti-fascist liberation struggles, and opened the way to the first stage of the anti-fascist democratic revolution and laid the foundation of the democratic constitution.

The leaders of communist parties in developed capitalist countries, including Italy, France and Spain, now attach importance to the policies on religion, and are trying to develop them creatively.

From the Togliatti period to today's Berlinguer period, the Italian Communist Party of the country housing the Vatican has placed great importance on talks with the Christians.

In a recently published "Declaration of Freedom", the French Communist Party states, "All persons have the right to freedom of conscience and religion. This includes the right to declare his or her religion or faith either publicly or privately as an individual or as a group, and to act in any fields in accordance with his or her spiritual choice. The churches and all other congregations or philosophical organizations shall enjoy freedom needed for their activities."

Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain says in his report to an enlarged meeting of the party central committee: "The Church nowadays knows that it does not need to have any fear of us. It knows that under all circumstances we are determined to respect its rights, and we positively appreciate the Church's every step to live up to the expectations of the people for freedom and justice."

These facts endorse not merely freedom of faith but also freedom to spread religion, guaranteed in the policy of communist parties in these countries. Communist parties in highly developed capitalist countries continue to make creative efforts to achieve a plural political party system and freedom in a new society.

Based on New Humanism

What has led to this important link of joint activities between scientific socialists and religionists is new social humanism, which takes a sensitive interest in the people's sufferings and tries earnestly to find a realistic solution.

This philosophy of humanism has so far played a social role in two directions. On the one hand it has minimized the study of actual societies in the study of social science; it has despised social scientific truth and devoted itself to exploring humanity in the abstract, transcending history and society, and virtually rejected the theory that history is created by the people. On the other hand, it has not been satisfied to search for humanity in a closed way; it has earnestly desired to find the solution to human distress and hopes, distinguishing the ordinary people from reactionaries; it has made use of the knowledge of the social sciences and looked capitalist contradictions in the eye, and symbolized the human relationship by the expression "one for all and all for one". Scientific socialism is the critical inheritor and developer of modern democracy, and expects new social humanism to come into full flower in creating a society that makes it possible for humans to live as humans with dignity.

Thomas Ogletree, a Christian who edited the book "Open-

ings for Marxist-Christian Dialogues", states that the Marxist analysis helps to resolve social problems, and says:

> "In America, one of the most important instances showing the Christian interest in Marxism is found in the Fellowship of Socialist Christians, which under the leadership of Reinhold Niebuhr, depends greatly on Marxist insight in pursuing the appropriate Christian response to the socio-economic crisis which overran the USA in the 1930s."

In his "Declaration of Conscience" written recently in jail, the poet Kim Chi Ha speaks of "unity of the concept of God with that of revolution".

Of course these circumstances do not resolve the differences in the philosophical bases of humanism and scientific socialism, but such differences do not stop the achievement of solidarity in modern humanism that provides religionists and scientific socialists with common enthusiasm for talks and joint action; they serve rather as an effective link.

In the history of revolutionary movements both here and abroad, many cases are found of humanists, who started as Christians, becoming communists. Engels was one such case; Sen Katayama, founder of the Japanese Communist Party, was another. These are outstanding instances in which religious believers with humanistic ardor devoted their lives to social reforms as social humanists when they took up social sciences.

Religion in Communist Society

At this point I'd like to consider some questions of religion in the highest stage of communist society, a stage not yet reached anywhere on earth, so this is in the nature of a theoretical projection.

Concerning the future of religion, it has been asserted so far in Marxist literature that human distress caused by social relationships will disappear from a society where social contradictions have been eliminated, and religion, as a transcendental reflection of such distress, will also disappear. This is the very point about which conscientious persons of religion, sympathetic to the realization of communist society with free and equal human relationships, express doubt and concern on religious questions in the future.

At the stage of highly developed communist society, productive power will be greatly expanded and people's work will be done according to their ability and labor's products distributed according to each person's need; all the organized violence to be used against human beings in general will be abolished, and state power as the apparatus of class control will perish. Naturally, with the termination of state power, communist society will have been established all over the earth, and there will be no danger of military conflicts between countries, and the need for the military forces will itself end. In such a society the fundamental distinction between manual and brain work will no longer exist, social conditions for the harmony of the whole nation will be established, and government as a power organization will give place to voluntary autonomy of social members to administer the whole realm of national life. In terms of the substance of spiritual life within such a society, as inheritor of the many-faceted developed human culture; and with the rich human development, the multifarious flowering of true talent and ability can be foresee'n. In accordance with the wishes of the people, activities of voluntary organizations and groups will be unconditionally guaranteed. This is the theoretically reasonable conclusion following the abolition of all state power and systematic violence.

In communist society social evils arising from class exploitation or domination of some people over the rest, such as is seen in capitalist society, will have long lost their basis for

continuance, and of course, the social bases for the vices of the capitalist system, such as poverty, unemployment, pursuit of profits, and speculation, will long have been abolished. At this stage of social development how will religion have developed? This is a new theoretical question of great interest; a sure theoretical prediction is that many of the dreams of conscientious religionists will be realized on earth. So one theme to be studied is what transformation will be made of the realization of human happiness, one of the important and constant features of religion since its most primitive forms, expected by some to be realized only in the supernatural other land, the world to come. Thomas Ogletree we have referred to, goes so far as to say, "The recent interpretation by Christians has paid more and more attention to the contribution Christian faith can make in their investigation into human problems to satisfy their life on this earth. The interest in the world to come has lost much of its significance; in many cases it has completely disappeared."

At the same time, even when our so-called social evils are overcome and people are freed from distress, as long as it is human society it is obvious that not only joy, but also unhappiness from illness, love, marriage or family life, and the gap between expectation and realization of one's own capacity and talent, expectancy of life and so on; all these human afflictions and distresses from human relationships in particular cannot be expected to disappear. Hence, spiritual activities to enrich the human spirit in relation to the limitations of human life, personal abilities, and the problems in human relationships throughout life will be inherited on the part of religion as one of the assets of humanity, and no one will be stopped from taking an interest in such matters; religion will be guaranteed as one field of free activities in free human relationships, and under whatever system, even at the highest stage of communism, freedom of religion including mission work will never be banned.

Here let me comment on an anti-communist prejudice, which holds that communist society is one dominated by the one despotic ruling party. A bold theoretical proposition was made by Lenin and confirmed by Gramsci, that at the stage of highly developed communist society, the party itself, having striven to build communist society, will become unnecessary, having completed its historical task. Both Stalin and Mao Zedong posed this question in reference to the necessary disappearance of the need for a working class dictatorship.

Direction of National Consensus

Now let me return from the remote future to the actual present.

Immediately before the agreement was made public, in its predictive article Asahi Shimbun took the lead with "Non-Interference, Coexistence", but characteristically, the article omitted completely the question of cooperation for common objectives. Directly after publication of the agreement there were various reports and discussions on the interpretation of the agreement. Seikyo Shimbun carried the Vice-President's interview and Akahata an editorial dated July 29. The interview in Seikyo Shimbun was characteristic in its statement about coexistence without joint activity, with emphasis on support for Komeito; it went so far as to assert that the anti-fascist attitude lay in abolishing the conflict between rightists and leftists, and building up the middle-of-the-roaders in the Komeito way. If it were feasible to equate the Japanese Communist Party with the rightists, and by "abolishing" them both, come to an anti-fascist stance, it follows that the anti-communist middle-of-the-road line would be the road to anti-fascist struggle.

The editorial in Akahata analyzed and evaluated the substance and significance of the agreement as a whole. Some reports about "no abuse or slander shall be made by either party in regard to anything, including political attitudes", said that this means "respecting" Soka Gakkai's support for Komeito; but Akahata clearly set out our party's logical criticism of these reports, that they are without any factual basis, and criticized the one-sided comments on the agreement providing for coexistence but without joint activity. The difference between the views of the two organizations was reported by the press, but at a press conference I endeavored to prevent the gap from widening, pointing out that the substance of the agreement itself provides the answers to these questions. Then, in a lecture given on August 20 Mr. Ikeda confirmed the views expressed by Seikyo Shimbun, saying that he has no intention to take joint action with the JCP, nor think of taking part in a national united front, although he did refer to such positive propositions as talking and coexistence with Marxism, and paving the way to formation of a national consensus.

To go more deeply these questions, it is necessary not only to discuss whether it is possible or appropriate to reach such a view from the agreement, but also to consider in greater detail the relationship between politics and religion.

In talking of religion and politics, what is of first significance is the separation of religion from state; the religion must be a private affair, divorced from the state. Secondly, a religious organization bound together by a common faith should not require its members to support a particular political party. Even though political parties profess to be progressive rather than conservative, of necessity they must deal with actual political issues. In no sense can they be expected to be free of errors; they often make mistakes; some political parties even stick to non-progressive attitudes. Generally speaking, if religious organizations should decide to support some particular political party or other it would limit the possibility of exercising free judgment on political parties, and developing themselves in human and social terms. If political parties take a wrong attitude, the religious organizations will feel obliged to support them. This is the reason for our decision that to support a particular party would be wrong.

On the other hand, while objecting to the union of religion and politics as set out above, we see it as perfectly reasonable for religious organizations to participate in politics in a broad sense, because members of religious organizations are citizens of the actual world, and influenced by it; this agrees with the human development and improvement sought by conscientious religionists. Some religious organizations, tied in with the reactionary forces and exploiting classes, have directed their social activities to oppose the working people's struggles for social progress and change; therefore, to have their social activities come into agreement with a national consensus for social progress would have significant meaning for religious organizations in taking active part in the present world. In comments on the present agreement, some claim that it conflicts with the principle of separation of religion and politics, but this is due to confusing the two distinct positions we have mentioned, holding the view that religious organizations should not take part in any political activities whatever. Many religious organizations, taking part in the action against the proposed Yasukuni Shrine act, are exercising their legitimate rights, taking part in political activities in the broadest sense of the word, combined with religious activities. The present agreement between the JCP and Soka Gakkai may be termed political engagement in such a broad sense. It is very obvious that this agreement in no sense demands support of a particular political party, still less the JCP. We of the JCP hold the

opinion that labor unions and religious organizations are wrong in obliging their members to support some particular party, because individuals as members have their own choices based on their political beliefs, as guaranteed by the Constitution. Clearly the JCP can never accept a decision of this kind, even if it meant supporting the JCP.

The political forces professing to be progressive in Japan today have not formed a united front; serious disruptions and mutual conflicts are prevalent, and unfortunately many religionists cannot take part in forming a progressive national consensus. The point is not which party to support from a limited standpoint, but to take part in the formation of a broad current of national consensus. This would not only be possible but just, and in fact there are numbers of religious persons playing an active role in promoting that cause.

Let us consider some points arising from the agreement. From the terms, "mutual efforts", "cooperation", "mutual defense" for achieving common objectives, it may be said that they mean cooperation in the true sense of the word, in the spirit of solidarity; making joint efforts and in some cases a joint struggle. It is difficult therefore to understand from the objective substance of the agreement, Soka Gakkai should ignore the significant search for cooperation, and apply the brake on the possibility of the agreement going further. We do not propose that joint meetings, demonstrations, or protests, as might be expected from the content of the agreement, should take place, in a way that is only possible between political parties, without paying due respect to the internal conditions of both sides. Moreover, merely because the JCP has the idea of a united front based on three progressive aims, and has recently proposed a campaign to build up an enlarged national consensus, we have no intention to demand any immediate agreement on this. There is no reason to fear that we may adopt some hasty plans based on the existing agreement; we are not political novices. But on the other hand, if mention may be made of a grand concept for moving history forward toward an expanded national consensus for the sake of world peace and Japan's democratic future, seen from the perspective of humanity as a whole, to respect the mutually agreed points will conform to the wishes of all conscientious sections of the population who appreciate the historic meaning of this agreement. I believe this is the way to prove that "mutual defense" against "currents toward new fascism" are not empty words.

In evaluating the relationship between Komeito and Soka Gakkai, both organizations speak of the separation of religion from politics; yet it is common knowledge that there are certain differences in the attitudes of the two, but at the same time deep-rooted links.

Komeito, for instance, has been persistently opposed to scientific socialism and the basic line of the JCP. In the controversy on the Constitution question, Komeito has been criticizing the JCP for some time, and in the final analysis this is nothing but the anti-communist Komeito version on this issue. In actual politics, Komeito has pursued the SPJ-Komeito-DSP line, with anti-communism as its prerequisite condition; this is evidenced by the hearty welcome given by Kakuei Tanaka, which we consider the helping hand given to the LDP in its historical decline. This thoroughgoing anti-communist attitude takes for granted that it fights against the JCP in every election, as its virtual major enemy. It is said that most Komeito members are also members of Soka Gakkai: we can easily see that this anti-communist attitude has been very influential in forming the fixed idea even among well-meaning Soka Gakkai members, that nothing is wrong with their anti-communist attitude. Even while talking of the separation of religion and politics, and claiming to be a popular party open to

the people, Komeito has Soka Gakkai as its leading support body. It is no wonder that many people thought that in its attitude to the talks and the agreement, compared with actual deeds, Komeito fell short of its professed principles.

The expressions in the agreement, "will not take a hostile attitude towards scientific socialism and communism", show that Soka Gakkai has made clear its historic departure from the anti-communist stance, a point which attracted the greatest attention both at home and abroad; Mr. Ikeda's farsighted views of history came into play, and the positive decision was made in accordance with this. He is farsighted also in referring to the possibility not merely of the existing pattern found in socialist countries, but also the new potential pattern of problems facing humanity and freedom. The goals set for a national consensus are in line with social progress. At the same time Soka Gakkai is characteristically unique in persistently declaring its support for Komeito, one of the leading anti-communist party centers. Freedom of individual members to support any party conflicts with Soka Gakkai as a religious body supporting a particular party, especially one positively emphasizing its anti-communist attitude. This makes it inevitable that some serious matters not limited to the separation of religion and politics will continue to be historically called in question.

Faced with the most serious choice whether to direct the historical current today in democratic channels or to allow themselves to reinforce the LDP in subservience to the United States and supporting the interests of monopoly capital, in the spirit of tolerance and mutual understanding we earnestly hope that all the Japanese people who suffered in the past wars and all who have struggled for Japan's true independence and a democratic change, will open up a road to formation of a consensus and solidarity in working for national salvation and progressive change, by overcoming all the obstacles on the way.

There Is No Future for Anti-Communism

Let me in closing say a few words about the attitude of the JCP toward the agreement. Immediately following its publication, the agreement reached by Soka Gakkai and the JCP has been on trial and subject to various interpretations, despite its shining historic significance. Some conscientious members of an alert public, who have noticed signs of democratic change in Japan as expressed in this agreement, are nevertheless somewhat perplexed and disillusioned. We can expect also that various complicated disputes and conflicts will arise, but I am firmly convinced that the guiding spirit of the agreement is the voice of the people who are hoping to see Japan advance along the road of democracy. The historic significance of the agreement, therefore, cannot be denied, whatever stormy situations arise in the years to come. By speaking of "faith" in the agreement we mean, above all, to be true to the substance of the agreement even in the face of whatever difficult conditions may arise.

Concerning the future course of the JCP, we will continue to do our best to promote the correct line of independence and mental and spiritual creativity which form the keynote of JCP progress over the past ten and more years. It is true that the actual circumstances have not resulted in an easy situation; faced with the advance of the JCP the ruling forces and the other anti-communist forces which act as their virtual reinforcing elements have concentrated great energy on attacks on us. Obviously this is not a problem of the JCP alone; past lessons of history teach us that anti-communism is the signal of the dawn of fascism and war.

The argument that the JCP has reached its peak does not

mean that our party has exhausted its power to advance; what it does mean is that we face a severe test of desperate counterattacks by the reactionary forces, such as have often taken place in the course of advancing history. Ebbs and flows are inevitable in political struggles. If we should deal with this issue in an easygoing way, not only would we stop advancing, but even be forced to retreat.

Nevertheless, generally speaking, the serious national and social contradictions brought about by the realities of Japan will help ultimately to raise the consciousness of the Japanese people and help the development of a progressive consensus. This is a law of historical development. A small minority group in prewar days, we never for a moment doubted the coming defeat of the despotic militarist power. Now our ranks have grown and developed into an incomparably more powerful force, and we are even more firmly convinced that nothing can stop us advancing along the road to an awakened self-consciousness among the Japanese people, no matter what turbulence may mark the way.

No matter how intent they are to block the advance of history, there is no future for the anti-communist divisionist forces.

MANIFESTO
ON FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY
JAPANESE ROAD OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Lecture delivered at
Japan Press Club luncheon
on June 4, 1976

Lockheed Cover-Up and Demand for Resignation of Miki Cabinet

When approached by the Club, I was asked to speak, as the Chairman has said, about the political situation, the question of a united front, the draft resolution of the Extraordinary Party Congress and other matters, so I will first touch on the political situation and the question of a united front, and go on to our recently published "Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy", taking into account its repercussions also.

The political situation is being followed in detail by you journalists every day. To touch briefly on the prospects, our position is that a thorough investigation into the truth of the Lockheed scandal should be made by Prime Minister Miki, with full responsibility, in accordance with the agreement reached in the five-party summit talks. The Diet should be dissolved after the investigation is completed and the truth of the Lockheed scandal is revealed from the materials obtained.

Second, many opposition members are demanding the resignation of the Miki Cabinet and dissolution of the Diet, a claim that has recently been made. They say that if a promise is made on immediate dissolution of the Diet, they will not object to calling an extraordinary Diet session; but this would mean only a change in the political situation, rather than investigation into the Lockheed scandal. We have no illusions about the

Miki Cabinet as an LDP Cabinet, and there is little hope that an investigation into the Lockheed case will be made more resolutely than now even if another LDP faction takes power after a Miki resignation. The fact is that it is obvious the case will end in so much smoke if the reins of government are passed over to the forces aiming to topple Miki from power. The forces attempting to bury the case will gain even more power.

In our view, the investigation into the Lockheed scandal should provide an opportunity for a change in the Japanese political structure in which such cases breed, and should go further than just bringing the facts to light to some extent. It needs a change in the political structure, the structure of corruption. A political change is needed to dig out the roots of such politics, the politics of three evils: plutocracy, war criminality and national betrayal; just to overthrow the Miki Cabinet would have little meaning.

The progressive opposition forces are not ready to take over power in case of a change in politics. Our view is that in the present situation the progressive opposition parties must not take the attitude of merely demanding the resignation of the Miki Cabinet; just passing the reins to someone else in the LDP cannot mean a change in the political situation.

It must be noted that Prime Minister Miki in the five-party summit talks promised to thoroughly investigate the Lockheed scandal, which has been placed under the Speaker's arbitration, which no other LDP faction has dared to do; we must persist in the demand that the Miki Cabinet be held to account and investigate the truth of the Lockheed scandal. We cannot let our attitude be determined by calculating that it may favorably affect our party in the immediate election. This is my second point.

While other parties are calling for the immediate dissolution of the Diet and general elections by overthrowing the Miki

Cabinet, we do not follow suit, a fundamental difference in our point of view.

It is reported that Mr. Nadao, an LDP leader, is maneuvering for a compromise, suggesting that they may let Prime Minister Miki investigate the Lockheed scandal to some extent, on condition that he steps down from power soon after. If the LDP should split up as the confrontation becomes sharper between the forces in favor of a thorough investigation into the case and those who try to moderate it or hush it up, it would be a good chance to expose the real nature of the LDP, viewing Japanese politics as a whole.

There is a strong possibility that the two forces will reach a compromise over investigation into the Lockheed scandal, de-emphasizing it out of concern that the LDP would lose in the elections unless there is party unity; this reveals the weakness of the Miki faction in the LDP. Prime Minister Miki must persist in investigating the facts of the Lockheed scandal, even risking his political life, and reject any ambiguous compromise, as he himself publicly promised. This is what the public are demanding. This appears to explain recent reports of an increased rate of popular support for the Miki Cabinet.

If the LDP should split over this issue, the question will be how to form a caretaker government. The question of a caretaker government was discussed among the opposition parties at the beginning of this year, but no real conditions existed at that time. But if Prime Minister Miki persists in conducting the investigation of the Lockheed scandal whatever the cost, Japanese politics as a whole will face a choice between the two positions; to hold a general election after a thorough investigation into the Lockheed scandal, or to give priority to the interests of the LDP in forming a cabinet. If the choice were to be made now, we think, at least theoretically, that it would be possible to take up the question of a cabinet preferable to carry through the election in the interest of the people, quite apart from any question of a united front.

Time for SPJ to Decide on Formation of the United Front

The second question is about a united front. Concerning the JCP-SPJ agreement that discussions should be continued on this issue, some people consider that the SPJ must have made a commitment in desperation for the moment, without the prospect of materializing. Of course, we are not very optimistic, but among labor movements or democratic organizations firm expectations were expressed after the agreement became known.

This is because, while people are fed up with the LDP and its politics, they say that there is no firm evidence that it can be replaced by a progressive movement to rally forces for a united front; they say, in fact, that the opposition parties are engaged only in polemics. This is given as the reason why the number of people who support no party is increasing, which would explain why the agreement between the JCP and the SPJ awakened expectations among mass movements and politically aware intellectuals.

There are many obstacles to fulfilling such expectations. For example, the Komeito opposes and interferes in such an idea, issuing statements about a plan for a united front including the SPJ and the JCP or organizing counter moves. In response, some people in the SPJ say that it may not go on holding talks just with the JCP and disregarding Komeito-SPJ relations, in spite of the commitment given to the JCP.

The agreement was concluded between only the SPJ and the JCP from the first, and has nothing to do with the attitude of the Komeito. Theoretically, we do not need to take into account the conditions of another party, but in reality, such a problem has already arisen.

Well then, how do we overcome these problems? It depends after all on the determination of the SPJ.

Chairman Narita, in a statement made in Matsue City, spoke of "'joint struggle of all opposition parties' (more exactly, joint struggle of all progressive parties) aiming at...rallying all progressive forces that share common objectives and actions; we have never made such a stupid statement as to say that we would not go ahead with our joint struggle unless all other opposition parties join in, when such opposition forces as do not agree to the said objectives and actions do not join the joint struggle, or drop out of it." If this theory is applied, it is logical to go on even without the participation of the DSP or the Komeito.

But the big problem is that in reality the SPJ cannot reach this position.

Another obstacle is the so-called "Accumulation Doctrine", which makes the point that the united front cannot come about unless we accumulate more joint struggles of various types to produce greater mutual trust. This sounds reasonable in a way; but when it comes to such an accumulation, we have already accumulated the experience of many joint struggles with the SPJ during the long period since the end of World War II. Even at national level, we fought together in the struggle against revision of the Security Treaty for a long time. At local level, the JCP and the SPJ have waged numerous joint struggles in establishing more than 200 progressive local governments, including the Tokyo Metropolis. More recently, we have also worked together on many issues in the Diet.

Clearly, we have fought together so far and are going to do the same in the future as occasion arises. The united front, however, will not be established as a result of spontaneous

development; it needs determination at a definite time, something which is called for by the present Japanese situation.

Another obstacle is the so-called "JCP erosion". This is a claim made, that in a united front the partners' strength will be eroded by the JCP. As foreign examples show, the French Socialist Party has made an advance since the Socialists and Communists formed a united front. The French Socialist Party realized the need to form a united front from the experience of its candidate being badly defeated in the presidential election, and finally took steps for forming a united front; since when the Socialist Party has made a steady advance, taking advantage also of Mitterrand (head of the French Socialist Party) becoming the unified candidate for the presidential election. The French Communist Party has also advanced.

When General Secretary Marchais of the French Communist Party visited Japan recently, I asked him in a meeting, "Did you ever expect the Socialist Party to make such an advance?" He answered "Yes, we did. We want the Socialist Party to make an advance in order to win a majority for the left. But the Communist Party is doing its best not to be fettered as a result, otherwise the united front would not be consistent. But it is natural for the Socialist Party to make an advance." He stressed that it was possible to win a majority with both parties making an advance. In fact, in local elections, the Socialist and the Communist Parties together obtained more than 50 percent of the votes, a point on which he was quite confident.

After we establish the united front, I expect and want the SPJ to make a great advance compared with present SPJ seats and its influence in trade unions. The Komeito is persistently anti-communist, and will not fight for power together with the JCP; but if a united front is actually formed including the SPJ and the JCP and joined by mass organizations and making a steady advance, many demands will be made among workers supporting the Komeito for a broader united front, and many will begin to question its DSP-like persistently anti-communist line of refusing to live under the same sky as the JCP.

It is up to the Komeito to decide its policy, a matter in which I do not meddle, but when a united front including the SPJ and the JCP sets sail, it does not follow that other forces would refuse to join it. In local elections, for example, many kinds of joint struggles have been carried on so far between the JCP and the SPJ, with the participation of the Komeito in some way or another; so there is still room to consider this in a flexible and favorable way.

But if they take the stand of rejecting the united front of the JCP and the SPJ starting without participation by the Komeito, though they somehow give up the idea of the DSP, it would be contrary to the statement made by Chairman Narita in Matsue City, and the united front would virtually be given up forever because of the political atmosphere created by waiting for the DSP.

On the labor front, the results of the spring struggle are now being summed up, with the responsibility for success or failure resting on the leadership. The new questions that need to be discussed are as follows: Japanese trade unions are putting forward many political and institutional demands in the spring struggle, including the right to strike, but to satisfy such demands, consistent with the name, "people's spring struggle", the united front is vitally necessary, a demand that has become a question of the trade unions themselves. The policy of the Japanese Teachers Union (Nikkyoso) also including this question.

Therefore, in addition to the question of trade unionists not being obliged to support a specific political party, if unions are to represent the position of the people, new struggle tactics will have to be adopted to ensure more people's support and to rally all democratic forces to the united front. In this way, trade unions will be responsible not to sabotage but to promote the united front. There is a difference here between Japan and France or Italy; in Japan the split in the trade union movement is a big obstacle to formation of a united front. The Seamen's Union once decided to support and recommend a JCP candidate, a decision in the direction of progress, but this became a big problem for the Japanese Confederation of Labor (Domei). Anyway, I want to emphasize that the relationship between the trade union movement and the united front is one of the pressing issues of the moment.

Question of "Shikken" and Scientific Socialism

The third question is on the draft amendment to the Party Program on elimination of "*shikken*", and the draft "Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy", both to be submitted to the Extraordinary Party Congress. This coincides with some reports on the French Communist Party that in its Congress it renounced the concept of "dictatorship". The comment has been made that the JCP, like the French Communist Party, is trying to decide whether or not to renounce the concept of "dictatorship". But the JCP categorically stopped using "*dokusai*", (equivalent to "dictatorship") three years ago because it is a source of misunderstanding. When the JCP set out its Program in 1961, it used the term "working-class power, namely the dictatorship of the proletariat" in the translation of those days; the term dictatorship was used with the same meaning as power more than ten years ago. In the same connotation, we rectified the term "*dokusai*" as the translation of "dictatorship" three years ago, as an incorrect translation which is apt to cause misunderstanding. At the same time, this term was not to be used as meaning arbitrary power given to either an individual or an organization. As this shows, the course of development in Japan has a different historical background from France.

While the two share the same concept, that "dictatorship" is not to be used to mean arbitrary rule, the courses of development differ.

In our case, already in 1961 we had adopted the line to establish a people's democracy by winning a majority of Diet seats by united front forces and move on from there to socialism with the people's support. In other words, we had adopted our Program, which defined the process of reaching socialism through democracy. As part of the clear exposition of this line, we proposed to eliminate the term "*shikken*" from the Program. As "*shikken*" is a term translated from a foreign language, there are many interpretations about it, such as one reflecting the Russian Revolution. If we were to keep the term "*shikken*", it would give rise to useless misunderstanding among the people, with a variety of interpretations. Now the term "dictatorship" is not used in the programs of all the communist parties of the world. There are some parties that do not include such a term in their programs.

Another proposition was made, that the term "scientific socialism" should be used in the Party Program and Constitution instead of Marxism-Leninism. In previous Party Congresses we confirmed that "scientific socialism" goes beyond the achievements of Marx and Lenin, and takes in the later experiences of many movements in the world. But in using the term "scientific socialism", we interpreted it as Marxism-Leninism, which is rather understandable. Strictly speaking, however, if a person's name is applied to specific thinking, we are apt to interpret such thinking within the framework of that person's

words and phrases. In addition, the trend to emphasize "Marxism-Leninism" in the present international communist movement suggests giving priority to the experiences of the Russian Revolution.

Originally, "Marxism-Leninism" was clearly defined by Stalin in the famous book "Fundamentals of Leninism" after the death of Lenin, which spread throughout the world. Referring to the amendments proposed by the JCP, the owner of the small enterprise said, "I fully agree with the proposal. It is not necessary to maintain a founder's name forever; socialism or communism is not a religion. It is based on logic." The greatness of Marx, Engels and Lenin lies in their creation of the socialist theories, which made a great contribution to the progress of mankind in the fields of philosophy, economics and social science, giving us the theory of surplus value, the dialectics of social development, the class struggle, moving from utopian socialism to scientific socialism. These contributions are very great, and we recognize them as the base of the theories of scientific socialism. Some of the words and phrases used 100 years ago by Marx and Engels and half a century ago by Lenin in different circumstances have universal application, but others have a particular meaning. It would not be correct to regard all of them as being applicable to any society or country and understand them as what is called "Marxism-Leninism". That is why we decided to use the term, scientific socialism.

Frankly, there are a considerable numbers of JCP members who grew up reading the "Fundamentals of Leninism" by Stalin. No one in the Central Committee pressed for retaining the term "Marxism-Leninism", but there are some who seem to feel nostalgic about it for some reason or other. But the JCP is not a party based on faith, or a religion, but a party of science, and can readily be understood by theoretical reasoning.

The line of the JCP set out at this time or previously is often referred to as the "completion of the Miyamoto line". So I take this opportunity to ask that the JCP line not be described with the name "Miyamoto" in the sense I have explained to you. We are just activists or leaders of the JCP for a certain length of time. The present line of the JCP is the result of various experiences, including the split in the party in the postwar period, the oppression and the interventions by certain other communist parties. I think that either with or without me the Japanese Communist Party would have taken this same line, and if it had just followed the line of the communist parties of China or the Soviet Union it would have found itself in a very difficult situation now.

Therefore, our basic line in a capitalist country as highly developed as Japan will, in principle, never change even in the future. I can add that this is the line which the JCP established after great pain and effort, and has nothing to do with my name.

The Manifesto that Succeeded to And Developed Modern Democracy

The publications of the "Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy" (draft) met with various responses, and today's newspapers carry many editorials and comments on it. As you know, the "Manifesto" describes the situation and the nature of "freedom" and "democracy" in present-day Japan, and what these words meant in the past. In other capitalist countries and in Japan there is an obstinate prejudice against communism and scientific socialism, which regards them as the antithesis of freedom, or speaking ideologically, incompatible with the principle of freedom. We have therefore tried to elucidate theoretically the relationship between modern democracy and present-

day socialism and communism, and the course of its qualitative development.

Some party members seemed to have expected a leaflet or directive for elections, instructing them to "do this or that", as the "Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy" is a document to be submitted to the Extraordinary Party Congress. But this is not the way; it is aimed at fundamental, theoretical and practical formulation of the question, as a more complete uniform system. It is not a dessert of sweets put out on display for passing elections.

The French Communist Party has also elaborated this question, but this is the lineup of provisions for a new Constitution for a future France to which the party is committed. I think the Japanese Communist Party is probably the first anywhere to have studied the principled relationship between modern democracy and scientific socialism, and set this out in an official document.

It involved a great deal of work with much study within the party before the draft could be published. It should be elaborated still further by whole party discussions. All members are called on to take part in the discussions and we will publish various opinions on the draft.

Compared to prewar days, democracy and freedom have undergone many significant changes, as seen in freedom to conduct general political activities or the exercise of suffrage by a much wider range of people. But I recently attended a meeting of a JCP branch in a big enterprise, and found that the main enemies of big business are none other than the JCP and the Democratic Youth League of Japan.

Under the control of such trade unions as the Japanese Confederation of Labor (Domei), you cannot address yourself to those who are apparently JCP members. If you do speak to them, it will affect promotion and wage increases. In fact, they all say that a very dark mood prevails there. If the realities of democracy and freedom in present-day Japan are closely studied, one will find that freedom for big business or freedom to exploit is no mere propagandist phrase. I realized that restrictions on freedom are very serious in the real life of workshops. The workers of that workshop strongly desired that if the JCP issues a manifesto on freedom, the facts about workshops of Japanese big business will be clearly shown, something that is reflected in the draft Manifesto.

It also mentions wiretapping. While I was living in Takaido (Suginami-Ku, Tokyo), a very sophisticated telephone wiretap was detected twice on the electric pole in front of my house. More recently, two wiretapping devices were also detected in a JCP prefectural committee office. We will make a protest to the Government and announce it in due course, but this shows that freedom in present-day Japan has serious defects.

As a future prospect, we are of the opinion that in a highly developed capitalist country such as Japan, Italy or France, a government cannot remain stable unless the people are persuaded to judge its policy and support it in elections. We hear some outsiders say that for us to step down after an election defeat from the power we have gained after all our pains and efforts, means to abandon an achieved position. This would mean that we are just paying lip service to principles and would resort to any possible means to defend the government.

But this is not so. A government which loses an election is not stable, and we cannot persuade the people to support it by trying to maintain it by anti-democratic means. Of course, once a united front government or a socialist government is established, it must not adopt policies that would doom it to failure, but should do its utmost to succeessfully implement its policy. Though a correct policy may prevent failure, we think it necessary to ensure a multi-party system as an institutional

guarantee under which a government will be replaced when there is not enough support from the people.

This is not in the least a passing thought. It is a view shared by the communist parties of Italy and France. When I met their representatives, I felt that they themselves were deeply convinced of this.

Whether to preserve such a system, allowing for the possibility of a change-of-power, after all depends on our trust in the judgment of the people of Japan. The JCP is but a small minority now. There is much misunderstanding about it, and the party shows many signs of immaturity. But the course of the development of mankind shows that current monopoly capitalism will be taken over by a majority of the people and the system socialized. It is a system of many evils caused by big enterprises controlling the means of production and depriving the people of an assured existence, a system of exploitation that will fundamentally disappear from the earth. Such a system cannot last forever, with politics virtually controlled by some big businesses, with the aim of serving their own interests.

Our belief gives us confidence in the future, that the Japanese people will make a reasonable choice as the result of rich experience, and our views are based on this.

Democratic Centralism Is a Precondition For a Modern Political Party

Finally, let me take up some comments made by various newspapers on the draft Manifesto, which, while agreeing that what is written is mostly reasonable, expressed doubt whether the JCP will abide by it. Many observations, or some opinions in particular, contend that our concept is incompatible with democratic centralism, the organizational principle of the party. Another opinion claimed that there is no democracy in the present JCP, and it should change its methods, first of all, insofar as it speaks publicly about democracy and freedom. The DSP and the Komeito in contention with the JCP, often criticize it on score that it lacks intra-party democracy. Mr. Eda, Vice-Chairman of the SPJ, says the same, so I should take up this question.

The JCP engages in political activities as such, working with its mind set on the expansion and buildup of the party. This stands to reason. When the party was founded 54 years ago, and especially during the prewar years, all members were arrested and imprisoned for a long time if they formed or joined the party. It was under these conditions that we founded the JCP. The spirit underlying its foundation was a theoretical prospect or conviction that such dark political rule could not continue, and that sovereignty should not reside in the Tenno, but in due course must be vested in the people, and that eventually socialism would take over in the course of development.

We founded the party when there was not the slightest prospect of being able to gain any material benefit by forming it and taking and maintaining leadership control. Rather, we had to be prepared for imprisonment and torture if we formed a communist party, or became a member or even a supporter.

To speak of politics in the language of the street usually reminds us of such immediate profits as gaining power and promotion of a career, but from the beginning, formation of the JCP was not associated with such motives.

So let me touch on the question of democratic centralism. We speak out in the party. Freedom of opinion is guaranteed; those who have opposing opinions are not expelled from or suppressed by the party just because they have differing opinions. But after full discussion, one must follow what is decided

by majority decision of the highest organ of the party. This is how democratic centralism works, the principle of the party aimed at unifying differing concepts; democracy and centralism meaning obedience to decisions. As regards criticisms made against the party, the Tachibana article in "Bungei Shunju", for example, argues that the JCP cannot be trusted whatever it says, as long as it talks about democratic centralism.

Let us examine this point. Take the Party Congress, for example; a complete draft is handed to all lower organizations without exception for discussion with guarantee of a certain time allowed; delegates are elected from both district and prefectural organizations by voting. There is no such thing as easy nomination of delegates by consultation. The JCP is most consistent on this point, compared with other political parties.

Some say that the fact that there are no factions in the JCP shows its intractable nature that denies freedom; but at present we see the LDP loudly calling for the modernization of the party by the liquidation of factions. Nor does the SPJ regard factions as good. Does having factions or being without factions make a political party modern? A group acting as a faction with a certain person at its center is far from a proper condition for a modern political party. In the LDP case, the situation is partly related to fund raising. The financial route is under the control of the head of a faction, and it is difficult to break such connections. Anyway, the very fact that there are no factions is one of the preconditions of a modern political party.

Attitude toward Opinions and Criticisms of the JCP

As I have explained we are free to hold opinions, but must obey what has been decided, which is the only reasonable attitude. One who has an opinion contrary to what has been decided has the right to retain that opinion, while acting in conformity with the decision taken, and is entitled to say, "You see, I was correct", if it is found later that it was correct, after the decision has been implemented for some time. If a minority opinion is found to be correct, it will be confirmed by the whole party. Looking back over my party life, mine was once a minority opinion, but I never considered setting up another communist party. There were some mistakes committed even by a majority, so we are rightfully free to retain a minority opinion.

Those who are called "anti-party elements" by the party or are expelled were not so treated because they held different opinions. They had engaged in factional activities. The Party Constitution which they themselves had agreed to on joining the party lays it down that members may not set up a faction; nevertheless such people did set up factions and violated the policy and decisions of the whole party, giving priority to their own factional interests, and for this they were expelled. We are convinced that freedom of factions, either now or in the future, can have nothing to do with modernization of a political party.

Though we cannot meet other's expectations for freedom of factions, there are some points in criticisms of the JCP which we should listen and pay attention to. I will touch on how we respond to outside criticisms.

We classify outside criticisms into two or three categories.

The first is an opinion with a good intention, a criticism of communism by ideology in response to what the JCP says; an expression of opinion not with an evil intention but from a usual fair spirit.

In principle we should listen to the opinions of such a kind; it would not be correct to totally ignore them just because they

differ from the JCP point of view. We will correct misunderstandings and receive opinions worthy of being listened to. That is the first group.

The next is a view that regards scientific socialism, communism or the JCP as dangerous, coming to the conclusion that communists are outrageous and extremely dangerous, propagating the devil's doctrine. This is "anti-communism". We call it "anti-communism", not because it criticizes the JCP, but because people have been stubbornly indoctrinated with systematic hatred and prejudice against the position and theory of the JCP.

To be quite frank, "Jiyu-Shimpo" is a good example of "anti-communism", always writing this or that about the JCP. There are also magazines and newspapers of this kind, whose attacks and criticisms we answer firmly and resolutely.

We never snap and bark at people indiscriminately when faced with criticism. This is confirmed in answers carried by Akahata in response to comments of various newspapers on the "*shikken*" issue, which are considered to be questions and opinions of a sober nature.

It is a necessary dialogue with the public; even if they misunderstand us when judging from our point of view, we have to take an open-minded and modest attitude and listen to them.

In this connection, some frequently argue about our attitude toward those expelled from the party because of factional activities. They say that the JCP is very cruel always to chase and charge them after they have had a problem with the party. But there are different categories in this also.

For example, when the CPSU interfered in the affairs of the JCP, some engaged in factional activities on the grounds that the CPSU was right. When Mao Zedong attacked the JCP, trying to impose on us the Chinese line, labelling us opportunist, some attacked the JCP and engaged in factional activities along with the CPC. But some of those expelled from the party for their factional activities have changed, including cases such as these. There are those who have lost all confidence in their earlier actions, or those who are no longer hostile to the JCP in word or action in real life.

When they begin to associate with the JCP in everyday democratic movements, we do not worry about their past. This is our attitude.

There are even some such cases who are recommended as united candidates for elections. These facts reveal that the JCP does not take a stubborn attitude toward a problem belonging to ten years earlier, ignoring later developments. We have recently been discussing in the party that we have to judge such people by what they are doing now, and disregard their past.

On Opening JCP Meetings to the Public

Another question is the demand for JCP meetings to be open to the public. It is often said that the Japanese Communist Party will not be trusted, however reasonable its statements may be, unless it fully opens its meetings to the public. The JCP Congress is open to the public.

But Central Committee meetings and others are not open to the public; I want you to take into consideration the specific political climate of Japan. It is the JCP more than anything else that the rulers or the ruling authorities of Japan are watching and trying to eradicate.

The Public Security Investigation Agency, the security police and many other special services are desperately trying to destroy party organizations, using spies and wiretaps, and to find out who are party members in workshops, who are then the first to be dismissed in any layoff or firing. It is clear that their policy is one of severest oppression and spying on the JCP.

The use of these special forms of oppression and spying is because the JCP is regarded as the arch enemy of both the establishment and big business, when they think of what will take place after their "exploitation system" is eliminated, even though the JCP takes a "flexible line" on a wide range of issues. As the information of the security police indicates, any little problem on things happening within the party is utilized to the full to slander the JCP, distorting it to suit themselves. There are a great number of such cases. Even in these days, in an anti-communist magazine, I found a completely baseless story about Comrade Oka, Vice-Chairman of the Presidium, who, while recovering from a long illness, attended a Presidium meeting to join in a serious debate. There is another recent example; when a JCP House of Councilors member had a little joke with a DSP Diet member, it was immediately taken up with the words, "The JCP monolith is broken"; this kind of thing is not found with other parties. It is, therefore, necessary for us to protect the party from such things, otherwise everything would end in just a dream. It would be easy for the JCP to strip down to nothing, if this were seen as a shortcut to gaining trust and winning people's support on the spot; but under the conditions of anti-communist politics in present-day Japan, speaking freely and frankly in public would probably result in either an embarrassment for our party members or being used for a long time by the Public Security Investigation Agency or the police to snoop on us. Because of this, our activities in this special situation are different from other political parties, and our meetings are not as open to the public as you would like; but please understand that our condition cannot be compared with other parties.

There is another story. Suppose I announce a plan in the press. Those who do not know the proceedings would say "Miyamoto says some new things one after another, as if he is speaking about casual ideas to suit himself." Some went so far as to say that Miyamoto just has hit upon such an idea while watching TV. But this is far from the truth. Before we announce anything important, it first comes before the Standing Presidium, the highest organ of the party in daily activity, and a conclusion is reached. This procedure is a matter of course. The question of eliminating "*shikken*" was discussed by the Standing Presidium, then placed before the Presidium for further discussion, formed into a draft resolution for the Party Congress through Central Committee discussion, and we are now waiting for the conclusions of the whole party. It can never mean that someone like myself can make a law like an imperial edict, completely disregarding the proceedings within the party. We are very careful in taking all necessary steps for this, as a modern political party. But we do have a leadership. If we as leaders could say nothing to express an opinion till it is approved by the Party Congress, we could rightly be called incompetent and irresponsible. Between Party Congresses, the Central Committee first, the Presidium next, and the Standing Presidium for daily activities, are entrusted with the handling of the various current problems, but this entrustment is within the framework of the policy already decided. Therefore any proposal on some new vital problems, especially relating to the Party Program and Constitution, must of course be decided by the Party Congress according to our established procedure.

We Are Not Trying to Impose Party Regulations on Society

The next question is on democratic centralism and that no factional activities are allowed in the JCP. I will go on to discuss the relationship between this question and the political structure of the future, or shall I say, the near future, when

freedom and democracy as we are proposing will be embodied in it.

It would be unpardonable, some might argue, for the JCP to make democratic centralism now practised in party management the norm of social life in future society; that present ways of the JCP are in conflict with the spirit of the "Manifesto". But as the "Manifesto" states, we do not aim to make the philosophy of the JCP the philosophy of the state.

A political party is an organization seeking power. To achieve power means to win the support of the majority of the people. If a political party were just a debating club where no conclusion is reached and no tangible progress made, it would be impossible to go on to victory and realize the aims we strive for. It is necessary and natural to implement democracy and centralism in a proper way. No deviation could be permitted, but democratic centralism is essential for a political party in building up its energy. A person is accepted into membership of the party on the condition of agreement on the Program and Constitution. But what we are proposing on freedom and democracy in the future society of Japan does not demand that a Japanese national be required to approve that Program and the Constitution. We are born Japanese nationals. Setting out the prospect of guaranteeing this and that freedom and democracy to born Japanese nationals is different from becoming members of a political party striving to establish such a society by agreeing to the Program and the Constitution.

The JCP is a political association made up of those who have become its members by their own choice. Before becoming affiliated, they have agreed with its Program and Constitution, stating that they will neither try to form a faction nor engage in factional activities, and that they are free to express opinions but must obey decisions, with freedom to reserve their opinions. Insofar as they have agreed with the aims and the way of activities upon affiliation with the party, any factional activity would violate these regulations and amount to open betrayal of the party in terms of freedom of association.

Any association has the right to decide to admit those who agree with the Program and the Constitution, if proper conditions are met; and the right to expel those who act against the Party Program and Constitution is also part of this freedom of association.

It would be unjust to call expulsion from the party unpardonable and anti-democratic for those who engage in factional activities; other organizations and political parties in present-day society operate on such regulations within the framework of "freedom of association". People agree to the regulations before becoming members; they were not forced to do so. Democracy as set out in the "Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy" is to be achieved in the society and in the nation, different from the way of the party.

The difference between the norms of internal life of a political party, and democracy in the future society it is working for, is seen in this. For sure, Lenin in his writings hinted at but did not assert clearly about whether or not a communist party will be necessary when, a communist society is realized, an ideal society, so to speak, based on truly free human relations in which neither imposition nor violence is needed. Mao Zedong once wrote in definite terms that the communist party will disappear on the completion of its role in such a case. Gramsci of Italy once made a bold prediction that a communist party will become unnecessary in such a society. The communist party is one of the means created by human beings for establishing such a new society. It does not mean that the communist party will take the liberty of doing anything as the only party, such as establishing a dictatorship when the society the communist party aims at is realized.

Theoretically, scientific socialism or communism does not aim at the perpetuation of rule by a certain political party, nor does it aim at imposing intra-party rules on society. A clear understanding of this is the minimum requisite for understanding the JCP, wherever you stand.

Progressive Majority Is Attainable

Our fundamental view is that even in the face of the many difficulties and the complicated situation, we will strive to develop Japan into a more reasonable society by democratic means, and persistently and independently seek a Japanese road of social development appropriate to Japan. This has been the established party line for the last ten and more years, since the 8th Party Congress. Certainly the JCP has had to face many problems in the past, such as what is known as the Molotov cocktail struggle. Strictly speaking, that came about by the action of some wing of the party during the time of the party split, and was connected with great-power chauvinist interventions by some foreign countries. It did not originate from official party policy, but was nevertheless regarded as authentic action by the party. We can readily understand that the memory of this would not be erased easily from people's mind.

On the other hand, even in the face of all kinds of upheavals over the last several decades, the JCP has never hauled down its banners setting out the most fundamental objectives held since its foundation: sovereignty vested in the people, opposition to the war of aggression and the domination of the *zaibatsu*, for woman suffrage, and defense of workers' rights and other fundamental human rights. It has never revoked such main objectives, in spite of many weak points and defects, and even sometimes big mistakes; it is a party of human beings.

This is one of the fundamental characteristics of the JCP; it has never gone back on its main objectives.

In the past ten or more years, we have not changed the principles of our basic line, which has been developed and fortified. But still other parties criticize us, saying that the JCP changes its stand in various ways. They say "The JCP is always changing", taking up the frank way in which the JCP debates the questions of teachers, local governments, etc., arguments not favored by some other parties. Our thinking is that these are all tentative products in developing the present Japanese-style movement suitable to Japan in accordance with the scientific mind. The charge that the JCP is always changing its words is not true; it is said because JCP claims are not in accord with what some other party has been arguing. Rather it should be understood that in conformity with the realities, the JCP is countering various dogmas and taboos that have persisted in the social environment.

We will continue to listen to what the people and public opinion say, giving them careful consideration, but in principle, the road we have followed is reasonable and just. It is our belief that a united front and a democratic coalition government will be established in Japan, though it may take long time, and that a progressive majority will be formed in due course.

(*Akahata*, June 6, 1976)

TWO PRESENT FOCAL POINTS

Based on stenographic record of lecture
given at Japan Press Club
on April 19, 1977

THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

We are to deal with the present current political situation, but I first want to refer to the attitude of a socialist country on the question of national territory, the focal point of today's meeting, in relation to the problem of the 200-mile territorial waters.

As you all know, Japan-Soviet fisheries negotiations have been suspended, due fundamentally to a territorial issue. According to an explanation given by the Government at party head talks yesterday (April 18) (The Prime Minister, as president of the Liberal Democratic Party, met Miyamoto, JCP Presidium Chairman, as part of a series of Prime Ministerial separate meetings with heads of political parties— ed.), Japan' s attitude has been to keep the territorial question separate from the question of fishing. It is true that if either side called for the settlement of the territorial issue as a prerequisite to any agreement on the fishing question, it would hinder the attainment of good results in the negotiations. The territorial question, however, unavoidably underlies the negotiations because the demarcation of fishing zones must be based on the coastline.

On March 28, we published a statement in the name of the Central Committee Presidium. My recent statement also pointed out that the Soviet attitude on this issue is contrary to the principles of socialism, and not appropriate for a socialist country. (The Soviet attitude was that the territorial question over the Chishima [Kurile] Islands had already been settled.——ed.)

You probably know that the JCP has carried on polemics for more than ten years with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over various issues, necessitated by CPSU interventions and attacks relating to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and other matters. Among the polemical subjects, we took up the territorial question. The Soviet commented that our attitude was based on "narrow-minded nationalism", while we described theirs as "great-power chauvinism". The development of this question of the Chishima Islands is set out in our pamphlet "The Question of the Chishima Islands and the Japanese Communist Party".

Putting these developments aside, let us take up the question of what is the logically authentic position of socialism on the territorial question. Clarification of this is necessary for both theoretical and practical reasons. During the campaign for the Habikino mayoral election, voted on the day before yesterday, Mr. Shiokawa, an LDP Diet member and the Vice-Director of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, said in his speech, "If you look at the present Soviet attitude, you will know how absurdly unacceptable a communist party or communism is." But the communist party candidate we recommended won the election by a wide margin. Nevertheless, a great many people still consider that we and the CPSU are blood brothers, because both share the common name of "communist party". So we feel it necessary to clarify the matter.

Basic Concept of Democratic Settlement

On the territorial question, the founders of the theories of

socialism made some comments. For example, in his article "The Po and the Rhein" (*1859)(Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. 13*), Engels said, "Instead of seeking our strength in the possession of foreign soil and the oppression of a foreign nationality, whose future only prejudice can deny, we should do better to see to it that we are united and strong in our own house"; and Lenin said in his article, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" (1916) (*Collected Works, Vol. 22*) that even under socialism, some "heritages" of territorial problems from earliest days will still remain in a socialist country. Since unjust partitions of territories had occured in many places in the past, socialism will take over the unjust territorial issues as "heritages". Lenin says that victorious socialism will naturally "restore and implement full democracy all along the line", "democratically demarcating state frontiers", taking into account "the 'sympathies' of the population."

Similarly, upon conclusion of World War I——which we regard as an imperialist war from both sides, or in other words, a war for expansion of each country's influence——Lenin says in his "Report on Peace" (1917), "By a just or democratic peace...the government means an immediate peace without annexations (i.e., without the seizure of foreign lands, without the forcible incorporation of foreign nations) and without indemnities" (*Collected Works, Vol. 26, "Report on Peace, October 26, [November 8] 1917, Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets"*).

We can find many other similar points raised by Lenin. It is indisputable that socialism has, as its reason for existence, formation of a society free from exploitation, as well as from suppression or aggression against other nations.

It is to be noted here that he pointed out very rigorously a requirement that, besides rejecting any unjustifiable expansion of its own territory, a socialist country is required to settle the problem in a democratic way from a just stand, when it has taken over as a "heritage" that was an unjustifiable territorial issue, not to leave it ambiguous on the score of military considerations or the like. This is a fundamental principle of socialism on territorial questions.

Why then did Japan's defeat in World War II bring about such a result, in spite of repeated statements by Churchill and Roosevelt to the effect that the aims of the war on the part of the Allies involved no territorial expansion? The results reveal a major chauvinistic error by Stalin. He launched an "Appeal to the Nation" on September 2, 1945, when Japan signed the instrument of unconditional surrender, in which he said, "The defeat of the Russian armed forces in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War left a gloomy memory in the people's consciousness. Our people believed in and waited for the day when Japan would be crushed and the stain removed...And now the day has come." He said that the possession of the Chishima Islands by the Soviet Union would give his country a very advantageous instrument, directly linking the Soviet Union with the ocean. These remarks were astonishingly non-socialist, a plain expression of revanchism, seeing in it revenge for their defeat in the earlier two-sided war of aggression in the days of Czarist Russia.

At that time the United States planned to hold a large number of military bases in Japan to ensure its military domination, which has been confirmed by US documents recently released to the public. As one step linked with this intention, the United States took the step of handing the Chishima Islands over to the Soviet Union in the separate peace treaty it made with Japan.

It was thus not an unjustifiable burden borne by that country, to use Lenin's words, as a "heritage", but a problem they themselves had created.

Logical Argument of JCP and the Development of Negotiations

We therefore considered this problem very seriously, and in 1959, when public opinion had not yet risen as high as it is now, I brought the issue out when on a visit to the Soviet Union, pointing out that at least the Southern Chishima Islands (Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands) had never belonged to any foreign country. In response, the Soviet expressed their view that so long as the Japan-US Security Treaty is in effect, with US troops stationed in Japan, the return of the Chishima Islands to Japan would mean the building of US military advance bases on these islands, threatening the Soviet Union. As we in no way supported the Security Treaty, both sides reached agreement to the effect that, when the Security Treaty is terminated, ending all such risks, the Soviet Union would return these islands to Japan. Although this was couched in certain diplomatic terms, it was confirmed.

In those days, we had not come to the point of demanding the return of all the Chishima Islands. Both sides discussed the Southern Chishima Islands in many ways and reached the common understanding that our claims on the Southern Chishima Islands were after all well grounded. Kushinen was among the Soviet delegation at that time. The Soviet side seemed to be surprised at our presentation of the issue in the talks, but through the discussions from various angles they reached the agreement as stated. I was impressed by the appropriateness of their position as a socialist country.

But as you know, the Japan-US Security Treaty was later revised, and the Japanese Government, having given up any claim to the Southern Chishima Islands as part of the whole of the Chishima Islands, now realized the awkward position in which they had placed themselves, and used sophistry in arguing that the Southern Chishima Islands do not form part of the Chishima Islands. In spite of the provision of the Japan-USSR Joint Declaration that Habomai and Shikotan Islands were to be returned to Japan upon eventual conclusion of a Japan-USSR peace treaty, the Japanese Government now made the additional claim that Kunashiri and Etorofu should also be returned at the same time as the other two islands, and on this basis refused to sign a treaty providing for the return of Habomai and Shikotan. In this situation the Soviet Union began to argue that Habomai and Shikotan cannot be returned, because, according to their interpretation, the revision of the Security Treaty was directed against the Soviet Union. The final result was that both sides maintained their respective attitudes.

So when I visited the Soviet Union in 1971 I again raised this issue, and proposed that, under these circumstances, Habomai and Shikotan should be returned to Japan as the first stage to be accomplished with the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Soviet side finally suggested that they would examine this proposal. Despite their commitment made during the talks the Soviet side later took an equivocal attitude. Meanwhile, controversies arose on other subjects between the JCP and the CPSU, with the territorial issue as one of the points seriously debated.

In this sense it is natural and reasonable that "territory" and "fisheries" should be dealt with separately, and that the "territory" issue should not be taken as a prerequisite for the other. But if the Japanese government accepts the status quo during the process or in the results of the present negotiations as a settled matter, Japan will suffer a total setback over the territorial issue, eventually leading to the abandonment of the territory. In this sense, there should be no acceptance of the

status quo in this issue. This was a point I made at the talks of party heads.

Conservative Government Abandoned The Chishima Islands

It was a government of the conservative party—— at that time the Liberal Party, predecessor of the current Liberal Democratic Party, that abandoned the Chishima Islands. Therefore the LDP Government is not in a position now to demand the return of the entire Chishima Islands, for which reason they always avoid using the term "the Chishima Islands"; they absolutely refuse to use the term (in relation to the recovery) but instead use the term "northern territory" and limit it to the "four islands".

This restrictive term, the "four islands" is the only way open to the LDP Government, I realize. But in the future there will be other governments than the LDP; a democratic government to be formed in the future will conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union; it would find itself in a difficult position if it was told, "your government has twice abandoned the Chishima Islands; first by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and then in the 1977 fishery treaty, by which the Japanese government confirmed that in its demand it is enough to say 'the four islands'". This was what I told the Prime Minister. Of course whether such a government will be formed or not is another question...Anyway, I advised him never to give such a commitment, stressing that his government would not be the only one to represent our country.

The attitude of the Japanese Government is generally marked by passiveness——not expressly wishing but undeniably reflecting its wish that, during the fishery talks, the territorial problem may be kept intact, so that if possible it may be able later to issue a statement or something like it, by which it can claim that it did not accept the Soviet stand on the territorial issue. Our opinion is that, since the current question is the delineation of fishing areas, both sides should draw their own fishing-waters borders first, with our border along the 200-sea-mile line; then some superimposed areas claimed by both should be designated as joint control waters by way of a tentative settlement. We feel strongly that one should never accept the idea that the territorial question has already been settled, as the Soviet side claims.

Not only when I visited the Soviet Union in 1971, but also during the Tanaka-Brezhnev talks, according to some reports, the Soviet Union admitted that the territorial issue is still pending. In these days, however, the Soviet Union has been actively emphasizing that the issue has been "settled". Moreover those who continue to press this issue are called anti-Soviet revanchists or militarists, which indicates that this is an important issue that concerns not only the levels of the fish catch, but the distant future.

Rectify Past Error and Conduct Fair Negotiations

During the party head talks, I also said that the territorial issue should not be taken up, using the argument that in these circumstances it cannot be settled fairly without resorting to force, that therefore we need more warships and weapons. This would mean power diplomacy; no successful diplomacy without military strength to enforce it. While I was speaking, LDP General Secretary Ohira who was also present, kept silent. In these days Ohira says that he wants to make the national security question the real issue in the coming election. We feel that his hidden intention is perhaps to impress people

with this Soviet attitude, as a way to shift people's attention and conclude that diplomacy without military power can no longer stand. This is a direction we should never take. To the Soviet error in terms of international justice and the cause of socialism, we should counteract fairly and justly in a peaceful way through diplomacy and negotiations. The Japanese Government, which in the past abandoned the Chishima Islands, should frankly confirm that it was their past attitude, but if they do confirm it, they will be charged with having done the wrong thing. To avoid this, the Government's argument for the territory necessarily lacks strength. Moreover, the Government itself, in an answer to a question in the Diet immediately after the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, said that Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands belong to the abandoned Chishima Islands; but later the Government changed its position, contending that neither island is part of the Chishima Islands. The Government position reveals these contradictions.

Japanese-Soviet Party Relations and Our Responsibility to the Japanese People

We opposed that war of aggression. We contended that the war was an unjust imperialist war, and called for the return of the territories which Japan had annexed, viz., Japan's colonies. In this sense, the JCP never lent a hand to the war of aggression, and after the War the JCP opposed occupation of Japan by the United States. Since this is the character of the JCP, and in accordance with the principle that a nation has full freedom to possess, control and manage its territory, it holds itself responsible for saying what it should say in outspoken terms to anybody, even to a socialist country or another communist party. It considers that to do this will also serve the people of our own country.

The CPSU and the JCP have long been negotiating on the Shiga question. The Shiga faction—the factional group of Yoshio Shiga and some others who launched attacks against the JCP in support of Soviet foreign policy, was praised by the organ of the CPSU as patriots of Japan, thus enabling Shiga and his clique to continue their activity, claiming that praise by Pravda was evidence of their being true communists. For this reason, we have been demanding that Pravda withdraw in some form or other its article that praised them as patriots, justifying their intervention in the internal affairs of the JCP.

Repeated negotiations on this point boiled down to the final stage where they still have some difficulties in definitely resolving the issue. When Vice-Chairman Nishizawa visited Moscow, it was agreed that negotiations could be continued in Japan last January so that the issue could be settled later in summit talks. Recently, the Soviet attitude seems more inclined to bypass the Shiga question so that other issues may be discussed if it fails to reach a settlement of that question. We, however, cannot leave the question unsettled and have demanded that a meeting be held accordingly. But no final conclusion has been reached. Irrespective of how the fishery question develops, our stand toward the Soviet occupation of the Chishima Islands will remain unchanged, since it is not a new issue about which we have suddenly begun to speak but has long been debated openly on many occasions. This is also well known to the Soviet side. Yet, in spite of such differences of opinion over the territorial issue, the JCP takes an attitude that the normalization of relations between the two parties should proceed in accordance with the developing situation. It is in no way considered hopeless, nor has it been given up by us. The reason for the present complications in our relationship with the CPSU is in the latter's intervention in the JCP and encouragement of the Shiga faction. The present relationship is far more complicated than could be completely rectified by top talks, issuing a joint statement and leaving the issue unsettled. We therefore expect many further turns and twists in the way ahead.

CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION AND WAY TO PROGRESSIVE UNITY

Let me take up the present political situation. With Mr. Eda leaving the Socialist Party of Japan at its Convention held the other day, Japanese political parties have increased to seven, each belonging to one of three major blocs: The Liberal Democratic Party-New Liberal Club bloc, the anti-communist "centrist" bloc composed of the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party, plus the Eda group, and the bloc of Communists and Socialists, who set three progressive objectives.

The SPJ Convention revealed two faces: It stopped short of adopting the so-called "SPJ-Komeito-DSP line", resisting the pressure from the inner-party rightist elements that oppose a joint struggle for power with the JCP, which may give the impression that the party is doing just the same as it did before the Convention. Nevertheless, while in the light of the outcome of the general election it may appear that the "centrist line" has been played up, it is still characteristic that the party has refused to commit itself completely to the anti-communist line, in spite of the "centrist line" being played up because of general election. But it does not mean that the SPJ Convention took the line of a progressive bloc or a progressive united front. As usual, the SPJ has adopted a policy for a coalition of the four opposition parties, which shows that the party's decision means support of the status quo, a decision that contains both positive and negative aspects.

Statistics Show that the Centrist Parties Have No Sure Foundation

Much has been said about "centrist" parties. In the general election, the advance of the Komeito and the DSP showed up against the stagnation or even a setback for the JCP and the SPJ, which has created a wrong impression about the balance of power being tilted in favor of the former two, a misunderstanding that must be corrected. In terms of votes cast for the separate parties, the SPJ and the JCP polled a combined 17.79 million votes, 31% of all votes cast, against the combined 9.70 million, 17% cast for the Komeito and the DSP, clearly showing that the relative majority of progressive-minded people is on the side of the SPJ and the JCP.

In respect of policy, the SPJ and the JCP have agreed that the "three progressive objectives" are in common to them. The two parties are negotiating on the question of joint election struggles, and it is expected that on the policy question they will be able to reach agreement with ease.

Another question for the "centrist" parties is whether they have a social and class basis to support them. According to a survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office, a majority of the people based on their standard of living consider they belong to the middle strata of society, but because the overwhelming majority of people are workers, this feeling of belonging to the middle strata in living standards, felt by a majority of the people, means only that they live by an "ordinary standard of living". It does not mean that the people who belong to the middle class have increased in ratio.

Over these 15 years from 1960 to 1975, the composition of the classes changed substantially, with the total labor force increasing from 44.61 million to 54.37 million; among this working population, workers in the broad sense of the word increased from 22.24 million to 32.35 million over the same period; their ratio in the whole labor force rose by 15 percentage points, from 50% to 65%. By contrast, the typical middle-class population, viz., self-employed workers, such as self-managing farmers and retailers, decreased from 20.14 million to 15.99 million, and their ratio fell from 45% to nearly 30%. These figures provide no material evidence to support the argument that the "centrist" parties have gained ground by reason of the changed composition of the classes.

Fear of Progressive Change Is Basic Cause of Anti-Communism

Then, why did the anti-communist "centrist" parties make more or less an advance in the last general election? When the one-party rule under the Liberal Democratic Party has revealed defects and failure in these and other fronts, the anti-communist "centrist" parties, including the new-born New Liberal Club, which have no intention to abolish the existing monopoly capitalist system, have been able to take over the votes of those who have begun to feel dissatisfaction with LDP politics. Objectively, these parties do not seek to change the existing capitalist system controlled by monopoly capital; on the contrary, they are even helping to stabilize the system.

This is why US Pentagon sources said the results of the general election will help stabilize Japanese politics, and the top leaders of big business have their minds set at rest in general, even in the face of the decline in LDP single-party rule; they openly admit that they are "completely satisfied" with the results of the general election, or "We have nothing to complain about in it."

Anti-communist "centrist" parties have repeated that they will not join hands with the JCP in the struggle for power.

They have suggested that they prefer the continuation of LDP politics to joining hands with the JCP in the power struggle. Why? Because they fear that scientific socialism of the JCP will eventually lead to a change of the monopoly capitalist system itself——even though our goal is not to carry out a socialist revolution at once in Japan. Fundamentally, the goal of socialism is to eliminate exploitation of man by man, and the anti-communist "centrist" parties, concerned that this may eventuate, are talking as if it is a "dangerous" thing.

This is why in our campaign speeches we call these parties "LDP-supplementary forces". We do not intend to speak ill of them, though they are rivals in the election, but broadly speaking, their role in the class struggle is to insure monopoly capitalism against the failure of LDP politics, providing great relief to big business.

Let me refer specifically to their policies. In round-table discussions in the April issue of the journal "Gendai" Mr. Eda said that he had no distinct idea on centrism, nor socialism; Komeito General Secretary Yano also emphasized that "civil socialism" raised by the "Association to Think over New Japan" does not mean citizens socialism, but merely "civil-society-ism". These words reveal the striking characteristic of these forces at present, of carefully avoiding the use of the word "socialism". This is not by accident; it comes from their fear of scientific socialism, the anti-communism that is the base for the ideology of these parties.

On the policy question, the DSP made it clear that maintenance of the Japan-US Security Treaty should be the minimum condition on which to form a coalition for power. The LDP, the New Liberal Club, the DSP and the Komeito actually formed a joint front in the Nagoya mayoral election in order to overthrow the city administration of progressive unity supported by the SPJ and the JCP.

Way to Meet Demands of Overwhelming Majority of the People

What then about our view for the future under these conditions? There are many things to consider, but it should be noted that 60% of aggregate capital of all Japanese enterprises, as well as 50% of all profits earned, are shared by some 1,600 major enterprises (capitalized at over 1 billion yen) which form the main support pillar of Japanese politics. There are as many as some 5 million small- and medium-sized enterprises, but the core of the Japanese economy is in the hands of a limited number of major enterprises, which also wield the major power in Japanese politics. For this objective reason, the contradictions between the present political rule and the working people, including small- and medium-sized enterprisers, cannot decrease but increase.

This is the reason why our political struggle should be organized in such a way as to resolve difficulties facing the overwhelming majority of the people. Otherwise it will be impossible to solve the fundamental problems of Japanese politics. But the SPJ is not in a position to take a determined line, because of its four-opposition-party-coalition stand, which has both positive and negative aspects, as I have said. So while the objective conditions call for a progressive bloc or a progressive coalition, the subjective conditions cannot respond to it. This weakness allows the ostentatious force of anti-communist "centrist" plots to be played. Because of these maneuvers, those who have no specific party to support, have the illusion that these plots may be able to take over from LDP single-party rule. In order to counter this, the progressive camp must take action.

An agreement has been reached between the JCP and the

General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) on the unity of the movement against nuclear weapons, but this still meets resistance in various places. Some anti-communist-oriented trade unions affiliated with Sohyo are resisting it. On other fronts, however, negotiations are going on between the JCP and the SPJ for a joint struggle in several one-or-two-member constituencies in the forthcoming House of Councilors election. These negotiations deal with such questions as which districts should be selected as joint-struggle districts and what the policy agreement should be. The two parties have reached agreement on a JCP-SPJ joint struggle in eight districts of Santama, Tokyo, but in spite of these positive results, the movement as a whole is very slow in responding to the needs of the situation.

This is the tenth year since the progressive Tokyo Metropolitan Administration came to power. Shortly before we won the victory in that gubernatorial election, a Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election had been held in which the JCP and the SPJ obtained a little less than 32% of the votes cast. In other words, only one of every three citizens in Tokyo supported either of the two parties. But once the united front was formed, a large proportion of people who had no specific party to support rallied around the progressive camp, bringing it victory. What a dramatic change that was! Added to this, there were only about 50 progressive local autonomies in which the JCP participated before the progressive Minobe Administration of Tokyo took office; now there are some 200; in this same period, the population covered by these autonomies has increased from some 5 million to 48 million. In other words, we see that a substantial change has taken place, and nearly ten times as many people now live under this or that progressive local government.

Choice Between Two Roads; Anti-Communism To Maintain Status Quo, or Progressive Unity To Build Democratic Japan

The two following options are to be seen in the forthcoming House of Councilors election:

One; that the JCP and the SPJ may suffer another setback or stagnation in the election, in which case, the clock of Japanese politics will be set back, the anti-communist "centrist" parties will be activated, and the influence of the anti-communist, pro-status quo regime will increase, though this will depend on how far the LDP will decline. The other is that the SPJ and the JCP may make an advance, in which case, the movement for establishing a progressive united front and a progressive bloc will be accelerated.

This is the 30th year since the enforcement of the Japanese Constitution; it is also the 30th year since enactment of the Fundamentals of Education Law, and the 25th year since the signing of the Japan-US Security Treaty.

I cite these dates, not because I am interested in their coincidence, the 30th year and the 25th year, but because now that it is 30 years since the end of the war, the whole course of Japanese politics has come to a crossroads; it is time to change Japanese politics so that the provisions of the Constitution——for example, the article guaranteeing a minimum standard of living——can be implemented not merely in form but in substance; or should we allow arms expansion to be accelerated and Japan to share militarily an important role in the US strategic system.

The Japanese Communist Party has made great efforts, but even though in the general election before last, when the JCP won three times more Diet seats than it held before, which created such a panic in the LDP camp and among other reactionary anti-communist forces, leading them to take every form of rollback operation and anti-communist battle formation, we have failed to take effective nationwide countermeasures to produce results. This neglect was responsible for the results of the last general election. But at the same time, we need to pay attention to the foundation from which the anti-communist, pro-monopoly capitalist forces, including the anti-communist "centrist" forces, are dividing work among themselves in launching their attacks. As I have said, the contradictions that lie deep in LDP politics, or more precisely, the system of Japanese monopoly capitalism, subservient to the United States, have increased, and the foundation for their rule is not really consolidated.

Anti-communist "centrist" parties have said a lot of things. But there are not more than two opposing camps in the political world—the one is the forces that favor monopoly capitalism, and the other is the forces that center on the wide range of working people. The struggle is between these two camps, and there can be no "middle course" to hold an equal distance from the two camps. Therefore, for all their maneuvers, there are already signs that these parties can no longer pretend to be socialist, that their aim to so pretend is too transparent. This fact indicates that fundamentally these parties are never stable. The favorable outcome of the general election for these parties is passing evidence of the contradictions or social vacilations, and a stable and democratic Japan is not on this extension line. I hold the conviction that the democratic future of Japan will in the final analysis depend on the progressive camp, a united front that links the SPJ and the JCP.

Since the outcome of the general election was made known, there are some people who say that the JCP has spoken of building a democratic coalition government by the end of the

1970s, and the time has come to haul down that flag. But while there are still a few years till the end of the 1970s, there is no reason to furl the flag. Politics will change when it will. A case in point was the collapse of the Gandhi Government of India. When a change occurs, it may surface through a general election, but a drastic change has taken place in depth in advance of that. I say this not from wishful thinking, but because I have the conviction, or more precisely, an idea that the objective contradictions of the political structure of Japan will, sooner or later, have to be brought to dissolution through such a process as we have forecast.

(*Cultural Review*, June 1977)

HISTORY'S JUDGMENT ON THE EVIL POLITICS OF DARK DAYS

Speech made at the Celebration Meeting on May 12, 1977 for Publication of "Kenji Miyamoto Before the Court Under Militarism"

I am deeply impressed that so many people are here to celebrate the publication of the book, "Kenji Miyamoto Before the Court Under Militarism".

I have made speeches in many places in the country, in which I have referred to the old Public Order Maintenance Law case, but I have never felt satisfied because the time was so limited for me to talk on this, along with many other subjects, though the audiences were very eager to hear from me in detail about this experience. This evening gives me the opportunity to speak more fully about this old case, and in dealing with it I will compare those days with the present time.

How the Book Came to be Published

Frankly, I had no plan to publish the record of the statements I made before the court; I just wrapped them up in a kerchief and put them on the shelf with other books, but Secretariat Chief Tetsuzo Fuwa discovered them and told me I should make fair copies and have them ready to be published at any time. So I decided to do this before the documents could be badly wormed. I asked my assistant to write them out bit by bit, without setting a time limit.

Some of documents were stenographic copies. All my statements before the court had been stenographed, but not all

were preserved. The stenographic copies had been kept in the court records, but were burnt when the court building was burnt down in the war; so only those which I had were preserved. As you all know, the Chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party and others launched an attack on us in the Diet, using the old cases in which we were involved. In their questions in the Diet, they demanded that the cases be taken up by the Diet, using many maneuvers to get this done.

In the face of this, we felt it was necessary to answer the charges by publishing the live record and evidence of that time. These were the circumstances under which I published my records in October last year (1976), which I had not imagined would be printed.

Generally speaking, in a party to honor the publication of a book, the author's friends and others gather to encourage the author with greetings. My first book was "Leninist Struggle on Literature", book of literary critiques. This was printed after I had gone underground, and was then arrested. My wife, Yuriko Miyamoto edited this book, and I had had no experience of a party in celebration of publication of a book, even from when my first book was published. I have published nearly 20 books since then. Comrades Tetsuzo Fuwa and Koichiro Ueda have also had a number of books published, and nearly 20 books by comrade Toshio Sakaki have been published. One view among party leaders is that it is quite normal for them to publish a book, so it has never been our practice to hold a celebration party for publication of a book.

But with the publication of this book, "Kenji Miyamoto Before the Court Under Militarism", Mr. Iwasaki, who gave greetings just now, famous as the manager of a progressive publishing house, proposed that a party should be held because the book has drawn so much political attention, and that the celebration should be a party not just for my friends and acquaintances, but should be a mass meeting in which a far wider range of people could participate. I thought it would be nonsense to hold a party just in celebration of publication of this book, but at the same time I thought it is sensible to hold it as proposed by Mr. Iwasaki in the form of a meeting. So I agreed and decided that I should give a speech here.

Many people have spoken here, giving me excessive praise. From the outset, we communists have taken it for granted that our purposes and cause must be defended in resistance to persecution, so we don't feel it is anything special to have defended our purpose and cause. And because it is usual for our struggle to face demagogy and slander, it is a matter of course that we should fight back. I feel flattered by your appreciation of what is our ordinary activity. As lawyer Morinaga said just now, for various reasons we two had not met for 20 years after the war, though we have talked over the phone. Lawyer Morinaga, who was not a communist party member, defended persecuted political prisoners who refused to revoke their stand on progress and justice, and were therefore hated bitterly by the authorities. In those days of intense persecution, to defend non-converting political prisoners was, in itself, a cause for repression, but Mr. Morinaga, along with our families, supported us in our struggle. As in those days, I still am much obliged to Mr. Morinaga.

A Number of Questions To Be Dealt with

Let me deal now with some major aspects. The Japanese Communist Party, of which we were then members, and which suffered persecution, was treated by the authorities in those days as an organization with a very rebellious ideology, and deserving of persecution. The Public Order Maintenance Law

was the basis of the cruelest punishment. What is the judgment that history has handed down on this? That is the first question. Which was correct between the following two positions? To persecute us on the grounds that the Public Order Maintenance Law was right, or for us to wage a struggle on the conviction that the Law and its basis, the absolutist Tenno system, with sovereign power vested in the Emperor, was wrong?

The second question is about the spying policy adopted at that time to destroy the Japanese Communist Party. The ruling class arrested us, stating that the case was not the result of our exposure of police spies, but was due to an internal struggle in the JCP. What is the judgment of history on this?

Another question I should deal with is the policy and attitude we took toward police spies.

When the sudden death of the spy during the investigation by the party occurred, the special political police of that time took advantage of this to practice demagogy, and by a large-scale campaign, to alienate the party from the people. It spread around the lie that the JCP had killed him by lynching. The third question is the nature and truth of the case. This "JCP-killed-a-man" argument collapsed even in the evil court of the time, and their demagogy failed to hold. But now, a plot to revive this issue is taken up in the Diet, a renewed attack on us in the name of the Diet, and using the same scenario worked out by the old special political police.

Further, though the fact is that we were sent to prison as political prisoners, our attackers assert that we were criminals who even now should be kept in jail.

In dealing with these questions, I want to make clear the reason why these attacks are being made and the political background of them.

I Respect the Sound Sense Of People of Many Strata

Before I take up the main subject, I should refer to protests made by many scholars and persons of culture living in Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto and Hokkaido, leaders of various circles and other local people. They opposed these attacks as soon as the renewed attack began in the use of the prewar court case under the Public Order Maintenance Law. They pointed out that such attacks are aimed at approval of the evil politics of the prewar dark days, and were actually an attempted justification of the Law. I take this occasion to express my respect and gratitude for the courage and sound judgment of these people.

Many other people also wrote letters to major newspapers, most of them speaking of the absurdity and uncertainty about this question being taken up in the Diet, and opposing this action. Not all of them are supporters for the JCP, but from their experiences in prewar days, the people now have sound sense, and a great number of people see in this treatment an extraordinarily evil and questionable action; I pay my respect to this sound sense of the Japanese people.

"JCP Activity Is Not to Be Persecuted, But to Be Promoted"

First, I will deal with the question of the Public Order Maintenance Law. I scarcely need to say that it was a bad mistake for this law to be used by the state to suppress and make a crime of the activity of the JCP, the party which had acted to put into practice progressive ideas, in the aspiration for social progress and development. In the book, "Kenji Miyamoto Before the Court Under Militarism", I make the

following statement:

> "And now, turning to our activity, its ultimate purpose is to promote the necessary development of society, and thus to bring welfare and peace to the Japanese people, contributing to the progress, peace and welfare of the whole of humanity" . . . To sum up, our activity is not to be repressed or persecuted, but to be supported and promoted."

Recorded statements before the court used many Chinese characters and old Chinese-style expressions, making it very hard for them to be understood at a glance. These statements were not written by me directly, but by persons in the court, or the court secretary, who had no knowledge of social science in summing up my statements before the court. Nevertheless, these summaries are rather good, perhaps because they are a summary made from my stenographed statements; the summary reflects the general lines of what I wanted to say before the court. You will find a great deal of *katakana* sentences in the book. This does not mean that I believe that *katakana* sentences are better or like an old Chinese-style expression, but this was the usual style which the court at that time used to make a summary of statements made in court. It is simply that I had to follow the same style.

I refused to make any statement during the police enquiry or the preliminary examination. I stated my case only before the court after an interval of seven calendar years, so the court could not refuse my demand for a stenographic record of my statements. I also pointed out extremely incorrect sentences in the recorded statements, and had them corrected.

My consistent stand was that our activity had contributed to the progress and development of society, and this activity should be encouraged, not persecuted. You will find such a statement in various parts of the record.

The prosecutors said that the JCP aimed at both a change in the national polity and rejection of private property, and that these points made the JCP an evil and criminal political association. But a change in national polity meant, of course, to transform absolutist Tennoism and the system of sovereign power being vested in the Tenno, to make it a system of sovereign power belonging to the people. The authorities regarded such an idea as a crime. I said before the court that the first objective of the JCP was to "abolish the bourgeois-landlord Tenno system", and that the political system was not static, but moving; so just like the revolutionary theory of the natural scientist Copernicus, that the earth moves round the sun, our argument, that society can be changed, did not constitute a crime.

I also stated that it was not correct to say in a simplistic way that a shift from a capitalist economy to a socialist system meant the abolition of private property. In these days on this question we say our aim is not to abolish all forms of private property, but only the capitalist, privileged exploitation system. But the law at that time said that the JCP was a criminal organization because it aimed at abolishing the private property system, not because it sought to change the capitalist system into a socialist one. Their purpose was to frighten the people.

They also attacked the JCP by saying it was a "secret association". Before the court I said that the party was not a secret organization but had "open existence before the people". I said that it was simply an "outlawed association", an association that was not recognized by the Government.

Public Order Maintenance Law: Weapon For Suppression and War

The Public Order Maintenance Law is completely abolished

under the present Japanese Constitution, which regards it as contrary to the universal principles of mankind.

The Preamble of the Constitution says, "We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with horrors of war through the action of Government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution"; this principle of sovereignty vested in the people "is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith." The evil Law was abolished as a tyrannical law soon after the war ended, even before the Constitution was promulgated. The Law comes under "laws, ordinances and rescripts" which the Constitution proclaimed to be in conflict with the universal principles of mankind.

Japanese people who were persecuted under the Law formed an association of those who suffered from it, demanding state reparations on the grounds that it was a crime committed by the state, and seriously wrong to put them in jail under the Public Order Maintenance Law. This was a just demand.

Under the Public Order Maintenance Law several thousand people were arrested, among whom were Takiji Kobayashi and Yoshimichi Iwata, who, on being arrested, died by torture. At least 65 communists and others were killed. Some 1,600 people arrested under this law died of disease or other causes in jail, mainly because they were kept in an extremely unhealthy environment with no adequate medical treatment. The authorities not only arrested and persecuted people under this law, just because they fought for the development of Japanese society and all mankind; they even took their lives. More than this, the law was used as a weapon to drive the Japanese people into the war of aggression, causing the death and injuries of several tens of millions of the people of neighboring countries, and in which 3,100,000 Japanese lost their lives. The alliance, the Anti-Comintern Pact, formed between Japanese militarism and German and Italian fascism, aimed at the defeat of the Devil of Communism, regarded as the evil of the world. They went into the war of conquest by calling it a holy war. Anyone who doubted this, communists or persons of religion, were persecuted——a true picture of the dreadful conditions under the Public Order Maintenance Law.

Courage of Japanese People Brought into Full Play by JCP

Unfortunately, only the JCP of all political parties resisted the absolutist Tenno system, though the party then had only a small number of members. It was also only the JCP among political parties that opposed the Public Order Maintenance Law. The Government had a strong military force, police force and military police, and controlled almost all means of propaganda. By enacting whatever laws and using whatever means they chose, they aimed to turn the whole of Japan into a jail, accusing JCP members of being unpatriotic and traitorous. But in the light of the progress of the past half century of history, we can affirm that the victory in the historic struggle of this half century was won by a very small force of communist party members, leading the people in the struggle to give sovereign power to the people, to abolish the Public Order Maintenance Law, and build democratic Japan.

The Japanese Communist Party can claim the honor of having had very excellent revolutionaries, such as Takiji Kobayashi, Yoshimichi Iwata, and Eitaro Noro, all of whom died in the course of the struggle, and many other unnamed party members of excellent gifts and ability, who, in facing up to the persecution of the ruling class, kept firmly to the road of scientific socialism, and kept their faith that the maladministration deriving from the sovereign power of the Tenno was incompatible with the welfare of the Japanese people. It is also to the honor of the Japanese people in that a great number of them displayed invincible courage in those dark days.

It Cannot Be Denied that Oizumi And Obata Were Spies

The second question directly concerns my trial. The old special political police repeatedly charged it was a case of death caused by an internal struggle of the JCP, or a conflict between intellectuals and workers within the party.

But they were two spies, Obata and Oizumi. Because of Obata's sudden death, we had to stop the investigation before we learned all we wanted to know. The other spy, Oizumi, had a living role with the police, while pretending to be a communist, as a Central Committee member of the party. But he was not a true member, and feared that if he kept up his pose, he would be kept in jail permanently. So he changed his attitude after a while and in desperation began to confess that he really was a spy. But if his confession had been accepted by the court, the case against us would have had to be dropped. So the judges ignored his desperate appeal and treated him as if he were a real CC member, and a defendant charged under the Public Order Maintenance Law. Oizumi, the spy, was sentenced to five years' hard labor, the lightest penalty for an official of an association outlawed under the Public Order Maintenance

Law.

Some people who recently studied this question again say that Oizumi was really a JCP CC member, and then later became a spy. They are trying to prove that the JCP at that time made a serious ill-informed mistake. But this is not true. Oizumi admitted that he became a spy at the instigation of section chief Ariaki Tone of the special political police of Niigata Prefecture. He confessed that in the April 16 roundup he gave information to the police, which was a heavy blow on the local organization of the Communist Party. He said that after this happened he could no longer work as spy in his prefecture, and escaped to Tokyo and sent information to Tone from there, while waiting to establish connections with the Metropolitan Police Office. The literary critic, Ken Hirano, is completely wrong in saying that the JCP was foolish enough to allow a spy to become a Central Committee member, and the party should criticize itself for this. The fact is that Obata and Oizumi crept into the party and sold comrades to the police. The number of genuine party members had declined, and the party center was in the hands of people from among the remaining members. These were the circumstances that let the two spies take a position in the party center.

The Aim of the Espionage-Provocation Policy

The primary objective of spies was not only to damage the party by selling comrades to the police, but also to lead the party into fundamental deviations. They instigated acts like absconding with money, and other bad anti-social offenses. So we didn't call them simply spies, but spy-provocateurs. In what was known as the Omori Bank raid, a spy using the name of Matsumura worked out a plan in close connection with the special political section of the Metropolitan Police, and

received instructions from them. This is why the money taken from the Omori Bank came back quickly to the special political police. After the bank raid Matsumura disappeared, and on investigation we found that Matsumura's real name was Iizuka, and was legally domiciled in Ehime Prefecture, Shikoku. The authors of an article in the monthly "Bungei Shunju" claimed that they themselves had found his legal residence, but the fact is that we had found this out before they did and this gave them the clue. He hid himself from the world, and escaped to Hokkaido to spend his dark years as a deserter; he had used a false name and address. The whole scenario of the so-called Omori Bank raid was written by the police, carefully planned and carried out under the direction of section chief Mori of the special political police. The main operator of this plan was Iizuka, using the pseudonym of Matsumura.

The special political police advised Oizumi to go to the Soviet Union, in order to give him status and become a top leader of the party after returning.

What was the aim of the police in trying to make him a JCP leader? The aim was to take over the JCP center and have it issue a statement supporting both the Tenno system and the war of aggression, in the name of the JCP Central Committee. This is what the attempt was for, but because they were spies, they would sooner or later betray themselves in one way or another. We saw through them as spies, and so we interrogated them. It was because of our long hard experiences and activities against obstruction by spies that we were able to recognize spies, not because of any inner struggle among ourselves.

When we wanted to interrogate a spy, it was impossible to call them to our office, as we would today, because at that time all our activities were outlawed. We would have been rounded up at once if the danger of an enquiry had been sensed, and the police would have been informed. For this reason we set up what we called an "underground" room and called him there. We were 99 percent certain that he was a spy, and he agreed to be detained, and he was interrogated on questions prepared beforehand.

Legitimate Self-Defense in Dual Sense Against Espionage-Provocation Policy

Arguing from the death of the spy, the special political police alleged that he must have suffered very cruel torture during the enquiry. And even in the recent session of the Diet, questions to this same effect were raised by use of a prewar court decision and other materials based on the police allegation. In replying in the Diet, Justice Minister Inaba used a "set reply", but our attitude toward a spy is very clear from the following statements I made before the court:

> "Fundamentally, we exposed spies in the party because the authorities challenged us with the aim of destroying the party, using spies and even violating the legal order established by themselves."

By the words "violating their own legal order", I meant that the authorities were desperately attempting the destruction of the JCP, and had no compunction about committing such crimes themselves as were considered infamous in the light of generally accepted ideas and laws, such as "absconding with money" in "raiding a bank". I answered their charge by the following two arguments: that "it is against historical justice to obstruct our activity, which is fundamentally a movement to promote the historical progress of society" and "thus, it is legal self-defense in a dual sense to counter such a challenge". In other words, I stressed that the basic activity of the JCP is legitimate, or at least not something for which we should be persecuted; it was therefore legitimate self-defense to fight

against whoever was persecuting the party. The second argument was that an attempt by a spy-provocateur to destroy the party on the instigation of infamous crimes made us to "flee to the wall" and it was "legitimate self-defense in a dual sense" for us to counter it. When a spy attempted this, it amounted to "his loss of all ethical grounds on which to demand legal protection of his interests".

Clearly, this reasoning is right only if the Public Order Maintenance Law is recognized as an evil law. For those who may think that the law was right and the activity of the JCP was wrong, it would seem reasonable for the authorities to use spies to suppress the party. We stated before the court that our enquiry was legitimate self-defense to defeat the plot to provoke us into serious crimes by violating the right of the JCP and the right of individuals as communist party members. The court did not accept our contention, but as I said before, from the standpoint of the present Constitution, or from the position of recognition of the Public Order Maintenance Law as an unfair criminal law used by the state authorities, in conflict with "universal principles of mankind", we can claim that our activity in defending the party, especially our argument that our activity in exposing spies was legitimate self-defense——however bold it may have sounded at that time——was not only reasonable historically, but also correct in the light of legal theory, an argument based on historical justice.

Maximum Penalty for Spying Was Expulsion from the Party

To make clear our attitude toward a spy, I made the following statement before the court: "Any measure taken against a spy must not be kept secret but made public; it must be published openly...When a man was found to be a spy, we should take the matter up openly, inquire and examine him carefully, and expel him from the party. The JCP is not a state but a political party...it is enough for us to expel from the party a violater of the Party Constitution. Expulsion is the maximum punishment given by the party." This was the stand we took at that time.

Recently some people took this matter up saying a spy is an object of hate; it is understandable for a party member, especially a young member, to hate him; it is not surprising but rather natural to want to kill a spy. So they say that at that time we wanted to kill or even did kill a hated spy, and it would be a rather courageous thing to acknowledge this. Calling it "courage" such people demand that we should say what was outlined by the special political police.

But these people in fact say this because they are ignorant of our policy at that time. Though we were politically immature we knew the difference between a political party and the state. The state has a penal code under which it can inflict a penalty of hard labor or some other punishment on an offender. For a political party, a spy is no more than a violater of the Party Constitution, however hateful he may be. He joined the party of his own free will, and was found to be a rebellious element. It is therefore enough to expel him from the party. When we took some measure, it had to be made public, so we expelled him publicly as a spy.

Enquiry Was Made Quietly

Unfortunately, it was found that one of the spies fell into an extraordinary condition of health during the enquiry. I told the court clearly that it occurred when I was asleep with my feet under a *kotatsu* (Japanese warmer) after our enquiry had given us most of the information we wanted. The spy, Obata, tried

to escape while other comrades were examining another spy. We tried to stop him escaping, and after a while he seemed to quit trying to flee and quietened down. So we took a rest for a while. But a comrade coming upstairs found when he took off a handkerchief used to keep Obata from shouting, that Obata's condition had suddenly changed. We were shocked and desperately tried to arouse him. I myself used a form of resuscitation used in *judo*, and others tried artificial respiration on him. But he never came round.

Since our policy was expulsion as maximum punishment for a spy, his death was, of course, a wholly unexpected turn of events, beyond our imagination. We tried immediately to resuscitate him, because our firm policy was that the maximum penalty was expulsion from the party. Considering these developments, it is quite false to think that we were willing to kill him. I also said before the court that we used a very small house, with one eight-mat room (about 26 m²) and a dining-kitchen downstairs, and one eight-mat room upstairs. It was about the size of what we now call a 3DK house, a small separate house, which stood very close to neighboring houses, roof to roof. When we rented it, we explored the surrounding area and found that one of the neighboring houses belonged to a policeman. We told the court that we carried out the enquiry as quietly as possible because we knew of the policeman's house nearby. This is exactly as it was. It would have been self-defeating to have made a noise, and we were very careful not to make a noise, undeniably showing that the enquiry was carried out quietly. People living around the house told the police afterwards that they heard the clear sound of people going up and down the stairs, but nothing else.

Contradictory and Ambiguous Opinions of Experts

The cause of Obata's death became a subject of debate. A doctor who first examined the body gave the opinion that Obata died of brain concussion. But he was not hit in the enquiry, and the examination found no evidence that he had been hit. So this doctor's statement was later rejected.

Another doctor, who gave a written opinion based on the autopsy of the first doctor, said that Obata died of shock. Typically a death from shock results from an inherent tendency or diathesis, so that one might die suddenly of even slight excitement, harmless to a normal person. But this doctor attached the adjective "traumatic" to his opinion. A doctor doing a post-mortem at that time did his work mainly for the court, the police and the prosecutor office. It was politically difficult for even an honest doctor to give an objective opinion at that time when the political demand was for a judgment that we had killed a person or injured him seriously. This is why the second expert opinion was very ambiguous.

Recently a surgical doctor published a very detailed article on these written opinions. In the final analysis, his conclusion agrees with my statement made before the court. I had pointed out that Obata died of shock due to diathesis, or an organic weakness of the heart; the old opinions of doctors given in an analysis of Obata's death showed that he suffered from an enlarged heart. I read a great deal on forensic medicine; there was no one I could consult. The circumstances of lawyers at that time did not include the detailed study of forensic medicine. I made a deep study of medicine from medical books, and pointed out the ambiguity of the doctors' opinions, comparing them with what I had read. I asked the court to call the doctors before the court and let me confront them, but the court rejected this.

Latest Study by Expert Supports My Position

Today, if a court were to reject a request for confrontation between a defendant and important witnesses or experts, it would be regarded as outrageous, a trial that is so unfair as to lose its value as a trial. In prewar days, because the court was able to refuse our demand to confront the expert witnesses, no thorough investigation was possible for us.

There was no evidence to support the doctor's opinion, that the death was caused by "traumatic shock". Death from "traumatic shock" can only be caused when a visible wound—such as destruction of muscle—is inflicted. But the doctor's opinion included no description of such a wound, which meant that the written opinion that death was caused by "traumatic shock" was very questionable, contradicting the understanding of present forensic medicine. The surgeon I referred to published a study that supports fundamentally my statements made before the court; I said that the death had not been caused by "traumatic shock", and no study by experts has appeared that supports the earlier written opinion of doctors.

I am confident that the statement I made before the court based on the process of events and my own reading was correct in the light of the views of experts in modern forensic medicine. In prewar days even the court, which had rejected my demand for confrontation with the experts, was unable to adopt a political police scenario that showed that we were guilty of murder; judging from the most recent scientific theory and as a matter of fact I made a well-grounded argument, telling the court that the written opinion about there being a serious wound that resulted in death, was not correct.

Covering all this, a very professional article with a lot of evidence from studies was published in the September 1976 issue of the JCP journal "Zen'ei" (Vanguard). It made a detailed scientific analysis which I recommend you to read. In the Diet, JCP member of the House of Councilors, Takeko Kutsunugi, rebutted the attack, stressing how inaccurate the written opinion was, pointing out that when a man dies of "traumatic shock", evidence of a destroyed muscle is found in the body. Her conclusion is the same as what I had stated.

This is what took place, and the outcome is as follows: the war ended and the Public Order Maintenance Law was abolished. A small number of communist party members had denounced the barbaric law, but their shout was almost unheard and lost in the dark. But as far as the rest of the world was concerned, it was a period when most people opposed militarism and fascism. The system of militarism and fascism, an evil system that suppressed the people's hopes for social progress and development, was overthrown by the tide of world events. Though our views were not strong enough to reach all Japanese people, the law of historical progress did not allow atrocious militarism to continue forever. This is one of the important lessons for the Japanese people from the history of Japan, learned at the great cost of their defeat in the war.

Matter Settled with Certificate: "...Not Having Received the Aforementioned Sentence"

What was the outcome of our trial? The Japanese Government opposed our release as long as possible, and did not like to rectify its past error. But at last it had to release political prisoners by order of US occupation forces. The US forces had two faces: one was that of an imperialist troop, and the other that of anti-fascist allied forces. As imperialists, they strove to turn Japan into a military base against the Soviet Union and China. They preserved the Tenno system of Japan as a stronghold for reactionary rule, turning the Japanese *Zaibatsu* (big business) and reactionary forces into their junior partner, to ensure US imperialist domination over Japan.

But at the same time, as anti-fascist Allied Forces and executor of the Potsdam Declaration, they could not dissociate themselves from being anti-fascist Allied Forces and executor of the Potsdam Declaration. They disliked Communist Party members and even considered them to be their future enemy. But on this question of political prisoners they ordered the Japanese Government to release them in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, opposing the deliberate reluctance of the Japanese Government.

Because the Japanese Government used slowdown tactics on various pretexts, the Allied Forces issued an ordinance, called Potsdam Rescript, making clear the reason why political prisoners should be released. The Japanese Government was finally compelled to hand down a decision, stating that "the person in question should be considered as not having received the aforementioned sentence".

A special decree, Imperial Ordinance No. 730, had been issued, under which civil rights were restored to those released. But it was much more than the mere restoration of such rights. Some scholars and the Japanese judicial authorities would like to regard it as a mere restoration of political rights, but that is not the correct interpretation. In a usual case, an amnesty decree means that one who was pronounced guilty is restored to civil rights, because the validity of the sentence is ended from the time the amnesty is granted.

Not A Mere Restoration of Rights

How should our case be interpreted? It was declared that "the person in question should be considered as having not received the aforementioned sentence". An amnesty decree stipulates that if a law is abolished because of unfairness or for other reasons during the time when one is charged under that law but on whom a sentence has not yet been handed down, the charge itself loses its validity; in other words, both the prosecution and the trial are rendered null and void. In our case, "not having received the aforementioned sentence" comes under this definition of an amnesty decree, viz., the charge itself was declared null and void. In regard to this, Justice Minister Inaba said repeatedly that it was extremely to be regretted that such treatment should be given to defendants prosecuted under the Public Order Maintenance Law, and that such a treatment was quite absurd.

But fundamentally, the Public Order Maintenance Law was in itself a crime committed by the authorities. As the League of Victims under the Public Order Maintenance Law demands, it is necessary that the state make reparations and an apology to those jailed under this law. At that time there were no political conditions under which we could make such demands. But our case was not so simple as a past sentence has lost all validity. We were considered as not having received the sentence, that no such court decision had even been handed down; so the restoration of civil rights to those subjected to punishment under the Public Order Maintenance Law followed from reflection and the sense of guilt on the part of the authorities over that barbaric law—a crime committed by the state that conflicts with a universal principle of mankind—which was the basis of our punishment. The authorities not simply restored our rights, but also stated that we were restored to the position of no such sentence having been imposed. It was a very important decision. Legally speaking, because no sentence had been received, it was no longer possible to regard us as even having

been pronounced guilty. It was more than a declaration of "not-guilty".

Proviso Attached to Imperial Ordinance No. 730

Some people have frequently taken up the proviso attached to Imperial Ordinance No. 730. The proviso stipulated that civil rights should not be restored to those who came under the definitions of certain specified items, even though they had been charged under the Public Order Maintenance Law. People trying to attack us on the basis of our case have desperately tried to use this proviso.

Even though we were charged with many other added crimes, the point was that we were sentenced by the authorities to lifelong imprisonment under the Public Order Maintenance Law as political prisoners; they never wanted to pardon us, people who refused to recant. Under this proviso, it was laid down that those found guilty not only of violation of the Public Order Maintenance Law, but also other charges, should not have their rights restored. This was an extremely unreasonable provision, by which defendants charged under the Public Order Maintenance Law were denied restoration of their rights, if, for example, they were at the same time charged with a violation of the Food Control Law.

The aim of this proviso was to place as many obstacles as possible in the way of release of political prisoners and the restoration of their rights in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration; it would enable the Government to prevent as many defendants as possible under the Public Order Maintenance Law from recovering their rights and resuming their social activities. Under the Food Control Law during the war, those who sold rice at an unduly high price or sold it underground could be punished, the heaviest penalty for which was a fine of ¥500.

This meant that if one was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment under the Public Order Maintenance Law, and at the same time fined ¥500 for violation of the Food Control Law while working in party activity, the absurdity was that such a person could be kept in jail for ten years even after the Public Order Maintenance Law was abolished, on the pretext of a trivial offense punished with a fine of only ¥500. These are some of the questionable points of the proviso attached to Imperial Ordinance No. 730.

These questions were discussed in the Diet, but unfortunately, under the conditions of that time, it was impossible for us to go to the core of the matter. After studying these questions it was found that there were contradictions in the proviso, resulting from the desire of the Japanese Government to obstruct the release of political prisoners and restoration of their civil rights.

In all these respects, the case was already settled historically in the way I have told you.

Why then was this case taken up again in the Diet? Not only was the case brought into the Diet, but also the rightist media, which have published anti-communist articles and reports, jumped at the chance to use it, with rightist organizations carrying out special actions and publishing books.

These thus became an important political problem.

But then we found the clue that exposed their aim, provided by the action of Assistant Judge Kito.

Kito's Illegal Acquisition of Documents Is Part of the Anti-Communist Plot

Soon after the House of Councilors election in 1974, Assistant Judge Kito visited Abashiri Prison on July 24. It was revealed that he secretly copied "*mibuncho*", the record of a prisoner. After investigation into this, it was found that he had taped his conversation with officials when he visited the prison. These conversations revealed that he did the copying with the consent of the prison authorities. Hodota, the governor of Abashiri Prison at that time, did not admit this clearly at first, but later confessed that he was asked by telephone from the Chief of the Second Department, Ritsuo Mori, of Sapporo Correction District, to offer assistance to Kito for reading the prisoner's record. In other words, Hodota permitted Kito to read the record on the instruction of his superior.

The case of Kito obtaining a prisoner's record from the prison, as well as his telephone call to Prime Minister Miki, using the name of another person, became a big issue. He brought my old medical record out of the Abashiri Prison, and this was used in books written by DSP Chairman Ikko Kasuga and other rightist writers, and appeared also in the monthly, "Bungei Shunju". It is clear that all got the material from the same source. The document Mr. Kasuga boasted about in publishing it, saying "I have obtained material on which to attack Miyamoto", was the same as what Kito copied at Abashiri Prison, a fact confirmed by the Justice Ministry. These facts reveal that there is a special anti-communist plotting group that includes Assistant Judge Kito. This group has committed itself in the attacks made by the LDP and the anti-communist opposition parties in the Diet, as well as in attacks by rightist media and rightist organizations, all of which began from the beginning of last year, using the same materials.

In the latest issue of the monthly "Tsukuru" (June 1977), some part of a large volume of what was called "top secret expert opinions" relating to our old case, was published, with a comment probably written by Kito. It contained investigations by various official agencies, access to which is confined to public security and other governmental officials. It is clear that an anti-communist plot group had long been engaged in Japan in this special undertaking before the court case was taken up in the Diet.

Prisoner's Record Was Brought Out For Two Purposes

Such a plot necessarily must be leaked from somewhere. Along with Kito's taking to a newspaper a recorded tape of his telephone conversation with Prime Minister Miki when he called Miki, using the name of another person, his Abashiri Prison case was also investigated from various sides. I was placed in a very unenviable position because my record in Abashiri Prison has often been referred by name in the mass media's reports on Kito, and consequently Kito and I are sometimes looked upon as associates. Why did Kito go to get my record from the prison?

One of his purposes was to obtain the record of the court judgment. The paper was of course read out in the prewar court, and there was no secret about it. But the trial drew little attention then, because it was held during the war of aggression, when Japanese cities were being bombed, the public activity of the JCP was completely suppressed, and a small number of party leaders were fighting it out in jail. For this reason it is very difficult to obtain the judgment paper now.

But to achieve their aim of taking this case up again in the Diet, they need the judgment paper which had the same nuances, though not all the same, as the scenario written by the special political police. Their strategy was to use the following argument: The old judgment paper says so-and-so, but the JCP

and Miyamoto refuted it; therefore, let the Diet take up the question and decide which is correct. As to the other purpose, they made the following calculation: Reading papers of the US forces contained in materials carried by the monthly Tsukuru, they found no evidence or documents by which to justify the release of Miyamoto, which indicates that the prison made a mistake or blundered in releasing Miyamoto; if this is so, they can send Miyamoto back to the prison, dealing a heaving blow to the JCP and enabling the anti-communist forces to sleep without fear for the time being. This was an over-optimistic idea. How did they try to achieve it?

Neither the Japanese Government nor the Japanese law system had any means or law under which political prisoners charged under the Public Order Maintenance Law could be released. They released them because the Allied Occupation Forces ordered it, and the Public Order Maintenance Law was in fact abolished. An article in the Criminal Action Law on "suspension of execution of a sentence" can be applied when some special event happens, or when a prisoner falls seriously ill and may die if kept in jail. But it was normal at that time for a prisoner to die in jail, and it would be too superficial to think that a prisoner would be released from jail if about to die. When philosopher Kiyoshi Miki, not a communist party member, was kept in jail undecided even after the end of war, August 15, 1945, he caught scabies, a kind of skin disease, because of the unhealthy conditions there. The disease spread all over his body, causing difficulty in cutaneous respiration, leading eventually to his death. Even such a philosopher as Kiyoshi Miki was not released from the prison though he was suffering from what proved to be a fatal disease. This was how the government treated a prisoner at that time. It was even more impossible for an unconverted political prisoner to be let out from the prison when he fell ill and was dying. Nevertheless, (when we were released) they seemed to apply this article to our case. They had no other expedient or convenience.

When you are incapacitated, you need to present a medical certificate, but when we were in jail, a medical certificate was never shown to us. In other words, we were never given such a certificate, and it was therefore not we who presented it to the authorities. The certificate was used only as a tool for the necessary proceedings between the prison and the Justice Ministry.

My health was gradually recovering after I was moved to Abashiri Prison. In the prison in Tokyo, I took rice only with warmed salty water as an article of diet. Abashiri Prison, a farm prison, produced potatoes abundantly. Therefore, for breakfast and supper, we could take enough potatoes in the warmed water. In Tokyo, my weight fell to only a little more than 40 kilograms, but after being transferred to Abashiri, I recovered my weight and regained my strength.

"Unwarranted Release" Theory Completely Broken

It is true that in prison I suffered from various serious illnesses, such as tuberculosis, intestinal tuberculosis, typhoid fever and scarlet fever, sometimes hovering between life and death. I was told by the authorities that if I made a compromise in producing a protocol of examination, I would be released because of my serious illness. But I maintained the principle of making no statement except in the court. I fell ill, but I rather recovered my health when I was released from Abashiri Prison. So after I was released, I used to talk to everyone about my recovery of weight. Even this was what some people tried to utilize. They said: "Miyamoto says he was healthy when he came out of Abashiri Prison, but his

medical certificate had a description of his illness. This was false, and therefore an unwarranted certificate. If so, Miyamoto must be sent back to the prison." If they obtained my record, especially my medical certificate, they thought, they can establish this argument. On this rationale, they announced that Miyamoto has a jail term of 14 years and several months unfinished, and demanded that this matter should be settled in the Diet and that Miyamoto serve the remaining jail term.

After examining US official papers, however, we reached a clear understanding that we were released as none other than political prisoners. The US authorities themselves expressed the judgment that we were released as political prisoners, since we had been innocent of any crimes other than violation of the Public Order Maintenance Law, and as a matter of course we were released when the law was abolished. At that time, the US Department of Justice put my name on the list of political prisoners to be released by the order of the United States. I received a certificate of restoration of civil rights, and a statement to the same effect was also contained in the record of the decision of the court. It was completely impossible to claim that these were all lies and dreams. Naturally, their plot had failed. But it is undeniable that they obtained my prison record for these two purposes.

Court of Impeachment Shelves Affair of Kito Obtaining My Prison Record

A prisoner's records are secret, not because a court judgment should be kept secret but because they contain many records of communication with the outside world. The record also contains reports on the prisoner's health conditions. To take the secret record of a prisoner's health conditions or communications into the outside world is banned, and their secrecy is protected by the law on non-violation of the secrecy of communications. Even in the law at that time, this was common knowledge, and no one could take a prisoner's record outside. It was possible for it to be taken out only when the court authorized it by an official decision. Kito did it through the mediation of a superior organ of the court. The former governor of Abashiri Prison, Hodota, who had promised to tell the truth someday, admitted that he had been telephoned by a superior. He finally mustered up enough courage to tell the truth.

Judged from these facts, Kito's action was not just his own. Anti-communist plot groups exist in the Public Security Investigation Agency and secret organizations of the police. They tap JCP telephones, tempt JCP members and engage in other illegal activities to destroy the JCP. These public security organizations, anti-communist party officials, and rightists, have joined hands with others, one of whose agents was Kito. Assistant Judge Kito, who was familiar with these facts, filed a threatening written statement with the Court of Impeachment in which the question of Kito's dismissal was examined. In his statement, Kito warned that if he told the truth about the question of his taking my record outside the prison, some opposition parties would find themselves in a difficult position, and so they should not go too far in their enquiry into the question. These parties fell into line with his warning.

Since it could not be denied that he took to Yomiuri Shimbun a recorded tape of his telephone conversation with Miki, he was dismissed as judge on these grounds. What about the question of his bringing out my record? Strictly speaking, this was a violation of the State Civil Servant Act. He took a forbidden document out of the prison. If his superior instructed him, it was also a violation of the law. Furthermore, if rightist organizations and anti-communist party officials committed

themselves as parties to this plot, they should also be charged. Threatened by Kito, those who knew tried to cover up and shelve this question, and dropped it from among the reasons for his dismissal as a judge. Writer Hidetaka Tezuka lodged a complaint against these proceedings, but the prosecutors decided that it was not necessary to take legal action about it.

These are the essentials of the questions I wanted to tell you about. Finally, let me talk of the political structure and political nature of those who attack the JCP, and played up my old court case with these purposes. I believe it is these people who have obstructed the solution of difficulties facing the Japanese people.

Government and Anti-Communist Party Leaders Never Reflect on Those Dark Days

Dear friends, let us take up the mayoral election in Nagoya City. Mr. Motoyama, who was supported jointly by the Communist and Socialist Parties, was successful. The Communist and Socialist Parties in Nagoya City obtained combined votes of 300,000 in the last general election, while the Liberal Democratic, Komeito, and Democratic Socialist Parties, as well as the New Liberal Club, all of which supported the rival candidate, together polled a total of 560,000 votes in the same election. Nevertheless, the incumbent progressive city administration of Motoyama defeated the attack of this reactionary and anti-communist alliance.

When the election campaign began, Ikko Kasuga boasted that he would become a banner-bearer of this anti-communist crusade. He said, "The contest is fought between democracy and communism, between the DSP and the JCP, and, I dare say, between your humble servant Ikko Kasuga and Kenji Miyamoto." Everyone knows already that Ikko Kasuga was the loser. Of course, it was not I, but the good sense and courage of the majority of Nagoya citizens, determined to defend the progressive city administration, that won the victory.

Many parties in Japan now shout anti-LDP slogans and call themselves progressive. They also claim that they are genuine opposition parties. But they say nevertheless that they can live under the same sky with the LDP, but not with the JCP. This statement reveals their true character. In the discussions in the Diet, the Government has maintained that the Public Order Maintenance Law was valid in those days. This is evidence to show that the Japanese Government has not yet been set free from the prewar anti-communist specter, the specter of dark politics. In response to this attitude of the Government, leaders of anti-communist parties have asserted that the Public Order Maintenance Law was a "reaction" to the JCP "action"; the bad reaction was a secondary product of this bad action. These are indications that their minds are the same as in the days of the Public Order Maintenance Law.

I dare say they rejected our call for an anti-LDP caretaker cabinet because the continuation of LDP administration was preferred by them to a coalition with the JCP. They are ready to form a coalition at any time with the actually conservative New Liberal Club to take over political power. They are also prepared to join hands with "rather good Diet members" of the Liberal Democratic Party. Among them, the Democratic Socialist Party supports the Japan-US Security Treaty, and accepts campaign funds from big business. Other anti-communist opposition parties also declare that they will wage a life-and-death struggle to block the establishment of a democratic coalition government that includes the JCP.

Reviewing DSP history, you will find that its former leader Suehiro Nishio spurred the Japanese people on to cooperate in the war of aggression, saying "Shed your blood for your country". He also supported the Public Order Maintenance Law. Ikko Kasuga founded Kasuga Weapons Co. during the war, and became its president. What attitude did present leaders of other anti-communist parties take toward the war of aggression? This question deserves your careful attention.

Keeping in mind the political currents and dark politics of those days, no one can criticize the Japanese people of those days for having taken the war of aggression as a just war. In a sense they were victims of the war. Nevertheless, we are safe in saying that if a person claims to be a leader of what he calls a progressive party arguing for democracy, he must clearly free himself of the specter of the dark politics of those days, and certainly of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, the basis for the war of aggression. In present Japan, with sovereignty vested in the people, and with the democratic Constitution now the basic law, this is the very minimum prerequisite.

Unconstitutional Challenge to Separation of Three Powers

The question is this. In their real policy as well as in their statements, anti-communist parties repeat the same old anti-communist slogans. They are also trying to stir the Socialist Party into cutting relations with the JCP. As for top leaders of the Japanese Government, it is impossible for them to say, "The war of aggression was an unjust war" or "The Public Order Maintenance Law was an evil law"——an indication of the backwardness of Japanese politics. Many anachronistic ideas of anti-communism linked to this backwardness are also found in the anti-communist opposition parties. This hampers the establishment of a united front in Japan.

On top of this, they have tried to call back the specter of the old court case under the Public Order Maintenance Law. They took it up in the Diet from their deep-seated grudge against us, saying that it is regrettable and wrong that political prisoners had been released from jail. But the Diet absolutely is not a court. It is not empowered to approve or revive an old trial. To do so would clearly be an unconstitutional challenge to the separation of the three powers. They dared to make such a challenge, and pressed the executive branch to express an opinion on the old court case, to use it for their anti-communist propaganda—a mean, anachronistic plot, and a manifestation of the most serious backwardness of Japanese politics.

For the Future of Japan

Dear friends, the question of the old court case is not a matter concerning only one or a few communist party members at that time. The way for the future of Japanese people can be opened up only when true progressive forces, set free of the thinking of the old dark forces, the Public Order Maintenance Law and the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, are united with one common objective, and maintain their struggle in a united front, defeating any form of "centrist" political deceptions.

The postwar history of Europe for 30 years has provided numerous evidences that show how anti-communist "centrism" has helped the conservative forces to bolster their rule. In France and Italy, a large proportion of the population want the communist party, or a coalition between the Communist and Socialist Parties. The Japanese situation is still very far behind these two countries, but the results of the election showed that the combined votes for the JCP and the SPJ were eight million more than for the DSP and the Komeito. And the total seats of

the former are 143 against 85 seats of the latter. Now I can say safely that the majority of Japanese people of progressive opinions place their expectations on the JCP-SPJ bloc.

Our old case should be seen from these points of view. Anti-communist forces will continue to use this case for shameless attacks on the Japanese Communist Party. In order not to allow this historically broken anti-communist plot to be revived, we must win a victory in the forthcoming House of Councilors election, creating a historical demonstration to show that an advance of the JCP will facilitate the formation of a united front.

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FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Representative Questioning in Plenary Session of House of Councilors, January 26, 1978

On behalf of the Japanese Communist Party, I want to ask several questions of the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers concerned.

In December 1977 in the bilateral talks of party heads, I frankly presented the JCP view on what Japan should do to overcome the present serious difficulties in the economy. We proposed that the budget for fiscal 1978 should be the first step in correcting the structural distortions that are apparent in the Japanese economy, ending the constant and abnormal rise in budget spending, with two results to be achieved: first, defending the people's living and increasing their purchasing power, and secondly, giving priority in public investments to spending related to the people's living.

The Government's Speeches Offer No Fundamental Way To Overcome the Difficulties

I listened carefully to the speeches made by the Prime Minister and other Ministers concerned. Unfortunately, they failed completely to offer any basic plan to overcome the present difficulties.

In your administrative policy speech, Mr. Prime Minister, you stressed first the need for international cooperation, and to learn the lessons of history, expressing your determination not to repeat the errors of the 1930s. Of course narrow-minded nationalism would surely bring us back to the chauvinist course Japan followed in the past, using the slogan, "the whole world under one roof". It is true that we should appropriately defend the independence and sovereignty of our country, but our experience in Japan's war of aggression in China clearly tells us that the most important lesson from our experience of the 1930s is to be learned from the harm we did to the independence and sovereignty of other nations in launching the outrageous war of aggression. And Japan entered into the anti-Comintern Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, an international militarist alliance based on anti-communist ideology, opening the way to world war. Violating the sovereignty and independence of nations one after another, Japan brought on them the greatest disaster in history, through which more than ten million Asians died, as well as causing three million Japanese victims.

A recent lesson to be learned is from the US war of aggression in Vietnam. The Vietnamese people themselves are the only ones with the right to choose their own political and social system; it is their inalienable right as a nation. Violating this right, the United States sent some 500,000 of its troops into Vietnam, interfering with arms in the life of the Vietnamese people, but the result was the miserable defeat of the aggressor. The unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam has now become a member of the United Nations Organization. The main characteristic of world politics of this half-century is that nations under the domination of colonialism and semi-colonialism have one after another won their political independence, and now comprise the majority of United Nations member states.

Solidarity Respecting National Self-Determination

If true international cooperation and solidarity is to be established between nations, it is necessary that the self-determination of all other nations be respected, and relations established on the basis of the five principles of peace, with equality and mutual benefit in trade relations. Mr. Prime Minister, I have some subjects I want to take up with you about this.

First, the most important lesson we must learn from our experiences of the 1930s is to reflect on Japanese politics of those days, when Japan descended into aggressive militarism and rushed to establish the anti-communist military alliance with Germany and Italy, rejecting the peaceful co-existence of nations.

Secondly, the judgment of history has already been passed on the baneful act of the Japanese Government in lending the land of Japan to the United States for a long time as the base for its aggression against Vietnam. Do you regard this as a case of "international cooperation" such as you call for? What is the relation of this to what you call your "conviction on peace"?

Thirdly, the Carter Administration of the United States has repeatedly said that the Communist Parties of France and Italy should not be admitted into the Governments of their respective countries. I think this is evidently an interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and represents the narrow-minded nationalism of the United States, aiming to force its own order on other countries. What is your opinion about this?

Fourth, there are quite a number of goods prohibited from being exported to socialist countries under the COCOM agreement. Isn't this evidence of narrow-minded nationalism?

Fifth, opposition to "protectionism and narrow-minded nationalism" must not repress efforts for the autonomous development of the economy. In other words, the forced import of US farm products must never be allowed to weaken Japanese agriculture and perpetuate the difficulties of Japan's own farmers. Mr. Prime Minister, do you regard the demands raised by the Japanese farmers on Japan-US trade negotiations as appropriate, or do you view this as "narrow-minded nationalism"?

I seek the Prime Minister's views on these five points.

No Unemployment under Socialism

Mr. Prime Minister, you have talked about the world economy. I think that what you mean by the world economy is basically the economies of developed capitalist countries. You have not taken into account the existence of more than ten socialist countries where the number of the population is more than 1.2 billion, a third of all the world's people. The developed capitalist economies have been suffering from recession, inflation, increased unemployment, and stagnating production since the oil crisis.

But in spite of the historical disadvantages of their economies having started basically from underdevelopment, the socialist countries have generally enjoyed stability of prices and industrial growth, ranging from 5 to more than 10 percent even during the oil crisis. There is virtually no unemployment in these countries. Rest assured, Mr. Prime Minister, I am not advocating that you should adopt socialism. What I want to say is that the crisis in the world economy as you understand it is but a common disease of monopoly capitalist countries, not a disease of the economies of the whole world, including socialist countries. Do you recognize this?

Redress Economic Structural Weaknesses

The second question I want to take up is the nature of the present economic crisis.

The economic crisis in Japan is not simply such as has been caused by mistaken governmental measures or by insufficient self-criticism. It is rooted in the very economic structure of Japan.

Fundamental to Japanese society and the economic structure is that it is big business oriented and at the same time playing a subservient role to the United States.

Some 1,700 companies, each capitalized at more than 1 billion yen, representing only 0.1 percent of all Japanese corporations, hold 56 percent of total Japanese capital and take 43 percent of total current profits. The influence of these big companies on Japanese politics and the economy is enormous. And by their political donations to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party over many years, these companies have gained many advantages under the present regime. Due to privileged tax exemptions or tax reductions, companies capitalized at more than 10 billion yen have long enjoyed the unfair advantage of an actual tax rate that comes to only 28 percent, whereas small and medium companies capitalized at from 50-100 million yen pay 35 percent.

Under the Japan-US security system, maintained since Japan was under occupation by the US forces, Japanese dependence on US farm products and energy has increased greatly, severely obstructing the autonomous development of the Japanese economy. The ratio of grain supplied by our own agriculture has fallen drastically from 83 to 37 percent in about a dozen years. The supply of energy has also fallen rapidly, with the result that the number of coal miners has fallen to one tenth in these twenty years. Every time Japan undergoes such an event as the "oil shock" or the "shock of rising yen", the increased burden has always been shifted onto the shoulders of the workers, farmers, fishermen, small and medium enterprisers, aged people, women and the handicapped.

In attempting to defend and maintain the present structure of the Japanese economy, the successive conservative Governments have used this and that step in economic policy to cover up the inevitable contradictions between this structure and the living and security of the people.

Mr. Prime Minister, if you are sincere in your effort to create a "healthier and fairer society", you should first of all correct the structure of the Japanese economy. This is an essential precondition for making the economic policy serve the people's interests. Are you ready to do this? And of the Finance Minister I ask, do you have any concrete plan for the Exceptions to Tax Laws to be "revised and rationalized", as you have said?

Workers Sacrificed to Assist Japan's International Competitive Power

I want to ask some questions about the rising yen and protection of the people's living.

The external cause for the rising rate of the yen is enormous deficit of the United States in international current accounts, which in turn is partly caused by the enormous oil imports made to build up US strategic reserves. At home, the cause is the extraordinarily strong international competitive power of the 50 biggest Japanese enterprises, whose share is about 50 percent of all Japanese exports, and this has generated a wide gap in Japan-US trade in favor of Japan.

A major reason for their strong international competitive power is the low wages paid to Japanese workers. The average per hour wage of Japanese workers in manufacturing industry is about half that of American workers, and two thirds that of German workers. Women make up a large percentage of the work-force in major enterprises, especially with the home electric appliance makers, but the average wage of women workers is only 60 percent of that of men, a level that disregards the principle of equal pay for equal work. Working hours are longer and labor is more intensive than in Europe or the United States. In addition, the Government has provided heavy subsidies for major enterprises by way of provisions of the national budget, taxes and financing, enabling such enterprises to continue their high level of investments and profits.

From these points, it is clear that one of the quickest ways to eliminate the excessive trade surplus is to pay attention first to improving the wage and working conditions of workers, as well as improving the conditions for subcontract enterprises and their employees; which would end the practice of having other sectors pay for the criticism of other countries about Japan's flood of exports of steel, cars and home electric appliances and the products of other major Japanese enterprises. This would help to raise Japanese workers' wages in all industries, the protection and development of small and medium enterprises, and an increase in the people's purchasing power. Mr. Prime Minister, I ask you for your account on these background factors that are causing the extraordinary massive trade surplus.

My next question deals with measures to increase the people's purchasing power.

Public Investments and The People's Purchasing Power

From 1955 to 1976, individual spending in the gross national consumption declined by 11 percentage points in real terms, from 64 to 53 percent. One structural reason for the present recession is that the people's purchasing power has declined,

while production centering on major enterprises has substantially increased. To make a choice between the two, public investment and the people's purchasing power, would not be our way of doing things. The Government opposes a reduction in income tax, and has paid little attention to the importance of the people's purchasing power. In the spring labor offensive every year, the Government and the employers have striven to hold down the workers' demand for a wage hike.

Mr. Prime Minister, there is no need to argue that the fundamental objective of politics and economics is to ensure the stability of the people's livelihood. Workers make up 65 percent of the Japanese population. Defined broadly, working people form the overwhelming majority of the population. It would be wrong to deal with the question of fattening the people's purses just as a result of raising the economic growth rate. In the context of current economic conditions, you should not forget another effect of increasing the people's purchasing power, viz., how this would stimulate the economy.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have consistently disregarded this in your economic viewpoint. My advice is that you should change your position. Do you agree with me?

On the question of public investments, in your administrative policy speech, the Prime Minister acknowledged that improvement in the livelihood environment has been delayed compared with the industrial environment. In the party head talks the other day, I stressed the need for livelihood-related public investments. I cited figures to show that such public investments would be no less effective than big-scale projects, in both stimulating the economy and increasing employment. Closely examining national railways documents presented by the Government to the Diet, we find that as far as civil engineering and construction works are concerned, major enterprises receive more than 90 percent of Shinkansen-related orders. Another survey conducted by the JCP found that the same can be said of both the Honshu-Shikoku bridge project, and the industrial port project in eastern Tomakomai, Hokkaido. In contrast to these projects, livelihood-related public investments would benefit all regions, and enterprises, including small and medium, throughout the country would have a fair chance of receiving orders.

Placing the Emphasis on Livelihood-Related Investments

Public investments for next fiscal year will see a little more weight on livelihood-related investments, but fundamentally, it will still be inadequate. For example, appropriations for construction of highschools or expansion of their facilities will be increased, but the absolute increase will be only minor.

Japan notoriously lags behind other developed countries in the provision of sewerage, the rate being only 23 percent against 94 percent in Britain and 79 percent in West Germany. The Government should also respond specifically to the need of youth for sports facilities, especially as the need to promote sports among the people is being ostensibly stressed by the Government. The Government plans to purchase P3Cs and F15s from the United States at a total cost of 1.5 trillion yen. If this money were used for the construction of nursery schools, it would be enough to build 18,000 of them, wholly overcoming the shortage.

In short, now that the Prime Minister himself has made a public promise to improve the livelihood environment, the Government should revise the 1975-1979 five year plan fundamentally from this standpoint, and drastically increase the weight of livelihood-related public investments. Mr. Prime Minister, I ask you to give your account of this.

Even under the limitations of capitalism, the JCP thinks a way should be sought to make full use of Japanese economic power to benefit the living of the people. Our published "Propositions on the Japanese Economy", a 600-page five-year economic reconstruction plan, is the result of the efforts we have made on this subject.

The aim of the plan is to introduce a systematic and orderly economic administration, by imposing adequate democratic restrictions on monopoly enterprises, so as not to allow them to behave selfishly on their policy of profits first. We show that in five years price increases would be down to 2 or 3 percent; that social insurance, including pensions, would be substantially improved and that the building of public housing, nursery and other schools would be greatly increased. We present figures that fully demonstrate it is feasible to reconstruct the Japanese economy, expanding the domestic market under stable economic growth at an annual rate of 5 or 6 percent. To have economic growth as the instrument to improve the people's living is quite different from mere acceleration of the growth rate, so in harmonizing defense of the people's living with growth of the national economy, a comprehensive mid-term plan is called for that gives priority to the people's interests.

Mr. Prime Minister, may I ask you not merely to say "At last light is seen at the end of the long tunnel of recession", but to listen carefully to initiatives and "propositions" from various strata of the people, including from opposition parties, to ensure that economic reconstruction can be promoted in such a way as to defend the people's living, giving priority to their interests. I ask for your account on this.

Sound Basis for Japan-China Relations

My last question relates to foreign policy.

As you know, since prewar days the Japanese Communist Party has consistently pointed out the errors committed by the Japanese Government by aggression against China and by a policy of hostility toward China. Of course we favor the signing of a Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty on a sound basis.

The Prime Minister has said that relations between the two countries have developed in a "steady and favorable way" since the restoration of relations. Is this really true? For instance, when the Chinese side invited a delegation of the Kyoto City Assembly to China, it required the exclusion of JCP assembly members. And when Diet members from all parties joined a flight in commemoration of the establishment of the Tokyo-Beijing air service, the Chinese side refused to issue an entry visa for a JCP Diet member on the list prepared by the Steering Committee of the House of Representatives. This could be considered permissible if the Chinese side had invited only those persons "it considers to be favorable", but the attitude taken on this toward delegations from the Diet and a local assembly is absolutely incompatible with the five principles for peace laid down in the joint statement signed on the restoration of relations of the two countries, viz., "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of respective territories, non-interference in the internal affairs of each country, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence".

This is the reason for my objection to the speeches made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, which ignore these realities and regard the five-year development of Japan-China relations only as "steady and favorable".

On the "hegemony" clause in the joint statement, to oppose any intervention by hegemonism and great-power chauvinism is, needless to say, a correct principle of international politics.

But it is not right to formulate this principle in such a way as to bind us to following a specific foreign policy line. I ask both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to answer this question frankly.

It Is Not Right to Give Up The Chishima Islands

The next question is on relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. Of course, we sincerely hope for friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, our major neighbor in Asia, to develop further. Our sincere desire to establish a firm foundation on which to build permanent ties of friendship between the two countries was demonstrated during my visits to the Soviet Union in 1959 and 1971; with the Soviet side I raised the question of restoring this territory to Japan.

The JCP had opposed the Japanese militarist war of aggression, and therefore we consider it to be appropriate for Japan in the postwar disposition with the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration to have relinquished Sakhalin, Taiwan and other territories that Japan had unlawfully taken. But it is also clear that the war aims of the Allied Powers was not to deprive Japan of its proper territory, including the Chishima Islands, which became Japanese territory by a peaceful exchange of lands between the two countries. In consideration of the nature of World War II, our conclusion is that it was wrong of the Japanese Government to relinquish the Chishima Islands under the San Francisco Treaty, and now occupied by the Soviet Union. In Hokkaido, where the movement for restoration of the Japanese territory is developing, the view has been advanced that a proper position on treaty provisions should be put forward in order to form a consensus of the people on the territorial question.

With a view to forming a national consensus, I want to ask the Government what position it now takes on the relinquishing of the Chishima Islands under the San Francisco Treaty. If you think their relinquishing is valid, please let us have historical and legal reasons. Or do you think that the case was beyond reason, and that we had no alternative but to accept it due to Japan's surrender and the US occupation?

Because the Soviet Union now claims that there is no outstanding territorial issue between the two countries, this pending question has acquired considerable meaning. In these circumstances, the minimum that the present Government should do is to refrain from taking such steps as will make it more difficult for some future Government to reach a complete settlement on the Chishima question, based on the people's consensus. Mr. Prime Minister, will you please give us your views on this issue?

(*Akahata*, January 27, 1978)

HUMAN IMAGE OF COMMUNISTS AND THE FUTURE OF JAPAN AND THE WORLD

Lecture at New Year Meeting
of JCP Supporters' Association of
Kanagawa Prefecture, January 18, 1981

IMAGE OF COMMUNISTS AS I KNEW THEM

I am very grateful to all of you for coming to this New Year Meeting of the Japanese Communist Party on such a cold day. I want also to join with all here to express our warm respect and appreciation to the executives of the JCP Supporters Associations, here on the stage, as well as the leaders of the JCP Prefectural Committee, local assemblymen, and candidates-designate, for their day-to-day efforts.

Three Requested Topics

For this New Year lecture, I have been asked by our friends from Kanagawa to take up the following topics:

The first is on the human touch of JCP cadres such as I have experienced or directly known in the struggles since I joined the party. They want to be sure of this because people in Japan still look on the party as something dangerous. In addition, young people have asked me to explain how I was able to hold firm convictions in the prewar dark days, and how I managed my studies.

The second request is to show how Japan can be changed by a progressive united front, which the JCP points out is both necessary and possible, in the face of the present difficult situation.

The third is to speak on the future prospect of socialism and explain how such incidents as the Afghanistan-Soviet Union issue and the "Cultural Revolution" in China— all to the detriment of socialism— could take place.

There may be other questions of course that concern you, but today I will concentrate on these three major topics as requested so as not to repeat the references I have made in New Year interviews with Akahata and the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK).

Demands at Party Summit Talks

You have already listened to Mr. Maeda telling of a physically handicapped person who published a collection of poems. Speaking personally, I also have a seriously handicapped child, and am deeply concerned about the question of the handicapped. At the year-end, I held a talk with Prime Minister Suzuki on the national budget.

The first request I made to the Prime Minister was to refrain from diverting the funds to cover the costs of welfare and education to military spending to suit the purposes of the United States. In addition, I reminded him that 1981 is designated the International Year for the Handicapped, and that the Prime Minister himself had announced that he would be responsible for implementing a program for these people. He nodded when I told him that the Government of Japan had prepared no specific program, though the United Nations recommended formulation of a ten-year program.

The second demand was related to the question of the disparity of votes per Diet representation. As you know, a voluntary group of eligible voters in this prefecture filed a suit over the excessive disparity between electorates in Japan's electoral system, charging that a vote cast in Kanagawa weighs merely one-fifth of what a vote weighs in some other places. The verdict given in the suit stated that a disparity as much as twice and over is unconstitutional. I argued that the electoral system has to be amended in this respect. What is actually being attempted by the Government, however, is to ban the use of Akahata loudspeaker cars and hand-held microphones, restrict posters on hoardings and prohibit stickers of supporters' associations; this is aimed at curbing publicity activities of the JCP during election campaigns. Having held secret talks with the other opposition parties, excluding the JCP, the LDP is attempting to put a bill before the Diet as soon as it resumes the session. Such measures curbing freedom of elections should be ended; and instead such unfair disparities as recognized by the court should be rectified between the constituencies for the House of Representatives and local constituencies for the House of Councilors. If such rectification is made for local constituencies for the House of Councilors, Kanagawa Prefecture will have a quota of eight, of which four will be elected in each election. As to the House of Representatives election, I stressed that the quota for each constituency in Kanagawa Prefecture should be increased.

Even the LDP General Secretary Sakurauchi said that they were taking up the question because they thought it no longer possible to ignore the court ruling. But he did not undertake to end the placing of restrictions on JCP activities. Now that voters in Kanagawa won that case, let us all continue our efforts to rectify the unfairness in the electoral system and left various unjust restrictions on campaigns.

The third demand was on a question about relief measures for atomic bomb victims (*Hibakusha*). A group of these victims, including some from Kanagawa, visited the JCP headquarters with a petition. The Government is in no way prepared to take up seriously the demands of the victims calling for medical treatment and insuring the living of bereaved families at state cost. "The Consultative Committee on Basic Measures to Deal with Atomic-Bomb Victims" appointed by the Government has taken no positive steps to deal with this question. The underlying reason is that the successive LDP Governments have maintained a position not to admit that Japan's launching of World War II was wrong, or the responsibility for the misery the unjust war brought on the Japanese people.

Neither former Prime Ministers Miki or Tanaka, his predecessor, nor the incumbent Prime Minister Suzuki, have ever said a word about the Government of Japan bringing misery to the people by waging that unjust war. It naturally follows that the Government is in no position to take specific responsibility for giving relief to the atomic-bomb victims who suffered such terrible misery. Let me remind you of some facts about Kanagawa; many factories of big business are concentrated in this prefecture, and half of all the workers in it work for such big businesses. Besides, in the prefecture there are 24 US military bases located, the biggest number of all prefectures in mainland Japan. About one-third of the fleet of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces is stationed off Kanagawa. For the relief of victims of the past war, too, we will make sincere and continued efforts with you, people of Kanagawa, now faced with the renewed danger of war.

Memories of Shoichi Ichikawa

Let me turn to your first requested topic. It will be 50 full years by this May since I joined the party. During these years I have met many admirable comrades, but here I will restrict

my memories to two of them.

First, Shoichi Ichikawa. He was born in Hikari Village, Kumage County, Yamaguchi Prefecture. The village, where I am also from, later became a municipality called Hikari City, in which you will see a fine monument erected to his memory. He was arrested at the age of 37, still unmarried, and was kept in prison for 17 years till March 15, 1945, five months before the end of the war. He did not recant, needless to say. In prison he wrote to his parents. Letters were written in prison, on a lettercard in a fixed booth, under a jailer's watchful eyes, with a time limit of about 10 minutes, after which he came up to inform that time was over, knocking the floor with his stick. It is impossible to convey what one really thought but could refer only to very practical matters.

It so happened that his parents planned to come up to Tokyo from Yamaguchi Prefecture to see him in prison. When he learned of this, he asked for a travel guidebook entitled "Itinerary and Budget Estimate", and other books on travel which were kept in the prison. With a view to making their journey, the purpose of which was to see their son in prison, as pleasant as possible, he made up a careful and well-thought-out itinerary so that they could enjoy a lot of sightseeing on their way. Would it be better for them to take a sea route via the Inland Sea and take a cruise on Lake Biwa? Or would it be a more elegant journey if they went along the ancient Highway of Nakasendo through Gifu and Nagano Prefectures? Or should they go south into the Kinki district to see Wakanoura Beach, Koyasan and Yoshino? When he knew that the book he had ordered was not available, he asked some of his relatives in Tokyo to look for it.

Shoichi Ichikawa was a member of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, and an Executive Committee member of the Comintern, an organization rallying communist parties of the world at that time. He was an extremely outstanding personality. In a letter to his parents in the country he said, "Please rest assured that I am in high spirits. I am not just pretending. How can I be otherwise, with no pessimism in my heart and always with strong conviction as to the rightness of the course I chose? I may not be able to write to you often, but you need not worry about me at all." In his last days in Sendai Prison, he became so enfeebled due to malnutrition that he weighed only about 34 kg. With the coming liberation only several months ahead, he died of malnutrition in the prison.

He sacrificed his life to his chosen cause. In this respect, he could not please his parents, but personally he was very considerate of them to help them have a pleasant journey. Before he was arrested, he had been instructed to attend the Congress of the Comintern in Moscow, and prior to departure, he went to see his father. Although his father had formerly been a policeman, he believed his son was not guilty of any criminal act, but was striving for the betterment of society. The father gave up hope of seeing him again, cherishing the memory of that meeting as the last sight of his son, and just wished him well. Being a wonderful comrade, the life of Shoichi Ichikawa proved that a communist party member would at all costs struggle for the cause he believed in, disregarding all the sacrifices. This does not mean that he did not care about his parents or others. He carried on his indomitable struggle to the last, only because he was sure that sacrificing his life for the good of all the Japanese people, including his parents, would express the greatest filial devotion. His life is proof that this indomitable militant was a person of warm heart and boundless love for his fellow human beings.

Takiji Kobayashi

The other person is Takiji Kobayashi, a communist writer well-known for his many works. While engaged in the Proletarian Cultural Movement, he once came to Kanagawa to give a lecture.

He was born into a very poor family. As he was the eldest son, one of his relatives supplied him with school expenses for him to study at Otaru Higher Commercial School, Hokkaido. His younger brother, who liked playing the violin, had to do live-in work at a haberdashery store. After their father died, Takiji brought his brother over to where he lived. From his first monthly salary of 70 yen, Takiji bought a violin to give to his brother. When the brother was working as a shopboy, Takiji visited him often with small presents of books and candies. Their poor house had but one room, in which Takiji, the widowed mother and his younger brothers lived together. In this one room, Takiji read books and prepared manuscripts while his younger brother played the violin. Usually one would complain about the sound disturbing his writing, but Takiji never complained, allowing his brother to do what he pleased, while he personally continued his studies under such inconvenient conditions. You will be interested to know that his younger brother, Sango, later became a professional violinist and played first violin in the Tokyo Philharmonic Orchestra.

Takiji later entered into underground activities. In those days the Japanese Communist Party was unable to conduct open and public activities. It was the Public Order Maintenance Law that was used as a tool of unjust suppression of thought, throwing into prison those who were opposed to the war or who advocated socialism, which was considered to be contravention of national polity. As Takiji openly identified himself as a JCP member, he had to go underground to escape the persecution of the police. His mother and younger brothers were left at home without any source of income, because until then Takiji had been earning their living by his pen. During his underground days, he wrote novels and sent them to editors of such established magazines as "Chuo Koron" and "Kaizo", everytime with a request to send the publishing fees to his family at home. One of Kobayashi's letters addressed to his family said that they need not worry about him because he was fine, and added that a magazine publisher would send them money for copy, with which they could pay the rent, repay debts and defray other expenses. An article he contributed to "Chuo Koron" at that time is well known today as "Living the Life of a Communist", a novel describing underground activities. The novel he contributed to "Kaizo" with a similar request to the editor was "People of the District".

Being a JCP member, he was persecuted by the police, but he continued his struggles to the last, overcoming all difficulties. At the same time, he showed thoughtful consideration for his family, asking editors-in-chief to send them money for novels he wrote with all his powers. His mother, a woman of very firm character but unlettered, took great trouble to learn how to write the Japanese alphabet (*kana*) and occasionally asked someone to pass her letter to Takiji. When Takiji was killed by barbarous torture, she cried over the corpse of her son which had been sent home, crying, "Stand up again my son!" The son was a man of admirable character filled with filial affection, matching his mother's love. As Ichikawa and Kobayashi were too young to have families of their own, I cannot tell how they would have behaved to wife or children. But I can assure you that the JCP members whom I have met were such people, expressing the greatest love for their family and kin, and had taken good care of them even under difficult circumstances.

Here I must tell you definitely that the Japanese Communist

Party was the only political party that even during wartime opposed the war and the Public Order Maintenance Law. It was also the only party that advocated equal rights for both sexes, an eight-hour working day, and sovereignty vested in the people. For a political party with such qualifications, the struggles were carried on in the indomitable spirit with the aim of defending justice and the people's living against the enemy. At the same time, such struggles had behind them the flame of love for one's kin and for the people of Japan. For this very reason they lived courageous lives of struggle, overcoming many difficulties so that they could extend their love to greater numbers of the Japanese people.

I am not going to speak about party activists of today. The party being characterized by this tradition, in many cases they will be very busily occupied and may not be blessed with material comfort. Nevertheless, you will find many cases of family life of activists in which husband and wife help each other with affection in childcare and housework, in parallel with their social activities.

Appeal from Female Activists

Some time ago at the party school for women, some women activists spoke to me about their husbands. As full-time party officials they are too busy to take even one day's leave. Their neighbors guess that they may be families without fathers. I replied that the Japanese Communist Party makes it a rule that by all means one day a week off should be taken, as Akahata has stated. I told them that if persons or organs in charge at prefectural level fail to follow this rule, they will be forced to take a day off, even as "punishment", and they were very pleased to hear it. Later a Prefectural Committee Chairperson reported that increasing numbers of full-time officials in many parts have been taking a day's leave once a week, according to the JCP Chairman's positive advice, and I hear that this move was favorably received in their homes. I ask for your continued support with generosity toward some shortcomings that may still exist, on which your advice would be welcome. Party members will continue to combine the love of society with love for their families and neighbors.

HOW CAN A UNITED FRONT FOR JAPAN'S PROGRESS BE FORMED?

Progressive Change in Politics And Unity in Action

Let me turn to the question of how to form a united front for a better Japan. This is really a big question. But I go so far as to say confidently that the united progressive forces in the future will be able to change Japanese politics; that this situation will arise without fail. There are many reasons for this. In short, LDP politics will necessarily clash with the interests of the people resulting in a decline in popularity. Politics of today is definitely directed to helping big business, however if uses pretty words to camouflage it. Moreover, it has no freedom to use the people's taxes to enhance the people's well-being, because the Japan-US military alliance demands that Japan's military spending be oriented to meet the demands of the United States. Last year, big business made huge profits, while real wages for workers declined. A decline in real wages means a drop in one's actual income due to increased prices, even if in nominal terms wages are increased. Why then could that party succeed in the simultaneous election for both Houses of the Diet?

One reason is that, faced with the sudden death of Prime Minister Ohira, the LDP appealed successfully to the Japanese people's feelings. Another reason is that some self-claimed opposition parties drew closer and closer to the LDP line, giving approval to the Security Treaty and the Self-Defense Forces. Such moves gave the impression to the people that it was better to vote straight out for the LDP. Seen long-range, however, the ratio of votes for the LDP has declined approximately 10 percent over the past 20 years. The misgovernment of the LDP is bound to reduce that ratio further. In the election last year, the ratio recovered by some 3 percent, but taken as a whole, the ratio was still down 10 percent, showing a distinct historical trend.

The other problem concerns the inequity of the election system, shown in the excessive disparity in the number of the elected per electorate. The LDP gained a stable majority, and was said to have won an "overwhelming victory", but was aided by this electoral system. If proportional representation had been introduced in the election in which the LDP won 284 seats, LDP seats would have been down to 245, while the JCP, with election results giving 29 seats, would have won 52 seats. In the ratio of votes polled, the LDP accounts for less than a half. It is not right to get the impression from the term "stable majority" that LDP politics gets a strong support from the people. So the question arises in such a political situation, how should the people proceed to victory. The answer is to be found in what we call unity of action and a united front.

Unity of action refers to concerted efforts of the people based on such agreed demands as withdrawal of the proposal for a general excise tax, reduction in military spending, ample provision for welfare and education, and improvement to the old-age welfare pension system.

A united front refers to join hands not only on such individual aims but on the general aim of progressive change in both local and national politics. It assumes that the progressive forces, united on such a position, are called for to cooperate in elections to form a progressive government both at central and local levels.

Working people form the overwhelming majority. It is the working people, including medium- and small-sized businessmen, who make up over 99 percent of the whole population. Only big businesses are enjoying huge profits; but considering their numbers, they represent only a very limited portion——0.1 percent——of all business. So if the people begin to think properly over the question of their living in relation to politics, such moves cannot fail to spread until they win a majority.

Why Will the Inversion of Progressives And Conservatives Come About?

The question comes then, how the inversion of ruling and opposition will come about. The progressive government of Tokyo Metropolis was overthrown. In the Yokohama mayoral election, opposition parties other than the JCP actually tuned in to the conservatives. The progressive municipal government in Nagoya was going to be taken over by the SPJ, Komeito and the DSP. Why do such inversions occur? The overwhelming majority of the Japanese people are working people, working citizens, farmers and medium- and small-sized businessmen. Among the various political forces of Japan, the LDP speaks of itself, while those called opposition parties have for long styled themselves progressives. The DSP once called itself progressive, as did also Komeito. The New Liberal Club gave itself the ambiguous title of progressive-conservative. In the trade union movement, the affiliates of the Japanese Confederation of Labor (Domei) suppressed JCP members and others who were politically conscious, cooperating with the employers and sometimes even outdoing them. Why do they act in this way?

We have seen countless similar examples in the progressive movement in other parts of the world. One thing can be said, that the conservative forces and big business do not take simple steps. They foster within working people's movements those forces or agents that support big business and their society. They are agents of big business, agents of the so-called bourgeoisie. Lenin, one of the founders of the theory of socialism, affirmed this in his work "Imperialism", in which he deeply analyzed the modern economic system.

In postwar Japan, the militarist domination based on the absolutist Tenno system of prewar was overthrown; the people began to speak about democracy and the progressive movement began to gather force. In this situation, the forces of big business began to train and take good care of such trade union cadres as will serve as their de facto agents. The Japanese Confederation of Labor and the DSP nevertheless still called themselves "progressive". When the misgovernment of the LDP becomes clearer before the people's eyes, endangering their politics, they can no longer afford to let these agents pretend to be progressive, but demand that they plainly approve the Security Treaty and the SDF, focusing their attacks only on the JCP, thus splitting the front. This is the way the DSP assumed the position of a right-wing faction of the LDP, and Komeito is called a de facto second DSP. To regret even the SPJ has gone so far as to adopt the SPJ-Komeito collaboration line, excluding the JCP. This happened because pro-DSP and pro-Komeito forces within the SPJ have become influential enough to represent 50 percent, which now take the position that they should not strongly oppose the

Security Treaty or the SDF, complying thus with LDP policy. This betrayal by some forces which had previously styled themselves progressives will, without fail, reveal its true nature. It is important to note that this course will not stop at this point, but will continue to follow this line.

Character of LDP Agents Will Be Exposed

Seen in this light, we can say that the people are sure to recognize the deception. Up until now, people have regarded the DSP and the Komeito as progressive, and may well have thought that the majority of the SPJ are reliable. But the people begin to see that things are different. It cannot be denied that some SPJ members are reliable. I would never say that all SPJ members are wrong, or that the SPJ offers no hope of the future, but we have seen such incredible things happen as the SPJ overthrowing the Ninagawa Administration in Kyoto Prefecture and subverting the progressive municipal government of Yokohama in collusion with the LDP, because the way of thinking of many members of the SPJ is very close to the DSP, with rightward degeneration as the consequence.

In the course of these events, the people will gradually come to realize what is the way to defend their living, and which party is truly progressive.

Nowadays, if an opinion poll asks whether the progressive or the conservative feature prevails in the DSP, many people answer that its dominant feature is conservative. Up till several years ago, when I said that not all opposition parties are progressive, even newsmen found it hard to believe, saying that all opposition parties are progressive, but the truth of this has been understood by them step by step.

In view of this, in what way can we go about forming unity? With the broad range of forces and people with whom we can

cooperate in defense of the people's living, even if their political views and philosophies are different from ours, we must work together. But we must resist the forces which aim to split the movement and divide progressives, keeping in step with the LDP, and whose fair words are betrayed by their deeds in subverting a progressive administration. We united with all for those who come to unite with us, but we fight those who attempt to split the front. This position is justifiable, and if we maintain it, greater numbers of people will become aware of its rightness, which in turn will widen our way.

Growth of Forces Aspiring To Progressive Unity

What are the moves we see these days? In the trade union movement, for example, aimed at formation of a united front, the Conference of Trade Unions for Promotion of a United Front (CTU-UF) has been established. Kanagawa has a Prefectural Liaison Council of Trade Unions, with which 100,000 working people are affiliated. The CTU-UF has been steadily increasing its influence all over the country. It has grown to become an organization with a membership of over 1.2 million, almost matching in numerical strength of the Federation of Independent Unions of Japan (Churitsu Roren).

In the situation of the SPJ acting against the united front, about two million people, nationwide, have agreed to establish progressive unity. Such organizations have been formed throughout the country. Kanagawa Prefecture has one such organization called the Prefectural Forum for Progressive Unity.

Now it is going beyond that. You may have gained the impression that local governments of progressive unity are being defeated one after another. The truth is that in more than 200 local governments the JCP still holds the status of ruling party, with 34 million people living under such administrations. The SPJ, even though following the line of the SPJ-Komeito Agreement, supports the progressive administrations in cooperation with the JCP in more than 90 local assemblies.

The fact is that one-third of the Japanese people today still have progressive administrations. In Hoya City of Tokyo, the JCP and the SPJ work jointly with a candidate of the progressive forces in opposition to the candidate recommended by the Suzuki Metropolitan Administration.

A movement in this direction will without doubt grow rapidly. Some 6,000 people from Kanagawa took part in the October 21 rally recently held in Tokyo. Among industrial unions belonging to the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), the call for united action has become stronger, enough to press the leadership to organize a big rally which would include the JCP, Sohyo, the SPJ and other democratic organizations.

The rally that followed on November 16 was organized by the CTU-UF, upholding the demand for "reduction in military spending and improvement of welfare and education"; 4,000 people from Kanagawa took part in the rally. It was a great success, with 80,000 people participating. The CTU-UF maintains correctly that a trade union should be independent of both capital and political parties, and should defend the interests of the working people, not blindly following either capital or political parties.

Rapid Movement of History At Points of Change

Concerning future prospects, it will certainly take time for the majority of the more than 100 million people of Japan to change their thinking on this. But in looking back, I recall it is now fifty years since I joined the party, when those who opposed the war were imprisoned. In those days, those who advocated people's sovereignty was arrested as a traitor for treason against the Tenno system. Now people's sovereignty is taken as a matter of course. Movements of history may seem slow and faltering, but at points of change history moves fast.

Contradictions in society— such as the Tennoist rule, deprivation of people's sovereignty, domination by the small numbers of big businesses, oppression of the Japanese nation by the United States— will necessarily be rectified by the people because of gross errors and contradictions.

The key to the acceleration of this change lies in the speed at which the JCP can become a major force, standing for the genuine progressive position and advocating and implementing the policy of progressive unity. When the JCP becomes more powerful in Kanagawa and all across the nation, and when it makes striking progress in national elections, the SPJ will be obliged to give its attention again to the progressive united front at national and local levels, instead of following the SPJ-Komeito line of dividing the progressive forces.

My earnest appeal to you is for cooperation in the expansion of party strength, which has such significance.

Now let me answer a question asked by the Democratic Youth League, on how I carried on my studies, and what enabled me even in wartime to maintain my perspective of the future.

Studies in Prison

When I was a high-school freshman under the old system, I began to read books on the principles of socialism. When I was 22 I joined the Communist Party, convinced that society was under-going changes in that direction, and I recognized that some people must lead the way in this process. My mother tried to dissuade me from joining the movement, saying that if society was destined to change in that direction I need not be the one to make a sacrifice of myself, and let society take its natural course.

But society is a collective body of people; for society to undergo a change, it needs people to work for it. It is on this conviction that I joined the party. In my prison days, with intensification of the war there were no JCP organizations outside the prison, nor trade unions or peasant movements. Only the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai) and the Industrial Patriotic Society (Sangyo Hokokukai), supporting the Tenno system and the war, could prosper in those days. But I was convinced that Japan, committed to that unjust war, would inevitably be defeated, and that, based on the experience of failure and reconsideration, a democratic society would emerge. That was the perspective; in other words, the strategy inherently upheld by the theory of socialism and the communist party; it was this perspective that Japan will necessarily pass through those dark days and move ahead to become a democratic country that enabled me to stand firm in prison in those dark days.

After my arrest, I persisted in refusing any secret trial, or to draw up a protocol, never yielding to torture and the unjustifiable suppressions. I insisted to appear in open court on the rightness of our cause. In order to be able to prepare for my

trial, the court at last had to give me access to such authentic books on socialism as the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. These books had been banned, and people outside of prison could not read them. The reason I gave was: "As I am to insist in court on the rightness of the Japanese Communist Party, it is necessary for me to make exact references on the basis of the theory and documents of socialism which I had studied." This reasoning enabled me to read in prison many times over such books as were under a ban outside the prison. For the first time I was able to read through the voluminous "Capital" while in prison.

This is how during those twelve years in prison I was able to read a great number of works, including books on socialism. A jailer, looking into my cell, scratched his head and murmured that reading those books would never permit a prisoner to recant. Far from thinking of conversion, I did not lose my conviction, even for a moment, that Japan would surely be defeated and the nation liberated from the war, even if I in person might be killed by the bombing. Though the JCP had some weaknesses in prewar days due to immaturity, we held the strong conviction that that was the only way to open up a future for Japan. We ourselves were not afraid of being called traitors or unpatriotic, but we felt deep pity for our parents, who suffered from these words. Nevertheless, we moved ahead because we thought that true filial devotion lies in overcoming such sorrow.

When compared with the situation of the past, you can see now that things are greatly changed. In Japan today so many people can take part in this JCP meeting; hundreds of thousands of people have joined the JCP; and in elections, millions of people cast votes for the JCP. Seen thus, no pessimism can be justified. I am convinced that the future will open up at greater speed if we continue to stand firm.

SOCIALISM NOW AND IN THE FUTURE

Equal Rights for Both Sexes, Medical Care, etc.

For my last topic, I will talk about socialism. The January 1 issue of Asahi Shimbun presented a feature article on socialism, with an explanatory big-tree-shaped chart. In an interview with this newspaper, I expressed my views on the future of socialism. In this feature there were round-table talks by four women who had lived in the Soviet Union, China, Poland, etc. They are not communists. They gave their impressions on living in these countries, illustrated by facts: e.g. the people have no need to worry about old age; equal rights are guaranteed for both sexes; conditions enable women to support themselves; and if one falls ill, the state takes care of medical treatment.

A special correspondent of Akahata, Mr. Mizuno, lives in Moscow with his family. Mrs. Mizuno, a nurse, has written about her experience when her child fell ill in Moscow. Medical care is provided free of charge in any socialist country. Education is also free. House rent never exceeds 5 percent of income. As everybody is qualified for a pension, there is no worry about security in old age. In summer, paid holidays of more than three weeks are guaranteed. If a child falls ill, a system of paid leave for nursing enables parents to attend the sick child without loss of wages if the parents are working. It is utterly different from a system in which parents are obliged to leave a feverish child at home and go to work to ensure being paid. A socialist country guarantees parental care through

these considerate arrangements such as cannot be found in the capitalist world.

In capitalist society, a specific group of people, namely the capitalists, take away or exploit some part of the fruit of labor of the working people; for example, by making them work for 8 or 9 hours a day, while paying wages equivalent to only 5 hours, the fruit of the 4 hours going to the profits of the capitalist. As a result it is possible for big business in Japan to enjoy profits "unprecedented in history", while in real terms the worker's wages have decreased.

Socialism allows no such mechanism of exploitation. Of course, both sexes are guaranteed equal rights, as well as equal wages. I must add that in Japan women get paid only 60 percent of the wages paid to men, when doing the same work. In a socialist country, everybody is entitled to get an old-age pension enough to live. These are some of the wonderful characteristics of socialism.

Concerning unemployment, the total number of unemployed in 7 capitalist countries that includes Japan, the United States, France, Italy and Canada, totaled 14.76 million as of April 1980. But in contrast there are no jobless people in other socialist countries than Yugoslavia and China. Yugoslavia has 0.7 million jobless people; statistics for China are not available. Nobody needs to worry about getting jobs, points that unquestionably speak of progress.

What is going on in Poland, then? In Poland, the economic policy went bankrupt, but neighboring Hungary was successful. Our view is that Poland failed not because it adopted socialism but because the policies of the Government and the Polish United Workers' Party had many weaknesses, and were not suited to that nation, resulting in many mistakes. The working people of Poland, who naturally should have had the right to operate trade unions, rallied to Solidarity, a self-governing trade union, with its members reaching 10 million in a short time. Solidarity put forward demands on various items. Some of their demands seem rather excessive, and do not meet the situation. On the whole, however, both the Government and the PUWP admit the existence of that type of trade union movement, and a new socialist democracy is making progress in such a form. On such developments no external forces should intervene. I am sure that the time will not fail to come when the initiatives of the working people of Poland will rectify the errors of economic policies and improve them to ensure consumer goods in abundance. The nation would otherwise not be socialist.

Referring to the speed of economic development in socialist countries as a whole, Hisao Kanamori, Chief Director of Japan Economic Research Center, made an interesting comment. He is an economist on the government side, and has taken part in drafting "Economic White Papers", regularly contributing to Nihon Keizai Shimbun and the "Economist" (Weekly). According to Kanamori, the annual economic growth rate from 1970 to 1978 averaged 5.6 percent in socialist countries; the average growth rate in capitalist countries, Japan, the United States, Great Britain, FRG, France and Italy, was 3.2 percent. This reveals that the economy of socialist countries grew almost twice as fast as that of the major capitalist countries.

This naturally leads to the next question, as to why socialist countries have not become more affluent. The reason is that socialism had to start from a very low level. In 1920, just after the revolution, Russia could barely produce 163,000 tons of crude steel. Today, it ranks as the world's largest producer of crude steel, with annual production of 130 million tons, ahead of both Japan and the United States. Production has grown nearly 800 times.

When we compare the movement of prices in four socialist countries; Romania, the Soviet Union, GDR and Hungary, with four capitalist countries; the United States, Japan, FRG and Great Britain, the biggest price rise is seen in Great Britain, with the index (1970=100) rising to 250 in 1978, a rise of two and a half times in nearly a decade. On the other hand, the moderate figure of 125 for Hungary is the highest in the socialist group. The lowest index of the socialist group was 96 in GDR, showing that prices decreased by 4 percent. In the capitalist group, the lowest figure was FRG's 146; Japan recorded 204. These developments during the past decade indicate that increases in prices of the socialist countries stood at half that of their capitalist counterparts. Added to this, these socialist countries have already institutionally met most of the demands for social welfare, which are our party's continued demand of the Government of Japan.

In the GDR sporting facilities are 14 times more than those in Japan, illustrative of a country with so many gold medal winners in the Olympic Games.

Three Errors Running Counter to the Cause

What are the points of major concern in socialist countries? Three major errors have been committed over the past twenty years. Twenty years ago, communist parties of 81 nations of the world met for a conference, which I attended. Since then the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of the Soviet Union and others has taken place. The other two were the "Cultural Revolution" in China and the Afghanistan intervention. What kind of errors are they? The "Cultural Revolution" in itself was an internal question of China, but the Communist Party of China persistently attacked the JCP, arguing that the JCP should admit that only Mao Zedong thought is correct, and demanded that the JCP carry out an armed revolution, consistent with Mao Zedong ideas, justified by the armed revolution which had been carried to success in China. At that time they instigated some JCP members, blind followers of China, to set up an anti-party pro-CPC faction. The CPC, having flattered such an anti-party faction, attacked the JCP. Among the opposition parties of Japan, not a few members have visited China and praised the "Cultural Revolution" of those days. A certain opposition Diet member took part in a parade, holding aloft the Little Red Book as Chinese people were doing. At the same time the Japan-China friendship movement was split. In this way the "Cultural Revolution" was not concerned merely with the internal questions of China, but brought about external intervention and pressure.

The Afghanistan question is also evidence of the unjustifiable error of intervention. The Soviet armed forces overthrew a foreign regime not to Soviet liking. In the Czechoslovak incident, the Soviet armed forces suppressed the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia which had begun to advocate socialism that retained freedom, using the pretext that it could be exploited by counterrevolution. These three events are errors of great-power chauvinism, that improperly interferes in other countries' affairs. For the reactionary forces of the world these errors provided a golden opportunity to discredit socialism.

Toward the end of last year, a delegation of the CPSU visited Japan to have talks with JCP representatives. The JCP thoroughly criticized the errors of the Soviet Union on the question of Afghanistan.

Based on reports from special correspondents of Akahata in various parts of the world, we inquired into the facts about the Afghanistan issue. It is true that counterrevolutionary bases against Afghanistan had been set up for some time in Pakistan, Iran and some other places, the purpose being the disruption of the revolutionary process. But the situation was not in such a

state of emergency that foreign armed forces invaded Afghanistan in an attempt to take control of the country. The Soviet Union sent Karmal, who had been expelled from the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, back again and placed him at the head of the administration, and sent in their forces to kill Amin, the former head of the Administration, which had not acted to the Soviet liking. It is nothing less than improper military intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which had nothing to do with the principles of socialism. On Polish events also, we reiterated our views that invasion by foreign armed forces on the ground that some of the measures taken by Poland were not to the liking of some foreign powers, could never be justified.

This statement of the position of the JCP went all over the world. At first the Japanese press did not pay much attention to it, but the overseas responses made it clear that the JCP views have gradually gained influence.

How can such errors be remedied? This will not be a simple task. But if we take China as an example, we see that China is gradually going through the process of self-criticism over the "Cultural Revolution" at internal levels. At international level, however, China at that time committed many interventions in communist parties overseas, including the JCP, making use of the press, radio and various anti-party elements. Now China admits that such actions were incorrect and holds the "Gang of Four" responsible for the error. The truth is that not only was the "Gang of Four" responsible but also Mao Zedong himself. On the whole, the gradual emergence of such self-criticism is to be noted.

Twenty years ago, when I attended a world conference of 81 communist parties in Moscow, the JCP was one of the parties that made the strongest calls for the maintenance of sovereign independence, but parties of European countries at that time were not very keen on taking such a position. But now the Italian Communist Party, the Communist Party of Spain, the Left Party-Communists of Sweden, the Communist Party of Belgium and the Communist Party of Mexico, have begun to express the same view, that great-power chauvinism is wrong, which we see as a very appropriate response. Among socialist countries, Yugoslavia and Romania are criticizing the chauvinist ways of great powers.

Because this is an undertaking to rectify the way of the communist movement in the world as a whole, it is a great challenge. But socialism or communism worthy of the name should never fail to rectify such errors. After the war Stalin integrated the Chishima Islands into Soviet territory. On this issue I also filed a strong request when I visited Moscow the year before last. I have no time to go into the details on this issue, but it is a matter of great regret that errors of these kinds have actually occurred. But they are not inherent to the principles of communism.

Concerning a blueprint of socialism for Japan, the "Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy" adopted by the 13th Congress of the JCP made it clear that freedom of political parties will be guaranteed in a socialist Japan, and that complete freedom will be guaranteed to the people of Japan, aimed at socialism with affluence, and at the same time, with maximum affluence.

For a Truly Free and Affluent Society Upholding the Original Principles of Socialism

The society which communism seeks is a society in which goods are produced without limit and people can choose work best suited to one's liking and ability. If products are abundant, people will be able to get necessary goods at very low cost, and

in the end, a society entirely free of power, of armed forces and even police, free of violence and coercion, will necessarily take shape, in which all people will be able to develop their talents and abilities in full consideration of the rights of others. I will not go into details, but I can assure you that society as originally conceived by communism is wholly free of violence and based on free human relations, with state power itself becoming unnecessary. The form of government will be mutual self-government. When such a society is realized in all countries armaments will become unnecessary, a simple matter of fact, and as a result freedom will prevail in that society. Communism goes ahead with such a society in view. Within this movement, particularly in socialist countries it goes without saying that such countries worthy of the name should decide foreign and domestic policies from this professed position.

Communist parties in Europe are advocating "Eurocommunism", which implies socialism with characteristics of both freedom and affluence.

In Japan, intense campaigns are going on in these days particularly among government circles, trying to discredit socialism, taking advantage of the weaknesses seen in socialist countries.

But difficulties notwithstanding, the Japanese Communist Party upholds the original principles of socialism, and is struggling for the communist movement of the world to make concerted efforts in that direction as fast as possible.

It is essential for a political party to endorse its claims with an actual victory in elections and expand its strength in its own country, however correct its international views may be. The JCP is a party that should act in this way. I ask all of you to read the various publication of the party, and to join the JCP Supporters' Associations, and cooperate with these admirable candidates-designate, and the assemblymen of Kanagawa Prefecture in their activities. It is the JCP organizations in Kanagawa Prefecture that should carry on the tradition for progress and renovation of this prefecture and take the lead. Before I conclude I want to ask you for your continued support for the Japanese Communist Party in its activity nationwide as well as in Kanagawa Prefecture.

Thank you for your close attention.

(*Sunday Akahata*, February 1, 1981; partial retouches made to stenographic record of the lecture)

II

Line of Sovereign Independence in International Activity

TEN YEARS OF SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE
Historical and Theoretical Grounds

Interview published in Asahi Journal,
July 30, 1967

From the Experiences of the 1950 Question

—Though the Japanese Communist Party says that the present JCP line of sovereign independence is not quite new, the public does not take it so simply. There are not a few people who regard it as self-defense to insist on sovereign independence; the neutral and middle-of-the-road position of the JCP is taken as an evasive posture in the conflict between the Soviet Union and China. Especially since February of last year, sovereignty has been emphasized in particular and the tone of the August 8 article (August 1966) gives the impression of being an interim program. Paradoxically, on reading a series of these articles and editorials, it appears as if so far there has been no sovereignty; but has there been any intervention with the party by great-power chauvinism or a foreign party?

There are not a few people surprised at the line of sovereign independence and wonder about it. But they are wrong. Sovereign independence based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism is a position taken for ten years by our party, based on the experience of the 1950 question, etc. Of course it is clear from the actual relations between us and the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that it does not mean neutralism in the conflict between China and the Soviet Union.

The party suffered confusions, having been subject to a heavy blow under MacArthur's suppression and the party split in 1950. This is related to our own weakness, in that we could not consciously establish an independent party line in relation to foreign parties for a considerable time, even after the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943. Before the war, when the revolutionary forces were not strong, not only in Japan but also in many other countries, the activities as a branch of the Comintern, an international organization of democratic centralism, were a positive form of activity in that period of growth. But even in the postwar period, when the Comintern had been dissolved and the sovereignty of each party was mutually recognized in principle, the fact was that the CPSU was regarded as the "leading party" by many parties, including the CPSU itself. The words of the Communist Party of China after its successful revolution were also received as the words of a leading predecessor in Asia. It was natural for these parties to hold prestige internationally at that time, for they had succeeded with great revolutions.

Your question whether or not there were interventions by foreign parties seems to mean the criticism by the Cominform at that time, and the attitude of the CPC and CPSU, which openly supported it. The Cominform twice made comments. The first was in January 1950, which was questionable as a form of criticism, as our Enlarged 15th CC Plenum (November 1957) pointed out, and as we see it now, it could be called great-power chauvinism in respect of the open criticism of one party by another; and in content, there was a simplification of the Japanese situation as we now see it, but it did point out the shortcomings of the party line at that time, and there was certain positive value in its stress on the imperialist aggressiveness of the US occupation and our struggle against it.

The second was the criticism in August 1951, which concerned the so-called 4th National Conference (February 1951) resolution on the ultra-left adventurist line and the intra-party problem; it not only poured water on the fire of spontaneous efforts toward unity exerted before that, but also one-sidedly supported the virtual dissolution of the Central Committee and the ultra-left adventurist line, thus perpetuating the split. At that time, however, it was true that the Japanese Communist Party could not correctly deal with the comment of the Cominform, because it was not long after it had been reconstructed, and there were many shortcomings; it was not fully able to independently work out a line, and there was a tendency toward flunkeyism in the entire party leadership, including myself, in facing the authority of the Cominform, or the CPSU and CPC.

—It was the period when the JCP was growing rapidly. Wasn't there some other means instead of this form of criticism, such as describing haughtily "the Nosaka theory as the servant of US imperialism"? For instance, could they not have told the party secretly, for there was a Soviet representative in the Allied Council for Japan? Mr. Tokuda was said to be indignant at the behavior of the Soviet Union.

The Cominform, which was intended to be a mere information bureau, had in reality taken on the aspect of a leading organ, led by the CPSU, and the prestige of Stalin had added to it. There were also other complicating factors, one being the tendency to establish a patriarchal personal leadership, and the prevailing bureaucracy in the party at that time, which suppressed party democracy. Another was the movement of Yoshio Shiga. We learned later that Shiga was in contact with the Soviet mission in Japan behind the backs of the Political Bureau of our Central Committee, and was informed of the coming international criticism. The "written Shiga opinion" at that time was circulated behind the scenes, and the Soviet Union also had a tendency to attach more importance to the information from persons hanging around than the report from the official organ of our party, exercising great-power chauvinism.

Mr. Tokuda's policy of dealing with the differences of opinion within the party and the suppression by MacArthur involved serious mistakes, but at the same time Shiga's speculative way of doing things added not a little confusion to the situation. And we were all immature.

—Then, you mean that all the split and conflicts within the party beginning with the 1950 question should be attributed to great-power chauvinism of the Soviet Union and others?

No, it is not as simple as that. That is not all. There were shortcomings and weaknesses in the party itself, basically caused by the lack of any systematic accumulation of theory and experience, as well as a shortage of cadres due to the wartime suppression. There were also other contradictions. While we were faced with the need to work out without delay an appropriate strategic line under what was historically a new situation, in that a country of developed monopoly capitalism was under the occupation of the United States, and the task of independence from US imperialism, which was emerging as an important question, the earlier theory of "peaceful revolution under the occupation" had not yet been correctly dealt with. In seeking a solution to these problems, a debate went on about the formation of the Democratic National Front, which the party had formally proposed at that time. For instance, under the wing of the prestige of patriarchal personal leadership, Takaji Nishizawa, Mr. Tokuda's daughter's husband, spread

the idea that the center of a cultural revolution was song and dance, with little concern for the strategic importance of the "Democratic National Front". Being strongly critical of such an approach, I came to value the content of the Cominform's comment stressing the importance of the anti-imperialist struggle more positively than the way of the Cominform comment.

—Is the positive effect of the criticism by the Cominform seen in the resolution of the 5th National Conference held later in October 1951, which said, "It is wrong to believe that the liberation and democratic transformation of Japan can be achieved by peaceful means" (Program of 1951), thus revising the former peaceful revolution theory? What would be the relation to the ultra-left adventurism of the 4th National Conference, which is said to be represented by a military policy?

That is not so. The speech of Liu Shaoqi at the Asian-Australasian Trade Union Conference of 1949 emphasized that the major form of liberation struggle in a colonial or semi-colonial country is armed struggle, which includes Japan. It was in this situation that the ultra-left adventurist line was introduced, and the so-called "New Program" (1951 Program) actually approved and strengthened the ultra-left adventurist line of the 4th National Conference. In working out the Program, Stalin played a main leading role and the CPC acted in concert. The provision of the 1951 Program you cited was later criticized by our party as unilaterally binding our hands, especially in the situation when the San Francisco Treaty had been concluded, resulting in transition from total occupation to semi-occupation. The 1951 Program as a whole, while it positively emphasized the anti-imperialist struggle, was not based on a correct analysis of the situation, of social and economic relations, and the problem of the power of Japan in subordination to the United States in spite of being a highly developed capitalist country, had the onesidedness of regarding Japan as virtually a semi-feudal colonial state. The result was the error of defining its revolution as a democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism.

It was also evident from the nature of the split in the party that the ultra-left adventurist line was not the official decision of the Central Committee.

Now it is evident that though the Japanese Communist Party in its split state asked for leading assistance at that time, the CPSU and CPC onesidedly supported the resolution of the Fourth National Conference, and denounced the critics of this policy, and even interfered actively in working out the ultra-left adventurist line in connection with the split in the party.

When the JCP delegation, which I was leading, visited the Communist Party of China as it returned from the CPSU 21st Congress in 1959, Mao Zedong frankly expressed the opinion in reference to the 1950 question of our party, that there had been an error in the attitude of the CPC toward the Japanese question at that time. It was a positive admission that the CPC take a measure close to interference in the internal affairs of our party at that time, and that the CPC was wrong in acting in concert with Stalin, though his leading role in the question of the 1951 Program was true. We dealt with the 1950 question chiefly as a problem of the JCP itself, and avoided bringing in relations with foreign parties; but I was impressed by what I considered an excellent attitude of the CPC leaders in their frank reflective statement, whereas the CPSU was completely silent.

Around the Independent Preparation for the 7th Party Congress

—Do you mean to say that sovereign independence was introduced from the experience of that time?

Yes, it was. It was during preparation for the 7th Party Congress that we began to study the 1951 Program in detail, based on that bitter experience, for it did not correspond with the reality of Japan. It was the practice of many parties to consult with an authoritative party; but instead of this we aimed to establish our line by discussions within the party. We published a special discussion magazine called "Unity and Advance" to promote discussions within the party. The draft Program was vigorously discussed in the 7th Party Congress, but without adopting the whole program by a majority vote, the decision was postponed until the 8th Party Congress, and only the platform part was adopted, in order to test it in theory and practice. The debate continued between us who characterized the immediate revolution as a democratic revolution against imperialism and monopoly capital and pressed for continued development into a socialist revolution, and the Shojiro Kasuga-Tomochika Naito group, who insisted on a socialist revolution against monopoly capital.

First of all, we set about studying the then existing situation in Japan and applying Marxist-Leninist principles to it. Our consistent attitude is that this should be done with our own brains and on our own responsibility. For this purpose, we studied the nature of Japanese society in subordination to the United States, while at the same time being a highly developed capitalist country, with many new characteristics. And we thoroughly studied Marxist-Leninist literature and strove to clarify our principled position on Marxist-Leninist principles, especially as touching questions of imperialist rule and dependent countries, problems of the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, the form of transition, and so on.

Further, we attached importance to the way to convene the 7th Party Congress in order to make it a turning point for the party. One of the most necessary things was to analyze and summarize the 1950 question and consolidate the cohesion of the whole party on that basis. To that end, we made an effort to get not only the functionaries elected by the 6th National Conference but also those elected by the 6th Party Congress (1947) to take part in principle in the preparations for the congress. Because we held the view that the dissolution of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee resulting from the red purge had been wrong, and that we should attach importance to adherence to the Party Constitution, we went back to the 6th Party Congress.

In the preparation for the 7th Party Congress, two wrong tendencies emerged about making a summary of the 1950 question. One was to avoid any summarization. People who thought this way stressed that confusion and disunity would surely spread if we tried to do it, creating an uncontrollable situation. The other was a desire for a mechanical hasty settlement, abandoning the progressive position of deepening the reliable summarization step-by-step in struggles; claiming that no advance of the party was possible unless this question was totally clarified and the personal responsibility for the split and confusion was brought to light. It was a major achievement of the leadership to resolve the problem by self- and mutual-criticism, overcoming such tendencies. The 15th Enlarged CC Plenum before the 7th Party Congress reached the unanimous decision for summarization, called "On the 1950 Question", with members and candidate members of the Central Committee and members of the Control Committee elected by the 6th Party Congress in attendance.

The spirit of this decision is to be seen in the summarization made by the 7th Party Congress. On this question there was

also great-power chauvinist interference from foreign parties. First, there was interference by Nikita Khrushchov. In November 1957, when Shiga and Korehito Kurahara visited Moscow on invitation to the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution, when a meeting of 12 communist and workers' parties was held—Khrushchov opposed our party's dicision to summarize the 1950 question at the 7th Party Congress, saying "We do not need to bring out dirty linen before the public now", and that the Japanese Communist Party would split if this were done. It was clear that Shiga, afraid that his responsibility for the 1950 question would come to light, was against the summarization and had informed Khrushchov of the issue. Of course Shiga agreed fully with Khrushchov, but Kurahara adhered to the stand that our unity could be advanced only by clarifying the 1950 question. Then, when they stopped off in Beijing, Liu Shaoqi and other people who met them on behalf of the CPC expressed a similar opinion of opposition, saying that it would cause a split for the Japanese Communist Party to summarize the 1950 question. After Shiga and Kurahara returned, these points were reported to the Presidium as the opinion of the leaderships of the Soviet and Chinese communist parties. Of course, encouraged by this, Shiga opposed the summarization, and Takaji Nishizawa was also opposed to it.

But as had been decided in advance, this problem was raised in the report to the 7th Party Congress. The Congress was attended by Mitin, member of the CPSU Central Committee, Satyukov, chief editor of Pravda, and others as guests from the CPSU. Shiga had persuaded them that the Japanese Communist Party would be divided again if the summarization was made, but as we frankly pointed out the shortcomings of the party and summarized the issue by boldly engaging in self-criticism as members of the Central Committee elected by the 6th Party Congress, the support of the delegates was won, and their attitude changed, judging that it was impossible to leave the problem unresolved. On seeing this, Shiga also rapidly changed his attitude, but Takaji Nishizawa continued to oppose it to the last and voted against it, resulting in his non-election to the Central Committee.

If we had abandoned this summarization at that time, of boldly standing for the study of the basic shortcomings of the party after the war, as well as the nature of the split and the confusion in the 1950 question, complying with the expressed opinions of the CPSU and CPC leadership, there could have been neither the present advance of the party nor the establishment of our sovereign line.

Meeting of 81 Parties, and the Position of the JCP

——The Akahata article on the Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of 1960 (January 5, 1961) stresses that "it is the working class of its own country which liberates its own country" and says that "a positive role was carried out" by the JCP at the meeting. What was that role?

We may talk about the attitude of our delegation at the Meeting of 81 Parties, but should refrain from talking much about other parties.

First, a meeting of the drafting committee composed of representatives of 26 parties was held as preliminary. Khrushchov was absent at that time, attending the UN General Assembly, and returned after the preliminary meeting. In those days, Khrushchov, who had visited the United States the previous year, talked about the "Camp David spirit" and President Eisenhower as a person who understood peace, indicating his sweet illusion about the nature of US imperialism. The "peaceful coexistence" line of the CPSU leadership under him had fallen into the unprincipled line of complying with the line of the United States, virtually giving the highest rank to peaceful coexistence in foreign and home policies. Our party made a severe criticism of the aggressive nature of US imperialism through the history of the US postwar occupation, in the debate on the program. With a firm sense we knew that one of the characteristics of revisionism was to neglect or deny the aggressive nature of US imperialism. The vehement controversy between the CPC and CPSU had already been going on before the meeting was held. Our party took the position that the purity of Marxism-Leninism should be maintained, and that the unity of the international communist movement, including the CPC and CPSU, should be achieved. We stressed the importance of this, because through our bitter experience of the split in 1950 we knew and that a split could only please the enemy and inflict damage on our cause. Our viewpoint was that in the international communist movement as well we must not allow an organizational split to occur while engaged in a principled theoretical debate.

The CPSU submitted to the preliminary meeting a draft which contained many important points to be discussed. In short, Khrushchov's opportunist attitude toward US imperialism was reflected in various problems. Parties in Asian countries which were suffering from US imperialist aggression or seriously fighting national liberation struggles, naturally expressed many frank criticisms on this draft. We proposed more than 80 amendments, in the attempt to have the draft conform to Marxist-Leninist principles. Other parties also presented many amendments, but at the same time many parties in principle stood by the Soviet draft. So there were active discussions on many problems about principle, strategy and tactics.

Our party's attitude was for thorough discussion of all the questions raised to reach a principled settlement, but we opposed the solving of these problems simply by a majority vote, and we proposed setting up subcommittees to deal with the respective problems. This was supported by many parties who were anxious for the meeting to be a success. We took part in almost all these subcommittees. As each subcommittee brought certain results, as a whole, the meeting was almost able to overcome some basic shortcomings of the draft except on certain questions, and was able to establish many positive common points.

Especially on the thesis that "communist parties decide on the prospects and tasks of revolution according to the concrete historical and social conditions in their respective countries and with due regard to the international situation", our party naturally took a positive stand. As to the way to maintain the unity of the international communist movement, we placed importance on the thesis that "all Marxist-Leninist Parties are independent and have equal rights; they shape their policies according to the specific conditions in their respective countries and in keeping with Marxist-Leninist principles, and support each other"; we insisted that, whatever the circumstances, at the present stage it was impermissible to set up an international organization of democratic centralism like the Comintern; that is, an international center to lead the revolutionary movement of the world. At the farewell party for representatives who had taken part in the preliminary meeting, which Khrushchov also attended, he turned to me to say that he had heard that the JCP representatives were afraid of the restoration of a situation similar to the time of the Comintern, but there was no such intention. We emphasized that communist parties, big or small, all with independent and equal rights, should adopt the formula of unanimity at joint meetings, and

never decide questions by majority vote. Some parties opposed this, but we did not yield, emphasizing that this was a most basic principle for the unity of the international communist movement.

It goes without saying that many other parties had contributed positively to the discussion to overcome the basic weaknesses of the draft.

One question our party raised independently was about the revolution in a country dependent on US imperialism, while being a highly developed capitalist country. As regards revolutions that had taken place in what are now socialist countries, the revolution in the Soviet Union was a revolution in a developed capitalist country but not a revolution in a dependent country, though the 1917 Russian revolution was an expression of many valuable common principles of democratic and socialist revolutions. China, where the democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism in a semi-colonial country developed into a socialist revolution, was not a highly developed capitalist country. Marxism-Leninism has valuable common principles, and the lessons of the revolutionary struggles in various countries achieved based on the theory are of great value, from which we have to learn many things. But it would not be a correct application of the principles of scientific socialism to the reality of Japan to try to apply these experiences mechanically. So we considered it necessary to apply in new and creative ways the principles of the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution to the conditions existing in postwar Japan. At the same time, these tasks are common not only to Japan but also, in principle, to every country that is virtually dependent on foreign imperialism even though it may be a highly developed capitalist country.

This proposition as a whole was approved, but the representatives of some parties in European capitalist countries, asked to add the regional limit of "non-European" in order to avoid misunderstanding, saying that their conditions are different from Japan. We believed that in principle, the situation of Japan was no exceptional phenomenon or our revolutionary course not limited to a specific country, that a regional limit was unnecessary in this sense, but we did not try to force the point, taking the differing conditions of each party into consideration.

We cannot claim that all points in the draft were thoroughly rectified. For instance, we consistently opposed the tendency to regard the CPSU as a "leading party". We also opposed including any special provision that extolled the role of the CPSU, but nevertheless this was transmitted to the plenary meeting, inconsistent in this respect.

At the plenary meeting, attended by the representatives of 81 parties, our delegation, together with not a few other parties, played a particularly positive role in maintaining the unity of the meeting. Although some vague and incorrect provisions remained, the joint statement of this meeting as a whole played a big role in collaboration of the international communist movement in a correct, principled direction. It also represented a certain victory of the revolutionary current in the international communist movement by overcoming various deviations from Marxist-Leninist principles.

The special epochal significance was to have clarified the independence and equality of all parties, as well as the need for joint action on the basis of mutual non-intervention, mutual assistance and agreed points, as a result of necessary consultation.

Our conviction was strengthened on two points in this meeting. First is the correctness of the sovereign and independent line based on Marxism-Leninism which our party established through the 7th Party Congress, having learned from the

bitter experience of the 1950 issue; that the revolutionary movement of our own country should be carried out by use of our own brains, taking the responsibility upon ourselves according to Marxist-Leninist principles, and permitting no interference from any foreign party. Second is the conviction that the theses about the sharp contradictions created in Japanese society, virtually a dependent country in spite of being a highly developed capitalist country, the struggles to resolve this and the theses faced by us as a result of theoretical analysis, namely the theses about independence and peace, the aggressive nature of US imperialism, united action and united front, transitional forms of the revolution, revolution and reform, revisionism and dogmatism, struggle against factionalism and unity based on democratic centralism, etc., are all to be pursued jointly by the postwar international communist movement, and that we ourselves hold firm views on these problems in both theory and practice.

During the period from the 7th to the 8th Party Congress, active discussions on the program question went on; it was carried on independently under the full guarantee of party democracy on the responsibility of the JCP leadership: so much so that, for instance, the 16th CC Plenum, which discussed the draft Program, was held over 16 days, and Tomochika Naito, who opposed the draft, spoke 56 times. But at that time no foreign party tried to interfere directly in the program question of our party. The overwhelming majority of the party organizations and party members had come to support the draft program, aided by the struggle against the Japan-US Security Treaty and the independent development of the intra-party controversy. The result was that, defeating the scheme of the anti-party revisionists, including Shojiro Kasuga and Tomochika Naito, at the 8th Party Congress in 1961 the party unanimously adopted the program.

The Line of the JCP in International Debate

—I understand your explanation, that the Japanese Communist Party has consistently striven to establish the sovereign and independent line. But the criticism of China in the August 8 article of 1966 gave the impression of "a bolt from the blue". That article called for international united action against US imperialism. The initiative of the JCP was notable in that, with the appeal as the premise, while it criticized Soviet revisionism, in reality it was criticizing Chinese dogmatism. The criticism of CPSU revisionism had already been made, and we thought that the Japanese Communist Party was on the Chinese side. That is why we not only evaluated the display of leadership in that article, we also felt a radical change in relation with China.

It was in common with the CPC that we criticized the US-collaborative line of the CPSU leadership. In this respect, some people regarded the JCP as belonging to the Chinese side. But there was a pretty important difference between our view and that of the CPC.

When we talked with the CPC leadership in Beijing as we came home from the 22nd CPSU Congress (1961), the Chinese side maintained the inevitability of a split in the future of the international communist movement, claiming that "one must become two"; but we did not agree with them.

In the period from 1963 to 1964, there was a CPSU proposal about an international meeting. The intention of Khrushchov at that time was undoubtedly to justify his position by resolving the international controversy by a majority vote. The JCP rejected the proposal of the CPSU leadership and presented a counterproposal, believing that it was not an appropriate time

to hold a meeting on theoretical questions, but that a conference for immediate joint action against the US imperialist aggression in South Vietnam and other places was possible. We emphasized that such a conference would need the full agreement of the countries concerned, and adopt the unanimity system for making decisions. But while it rejected the proposal of the CPSU leadership, the CPC did not make a specific counterproposal about a meeting. Nor was that all. Its attitude was that "probably it is better to hold an international meeting of the fraternal parties later on rather than to hold it soon, and it is better not to hold it than to hold it" (May 1964).

As regards international democratic movements, whereas the CPC leadership regarded them as rostrums from which to expose revisionism, we regarded them as important to advance united action against the US imperialist policy of aggression and war. Our party held the view that the struggle against opportunism could be effectively fought in the course of such efforts.

As regards joint action with social democratic parties, for instance, the so-called "proposal of a general line" of the CPC leadership (June 1963) was a policy of undertaking joint action with the left wing of social democratic parties and isolating the right wing. Our view was that we should undertake joint action with the whole of the socialist party and in the struggle fight against the influence of opportunist and divisionist trends.

But it was covertly discussed between the two parties and not necessary to talk so loudly. Besides, at that time it was the CPSU leadership headed by Khrushchov that had committed the greatest error in the international communist movement.

In the summer of 1963, Zhao Anbo, a Chinese representative to the World Conference against A & H Bombs, came to see me while I was confined to bed with pneumonia. He said, "You will miss the bus (chance) if you do not criticize Khrushchov as soon as possible." I answered that we would do it if we found it necessary for the Japanese Communist Party, but we would not blindly follow the lead of another.

We had objectively published the materials of the open debate between the CPC and CPSU in our magazine "World Political Materials" so that we could study the debate in the international communist movement, but the CPSU leadership complained through Zhukov, who had visited Japan in the spring of 1962, that the JCP should not have printed the materials which criticized the CPSU. But we rejected the protest, saying that it was natural to publish the materials of both sides, since the debate was already being conducted openly and reported in Japan, and the masses were interested in it.

In September of 1964, after Khrushchov openly attacked our party and we published our reply to the CPSU leadership, I went with Tomio Nishizawa to Indonesia, and talked with the delegation of the Communist Party of Indonesia led by Chairman Aidit; a joint statement of the two parties was published, which emphasized that both sides "have been consistently stressing the importance of holding an international conference such as would be conducive to unity", that such a conference "should not cause a split" and that "consultations and efforts (to correctly prepare for and realize the international conference) should be made continuously and actively by every available means".

On my way home, I went to Beijing and exchanged opinions on the question of holding an international meeting. The Chinese side held to their point-of-view, because of relations they had with a "leftist" parties and groups, and suggested cooperating on problems common to the views of both parties rather than taking the attitude of especially denouncing our proposal for an international conference for unity; they said they understood the reason why the Japanese party pursued

"tactics of making a detour".

The August 8 article of 1966 is a continuation of the article published on February 4 that year, the basic ideas of which were quite natural if one confirms the need for an international united front against US imperialism, the ringleader of world reaction, and if one stands for "coordinating joint actions in the struggle for common goals" as was said by the Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties. The task became even more urgent after US imperialism launched the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The Communist Party of China had emphasized the importance of an international united front after the Meeting of 81 Parties. Mao Zedong wrote repeatedly about it in his statements on support for the anti-US patriotic struggle, addressed to Vietnam, Congo, Dominica and even to Japan (January 1964). But after Chinese documents began to say that the CPSU should not be included in joint actions (November 1965), the difference of opinion between the JCP and CPC on this point became prominent.

At that time, although we did not believe that the CPSU leadership had eliminated the revisionist line even after Khrushchov was removed from office in October 1964, the CPSU leadership, while continuing the old line, was at the same time openly assisting Vietnam, and had adopted an official policy of opposing the US imperialist aggression in Vietnam, we believed that on the Vietnam question it was not correct in theory and practice to exclude the CPSU from any international united front on Vietnam against imperialism. On this question, an article of the CPC published in November 1965 not only denounced the Soviet Union, but also argued that those who did not agree with the Chinese position were renegades. The JCP therefore in an Akahata Editorial of December 1965 emphasized the necessity of united action of the international communist movement. This was followed by the article of February 1966, which specifically set out our consistent position on the international united front against imperialism. Comparing the articles of the JCP and CPC, the differences between them are very clear. Some people seem to have the impression that the August 8 article was "a bolt from the blue", but if one knows the history of the party over these ten years, as set out above, there is nothing strange about it.

—I think there were discussions covering these problems at the summit meeting of the JCP and CPC in February and March 1966, and many have tried to guess the content of the meeting. Could you give me the facts? Were you invited, or did you visit at your own wish?

Our visit to three countries was on our own initiative but in the form of an invitation. The meeting with the CPC was attended by Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng and others. The focus of the discussion was assistance to Vietnam and the international united front against imperialism; an estimation of the CPSU leadership was another point. Our attitude was "Nothing venture, nothing win", instead of "A wise man avoids danger", but their opinion was not the same as ours. At that time, however, they did not call us revisionists. In the end, it was confirmed by the two sides that the differing ideas should be put to the test by practice, and that we should cooperate on points in common such as opposition to the aggression of US imperialism, assistance to Vietnam and friendship between Japan and China. When we dropped in again at Beijing on the way home from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the CPC side suddenly proposed issuing a joint communiqué; their delegation consisted of Zhou

Enlai, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Liu Ningyi, Liao Chengzhi and Zhao Anbo, because Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were absent on a trip. The communiqué naturally was to be based on common points of agreement, reserving points of non-agreement, and assistance to Vietnam and promotion of the Japan-China friendship were naturally to be included. Opinions on the importance of the anti-US united front and international democratic movements in general were held in common, but no reference was included because opinions differed on the question of whether or not the Soviet Union should come into it. In this way the communiqué was prepared. Scores of people, including Japanese in Beijing gathered for the send-off party for us, and Zhou Enlai and I officially agreed on the significance of the formulated joint communiqué. We were to see Mao Zedong on our way home, and never dreamed that he would raise an objection.

—I have heard that, besides differences in the estimation of the Soviet revisionist leadership, Chairman Mao Zedong opposed the text because it did not state that "revisionism exists not only in the CPSU leadership but also in various parties around it", and that they should fight against "revisionism within various parties and revisionism of the two parties". There was also a rumor that he demanded an "armed struggle".

The question of inserting an evaluation of the CPSU leadership was but a repetition of our disagreement, and questions about revisionism and dogmatism within respective parties were not raised at all in the Beijing meeting. This way of doing things had never been seen before in meetings between the JCP and CPC, nor between us and other parties.

—About the armed uprising?

There was no particular question of Japan on the agenda, but the view of the Chinese side was that we should be prepared for a Sino-American war—World War III—and that it would be better in checking the war strength of imperialism for thousands or tens of thousands to take up arms, than for a membership of a million or mass activities.

To add a few words of caution on this, they did not advise that we should at once start an armed uprising, but their view was clear in the light of the following facts. They had already emphasized "people's war" theory, and the Chinese ultra-left opportunist, great-power chauvinist elements repeatedly attacked the Party Program and activities as "revisionist", because we did not accept their "violent revolution only" theory, or the "people's war" theory.

—Some people say that the sovereign independence of the JCP is supported by its "sovereign independent finance". There has been a rumor, almost a general idea, that there was some financial aid from the Soviet Union and China, but what is the truth? Does the monthly budget amount to about six hundred million yens?

There is no financial aid from a foreign country. Who said this about ¥600,000,000 a month? Our financial operations for the past year totaled ¥1,800,000,000. On the financial side we are considerably bigger than the Socialist Party, because our membership is several times larger and the scale of our publication activities is greater. Our income consists of party dues, annual salaries for Diet members, small contributions, and profits on organ papers that sell 1,300,000 copies, including Sunday Akahata, as well as other publications; and the salary

of permanent party activists is less than the average salary paid by smaller enterprises. We want to raise it, but it is not easy to do so.

New Stage of the International Communist Movement

—Finally, about the future prospect of the international communist movement, including the Chinese and Soviet Parties.

The line we have followed for these ten years is firmly based on the conviction that Marxist-Leninist principles must be applied to the situation in Japan, and that proletarian internationalism and patriotism should be correctly combined; we hold that although the revolution of Japan is a part of the liberation of the world's people, it is chiefly by the might of the Japanese people that the liberation of the Japanese people must be won, and in this sense, the communist party of a country bears the responsibility to decide independently the policy of that country, and naturally, revolution cannot be imported. At present, the voluntary unity of sovereign independent communist parties based on these views is a new form of proletarian internationalism, a new point reached by the international communist movement. It is a new stage of development that following the form of unity during the Comintern period, the historical significance of which is confirmed. Its great importance is not only in its being the foreign line of our party, but also for carrying on the Japanese revolution, chiefly relying on the strength of the Japanese working class, the working masses and united front forces. It is supported by the deep conviction that the international communist movement will surely recover militant unity in the new stage, and that Marxism-Leninism will certainly prevail in world history.

(*Akahata,* July 28, 1967, including those parts that were not published in *Asahi Journal*)

LAST TALKS WITH MAO ZEDONG

On February 1966, the year following the first bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party sent quite a big delegation to three Asian socialist countries: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to hold talks with the communist and workers' parties of these countries, with a view to forming of an international united front against the aggression in Vietnam. On February 9, the delegation boarded the Chinese cargo ship "Hongqi" (Red Flag), left Port Wakamatsu in Fukuoka, and sailed for Shanghai.

As JCP General Secretary, I led the delegation, which comprised Standing Presidium member Masayoshi Oka, as vice-head, and Presidium members Korehito Kurahara and Itaru Yonehara, plus alternate CC members Tetsuzo Fuwa, Koichiro Ueda and Akira Kudo. The delegation was assisted by Masaru Kojima and Hiroshi Tachiki. Secretariat member Ichiro Sunama, at that time stationed in Beijing, also joined the delegation after our arrival in China.

In Shanghai, a reception was given in honor of the delegation, attended by Political Bureau member Peng Zhen, candidate Political Bureau member Kang Sheng, and CC member and at that time Chief of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Liu Ningyi, and others of the Communist Party of China; preparatory talks were held preceding the full-fledged talks scheduled to be held later in Beijing.

On February 17, the delegation arrived in Hanoi, and was given a welcome reception by President Ho Chi Minh, First

Secretary Le Duan and Political Bureau member Truong Chinh; the delegation also met and talked with a delegation led by Le Duan. After ten days stay in Vietnam, the delegation signed a joint communiqué with them, left Hanoi, and arrived in Beijing on February 28.

That day a banquet was held in the People's Great Hall in honor of the delegation. At the banquet from the CPC were Party Vice-Chairmen Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, Political Bureau members Li Fuchun and Li Xiannian, Political Bureau candidate members Lu Dingyi and Kang Sheng, CC members Liao Chengzhi, Lin Feng, Ye Jianying, Liu Xiao, Liu Ningyi, Xiao Hua, Xie Fuzhi and others. The talks between the two parties began on March 3, the CPC delegation comprising Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Liu Ningyi, Liao Chenzhi, Wu Lengxi, Zhang Xiangshan and Zhao Anbo.

The delegation held four rounds of talks during the more than one week in Beijing and was able to endorse some points in common, while major disagreements also came to light. In sum, it was a controversy between "international united front against US aggression in Vietnam" and "anti-US, anti-Soviet united front". Both sides discussed the subject fully; but no initiative came from either side for issuing a joint statement or communiqué. We headed for Korea, our next destination.

Unexpected Proposal from Chinese Side On Issuing a Joint Statement

The delegation arrived in Pyongyang on March 11, and after issuing a joint statement on the 21st we left Pyongyang, arriving in Beijing the same day, but considered this merely a stop-over on the way back to Japan.

Unexpectedly, however, a proposal was made by the Chinese side who met the delegation at Beijing Airport. They said that they wanted to hold a mass meeting to welcome the JCP delegation, and issue a joint communiqué of both parties. After examining the proposal, though quite unexpected, we decided to accept it because there was no specific reason not to.

At the mass welcome rally held in Beijing on March 26, Vice-Chairmen Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Liao Chengzhi, Lin Feng, Liu Xiao, Liu Ningyi and many other leaders were present. Peng Zhen and I delivered speeches on behalf of the respective parties, with the full text of my speech carried by "Renmin Ribao".

As regards a joint communiqué, we thought it natural and sensible that both sides should draft the joint communiqué on the points of agreement, with reservations on points of disagreement, as points of disagreement had been made clear, and the Chinese side, knowing them all, proposed publishing a joint communiqué. Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi, who had taken part in the talks between the two parties before our visit to Korea, had already left for Pakistan, and Deng Xiaoping was away from Beijing on a mission. So the leader of the Chinese delegation was Vice-Chairman Zhou Enlai.

It was decided that the drafting of the joint communiqué should be done by a commission composed of four members from each delegation. Oka, Yonehara, Fuwa and Ueda were the Japanese four, and from the Chinese side Liu Ningyi, Wu Lengxi, Zhang Xiangshan and Zhao Anbo. First, the Japanese side presented a draft and the Chinese side made a counter proposal.

In the drafting of the communiqué, the Chinese side proposed criticizing the CPSU by name. The Japanese and Chinese parties had both made criticisms of the CPSU leadership, but they differed on the assessment of the character of Soviet power and its position in the international communist movement and international united actions. The position of the JCP is not to criticize a third party in a joint communiqué. For five days the subcommittee fully discussed the draft, during which six meetings took place. The efforts resulted in completing the joint communiqué, based on agreed points, and not involving any criticism of the Soviet Union by name. The drafted joint communiqué was made up of over 3,000 letters, the major points of which were severe denunciation of the US aggression in Vietnam, calling with emphasis for formation of an international united front to counter it, and to struggle against modern revisionism that would acquit US imperialism. In addition, the communiqué advocated strengthened activities in the international democratic movement, solidarity with the working class and peoples of Asian countries, and friendship and solidarity between the JCP and the CPC.

The joint communiqué was confirmed by the two delegations in the final meeting in which the CPC delegation was led by Vice-Chairman Zhou Enlai. In the evening of March 27, the day before the JCP delegation was to leave for Shanghai, a send-off party was held for the JCP delegation in the People's Congress Hall. Present at the farewell were Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Peng Zhen, Tan Zhenlin, Kang Sheng, Lin Feng, Liao Chengzhi and Liu Ningyi, and some 300 public figures, including some Japanese residents in Beijing. At the celebration, Zhou Enlai said, "The announcement of the JCP-CPC joint communiqué will strike a heavy blow on US imperialism and modern revisionism". I also commented that "This joint communiqué will be a blow to our enemies, and give encouragement to our friends". Then we two gave a toast on the adoption of the joint communiqué.

Naturally, we thought that all official talks with the Chinese delegation were over; all that remained was to fix a date with the Chinese side for the release of the joint communiqué. The

Chinese side called our itinerary in China after our visit to Korea "the third stage" of our ongoing visit to China. The joint communiqué included the statement that the Japanese delegation had met and talked with Mao Zedong in Shanghai, and we thought therefore that the joint communiqué would be announced as soon as we had held the meeting with Mao Zedong in Shanghai.

We had no doubt that the proceedings of the meetings of the two parties and the drafting of the communiqué with its contents had been reported to Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party of China, and completed with his direction and approval. We thought that our scheduled meeting with Mao Zedong in Shanghai would be a kind of courtesy call.

The JCP delegation left Beijing for Shanghai on a specially reserved flight at 7:40 a.m. on March 28. Kang Sheng, Zhao Yimin and Zhao Anbo accompanied us. Zhao Yimin, candidate member and vice-head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC, had not been present at the talks in Beijing between the two parties.

The delegation arrived at Shanghai Airport at 9:30 a.m. Kang Sheng and Zhao Yimin, saying that they had to give a preliminary briefing and make arrangements with Chairman Mao, left us waiting there for nearly an hour. We arrived at the residence of Mao at about 10:25. From the gate to the porch of the magnificent residence, we had to drive some distance. As it seemed that a limited number would be present from the Chinese side at the meeting with Mao Zedong, it was then arranged that the members of the Presidium and the Secretariat of our party would attend the meeting, and five members—myself, Oka, Kurahara, Yonehara and Sunama—entered the meeting hall. It was a spacious room with sofas set out in a bow shape, at one side of which we took our seats.

In the absence of Mao Zedong, Zhao Yimin, Zhao Anbo and

Wei Wenbo and others were present. Zhao Yimin spoke first.

"Chairman Mao has a few things to say about the communiqué. Though a rather good one, it does not clarify the main themes; it does not serve any useful purpose; one cannot see why a communiqué like this needs to be issued." Then Zhao spoke about the amendments Mao wanted to make to the communiqué.

I was surprised to hear this. What could it mean, that Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party of China, proposed such amendments at this stage to the communiqué, which had been officially confirmed in the talks between the two parties in Beijing? Is Mao not in a position to be responsible for the talks between the two parties held in Beijing? Is anything wrong with the Communist Party of China? I got the impression from this abrupt and unexpected incident that the situation was quite abnormal and serious.

As a matter of fact, Mao's proposed amendments amounted to a change in the keynote of the communiqué, raising new issues not considered in the Beijing discussions.

The first point of the amendments was to stress a united front based on the revolutionary line, ralling "the revolutionary peoples of the world", whereas the original keynote was to emphasize a united front against US imperialism; the second point was to add to the term modern revisionism in the original text the qualification, "centering around the leading group of the CPSU"; and the third point was to propose an intra-party struggle to oppose dogmatism and sectarianism, and "resolutely oppose the thoughts of modern revisionism" within the respective parties, in particular.

The first and second proposed amendments meant a revival of demands the Chinese side had made in the Beijing meeting, to wage a concerted struggle that should in the final analysis be limited to "revolutionary parties" recognized as such, and

thereby to exclude the Soviet Union by name from international united action; and the third proposed amendment, defining the character of an internal struggle in each of the two parties, had not even been raised in the Beijing meeting.

Controversies Continued Between the Two Parties Concerning an International United Front

At that time, open polemics between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were going on. This had its origin in a series of open attacks by the CPSU leadership on the JCP, expressly giving support to the faction of Yoshio Shiga and the publication of organ, Voice of Japan, which had been repeated in Pravda and over Radio Moscow. On the idea of using good terms in speaking of US imperialism under Kennedy, and imposing this on other parties, as was evident in a series of policies of Khrushchov and others, we had been making frank countercriticisms.

Polemics for more than a few years had already been going on between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The position of the JCP and that of the CPC had differed considerably for some time. The CPC leadership took the stand that disunity was inevitable in the international communist movement, and from that position the CPC was actually engaged in organizing so-called "leftist" parties one after another in other countries. Mao Zedong, however had emphasized the importance of a wide anti-US united front repeatedly in his statements and speeches up to May 1965, on the struggle of the peoples of Japan, Panama, Congo and others.

Although the Japanese Communist Party had severely criticized the CPSU leadership for its deep-rooted great-power chauvinist interference and line of subservience to the United

States, it took note of the fact that the CPSU leadership had been calling for joint action in opposition to the US imperialist aggression in Vietnam for some time, specifically since March 1965. The JCP insisted that the CPSU should not be excluded from international joint action and in a united front against US imperialism, so far as the CPSU was giving specific material aid to the struggle of the Vietnamese people. The position of the Japanese Communist Party was that the situation could be improved only by adopting what we called a revolutionary dual policy in united action; it meant making a clear and positive evaluation and promotion of what is correct, and criticism of what is wrong.

On the other hand, the Chinese side emphasized in the Beijing talks that joint action with the Soviet Union would obscure the line of demarcation between revisionism and the revolutionary stand, and would consequently cause confusion in "leftist" parties. The Chinese side argued that the Soviet Union was too ready to follow a policy of interference, with a view to imposing on Vietnam a compromise solution with the United States, because of the Soviet opportunist policy of non-interference.

In reviewing international experience on the united front issue, we carefully studied Lenin's appeal to the Second International and the "Two-and-a-Half International" for united action (1921), and formed the clear conclusion that there should be no rejection of non-revolutionary forces becoming parties in a united action. An article published prior to our visit to the three countries, entitled "For Strengthening International United Action and a United Front against US Imperialism" (*Akahata, February 4, 1966*) was a detailed exposition of this position.

It was not likely at all that we would agree to the proposed amendment calling for an anti-US, anti-Soviet united front, instead of calling for strengthening an international united front against US imperialism.

I started to say to Zhao Yimin, "The communiqué has been made not on the basis of full agreement between the two parties, but in the circumstance of there being points of disagreement between them. A subcommittee formed of representatives of the two parties prepared the document after confirming the following viewpoints; (1) drafting should be done on the basis of points of agreement, (2) no mention should be made of points of disagreement, and (3) it should be as brief as possible."

While I was speaking, Chairman Mao, accompanied by Kang Sheng, came in.

Mao Rejects the Joint Communiqué as Weak

It was my third meeting with Mao Zedong. The first was in February 1959 in Zhengzhou, and the second in the fall of 1964 in Hangzhou. When I met him for the first time he had unexpectedly told me that the attitude taken by the CPC toward the 1950 split in the JCP had been a "mistake". This made me feel something of the greatness of Mao Zedong; for a long time I had considered his theory and practice of the Chinese revolution as epoch-making.

In the spring of 1964, when I was in a run-down condition after a long bout of pneumonia, and hardly able to walk, the CPC kindly invited me to recuperate in the warm climate of Hainan Island. At that time, Mao Zedong, visiting Guangdong, had wanted to see me but did not come there out of consideration of my being under medical care. When told of this later, I realized how considerate he was, which left me with a good impression of him.

So in visiting China in 1966, we had hoped to reach agreement in calm discussion with Mao Zedong, because he was such a kind of man, though we had realized that such an agreement would not be easy to reach, judging from articles that had already been published in China.

Mao, with a very stern look, started by saying, "One must not be afraid of isolation. One must not be afraid of war. It is no good to take a conciliatory attitude toward traitors. Do you take a conciliatory attitude toward Shiga and right-wing social democrats?" He then spoke of his own experiences of being isolated in the past, stressing that Lenin was also never afraid of being isolated. Mao then asked, "Have you ever had an experience of being isolated?"

I replied, "Yes, I have." Mao resumed, "The United States threatens to escalate the Vietnam war and expand it to China. But we are not afraid of war." He said that if the United States attacks China and expands its aggression from the south, the Soviet Union would be likely to invade China from the north. He went on to say that the war might cost a great deal of sacrifice but that one should not be afraid of the loss of lives in a war, giving the example of his eldest son being killed in the Korean War, and his wife, younger brother and younger sister being killed at the hands of the Nationalist Party. Mao added, "But I am alive. I was engaged in the war for 22 years, but not a single shot hit me. I was possibly protected by Marx!"

Mao went on to say that the US air raids were uniting the Vietnamese people, and used the illustration of Japan's aggression against China leading the Chinese people to unite, and again stressed that one must not be afraid of war. Then he asked, "What is your opinion about my proposed amendments?"

I replied, "We will study them later." It was because the members had not yet had the opportunity to exchange opinions, though my own view was clear, leaving no room for doubt.

Mao said: "I was very displeased to read the communiqué. It has failed to clarify the themes. It mentioned modern revisionism; but one cannot see who is being criticized. Both the Communist Party of China and the Japanese Communist Party criticize Soviet revisionism, so it would be useless not to mention it by name. This communiqué is in a compromising tone. I must say this. This communiqué is lacking in courage: it is soft and powerless." I said, "The communiqué was first drafted by the Japanese side". Kang Sheng added, "Our proposals and views were put into it, too".

Mao, increasingly excited and speaking even louder, said, "Those in Beijing agreed to it, too, I presume. I do not want to impose my views, but the communiqué as it now stands should not be made public". He concluded by saying, "This is the end of my statement. It is now your turn to attack me". The atmosphere of the room remained very tense.

It was already near noon.

By way of introduction I said, "Comrade Mao Zedong has expressed his views quite frankly; we too are here to exchange views frankly". Then I explained the resolute struggle of the JCP against various erroneous trends, and the adoption of our Program, specifically mentioning that, at the time when the JCP had been split and suffered a serious blow because of the line of ultra-left adventurism in the 1951 Program set out by Stalin, the JCP, drawing correct lessons from this bitter experience, had established a position of sovereign independence and had independently made the present Program by itself. "This experience later enabled us to propose many draft amendments of our own without fear at the preliminary conference for the Meeting of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties, where we were in a minority from the outset. This we did without any instruction from any other party, including the Communist Party of China", I said.

As for the controversy with the CPSU, I pointed out that the JCP had not conducted open polemics mentioning the CPSU by name until they openly attacked us, and added that Zhao Anbo, while in Japan for the World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, tried in vain to "incite" us to "climb on the bandwagon and quickly join in open polemics with the CPSU".

I also indicated that the JCP at its 7th Congress summed up the 1950 split in the JCP. I referred specifically to the fact that when Shiga and Kurahara were in the Soviet Union in 1957, Khrushchov tried to dissuade the Japanese Communist Party from summing up the 1950 problem at the Congress, and that on their way back, when they were in Beijing, Liu Shaoqi likewise expressed opposition to the planned summing-up of the problem by the Congress. "In those days, the Soviet and Chinese parties were two major parties with considerable prestige throughout the world. But unafraid of isolation, and turning down the opinion of Shiga who tailed along after Khrushchov and Liu Shaoqi, we summed up the problem of 1950 at our Congress, on our own judgment and responsibility", I said.

Mao said, "I have never heard of this", and turning to Kang Sheng, he asked, "Do you know anything (about the issue involving Liu Shaoqi)?" Kang Sheng shook his head in denial.

I went on:

"At the Bucharest meeting, Comrade Yonehara here was present; he did not support Khrushchov's attack on China. This was done without any advance consultation with anyone. Likewise, on the question of whether or not to attend the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, we made our own decision, without consulting any other party. This was not an item on the agenda of the meeting in Beijing. So we have done what we believed right, without fearing isolation, using our own judgment, and in a courageous way."

"We have taken quite a principled stand toward the

Soviet Union. When the Soviet Embassy held a reception or a meeting commemorating the October Revolution, we refused to attend so long as the Shiga clique was allowed to be present. We are diehards, pure and simple, in this respect."

Mao intervened, saying: "That diehard attitude is good." He now looked a little relaxed. Referring to the JCP position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union on several issues, he even said, laughing, "In this respect, you are ahead of us."

Stressing the importance of the Vietnam question, I said:

"The Vietnamese comrades are carrying on the struggle superbly; but international assistance for them is not necessarily working very smoothly. The Statement of the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties mentions the superiority of the socialist camp, which, however, is not wielding its full strength with respect to the Vietnam problem."

"It is a good thing that China should be prepared for the worst contingency. But one should, I must say, not only prepare for a bad possibility but do one's utmost to realize a good possibility. Needless to say, it is important to prepare for the eventuality of the war being expanded into China; it is more important, however, to strive to settle the Vietnam question in Vietnam and prevent the war from spreading to China. As Comrade Mao once said, one must encircle and isolate the enemy politically."

Mao intervened, saying: "Of course, one must prepare oneself politically."

I continued:

"For that purpose, it is necessary to rally and unite all forces opposed to the United States. You say that the Soviet power has become capitalist and that the Soviet Union has become fascist; but it is necessary to make various scientific studies before making such judgments."

Mao replied, "Yes. There is need to make studies."

I made some other remarks on the question of activities within the international democratic movement and a view on the Indonesian situation of that time.

Mao said that when A.N. Kosygin was visiting China, he asked the Chinese side how long the open polemics would last, to which Mao replied that it would continue for ten thousand years. He also noted that when he last met Kurahara, he was asked if it was possible to realize communism in only one country, and that he replied in the negative. He went on to say, "The issue of the revival of capitalism would continue to arise. Two packets of cigarettes may be enough to bribe some people."

At that moment, we were told that lunch was ready. Mao proposed, "Why not have a meal first, and then resume the discussion?" The Japanese side agreed. As the meeting was recessed all went to the dining room. Jiang Qing failed to appear.

It was already past 2:00 p.m.

All members of the Japanese delegation were present at the luncheon.

Mao Zedong seemed to be rather relaxed at the table. Referring to the Japanese Communist Party's split in 1950 in a reflective manner, Mao said, "The CPC has intervened in the internal affairs of the JCP too much."

When I said to Mao, "You look very spry, indeed", he replied, "I have a cough from time to time; that annoys me." Then the talk turned upon smoking, and jokes were exchanged on that topic. One remark was that state finances would go bankrupt if everybody quit smoking.

"Act As Though No Meeting Has Taken Place"

Mao said: "Kongzi (Confucius) died at the age of 73. I am now 72, turning 73 later this year. Probably, sometime toward the end of this year, I may be able to go to meet Karl Marx."

In response, I said, "When I last met you, Comrade Mao, you said your five-year plan included a plan for a visit to Marx; so I said I was opposed to such a five-year plan. I have not changed my mind about that." Kurahara joined me, saying, "I would like to ask you to seek the best possibility in this respect, too."

For a topic of conversation, the limited number of Chinese characters designated for daily use was taken up. Mao asked, "How many Chinese characters are in use in Japan?" Kurahara answered, "There are about 2,000 Chinese characters designated for daily use." Mao said, "I am surprised so many Chinese characters are still in use. It is better for you to quit using Chinese characters and change to Roman letters." I retorted, "We are opposed to that. This problem, however, should be kept out of today's agenda as a matter of future study." The lively conversation went on.

At the end of the luncheon, Mao Zedong said, "What will we do with the meeting? I have nothing more to say." I said in reply, "We have something more to say; though not much." Mao concluded, "Then let us resume the meeting tomorrow." After that, all stood together for a commemorative photograph.

That night, the delegation held a formal conference to discuss Mao's proposed amendments. The Mao proposal involved a very serious matter of principle, which could not be dealt with by changing some words and phrases; every member of the delegation made a similar statement. A rupture of the talks would most probably create many difficulties in future relations between the Japanese and Chinese parties, but we had to take a principled stand; otherwise it would have been a grave theoretical mistake and would have created serious confusion both at home and abroad; there was hardly any need for detailed discussions, because all were unanimous on this. In other words, there were no "soft" members in the delegation on that matter.

On the next morning when we visited Mao's residence, we were first asked by Zhao Yimin if we had studied the communiqué. I replied, "The communiqué, if it can be worked out satisfactorily, should be something like the original, written briefly, based on the points of agreement and excluding points of disagreement." I went on to make a detailed explanation on our views regarding the controversial points of the proposed amendments. I added, "Rather, we think today's meeting is a very good opportunity to talk with each other on important questions, without limiting the discussion to working on the communiqué. One cannot impose one's views on the other; but this is a good opportunity to talk."

Zhao Yimin left the room to report to Mao Zedong. Some time later, Mao came in and asked bluntly, "Have you got anything more to say?" I replied, "We have a few things to say", and supplemented my remarks made the previous day. As I have told Zhao Yimin, to make our position and views even clearer will accord with the aim of our visit. I spoke about a comparison between the time when Lenin formed the Third International and the present day, and about the assessment of the First Tricontinental People's Solidarity Conference in Havana. Halfway through my talk, Mao said with a pause, "I have looked over the record of our talks in Beijing." He would probably have looked through it the night before. He

seemed to have completely given up his intention to have us agree to the line of the proposed amendments.

Before concluding, I said, "Through the latest series of meetings we have familiarized ourselves with various arguments of yours and their background, such as had escaped us in reading your articles. Let the two parties study the point of disagreement further in the course of struggle, so as to let practice verify their respective stands." Finally, I stressed that the Japanese, Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese parties—the four parties in Asia whose national territories are subject to US aggression—should now cooperate with each other.

"This is all I wanted to say." I concluded.

Mao said: "I have nothing more to say, either, except one or two comments. A stand like yours will be welcomed by the CPSU leadership; this is the first thing I want to say. We cannot welcome such a stand; this is the second point. In my opinion, the communiqué cannot be published. It was a mistake for our side to have proposed issuing a communiqué, which you had not asked for."

I said, "We do not insist on the issuance of the communiqué. We firmly believe that our stand will be welcomed neither by the United States nor by the Soviet Union. Our opinion on this differs also."

Mao said, "Which side is correct can only be corroborated by facts. Ultimately, the heavens will not fall. Given opportunities, we can talk to each other in the future. Our present meeting, I presume, may be ended here." Finally, he said, "Let it be assumed that there was no meeting." Mao, rising and walking with the others, murmured, "Both sides now feel relieved; they both have put off the burdens from their shoulders."

During the meeting on the second day, Mao hardly spoke; he was unsmiling. Yet, when the Japanese delegation was leaving, Mao accompanied us out to the porch to see us into the car.

The same day we left for Guangzhou by air. Those whom we met in Guangzhou appeared to have been shocked by the fact that the Japanese delegation had a talk with Mao Zedong, but that no joint communiqué had been issued, apprehending that the two parties may be going different ways. The scheduled big send-off party and other events were called off.

Corroboration by History

After the delegation returned to Japan, we decided to maintain silence about the meeting with Mao Zedong, taking into consideration the wish of the Chinese side, "Let it be as though there was no meeting," although no pledge to keep it secret had been made. At a later date, however, when "Red Guards" waged attacks by giving distorted pictures about the proceedings of the talks, and Michio Iwamura and others gave extremely distorted accounts of the talks, allegedly hearsay from Zhao Anbo, we made a counterargument to a necessary extent.

As we were to learn later, March 28, 1966, the first day of our meeting with Mao, was the very day when Mao had sent out his directive to launch the so-called "Great Cultural Revolution". The directive said, among other things, "I hereby call on the provinces to rise in rebellion and march on the center. Every locality should turn out a large number of Sun Wukong—the legendary monkey that appears in the Chinese classic, Xi You Ji—to enable them to storm the heavenly palace." In this way the historical background from which Mao had proposed one of his amendments, adding a provision about an "intra-party struggle", had become evident.

Eleven years have passed since then. Many people with whom we talked in China seemed to have undergone shifts and

changes. Both Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong have passed on. I have no intention to set down here my own judgment as the person concerned. I was eventually interested, however, in two facts.

The first is that no call for an anti-US, anti-Soviet united front was made in the joint communiqués when the leadership of the Communist Party of China had talks with the Romanian Communist Party of in June 1971, with the Vietnam Worker's Party in November 1971 and June 1973, and with the Workers' Party of Korea in April 1975.

The second is that the liberation struggle of the people of Vietnam against US aggression, which had been the dominant theme of our visit to the three countries, won a complete, world-historic victory that meant the total withdrawal of US forces two years ago. Although an international united front against imperialists to which we attached much importance did not materialize as such, socialist countries, anti-imperialist forces and all communist parties expressed in one way or another their support for the people of Vietnam. On the basis of the great, wise and independent struggle of the people of Vietnam themselves, the history of Asia has taken a new turn.

As Mao commented at the meeting, if there were opportunities, we would be able to talk again with each other; the disagreement in opinions between the two parties should not mean severance of relations between the two parties. Unfortunately, however, relations between the two parties have long been discontinued by reason of subsequent mob violence used in Beijing towards a JCP Central Committee member and a Akahata correspondent posted in China, attacks and interference made on the JCP, and support given to those who were expelled from the party because of their factional activities in blindly following China.

Ten years of discontinuation, though not of short duration, is only a brief period of time when viewed against the long years of friendship from when the two parties were formed. When compared with the span of human life, the history of the communist movement and of socialist countries since their beginning cannot be qualified as short; but it could be only a moment when seen against the long history of mankind. Surely the people of each country will be seeking a way they think best, but history will take time to corroborate it.

(*Weekly Asahi*, June 24 , 1977)

MANY POINTS OF AGREEMENT

Opposition to Great-Power Hegemonism

Remarks Made at a Press
Conference after Talks with
President Tito, June 30, 1978

After exchanging greetings I gave my impressions of the report made by President Tito at the 11th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Tito said that the 11th Congress had demonstrated the firm unity of the party and was the most important since the 5th Congress held immediately after Stalin's intervention.

Both Parties Had Struggled against Great-Power Chauvinist Intervention

I said how necessary it was to pay attention to the problem of great-power hegemonism in international politics, as well as in the communist movement throughout the world. I explained how the Japanese Communist Party had struggled against great-power chauvinist intervention and established its line of sovereign independence. In this, the League of Yugoslavia is the forerunner. Intervention in the affairs of the JCP was without parallel; either the government or the communist party of the three big powers—the US armed forces occupation, the Soviet Union, and China had all interfered in the party. Comrade Tito agreed and stressed that the establishment of relations based on independence, equal rights and non-interference in the internal affairs of any other party was essential; he referred to the Yugoslav struggle against interference by the Cominform.

Talking about the time of the Comintern, Tito said that he had met a Japanese representative then. I asked him if his name was Okano. Tito said that it could be. Okano is the pen name of Chairman Sanzo Nosaka of the JCP Central Committee, now 86 years old, the same as Comrade Tito, I said, which deeply impressed him.

Tito to Send Message to World Conference against A and H Bombs

Seeking a total ban on nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament, the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly was held on the initiative of the non-aligned states. The struggle for a total ban on nuclear weapons is extremely important for Japan, the A-bombed country. The big nuclear-weapons-possessing powers are not eager about this, though they do speak about certain partial measures.

But I always emphasize how important it is to make a direct demand for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. On my request to extend cooperation and solidarity as before with the World Conference against A and H Bombs in August, Comrade Tito promised to send a message.

He also stressed the importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy; Yugoslavia has three nuclear power research institutes working very hard. I told him that I had lost my younger brother by the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and that in realizing a non-aligned, neutral Japan, Japan should abrogate the Japan-US military alliance and reject the nuclear umbrella. Comrade Tito laughed, saying that the nuclear umbrella would not even protect from rain, but would in fact invite an atomic bomb.

Defense of Unity of Non-Aligned Movement

We exchanged rather detailed views on the movement of non-alignment. The Foreign Ministers' Conference of Non-Aligned Countries is to be held in Belgrade from July 23, and Comrade Tito said that there could be some difficulties. He went on to say, "There are some disputes between non-aligned countries. Some are even at war with each other. But we must maintain the unity of the movement. Some international forces are inclined to classify non-aligned countries into progressives and non-progressives, but this is not right. Since the first conference of heads of the non-aligned states in 1961 in Belgrade, the movement of non-alignment has developed greatly, and now about two thirds of the member states of the United Nations, more than 100 countries, take part in the conference. In the United Nations we have successfully expanded our strength. At the First Conference, all the non-aligned states confirmed the principles of anti-colonialism, non-interference and economic development, the principles which had been adopted at the Bandung Conference. We will struggle in defense of the unity of the movement of non-aligned countries."

By Negotiations Settle Conflicts Between Asian Socialist Countries

On the international situation, I expressed regret that conflicts between Asian socialist countries were having a negative impact on the Japanese revolutionary movement, and hoped that conflicts could be solved through peaceful negotiations. Comrade Tito, who in his report to the 11th Congress had emphasized the need for the settlement of conflicts by peaceful negotiations, said that this should be taken as a matter of course.

Determined to Change the Current Pattern of "Ten Steps Forward, Two Steps Backward"

Touching on tasks of each country, I explained that our view of the present Japanese movement could be called "Ten Steps Forward, Two Steps Backward". "All indexes of party strength, including votes obtained in national elections, the number of Diet members and of local assembly members, the party membership and the circulation of the organ paper, show that the JCP has developed between ten and fifty times from the time the party split was overcome. This is ten steps forward. Against this, the forces of reaction are launching strong counteroffensives such as the mal-revision of election law, helped by the anti-communist centrist forces. This has led to two recent steps backward. But we are counterattacking and struggling now. We hope you see us surely overcome this problem", I said.

Creatively Seeking Socialist Democracy

We heard explanations of the socialist self-management system in Yugoslavia. There have been many hardships in socialist construction since Yugoslavia's struggle against interference by the Cominform in 1948. The country was even charged with the payment of the debts of the prewar Yugoslav kingdom to foreign countries, but all was completely paid off by 1959. Foreign enterprises in the country had been nationalized.

We maintain the lines of revolution that accords with the condition of Japan as a highly-developed capitalist country, that is to achieve an independent, democratic, peaceful, and

neutral Japan, where the people's living will be improved as we pass through a democratic revolution and a socialist revolution: we will approach such revolutions with the united front forces supported by the majority of the people, and by winning a victory in the Diet. It is very important to keep the power of the working class in socialism unified with socialist democracy. We have the perspective of this. We have paid attention to the creative and active efforts of Yugoslavia, where the level of development was different from Japan, for achieving socialist democracy as much as possible under the socialist self-management system, with 2.50 million delegates represented.

Further Exchange between the Two Parties

As a whole, the talks again showed that there are many common or very close fundamental views between the two parties on international questions. In a very friendly and cordial atmosphere, including our lunch together, we talked in a free and lively way. Although this was our first meeting, already we understood each other's basic stand-points. A film on the battle in Neretova, which was led by Comrade Tito, was also one of our topics. Comrade Tito spoke about negotiations and disputes with Stalin at that time. In trade between Japan and Yugoslavia, the latter's imports being in excess, we said with smile in referring to the exchange between the parties, that our reception by Yugoslavia was also in excess, hoping that visits to Japan by Yugoslav representatives will increase, and that exchanges between the two parties will be consolidated much more. Comrade Tito is a fearless character, and was in high spirits. I was very pleased that we enjoyed such warm and frank talks with him. I believe that my visit to Yugoslavia, so far from Japan, on invitation from Comrade Tito, was very worthwhile.

(*Akahata*, July 2, 1978)

JAPAN-CHINA TREATY AND THE JCP POSITION

Statement Made at a Press Conference on October 16, 1978

Historical Background to Japan-China Relations

There are two aspects of the historical background of Japan-China problems. One is that, in the discussions in our country on Japan-China relations, it has been stressed that Japan has a point of weakness due to its unjust aggression against China in prewar days, and this had led to a tendency to refrain from taking a clear and definite attitude toward the present Chinese policy line.

In the postwar period, especially since 1966, when the "Great Cultural Revolution" began, great-power chauvinism and hegemonism have characterized China's foreign policy in the main. This policy has been directed not only against our party, but against communist parties of other countries. China has claimed that "Mao Zedong's theory guides the world", and has been calling communist parties that exist in Europe "revisionist" or "pseudo-communist". They have gone so far as to organize groups in different countries that blindly follow them. These could be interpreted as hegemonistic acts, a policy that aimed to dominate the destiny of movements of other countries on a pattern of Chinese invention. Claiming that to adopt a line other than the line of armed struggle is revisionism, they tried to split other communist parties. In recent years China has put forward the so-called "Three Worlds" theory, which is the basis of diplomatic activities that classify as good those who favor an anti-Soviet international united front, and those oppose it, as bad. Armed struggles and an anti-Soviet united front, as well as hegemonism based on these two main lines, characterize Chinese foreign policy.

The second of these two aspects has been in operation for more than a decade, and it would be unwise and erroneous to underestimate it. This is our position.

We have therefore insisted on the need for full and serious debate on every issue of the treaty in the light of the existing situation, viewed from the historical background I have given you.

Contradictions between the Japan-China Treaty and the Actual Situation

The Japan-China treaty has two essential pillars. One is, firm support of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the other, opposition to hegemonism. On appearance the treaty regards these two principles as international axioms. These are not points that our party has been doubtful about. The problems we see are in relation to the actual situation. Take "anti-hegemony" as an example. As I have explained, it is necessary to watch carefully to see if Japan will commit itself to the policy line of China.

Historic Significance of the JCP Questioning at the Diet

We have taken a serious view of Chinese interference in the internal affairs of Japan, not merely as a phenomenon, such as their refusal of a visa to a JCP Diet member. What we are concerned with is consistent evidence of interference. In July last year, after the House of Councilors election, Beijing Radio

broadcast what amounted to a call for preparations for armed struggle in Japan. At a reception to a Japanese delegation visiting China in August 1966, after the rupture of my discussion with Mao Zedong, Liao Chengzhi said explicitly: "Some people in Japan say that it is outrageous for China to insist on an armed struggle by the Japanese people...but we do advise the Japanese people to wage an armed struggle...because we are convinced that an armed uprising is the only correct tactic for the Japanese people." The New China News Agency (Shinhua) has also repeatedly said that "the parliamentary road being advertised by the Miyamoto revisionist group should be smashed." (*See Editor's Note 1*)

This is not a question merely between the communist parties of our two countries, but a question deeply affecting the destiny of our people; it is such a serious issue as forcing on the whole Japanese people the adoption of the Chinese line of armed struggle.

The chief reason why they refuse to grant visas to JCP Diet members is that the JCP is opposed to their hegemonism.

On this issue, the Government of Japan has said it will not condone any unjust intervention, and has even promised that it will take decisive action against any such acts, and strive to improve the situation. Only the Japanese Communist Party has raised this issue. Among other opposition parties there is a certain tendency that praises every word spoken by the Chinese side. On the whole, both among political parties and the press in its overreaction to their past collaboration with the war of aggression, there is an attitude of servility, for instance, a tendency to uncritically accept, the so-called "Great Cultural Revolution". It is of historic significance that it is only the Japanese Communist Party that has raised the question of the relationship of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to recent Chinese hegemonistic acts. The logical questioning done by our party held the Government to promise that it would take a resolute attitude on these matters.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

(*Asked if the JCP, on certain conditions, will support the treaty in the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee debate:*)

The vote must be either yes or no, so we prefer yes. But we set out a condition that the points raised by the statement of the Presidium of our party be observed.

(*Asked if he will meet Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping when he visits Japan:*)

That depends upon the attitude of the other party. At the stage when no one can tell what attitude he will take, we can only say that we will never take a servile attitude committing us to take this or that step from our side.

(*Questioned on planned talks between the Chinese Vice-Premier and heads of opposition parties:*)

There seems to be some speculations about this, but it is not appropriate to comment on the question at this stage.

(*Asked if the JCP had never considered abstaining from voting on the treaty:*)

Our party's position was that that depended on the process of the debate. During the debate, Foreign Minister Sonoda, referring to the problem of interference, said that he had requested the Chinese to refrain from expressing support for the violent elements in connection with the Narita Airport issue. He also said that he had asked China to abandon such acts as refusing to grant visas to JCP Diet members. If, in the debate, the government had wholly supported the Chinese attitude in this respect, we would have taken a different attitude. As for the meaning of hegemony, Prime Minister Fukuda took the term in a broad sense, that it includes attempts at political coercion as well as imposition by force. If it were limited only to the use of force, hegemony would apply only to war, and would amount to name only. These two are the points on which we based our decision.

Anti-Hegemony Clause Provides the Rationale By Which to Stop Chinese Hegemonist Acts

(*Asked if there would be any change in the JCP's attitude toward and the evaluation of the Communist Party of China:*)

This depends on future Chinese attitude. At present we are not in a position to reevaluate what we have said on the line of the Communist Party of China.

(*Asked whether the party made a distinction between the relation of states and the relation of communist parties:*)

The two relationships are different, but are inter-related. State-to-state relations are not confined to governmental levels, but represent the attitude toward the peoples concerned. For example, the problem of forcing the Japanese progressive and revolutionary movement to adopt the line that, "Nothing is acceptable except armed struggle" concerns all the Japanese people. In no sense can this be treated as a problem only of relations between communist parties. The worsened relations existing between our two parties are due to the fact that the JCP has refused to yield to the Chinese hegemonist acts toward the Japanese people. Our party categorically rejected such acts, and is thus the strongest antagonist to China. If we had flattered them, they would have welcomed us with great pleasure.

There is a distinction between state relations and party relations, but both sets of relations involve the people. Both relationships are separate, but interrelated. It was in taking this distinction and interrelation into account that we raised questions in the Diet and made our decision.

Therefore our party decision does not mean that we regard every problem of relations between our two parties to have been resolved. Concerning the anti-hegemony clause, put into the treaty on Chinese insistence, although China aimed by this to form an anti-Soviet united front, they have undertaken not to act to establish hegemony. Now that China has agreed to the treaty on these terms, we have grounds for demanding that China should not commit hegemonist acts. In this sense we have no reason to take a passive attitude, seeing a situation that is difficult to deal with because of the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause in the treaty; rather we should make use of this provision as a strict standard that will not allow China to adopt hegemonistic attitudes toward Japanese movements.

(Asked about tangible perspectives relating to Chairman Miyamoto's answer, that future relationships between the two parties depend upon the attitude of the Chinese party:)

The Chinese side has still continued to refuse to consider our party representatives taking part in official delegations to

China, not even waiting for technical procedures on issuing visas. There is nothing to indicate any change in the Chinese attitude.

The cause of rupture of relationships between the two parties has already been made clear by the judgment of history. The rupture of our bilateral talks occured because we did not agree to the Chinese line of establishing an international united front directed, by name, against the Soviet Union. The signed treaty does not include the word "anti-Soviet". It was not by such abstract words as "opposition to hegemony" that our Chinese counterpart demanded our concurrence in a joint communiqué in 1966. The fact is that the Chinese side tried to impose on us something that would be wholly unacceptable today in international relations.

The rupture of relations between our two parties also took place in an abnormal way. Previously they had been saying that our party Program was fine; then suddenly they changed their minds and began to say "nothing is valid except armed struggle." The Chinese side went so far as to try to force our party to adopt the theory of Chinese-style people's war, claiming that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" or "Lay siege to the cities from the countryside", as advocated by Lin Biao. These are the slogans they put over Beijing Radio and through other media. (*See Editor's Note 2*)

In the course of these developments, the representative of our party and the Akahata correspondent in Beijing were subjected to mass terrorism at Beijing Airport and were deported; the Akahata correspondent suffered broken ribs. These were the outrageous means used in the rupture of our bilateral relationships.

Judging from this, there is no reason for us to hesitate. If they wish to talk with us, we would not of course take the attitude of rejecting them without consideration.

Based on Independent Position, We Will Demand Faithful Implementation of the Japan-China Treaty

(Asked if the JCP bears any responsibility to the treaty now that it favors it:)

The party would bear the responsibility of watching the observance of and promoting the implementation of the anti-hegemony principle and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which are the essential points of the treaty. Even though contradictions between these principles and actualities exist, the principles themselves are good. But there is no reason to support the Chinese policy line unconditionally, or to agree with them in everything. It is important to monitor the future process to see that the provisions of the treaty are implemented in sincerity. That's what we are responsible for.

(Asked whether the support of the treaty by the JCP, even with conditions, did not mean that the JCP appreciated the treaty, as in the Diet a vote being taken on a for or against basis:)

The party is in favor of the provisions of the treaty. We will correct any practical distortions by applying the principles laid down in the treaty. This is what we mean by favoring the treaty with certain conditions. So we will be attentively observing what attitudes China is taking. This means that our party will have an independent free hand.

This is the only way we can strive for total and sincere implementation of the treaty. We are qualified to do that. Now that our party has favored the treaty, we bear the responsibility of demanding that both Governments literally fulfill the

correct and overall provisions of the treaty.

Editor's Notes:

1) Imposition of armed struggle by the New China News Agency:

The NCNA on December 12, 1968 said, "The Japanese people have broken through the frameworks of legalism, and fought a battle with the enemy courageously with clubs, stones and sickles in hands. The Japanese people have to smash the 'parliamentary road' which the Miyamoto revisionist group is crying for, and firmly maintain the Marxist-Leninist road of violent revolution..... The truth, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun', is putting down its roots each passing day in the workers, peasants and revolutionary masses."

2) The theory of Chinese-style people's war:

This was claimed by Lin Piao in his article in September 1965, "Long Live Victory in the People's War". In this article, Lin made it absolute that the only way to attain power is to go through a "revolution by force". He made absolute the tactics of sieging the cities by long armed struggles from the stronghold of the countryside and finally taking them over, claiming that this is the road that should be followed by revolutionary movements of the world under all circumstances.

(*Akahata*, October 17, 1978)

ESSENTIAL POINTS IN THE JCP-CPSU TALKS

On the Joint Statement between Both Parties

Statement made at a press conference
in Moscow on December 24, 1979

Great Significance of the Talks

I think that, taken as a whole, there is great significance in the talks which we have held at this time.

First, the normalization of relations, which were disrupted in the past by the Shiga problem: This was the first and foremost purpose of the talks. This was the point confirmed by both sides in the official talks. And in the same spirit, on the question of the split that occurred, related to this problem of the past, in the mass movements, including the movement against atomic and hydrogen bombs and the Japan-Soviet friendship movement, both sides agreed to make efforts to reunify and develop these movements.

The second question deals with the world situation and questions of Asia and Indochina: both parties are opposed to the Japan-US military alliance, which is a point of agreement. There are a number of other points of agreement, as, for example, the movement for a total ban on nuclear weapons and opposition to the nuclear arms race.

Thirdly, the question of the international communist movement. It was clearly emphasized that each party has the right to decide independently its own policy line, and to adopt an independent line without any outside interference on such questions as the ways of transition to socialism, and the building of socialism and communism. This point has been made

repeatedly in words only, but confusions that arose in the international communist movement over these ten years and more actually reveal that the root cause of such confusion is the attempt to establish hegemonism, a point which I stressed in the talks. This is also included in the joint statement as an essential point, though not as a lengthy statement.

Finally, questions concerning relations between the two countries and peoples. As you may well know, much attention has been focused on the so-called territorial issue. This question has come to a complete deadlock in relations between the Japanese and Soviet governments. For several years now it has been emphasized that this issue has already been settled. In the nearly ten hours of talks, I spoke some five hours and, half of my time was devoted to this issue. I took up all arguments of the past: the proceedings from the historic Shimoda Treaty to the Chishima (Kurile) Islands-Sakhalin Exchange Treaty; the question of the nature of the Second World War; the question of the definition of "non-territorial expansion" as expressed in the Cairo declaration, the Yalta agreement and the Potsdam declaration; the series of negotiations on this issue between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the postwar period; questions taken up in bilateral talks, such as the agreement on the issue of the southern Chishima Islands reached between the two parties when I was in Moscow in 1959, and the proposal we made on the Habomai and Shikotan islands question when I came here in 1971. In dealing with the relations between the two governments I took up the accord set out in the Japan-Soviet joint declaration, that Habomai and Shikotan Islands would be returned to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the various official statements made on this issue, including the assurances that negotiations would be held for concluding a peace treaty, which would include negotiations on the so-called territorial issue. One recent example is the talks held between L.I. Brezhnev and Kakuei Tanaka, in which the two parties reached agreement that problems that had remained unsettled since World War II would be resolved and a peace treaty would be concluded. This agreement remained valid until the Miyazawa-Gromyko talks were held in January, 1976, but since then this agreement has not been reconfirmed.

The Return of Habomai and Shikotan Islands, And Our New Proposal for an Interim Treaty

The present situation is marked by the repeated assertion that this issue has already been settled.

While this is the situation, our basic position is this: We are not representatives of the government, nor do we have power; we therefore are not in a position to solve definitely the issues existing between States; but this issue is not a mere problem between the two governments; it is an issue vital to the development of friendly relations between our two peoples and countries. For this reason, because we as a party to represent the desires of the people, we must take up this issue for discussion between our two parties.

Of course such vulgar arguments as "you are not the government, so it is of no use..." and "the parties have no right to negotiate such an issue", have often been made. But this is beside the point. So we made a new proposal, clarifying the position as I have just stated, on the premise that taking up the issue in party-to-party relations has significant value.

Habomai and Shikotan Islands are not part of the Chishima Islands, the right to which the Japanese government renounced by concluding the San Francisco Treaty. These islands are part of Hokkaido. As I have said, they are the islands which the Soviet Union agreed to return at some time. It is within

this context that we made a new proposal that an interim treaty be concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union. What is such an interim treaty? In brief, it would not embody the ultimate goals of a peace treaty, but would aim at consolidating friendship and goodwill at this stage. The Soviet side has offered a good-neighbor and cooperation treaty. Although we do not acknowledge all the provisions set out in that proposed treaty, we claim that the conclusion of such an interim treaty and the question of the return of Habomai and Shikotan islands should be negotiated in one package, which could be very important in resolving the issue in a forward-looking way.

In considering the return of Habomai and Shikotan islands, what the other side emphasizes more than any other question is: "If we return these islands, they will be used for military bases"; and further, "These islands could be used for an attack on the Soviet Union." They noticed that they "cancelled the return of islands" because the Japan-US Security Treaty had been adversely revised, and the islands "would be used for military bases." Then, they should not be used, nor be allowed to be used for military bases. Neither the Japanese Self-Defense Forces nor the US forces should use them. These islands should be kept out of the coverage by the Security Treaty. Against such assurances, these islands should be returned. And at the same time as for a good-neighborhood and cooperation treaty they propose,—which includes items we cannot approve, for example, one providing for necessary consultations on threats, although they do not mean so much as military consultations—we have proposed to put those awkward points aside and discuss an interim treaty to be concluded in one package. This is a new and unprecedented proposal that we have just made in the talks.

The Soviet side requested us to support the proposed good-neighborhood and cooperation treaty. We made our new proposal from the stand point that progress could be expected if justice and reason prevail, because it intends peace between our two countries and to break the present difficult deadlock in a positive way and also because it has nothing to do with the article on renunciation of Chishima Islands signed by the Japanese Government.

In the discussions on the territorial question, two reasons were advanced by the Soviet side. One was the treaty for postwar disposal, particularly the document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This means that, viewed in the spirit of that document, a reference to the territorial question would touch off territorial issues in every part of the world. It would therefore be injudicious to open up the issue of territorial questions in the Far East.

The other reason is that Japan, the United States and China are tightening the encirclement of the Soviet Union, using the Japan-US military alliance as the core. The Soviet Union is placing great importance on this point. In these circumstances, they say that though Habomai and Shikotan are very small islands, if they are to be returned they will be returned to the Japanese Government with the consequent danger that they would be made into a strategic stronghold, aimed at attacking the Soviet Union, with a military buildup that threatens the security of the Soviet Union. These are their two major reasons.

Fundamental Discussion on Territorial Problem

In the talks, we made a fresh approach. We took up the territorial problem in a more fundamental way. The Soviet attitude is that "the problem is already settled"; but the Japanese Government is calling for the return of the islands

even though the claim was officially renounced. As we see it, unless new clear theoretical light is thrown on this problem, it cannot be expected that progress will be made. The clearest fact which no one can deny is that, even though World War II is over, no agreement has ever been reached on the demarcation of the borders between Japan and the USSR.

Since 1946, the USSR has incorporated into its territory the land it occupied at the end of the war. Thus, seen from the Soviet standpoint, the Soviets maintain that insofar as the land has been so incorporated, the "territorial problem is already settled." From the viewpoint of disposal of all World War II issues, however, it can be said that no agreement on postwar borders has been reached between two belligerents in the war, Japan and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the historical fact is that the two countries have no demarcated boundaries between them, and that to demarcate such borders is nothing less than the territorial issue. This is not a problem of difference of opinion, but an undeniable objective fact. The history of the numerous governmental negotiations after the war provides firm evidence of this.

So, in the discussion we emphasized the following: the sudden Soviet statement that "the problem is already settled" carries no persuasion, and is an attitude that only provides a good excuse for the reactionary forces who are trying to exploit this problem to estrange Japan and the Soviet Union from each other; so the Soviet Union should not take the attitude of "having no ears to listen", but should take the attitude of listening seriously.

Europe has fundamentally determined its borders, which is markedly different from (the Japanese situation). In addition, Europe has the final document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. But in the Far East, since the border between Japan and the USSR has never been demarcated, this question has had to be taken up repeatedly. The demand we are making is not unreasonable, because it is not that we are abruptly claiming the return of any territory which Japan once agreed that the Soviet Union should incorporate. We are not deliberately stirring up trouble by asking for a change of determined borders, such as exist in Europe. On the contrary, as long as there is no agreement on borders it will perpetuate the present instability.

We have studied in detail the final document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (signed on August 1, 1975). It has a clause saying that sovereignty and equality, and rights inherent in sovereignty, shall be respected, and of course there is a clause also assuring the territorial integrity of states, i.e., the inviolability of borders. The former clause provides that "the participating countries consider that the border may be changed in accordance with international law, and by peaceful means and agreement." In other words, the document on the security in Europe promises that, even after a border has been determined, room is left for peaceful negotiations on border changes.

Continuing Exchanges of Opinions Toward Signing of Peace Treaty

It is a fact that between Japan and the USSR no borders have been demarcated. So we told the Soviet side that this problem must necessarily be raised; and that the best way to maintain the security of our two countries is to persuade the Japanese people so that a majority of them will be convinced that clearly the Soviet attitude toward Japan is one of goodwill, and that "solution by the USSR is based on reason." In a heated discussion, we also presented our views about the US return of Okinawa to Japan, saying that the United States had decided that for stabilizing the Japan-US military alliance the core spot should be removed.

The conclusion reached in the discussion between the two parties on this problem is that, though the opinions were expressed by the two parties, the exchange of opinions will continue, based on the shared hope of the two parties that a peace treaty will be signed, a hope which is expressed in the joint statement issued by the two parties. It can thus be said that the Soviet Union did not take the attitude of "having no ears to listen", but took a listening attitude, with the assurance that the Soviet Union will continue to have listening ears. This is a most important advance made in the discussion on this problem.

From this explanation on a clause of the joint statement, "Both sides recognized that the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and USSR will.....", you will be able to understand that the future exchange of opinions should cover the problem of "relations between the two countries", "the territorial problem", and a "Japan-USSR peace treaty".

Adding to this, I must take up one more clause, "Proceeding from the accord reached between the two parties, it was agreed by both sides that, when necessary in the future, issues of mutual interest to both, and questions concerning relations between the two parties and countries would be discussed." While the USSR and the Japanese Governments have talked at cross-purposes on this problem—the former saying that the problem is already settled, the latter that the four islands must be returned in one package, we were able to reach agreement, based on the standpoint and theoretical views I have set out above. In this same connection, I want to remind you of a statement I often made before my visit to the USSR; I said, "the Soviet side will not take an attitude of having no ears to listen, if we speak in terms of socialists."

Speaking in Terms of Socialists

In the talks we told the Soviet side repeatedly that, as the things are so on so, if it should take an attitude of "having no ears to listen", it would lose the understanding of the Japanese people. So when I spent nearly two and a half hours of my speech on this (territorial) problem, the Soviet side said, "we have listened to you carefully and patiently. This is the evidence that we have ears to listen", which provoked a burst of laughter. Then whether we have ears to listen or not was taken up as a topic in the discussion time and again. Eventually, the two parties confirmed that they would continue to exchange opinions with ears that listen carefully.

— *Mr. Chairman, who said that?*

One of influential leaders of the CPSU. That's all for now. The remarks are recorded in the protocol. There was no opposition to our argument that the border has not been determined, and therefore the territorial problem still exists between our two countries, though interpretations on the issue vary. That the Soviet Union took the procedure to incorporate the land into its territory is one thing, and that the border should be determined by an agreement between Japan and the USSR is quite another. In Japan, too, this question is not understood enough. The two countries have bandied words about it; one says, "You must return the land", and the other says, "We will not return it". This is not the right way to deal with the matter; fundamentally, the disposition of World War II has not been completed, and settling the territorial problem is nothing less than completing such disposition. In this connection we are

faced with delicate and complicated questions. It is well known that Japan renounced its claim to the Chishima Islands by the San Francisco Treaty, and is maintaining a military alliance with the United States; and meanwhile, the Soviet Union has incorporated militarily occupied land into its territory.

On Three Positive Viewpoints

Our positive view on this problem, as seen from my explanation, is made up of three parts:

The first is the problem of Habomai and Shikotan Islands. As we see it, from every point of view, these islands should duly be returned to Japan at once. If this were done independently, it would be best; and from the viewpoint of mutual cooperation between the two countries, it is possible that the return could be negotiated along with a good-neighborhood and cooperation treaty, an interim treaty.

The second is the problem of the southern Chishimas. It is true that the Southern Chishimas are part of the Chishima Islands the claim of which the Japanese Government renounced. But, in 1959 when we were in the Soviet Union, agreement was reached that a new approach would be possible on the southern Chishimas when a democratic Japan is built in the future. We did not take up this problem then in relation to Japan renouncing Article 2, C of the San Francisco Treaty. Our standpoint was that, in the light of the Shimoda Treaty, the Southern Chishimas are properly Japan's own territory, never having been the territory of any other country. Our standpoint in 1959 was right, and even now, since the Southern Chishimas have never been foreign territory, we can make the same case, irrespective of whether the Japanese Government renounced the Chishima Islands or not, from a truly lofty standpoint, and on the ground that the southern Chishimas will never become a military threat if they are returned when Japan is built as a peaceful state; rather, the return will become evidence of Japan-USSR friendship and good-will.

The third is the theoretical foundation we presented in 1969 for reversion of all the Chishima Islands. Legally, there can be no international basis for the claim unless Article 2, C of the San Francisco Treaty is abolished. These are the three theoretical points in our views, although in the practical sense, it will take a long time for a Government that could put our argument into practice to take office.

In our talks at this time, we not only presented these three viewpoints, but also made the concrete proposals I have referred to. In the course of our discussions, the two parties confirmed finally that an effort must be made to speed up the exchange of opinions and the signing of a peace treaty.

It is clear that the two parties did not discuss these territorial issues at cross-purposes. The talks were placed firmly on the track, and the Soviet side opened its heart wider and had ears to listen more carefully than in previous government-level talks.

Stance for True Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the USSR

Both dealing with the Soviet proposal for a good-neighborhood and cooperation treaty, and our proposed simultaneous negotiations on the return of Habomai and Shikotan Islands, and the signing of an interim treaty, are very big issues. It is impossible that after a brief discussion, we could say, "All right. Let's start to work from tomorrow." But it is also true that the Soviet side did not act as it had done against some reactionary forces. The Soviet side said that it understood well the motive of the Japanese Communist Party in making pro-

posals with its consistent aim of establishing permanent peace and friendship between Japan and the USSR. The discussion was heated, but never abusive. Thus it can be said that even this most difficult problem was discussed in a frank, comradely and friendly atmosphere.

Progress in Problems of Fishing, Visits to Graves, And the Gathering of Ashes of the Dead

The party had studied other problems too, and were able to make seven or eight demands relating to fishing, visits to graves, the gathering of ashes, and other matters. These are, so to speak, reformist demands. Since they were not big issues like the territorial one, the Soviet side showed an as-active-as-possible attitude toward them. The Soviet side said that such demands are welcome, and encouraged us to raise them at once with the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and the Fishery Ministry. These problems were, so to speak, administrative, and some could be settled at once by telephone. For example, the Soviet side called up, I imagine, a chief of a border guard unit, asking him whether or not Japanese fishing detainees could be released at the request of the JCP delegation. Probably the chief said at once, "OK. I will do my best to meet the request."

When I made these requests to the Soviet side, I cited Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng saying, in the talks with Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira who visited China, that visits to graves are quite welcome. In future, we can expect that a business-like improvement will be made in dealing with such problems. The problem of kelp harvesting around Kaigara-jima Island has also been at a deadlock. Hearing opinions from fishing cooperatives in Hokkaido, we proposed to the Soviet side an en-bloc-registeration system. We expect that an improvement will be made on this and other problems.

(*Akahata*, December 27, 1979)

ON AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER PROBLEMS

Letter to CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev,
June 17, 1980

It is now more than half a year since the talks between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were held toward the end of last year. In our talks, seeking the resolution of past interferences, and in the interest of independence, equality, and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other side, it was agreed to oppose any act that sought privilege or hegemony, and strive for a ban on nuclear weapons, for disarmament, and the achievement of world peace; to oppose the "export of revolution" and the "export of counterrevolution", and continue our two party negotiations for the signing of a Japan-USSR peace treaty. The talks have proved to be internationally important as well. To our great surprise, however, armed intervention by Soviet troops in Afghanistan took place immediately after we came home; which, needless to say, was a great shock to the world. On this question, we have more than once made clear our criticism, and we expressed our frank opinion to the CPSU delegate to the 15th JCP Congress. Taking into consideration what has occurred thereafter, and regarding it as necessary that we express our frank opinion again to you, I send you this letter.

The situation in Afghanistan is now helplessly mired down, with increasing criticism and resistance by the Afghan people to the intervention by Soviet forces, and interference in their internal affairs, leading to correspondingly escalated Soviet armed intervention. It is recognized that the maneuvers of the

US and China in sending guerrillas into Afghanistan have contributed to the complicated situation there; but there is no doubt that last year's unreasonable intervention by Soviet troops is the main cause of the present bogged-down situation. At the same time, no international solution to the issue has been found. Many people of goodwill in Japan are deeply concerned about this matter, and hope that it will be resolved as urgently as possible.

After we were informed by you on this issue on December 28, 1979, we asked you what relations there were between the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and the December coup d'état in Afghanistan. To our regret, no adequate reply has been received.

In your information to the JCP, you claimed that the armed intervention was based on the "Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness, and Cooperation" signed between the USSR and Afghanistan, a step which was taken in response to the call of the new Government of Afghanistan. But various facts provide evidence that you, taking advantage of the past call of the Afghan Government for military assistance, carried through a coup d'état by your military intervention, to overthrow the Amin administration, which had lost favor, and brought one of your own selection to power.

Needless to say, this is a most outrageous violation of the right of Afghanistan to national self-determination. We have stated that your troops should be withdrawn immediately from all Afghan territory so that the destiny of Afghanistan can be decided by the Afghan people themselves. The Afghanistan problem is becoming more deeply bogged down, and we therefore emphasize again this demand as an increasingly urgent one.

Of course, the right to national self-determination of Afghanistan must be defended from intervention by any country or force, and the governments of the United States and China should also stop all forms of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. But intervention by these countries can never be used to justify your involvement and intervention in Afghanistan's internal affairs. In so far as you stand by the cause of socialism and communism, you are urged to withdraw your troops from Afghanistan immediately, without perpetuating the error of this interference in internal affairs and violating further the right to self-determination. We are sure that this is the way to a correct solution of the problem of Afghanistan, and will serve to enhance the prestige of socialism.

There is scarcely any need to quote from the works of Marx, Engels or Lenin to show that respect for the right to self-determination of other nations is a fundamental principle of scientific socialism and the socialist cause. Full respect for the right to self-determination and peace on this basis should be a primary principle of foreign policy. Furthermore, full respect for the right of nations to self-determination is an essential prerequisite for true internationalism.

As is well-known, in spite of the unprecedented difficulties that faced the Soviet Union immediately after the victory of the 1917 Russian Revolution, Lenin consistently attached importance to the general interests of the common cause of socialism and national liberation, and renounced all inequitable treaties between Czarist Russia and other countries, to clarify the attitude of defending the national interests of other nations and the sovereignty of other countries. Actually he took unconditional steps, including the reversion of territories that Czarist Russia had taken from neighboring countries and the renunciation of the privileges Russia had exercised over those countries. The steps included the return of territory to Afghanistan, then a kingdom. This is an example that really conforms to the principles of scientific socialism. In fact, Lenin's foreign policy line helped to increase the trust in socialism by the peoples of neighboring countries and the working people of the world, and tremendously inspired the struggle of the world people against imperialism.

In his article "Socialism and War", Lenin said, "It is therefore impossible to fight for the socialist international revolution against imperialism unless the right of nations to self-determination is recognized." By harming the cause of socialism, your present attitude toward Afghanistan is giving US imperialism and other reactionary forces an excuse for their intensified attacks, including direct armed intervention in the Middle East, the expansion and strengthening of their military blocs, and arms expansion, and at the same time, it is a heavy blow on the "socialist international revolution", as mentioned by Lenin, and on the forces all over the world that are striving for progress, democracy and peace.

With the territorial issue between Japan and the Soviet Union still unsettled, and with the problem of Soviet military bases in those areas, an argument has been put forward about a "threat from the Soviet Union". Recently, it has been reported that even a detailed operational plan to counter invading Soviet forces in Japan was made by Japan-US military circles. Now the strengthening of the Japan-US military alliance for aggression and arms buildup, including the strengthening of Japan as a stronghold for interference in areas that include the Middle East, are being actively promoted. This idea is prevailing among opposition parties here, including even the Socialist Party, with the exception of only the Communist Party; it means approving or strengthening the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Self-Defense Forces. Alliance-like relations between Japan, the US and China are being advanced rapidly, on the basis of the Japan-US military alliance.

In fact, the maneuver for strengthening the military bloc

and increasing tensions, using the pretext of the Afghan issue, has now reached a most dangerous stage for Japan and for the world, in the present international situation following the debacle of the United States in its war of aggression against Vietnam. We are therefore convinced that to settle the Afghan issue has become a very urgent international task. Along with settling this issue as soon as possible, it is also urgent that a banner be raised, to call for dissolution of all military blocs, in order to end the policy of military blocs itself, and end the arms race now being accelerated by imperialism.

We place importance on the fact that those concerned with the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which was forced into existence to counter the establishment of NATO after World War II, argued for the simultaneous dissolution of both military blocs. We also place importance on the fact that in connection with the US imperialist arms race, the Soviet Government in the UN and in other arenas demanded a total ban on nuclear weapons. In the present circumstance of the vicious circle of the arms race, which includes military blocs and nuclear weapons, we urge that the initiative be taken for the dissolution of all military blocs, for a total ban on nuclear weapons and for general disarmament, and that how the true image of socialism in defense of peace should be shown to the world's people.

We strongly ask, in connection with the above matter, that you take up the territorial issue between Japan and the Soviet Union. We strongly request you to take a positive peace initiative on this unsettled territorial issue, which is inseparable from the signing of a peace treaty; our two parties in last year's talks agreed to continue discussions on this, and on the question of military bases on territories in dispute. The JCP is the only party in Japan that stands for the abrogation of the Japan-US Security Treaty and the removal of US military bases. We are convinced that this demand is in harmony with the genuine interests of the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people, and we believe that an initiative by you would be in the interests of the security of your land and your people.

We again place this proposition before you, calling for your initiative on these matters for the sake of the general interests of the world revolutionary forces, the anti-imperialist democratic forces and those forces seeking social progress and peace. Your positive initiative will contribute to establish stable friendly relations between our two countries: above all, we ask for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. We propose that frank discussions be held soon on the issues we raised in this letter, with the participation of suitable level of representatives of both parties.

(*Akahata,* June 18, 1980)

PUBLICATION OF "FOR A TRUE PEACE PROGRAM"

From statement at a press conference, June 30, 1981

In the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee (15th Congress), I said that we would issue a "Peace Program", and when I met press corps covering opposition parties at NHK, I told you we hoped the program would be ready before the election. Though a little late it is ready now, and you will find it has an explanatory paper with it. Therefore, it is meaningless for me only to read it to you. I want you to read it for yourselves, so I intend only to touch briefly on the background from which this peace program was issued.

A Common Banner for World Peace

The opening of the paper points out how extremely aggravated international tension is, with an actual war going on in the Middle East. The Reagan Administration is engaged in dangerous policies involving an extensive build-up of US military power and tighter military alliances. The Soviet Union shows no sign of reflection over its military intervention in Afghanistan, and now Poland is feeling Soviet political pressure, leading to a controversy over this issue between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The question of war and peace is now very much in everyone's mind.

Unfortunately, those who view the situation in broad perspective are very few, who go deeply into the issues involved in an attempt to find the key by which to unlock them, a way that all the world could take. There is the World Peace Council, which has long put forward logical demands, including a total ban on nuclear weapons and the abolition of military blocs. But it is not pressing these demands at present.

In addition, looking at the various world democratic movements, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, we find among other matters that on the agenda for its council meeting from July 1 they have laudatory comments on the Brezhnev proposal made at the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The Executive Committee of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Executive Committee of the World Federation of Scientific Workers and the Women's International Democratic Federation have all joined in praise of the Brezhnev report.

To regret there is not one world-wide movement which criticizes not only US imperialism, but also the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and shows the way to a just peace, drastic disarmament, a total ban on nuclear weapons, dissolution of military blocs and defense of the right of nations to self-determination. If we look at the different communist parties of the world, we find that some European parties, including those of Italy and Spain, and in Latin America the Mexican party, are doing this, but in the arena of the world peace movement, there is no genuinely common banner hoisted yet. The Soviet Union is pressing the wrong line internationally, calling for support of the Soviet position, and a substantial number of organizations are falling into line.

To speak in more concrete terms, the CPSU sent a letter to other parties, including the JCP, and this created quite a stir. In this context and the present situation, the JCP has to consider the historic and actual position in which Japan is placed. The national principle of Japan is the rejection of nuclear weapons; Japan is an atom-bombed country, but an important foothold for US strategy being followed in Asia and a big economic

power. So our party has resolutely proposed a program consistent with that position that draw world attention. We sent a reply to the CPSU after receiving their letter, and at the same time we thought that we should take the responsibility of presenting on our own behalf a program for world peace; so we began drafting it.

Let me say one more thing. At each Party Congress we have always defined international policy, dealing with relations with the parties of other countries, the struggle against interference by foreign parties, and other basic questions, including the problem of peace and war. This is, however, the first time for us to narrow down the theme to the precise problem of war and peace, and to make a forceful proposal in the form of a "Peace Program".

Analysis of Present Cold War Policy

The statement on our Peace Program is too lengthy for me to go into it now, but it is based on the deep and detailed analysis we have done on United States policy. After its defeat in Vietnam and other parts of Indochina, the United States then lost the important position it held in the Middle East, as a result of the revolution in Iran. The roll-back policy began then under Carter. Although after the setback from Indochina the United States asserted that it would not repeat the mistake made there, its policy was tightened after losing Shah Pahlavi in the Iranian revolution. Consistent with this, the United States government policy meant increased tension, a historical fact even before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The military intervention in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union provided another excuse for the United States to expand its tension-increasing policy.

And faced with decline in its historical position, the United

States then launched a number of offensives to which it mobilized Japan and other allies. It is in the nature of a new version of its cold war policy. It mobilizes all its allies on a simultaneous contingencies strategy, not merely as anti-Soviet deterrence, but as attacks on the Soviet Union on every pretext, wherever there is a conflict of interests with the Soviet Union. This is one of the main causes of the increased tension.

Soviet Rationalization of Aggression And Military Buildup

The other question relates to "world peace, the right to national self-determination, and the Soviet military interference in Afghanistan", which is dealt with in Chapter 3. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, coming after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, was an unfortunate error, which provided the imperialist camp with a reason for a further military buildup. The Soviets have not reviewed this action as an error but attempt to get others to accept its rationalized argument. Our Peace Program goes thoroughly into this issue, charging that the invasion of Afghanistan amounts to a departure from the way of socialism, the road of Lenin.

Another question we raise is that the Soviet Union is following a policy of "equilibrium of military strength", i.e. "balance of power". This was originally an imperialist argument to justify the expansion of armaments. In the CPSU Congress held last year, the original points made by the peace movement, including the demand for a total ban on nuclear weapons and for dissolution of military blocs, were all omitted. Rationalization of the military intervention and the rationalization of its own military buildup are two characteristic points of that Congress.

On the Polish question as well, although the Soviet Union

has not been guilty of military intervention in Poland, it has never said that it will not invade Poland. At the Congress of the Czechoslovak party, Brezhnev rationalized and praised the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak side responded favorably to his statements. The JCP has consistently argued and opposed this attitude. But it has never been said that no military intervention will be made in Poland. Nevertheless, every effort is being made to help the pro-Soviet faction survive the Polish party congress. These errors come into the category of great-power chauvinism; and we go further and say that the military intervention in Afghanistan amounts to social imperialism, that although the Soviet Union is a socialist country, its action is "social imperialism" in the sense that it acts in an imperialist way. It is one of the main causes of the increased international tension and the arms race. We made no reservation in analyzing this point fully and clearly.

Brezhnev recently issued a "Peace Appeal" in the name of the Supreme Soviet, to which large space was given in Mainichi Shimbun. The appeal was addressed to the parliaments of other countries in a restrained tone compared with the report given to the CPSU Congress. On careful reading, we see from the appeal that the Soviet Union will agree to reduction or prohibition of any weapon, which would include a ban on nuclear weapons also. But the appeal is clearly linked with the report to the 26th CPSU Congress, from which it can be concluded that there is no fundamental change of course. These are two factors leading to the intensification of tension.

The Origin of the Ongoing Arms Race

The origin of the present arms race can be traced to nuclear arms buildup linked with conventional weapons. The seriousness of this issue is seen in the report of UN Secretary-General

Kurt Waldheim, and proceedings in UN sessions. The overwhelming majority of member states are condemning the nuclear arms race, the use of nuclear weapons and their introduction, but the major powers take no account of this.

It is interesting to note that the recently formed French Government under an agreement between the French Communist Party and the Socialist Party on cooperation at government level, referred to "dissolution of military blocs", and spoke about what should be said on the issues of Afghanistan and Poland. The circumstances are that moves calling for a halt to the nuclear arms race are gathering much more strength in the various struggles going on in Europe against nuclear weapons.

In Japan, the nuclear umbrella theory is called in question, and if the Japanese Government follows the policy of military blocs in keeping with nuclear-weapons states, Japan of course will become part of the global nuclear strategy. This is the point Professor Toshiyuki Toyoda is emphasizing, which is included in our document in elucidating the question of the arms race.

In the Peace Program, reference is made to China, which has ceased to emphasize the need for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons and the abolition of military blocs. On the contrary, China, together with the US-led military bloc, has gone so far as to strengthen its strategy against the Soviet Union. There were some factors that led to the disputes between China and Vietnam, but it was China that invaded Vietnam. In this same context, it has made errors in supporting US imperialist military strategy, and intervening in other countries, including chauvinistic intervention in the JCP. One weak point in the struggle for world peace is that socialist big powers are engaged in inappropriate actions.

Defense of National Sovereignty Is Fundamental to World Peace

The section on "substance of a peace program as needed today" is made up of seven points. Characteristically, it first takes up opposition to all forms of aggression against other nations and the defense of the right of nations to self-determination. It is clearly understood that the peace movement aims at disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons; but the right of nations to self-determination is also a matter of great importance, because national sovereignty was violated in the circumstances I have referred to. The JCP cites and condemns the invasions of Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia; the United States has intervened in El Salvador. From this angle, the JCP Peace Program first takes up opposition to all aggression against other nations. It emphasizes the need to withdraw all foreign forces from the Middle East, and the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In cases of aggression against other countries, factions of parties were used, and invasion justified on the grounds that the sending of troops had been requested. Because of this the JCP has emphasized that the promotion of factions within progressive and communist parties is not merely a question between parties, but is a very serious issue in that it serves as a strongpoint and excuse for aggression.

Chapter 7, "Resolution of conflicts by negotiations" sets out a natural prerequisite for international peace. This is the only way the war between Iran and Iraq can be resolved. It is again emphasized that for Japan it is very important that the early returns of Chishima islands, Habomai and Shikotan etc., be realized by peaceful negotiations. In the joint statement issued when I visited the Soviet Union, it was promised that talks on the early return of these islands would be held with a view to concluding a peace treaty. But an Izvestia reporter claims that

Hokkaido was originally territory of the Soviet Union, an open history. He went so far as to say that Russia concluded the Shimoda agreement under a threat from Japan.

Following the total occupation of Japan by the United States, Japan, the only atom-bombed country, has been turned into an Asian stronghold of the military bloc under the United States. Taking into account Japan's international role, the Peace Program concludes with emphasis that the question of Japan becoming a non-nuclear and non-aligned country free from nuclear weapons and a non-participant in any military bloc by abrogation of the Japan-US Security Treaty, is the task of the progressive forces and all the Japanese people. This is but a brief explanation, setting out the points of the "For a True Peace Program".

If you have any questions I am ready to answer them.

IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS FROM REPORTERS

— Regarding the question of the Soviet error of invasion of Afghanistan, you used the term, "Social Imperialism". Is this term used for the first time or has it ever been used before?

No. The JCP has not previously used it. This is the first time.

— Mr. Chairman, you said that the JCP felt the responsibility for setting out its own Program because of the Soviet letter. In your Peace Program are there views that challenge the Soviet Peace Program?

"For a True Peace Program" should be seen as a comprehensive and principled one. The points mentioned in it had

already appeared in JCP policies, but after reading the Soviet letter, I felt it was necessary that the points be summed up as a "Peace Program".

It was named a "Peace Program", partly because of the Soviet proposals, but actually it was decided about half a year ago that the JCP should issue an article that deeply analyzed the problems of world peace, because the international situation had become more complicated after the Afghan issue.

As the article is long and voluminous, many preparations had to be made, and when the manuscripts were completed, it was not possible to make it public immediately. It was a long time before the work was completed. This kind of title was adopted after taking into account the need for the JCP to prepare the article as its own "Peace Program", international in character. As an article on peace it has been part of our work program since the beginning of this year.

— Will this "Peace Program" be distributed to communist parties of other countries?

This kind of the JCP article on international problems is read overseas with great enthusiasm, and it is natural that this article should be translated without delay. It will be carried by the "Bulletin" (English, French, and Spanish versions) published systematically, and will be sent out throughout the world.

— What is the meaning of "For" in the title of the "For a True Peace Program"?

Well, this could be called a rather modest expression. It is modest in that the JCP thinks this could show a real road to peace.

— I want to ask you about "social imperialism". In that part about the Afghan issue, we find such an expression a "social imperialist error". What do you mean by social imperialism?

Social imperialism uses "socialism" as a signboard, but at the same time is guilty of acts of aggression similar to imperialism. Back at the time of the First World War, the then socialist parties of the Second International supported the war in the name of socialism. Since then this has been called social imperialism. Briefly, imperialism means bringing other nations under its own control. For the sake of this, it carries on ideological activities, but also resorts to military power. This is characteristic of imperialism. As a system, there may be neither capitalists nor exploitation in a socialist system; it must respect peace and independence. But if it is guilty of this kind of political error, we call it "social imperialism". But this does not mean that the Soviet Union has now become an imperialist country.

In 1966 I argued with Mao Zedong; he said that the Soviet Union had become an imperialist country, and that there is no difference between the Soviet Union and monopoly capitalist countries. We argued that it was a socialist country, but it was following erroneous policies. As a matter of fact, the errors made at that time because the Soviet Union had attached itself closely to the United States, and was implementing a compromising policy by following it. Mao said that this question should be left pending, to wait for history to determine it. It does not mean that the Soviet Union has become an imperialist country, nor does it mean that the Soviet Union is not a socialist country. Even for a socialist country, we use the word "social imperialism" when the country follows a policy of

aggression that makes no difference from imperialism.

(*Zen'ei*, September 1981)

DISSOLUTION OF MILITARY BLOCS: AN ESSENTIAL TASK OF WORLD POLITICS

New Year Interview by Toshio Sakaki,
Director of Akahata, at the Opening of
1982, the 60th Anniversary Year
of the JCP Founding

—*A happy new year.*

A happy new year to you, too.

I want to take this opportunity to thank readers of Akahata for their constant support. I hope this year will be better for all of us.

THE POLISH QUESTION AND JCP STAND— MILITARY RULE MUST BE ENDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

—*I have many questions to ask you on behalf of the readers, but I must select only some. First I want to ask you about the Polish question, which is a current issue claiming much attention.*

Adverse Tide Impeding Independent And Democratic Development

The Japanese Communist Party has been following the Polish situation with great attention since 1980, very closely observing the movement of "Solidarity" and the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party. Throughout the period our hopes have been that Poland as a whole would advance along the road of democracy and independence, based on the principles of socialism; we have judged developments from this position.

Since the 9th PUWP Congress held in July 1981, a big change has taken place. As pointed out by Akahata and other party publications, the Soviet Union until then had resorted to criticism of leaders such as Kania and Jaruzelski by name, while praising some anti-party splinter groups such as the "Katowice Forum" as "true communists". They also demanded the postponement of the party Congress. But this was refused and the Congress convened as planned. In spite of pressure from the Soviet Union there were positive debates, and in this respect the Congress was to some extent "successful". A new leadership was democratically elected, since when the Soviet Union has tried in many ways to bring the newly elected leadership more into line with their thinking.

Meanwhile, the "Solidarity" movement, which, from the first aimed at establishing a free and democratic labor movement, rapidly gained strength among the wide-ranging masses, an unusual development in a socialist country. Lenin said that the workers' right to strike must be recognized as a means of overcoming bureaucracy in a socialist state; but, as we pointed out in Akahata at that time, the arbitrary use of the strike action is not the correct way, seen from the basic principles of socialism. At that stage, the majority of the Polish people were hoping that Poland could overcome its economic crisis. They would therefore have got more support from the people if, by taking the people's wishes into consideration more appropriately, they had taken the lead in building up the economy and increasing production as a trade union of a socialist country, by making full use of the socialized means of production.

But it is to be regretted that, as was reported, an extremist trend is evident in part of the "Solidarity" leadership, and consequently the tendency to arbitrarily resort to a strike was apparent. It seems that Chairman Walesa tried in a way to hold this down, but there was a tendency, as a whole, to arbitrarily expand issues for the sake of a struggle, resorting to strikes. The Soviets, using this tendency as a pretext, continued to criticize it through their newspapers and by other means, alleging that counterrevolutionary and anti-socialist trends were going to take over in Poland.

Ignoring Law, Parliament and Party...

—The Soviet Union has attacked the "Solidarity" movement as a whole as anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary.

There were often arguments put forward in the Soviet Union that "Solidarity" itself is counterrevolutionary. The 6th Plenum of the Central Committee held last November put forward a proposal to submit a bill to the Parliament on a state of emergency, and "Solidarity" called for a general strike to counter this in case it is adopted, which led to extreme tension.

It was during these developments that suddenly Jaruzelski made a speech in which he declared the establishment of a "Military Council for National Salvation" and the proclamation of martial law.

This was the situation when the Japanese Communist Party, in analyzing the basic causes of the turnabout, issued an evaluation of the situation in a statement made by Tomio Nishizawa, Chairman of the International Commission and Vice-Chairman of the Presidium, saying that this was an unjustifiable development in a socialist country. Akahata also dealt with it in an editorial, thus arousing international repercussions. We consider that recent developments have verified the correctness of our statement in calling it totally unjustifiable.

We do not deny that the Polish Constitution provides for a declaration of martial law in an emergency. Article 33 says, "The State Council may proclaim martial law over part or the whole of the territory of the Polish People's Republic if necessitated by consideration of the defense or security of the state." In general terms we do not disagree that the constitution of a socialist state should provide for the imposition of martial law, quite apart from the rightness or wrongness of when it should actually be applied.

But it is not yet known from the announcements made so far by what organ and on what principle the "Military Council for National Salvation", composed of 21 military officers on active duty, was designated and established. There is no provision in the Polish Constitution on which to recognize the establishment of what is called the "Military Council for National Salvation". Reports so far published do not state what action the State Council, formed under the Constitution, took in the process of decision-making on this grave issue, nor what the responsibility and role of the PUWP Central Committee and the Parliament were. The Polish Constitution lays it down that the PUWP is the "leading political force", but both the party and the Parliament have apparently been over-ridden.

The fact that Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the PUWP and Prime Minister, is leading the "Military Council for National Salvation" tends to give the impression that the Government or the party are responsible, but the facts are as I have stated.

This is not merely a procedural problem. The question is whether or not what has been done is within the framework of the order of law in a socialist country.

Under military rule, all basic human right are suppressed, including rights of assembly, speech, press, etc., in addition to communication among the people being prohibited by cutting telephone links. Jaruzelski stated, "In the name of national interests, preventive detention is applied to groups of those threatening the security of the state." It has been reported that those regarded as "extremist" leaders of "Solidarity", those who were regarded to have committed political errors in the past or involved in corruption, have been detained. The list of detainees depends on the judgment of the "Military Council for National Salvation", and no legal procedures, such as under a democratic constitution, are taken.

Military Dictatorship Is a Big Unnecessary Evil

Jaruzelski stated in his speech, "We are not aiming at a military coup d'ētat or military dictatorship", but there is no question that, judging from the developments so far made public, what we are seeing is virtually a sort of military coup d'ētat and military dictatorship. Jaruzelski in another speech said that this was a "small evil" committed in order to prevent a civil war, the biggest evil.

That a civil war was inevitable is open to question. Polish criminal law guarantees and provides the government with countermeasures against subversive activities, or unjust violent attacks or assaults against the Government. The existing laws cover all such offences, including taking up arms against the state power, such as an attempt to civil war. The very establishment of a military regime for which there is no provision in the constitution, its seizure of all powers, or a dictatorship amount to nothing less than a clear infringement of socialist law and order, and a big evil that violates the principles of socialism.

What then is the real reason behind the turnabout in such a situation? Since long the PUWP has not only placed special importance on Poland's relations with the USSR but considered

the relations absolute on the grounds that their country is a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. That is why the resolution was adopted by the 4th Plenum of the Central Committee held last October, and what Jaruzelski's speech stressed when he said, "We must oppose by all means any attempt for the anti-Soviet propaganda", or "Maintaining friendly ties with the USSR is of great importance for Poland, and has special meaning." In the speech made at the time of the proclamation of martial law it was emphasized that Poland is a "permanent member" of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and that the alliance between Poland and the USSR constitutes the "corner-stone of the national stand" of Poland. This indisputably demonstrates that the USSR, which had repeatedly criticized and warned Poland both publicly and covertly, was the consultant to whom Jaruzelski gave top priority. It is political common sense to say that based on the analysis of the situation that met the Soviet view, "military rule" was established with the backing of the Soviet Union and in compliance with the judgment given by the Soviet Union on the situation.

—Some newspapers attempted a sort of justification by claiming that it couldn't be helped, and was a "necessary evil". I feel that it has something in common with condoning the Pinochet military dictatorship of Chile, or the Chun Doo Hwan junta of South Korea.

Yes, you are right. Some of the Japanese mass media and politicians are approving the South Korean military dictatorship and the military dictatorship of Chile, both of which came into being in a coup d'ētat. The Democratic Socialist Party, which calls itself an opposition party, approved the military coup d'ētat in Chile. If one criticizes the Polish situation from the same standpoint as I have, both the ROK and Chile will have to be condemned. This is why some people consider that unless there is open military intervention by Soviet forces there is nothing to question. This is just a way of approving the Polish situation on grounds similar to what has happened in other countries. They do not look at the Polish situation from the angle of defending the sovereignty of a socialist country, guaranteeing human rights by law and safeguarding the principles of socialist democracy.

"Anti-Soviet" Label Used to Suppress Arguments on Sovereignty

It goes without saying that it is highly possible for the Polish people to hold diverse opinions within their own rights on the question of how the security of their country should be guaranteed. A serious debate on the reality of military blocs and its relaltion to Polish sovereignty would be welcome. However, the charge of "anti-Soviet propaganda" is used to suppress arguments that question the value of military blocs, a most unusual contention.

—In fact, there was a period in Poland too when the PUWP stressed "real sovereignty and thoroughgoing democracy". This was after the Poznan incident in 1956. But it was rejected soon after that and subordination to the Soviet Union was intensified.

In its October 30, 1956 statement, the USSR itself announced that relations between socialist countries must be based on complete equality and non-interference in internal affairs. This statement was issued at the time when the Poznan incident in Poland and the Hungarian incident took place. It also said that consultations would be held with countries where the Soviet troops were stationed, on the question of Soviet troops being

stationed in Warsaw Treaty member countries (at that time, Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary, Romania and Poland). The question naturally involved the continued stationing of Soviet troops there. After that, the USSR again sent its troops into Hungary, and the question of negotiated withdrawal was nullified. Soviet troops were withdrawn only from Romania. Then, in 1968, the USSR drove into Czechoslovakia. Now, merely to argue for the withdrawal of Soviet troops is called "anti-Sovietism".

The essential fact is that the establishment of a military bloc was necessary in order to provide a counterforce to NATO, and originally the abolition of military blocs was set out as a principle. It is not surprising therefore for that statement of 1956 to be made. The existence of a military bloc does not make it necessary for the Soviet Union to station its troops in every member-state. In the light of the 1968 Czechoslovak events and others, the fact that the question of withdrawal of troops was retracted is posing a question about what the role of the military bloc is in actuality.

Military rule in Poland, instituted in its present form, is based on the claim that it is an action taken for security as a constituent member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Military Bloc as Means of Oppression

—The foreign press reported that the commander-in-chief of the WTO Forces was staying in Warsaw at that time.

The oppression was carried out very precisely and quickly in terms of military science. It represents the distressing politics of fear, because anybody may be detained on the judgment of the military authorities.

Conferring with neither the Parliament nor the party, it was done on the score that Poland is a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and therefore anything can be done so long as the USSR approves it. Military rule means just this.

As shown by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Treaty Organization itself became the means of exerting armed repression in any event on any trend or inclination found to be not favored by the USSR, labeling it "counterrevolutionary", mainly based on the Soviet judgment.

From the beginning, the important aspects of joint defense of socialist countries include defense of people's sovereignty in each respective socialist country and the fundamental human rights of the people. But far from this being upheld, the Warsaw Treaty Organization threw troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 on the score of the danger of counterrevolution, and arrested the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who were taken to Moscow and forced to submit to the repression. Now Lech Walesa has been arrested, segregated and taken to Warsaw in the attempt to force him to collaborate with the military authorities. There is similarity between these two cases, though there is the difference that the former was an international version but the latter is a domestic one.

PUWP Leadership as Mouthpiece of the USSR

In this connection, I want to speak about some experience we had on the Polish situation and the position of the PUWP. In July last year, two or three days after the PUWP Congress, the chief of the international department of the PUWP asked the JCP through Akahata correspondent Setsuzo Otaka not to deal with the question of Poland in its debate with the CPSU. The origin of this can be traced back to the letter sent by the CPSU to the JCP about the 26th CPSU Congress. The letter set

out Soviet foreign policy, including reference to the Polish situation, and asking the JCP to comment on it. Of course we sent a reply to the CPSU. After this the CPSU gave its support to a pro-Soviet splittist faction named "Katowice Forum", and we sent a cable to the CPSU asking them "not to support the splittist faction". As everyone knows, the Polish issue has already become a serious international question. Both the CPSU and the PUWP leadership always argue that Poland is a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, but that Organization is a major international phenomenon. There is frequent insistence on Poland's responsibility as a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and its relationships with the Soviet Union. It is quite illogical to try to persuade people that it is the internal business of Poland. Quite obviously it is a major international issue.

Actually correspondent Otaka's report was late in reaching the JCP center, and our response was delayed. However, the dispute with the Soviet Union arose from the circumstances we have explained, and we therefore replied in clear terms that we could not promise not to take the issue up. Then, on August 14, Stanislaw Kania and Wojciech Jaruzelski visited the Soviet Union and held talks with Leonid Brezhnev. They returned home on August 15, and on the same day, "Trybuna Ludu", organ of the PUWP, carried a letter from the CPSU dated July 30 addressed to the JCP, though the part denouncing the JCP by name had been omitted. This was quite surprising, to say the least.

—It was quite an exceptional case.

Many parties pledge loyalty to the Soviet Union. But no party except the PUWP leadership did this in connection with the current dispute between the JCP and the CPSU. It was evidently unjust interference in the dispute between the two parties, favoring the position of the CPSU. After this, on August 26 a section chief of the International Department of the PUWP notified correspondent Otaka that the permanent stay of an Akahata correspondent in Poland could not be permitted, though the Polish officials had once said there would be no problem. The attitude of the PUWP has drastically changed since the 9th Extraordinary PUWP Congress, indicating a further loss of independence; more than losing its independence, it has become a kind of mouthpiece of the CPSU in the debate between the JCP and the CPSU. This reveals how far they have gone from being independent.

JCP Concern over Two Trends

During the development of the situation, we were very concerned over two trends being strengthened—the extremist line taken by some part of "Solidarity" and the increased suppression on the pretext of the former. Though we were concerned, we made no detailed criticism of those trends. In principle, we thought that it was not for us to discuss whether the PUWP policy line was good or not. What we pointed out in our dispute with the CPSU was that, judged from the criteria of normal relations between communist parties, the CPSU was not justified in supporting a faction within the PUWP.

But now, after the de facto military coup actually took place, our concern over these two trends proves righteous.

From the world point of view, our party's position is that the Polish people are reasonable, patriotic and progressive in expressing opposition and dissatisfaction with the military rule. This is our overall view. But in considering the development of the situation, we were right in saying that "Solidarity" should refrain from resorting to random strikes. Although our considered viewpoint on the military regime is as we have stated, it cannot be said that we should not have criticized "Solidarity" for what they did at that time.

Independent Solution by Rallying Forces of Good-Will

—How do you think the Polish problem should be solved at the present stage? And your opinion on military blocs...

First of all, the military rule, a military dictatorship based on a de facto coup, should be ended at the earliest possible date, and an independent solution free from any outside interference should be found within the legitimate framework of the party and parliament, by achieving a consensus among the sincere forces of Poland. The formation of a Front of National Accord has been mentioned.

In addition, I think that the issue of dissolution of military blocs should be taken up more seriously than ever in world politics. US President Reagan criticized the Polish military rule and the Soviet Union. But there is a fundamental contradiction in his support, at the same time, of the military dictatorships in Chile and South Korea. The fundamental starting point should be abandonment of the very pattern of trying to dominate world politics through military blocs. Along with this, it is essential for every communist party, including those of socialist countries, to become independent in the true sense. Otherwise, in world democratic public opinion, at least in the opinion of the people in developed capitalist countries, national sovereignty as well as the people's fundamental human rights based on socialist democracy in socialist countries affiliated with the existing military bloc, are seen as having been openly violated in the name of "security" of the military bloc.

—From this angle, the demand for "dissolution of all military blocs and alliances, including the simultaneous dissolution of both the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization", the demand put forward by the JCP in the article published last June, entitled "For a True Peace Program", must be seen as fundamentally important.

You are right. Our publication, "For a True Peace Program" was put forward as a counter-argument to the imposition of the Soviet line adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress, and very appropriately pointed out that the Soviet Union has not set out the demand for a complete ban on nuclear weapons as an immediate task, and that it has also dropped the call for dissolution of the military blocs, a task that it once upheld. After that, a conference on the journal "Problems of Peace and Socialism", in which you took part as a member of the JCP delegation, was held, and this issue came up for debate.

The USSR has done nothing but attempt a very weak self-vindication, saying that the task of dissolution of military blocs had been taken up in previous party congresses, and the demand still stands. They cannot say straightout that the military bloc is of permanent value. But in actual political terms, if one refers to the Polish relationship with the USSR in discussing the Poland issue even as an academic study on the dissolution of military blocs, this is condemned as "anti-Sovietism". This is the present situation. In the conference of party representatives on the journal, "Problems of Peace and Socialism", the attempt was made again to involve others internationally in a struggle against "anti-Sovietism".

Soviet Economic Power Is Used to Prop up Intervention

—Yes. As a task of international ideological struggle...

Truth to tell, any criticism of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan or the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the forces of five countries is labeled "anti-Sovietism".

There has been a considerable development in economic growth in the Soviet Union over the past 60 and more years since the Russian Revolution. But as became evident in the international conference of the journal, "Problems of Peace and Socialism", this power is now being used as an instrument for rallying support for Soviet hegemonism, and for eulogizing the Soviet line. The Soviets send their personnel, provide funds and various other aids to those parties which support Soviet policy. Part of the socialist power, inaugurated by Lenin, is now boosting Soviet great-power chauvinism and being used as an instrument for painting a rosy picture of what are really blatant interventions in Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

With farsightedness and good reason it is correct for our party to have expressed the view that the discontinuation of publication of the journal, "Problems of Peace and Socialism", would serve the interests of international communism and correspond to world progress.

In fact, the two CPSU letters to Poland used the tone of a letter written to a subordinate organization, quite different from one that would be sent to a party of equal status and rights. The reply of the PUWP used the expression, it is "fully understandable"...

—Suggesting that "the Soviets have the right" to speak like that...

In this sense there is no independence in the attitude of the PUWP. When the present Polish crisis arose, the JCP pointed out that bureaucratism, corruption and lack of independence in the successive Polish governments and Soviet trends, plus some wrong trends within "Solidarity", were fundamental factors leading to the present situation in Poland. Events have shown that the JCP view was generally accurate.

—You attended the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of 1960, and maintained the position of sovereign independence throughout. Compared with the situation then, you must have some impressions now.

At that time, the Communist Party of China was a big party within the international communist movement and had differences with the CPSU. The movement at that time had not been painted a single Soviet color. Nevertheless, most European parties supported Soviet policy. They agreed on almost all proposals that defined the CPSU as the de facto vanguard of the international communist movement, but which the JCP rejected. It is now twenty years since then, and an increasing number of parties in Europe, in dealing with the Polish issue, frankly oppose the introduction of military rule, affirming its incompatibility with socialism. Such parties are in north and central Europe, Italy, Spain and other areas, which the JCP delegations, which included Comrade Sakaki, visited in August and September last year.

We regret that all member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization support the military rule in Poland. But the Polish people have suffered great distresses from their national tragedies. The Polish people at the same time are proud of their traditions; they produced the famous patriotic writer, Henryk Sienkiewicz, known for his "Quo Vadis" and other works, and great musicians, including Chopin. The time will come when they will resolve rightly these current problems, as the communist movements advances in the world.

Bureaucratism and a Tuxedo

Referring to the Polish issue, I remember one impressive happening. It was an experience from which I learned what an evil bureaucratism is, even in a socialist country. When former Polish Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz visited Japan, I received an invitation to his reception, to which guests were asked to wear tuxedos. Presidents and other leaders of capitalist countries, like Ford of the United States, come to Japan, but even for Ford we were not asked to wear Tuxedos. For the Polish Premier, yes. Of course I have no tuxedo, so I did not go to the reception.

It was a great surprise to me that a Prime Minister of a socialist country had fallen into such an aristocratic thinking. He later lost his position and is now among those arrested under military rule. Of course, I'm not in favor of preventive detention. But I realized then that unless it undergoes self-reforms, terrible bureaucratic and aristocratic tendencies can arise even in a country that has reached the stage of socialism. I had some doubts about the capacity of the PUWP leadership, but my firm belief and hope are that the Polish people will go ahead and overcome all such tendencies.

FOUR FAILURES AND GRASSROOTS COUNTEROFFENSIVE AGAINST MALADMINISTRATION

—In the United States, the head of the other military bloc, the Reagan Administration is making all-out efforts to speed up armament and raise the level of that military bloc. For this purpose it is pushing "administrative reform" as a means of cutting down on the people's living and welfare. But this is

being opposed by the people and meeting failure. This is another distinguishing feature of 1981.

World-Historic Movement against Limited Nuclear War

Yes. A formidable effort is being made by the Reagan Administration to build up the US military. On December 15, some 200 billion dollars were approved for 1982 defense costs, up 26% on the previous year, the greatest military budget in the history of the United States. In the five years, 1982 through 1986, the US plans to spend some 1.5 trillion dollars for military purposes, about seven times the size of the total Japanese budget for the current fiscal year. At the same time, taxes on major companies are to be reduced, while welfare is subject to drastic cuts. It is estimated that the 1982 deficit will go as high as 109.1 billion dollars, the highest in history. Unemployment has now reached about nine million, 8.4%, as of last November. This Reagan-style "administrative reform" is being carried out on a formidable scale, and Reagan was the first to openly talk of the possible use of neutron bombs and waging a "limited nuclear war".

Under the Thatcher Government, the people of Britain have suffered seriously. After reaching a peak in June 1979, mining and industrial production dropped 6.8% in the following year, with another drop of 3.4% in August 1981 from August 1980; the number of unemployed rose 825,000 in 1980 above the previous year, to a total of 2,151,000, rising further to nearly three million at the end of last November.

Until the beginning of last year, in Japan we often heard the claim that the election of Thatcher and Reagan signaled the coming of a "conservative era" all over the world, an opinion which we rejected. Subsequently, the Mitterrand government took office in France, and a progressive government that

advocates withdrawal from NATO came to power in Greece, showing that people of goodwill oppose repressive governments.

Most striking is the anti-nuclear weapons movement in almost all countries of western Europe; several million people have participated in rallies and demonstrations. Reagan's claim that the movement has been carried out under a directive of the Soviet Union is patently absurd. The fact is that the danger of limited nuclear war has become more real than ever, and an enormous movement has developed by the people in their fear that the presence of some 6,000 tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe could not defend them, as the proponents of the "nuclear umbrella" theory assert, but, on the contrary, would only thrust them into nuclear war. I see this as the beginning of a great world-historic grassroots movement.

One problem is that in this situation the argument that "in a quarrel both parties are to blame" is being heard, because socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, have not taken the initiative and have failed to display their merit in the struggle for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and the dissolution of military blocs, even though the present situation has made it clearer than ever that military blocs, and especially nuclear military blocs, are the way to real disaster. The affairs of Afghanistan and Poland have led some people to say that there is no future in socialism, or that socialism is an anti-people system; this makes it very difficult to throw into relief the real picture of the crimes of Reagan and his gang in the military buildup and preparations for what they call "limited nuclear war".

——A Japanese scholar living in the United States in a magazine article said that the more Reagan shouts "Strong America" and increases war preparations, the more the US will

be isolated internationally; which could also be the case with the Soviet Union. I am confident that the people of the world share this healthy view.

The World Development Report of the World Bank, issued in August 1981, emphasized how absurd it is to spend such an enormous amount of resources and wealth for military purposes. Some 750 million people are living under conditions of absolute poverty. Their lives are extremely miserable, their children on the verge of starvation. They say that the number of such deprived people will increase to some 850 million by the end of this century. The opposite side of this picture is that the weapons of murder, especially the weapons of annihilation, such as atomic and neutron bombs, are being stockpiled in ever greater quantities. It was considered that such weapons could not be used because their use would lead to doomsday, but a new concept is now being promoted, that they could be used. Reagan has put forward the absurd view that these weapons could be used without endangering the safety of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union refuses to endorse this limited nuclear war concept, and it is not surprising to find that this concept has become a trigger to awaken the people all over the world.

Stop the Folly of Seeking Atomic Death With a Rearmament Budget

In Japan, when I had a summit talk with Premier Suzuki the other day, I called especially for a more than 1 trillion yen reduction in military spending in the next fiscal year's budget. Why? We called for a 700 billion yen reduction in the 1981 budget. Now we are demanding a reduction of more than 1 trillion yen. The greater the reduction the more we would

welcome it. Based on this, I reminded the Premier that we are faced with the terrible concept of limited nuclear war as propounded by President Reagan and Eugene Rostow, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We should therefore regard the present time historically as an exceptional period that will have an incalculable influence on the future of the Japanese people; so, with a special sense of responsibility I said to the Premier, citing the case of Japanese troops being reduced by as many as 90,000 in the Taisho Era, "it is quite wrong for the present Government to give special sanctuary to military budgeting."

The Premier replied that although he had a different opinion, he had listened to me and would carry my opinion back to the Liberal Democratic Party. The Premier was not able to reject my opinion outright and call our argument nonsense. I told him that my opinion may sound naive, but the present situation shows that it is this naiveté that is now needed in practice.

But the finally approved draft of the budget proposes a striking 7.754% increase in military spending, overshadowing the 7.5% increase proposed by the Finance Ministry in its concept of a "zero ceiling" budget. This reveals that the Suzuki Government is shameless, ignoring everything except meeting the demands of the US Administration. It was subsequently revealed that an oral request had been made by US State Secretary Haig to Premier Suzuki around Christmas day, and when the draft budget was finally approved, Haig cabled Foreign Minister Sakurauchi to express gratitude, and US Defense Secretary Weinberger issued a statement praising the decision of the Japanese Government.

We find it wholly inexcusable that in the United States it is being said that neutron bombs are especially suitable to conditions in Asia, because these bombs would cause more deaths than injuries. To claim that because a weapon would cause more deaths than injuries makes it more suitable for conditions in Asia is to hold Asians in contempt. Some are even saying that neutron bombs may indeed be deployed in Japanese territory.

It is in the light of these developments that "administrative reform" is being implemented in Japan, with its many contradictions, as we have pointed out. The livelihood of great numbers of people robbed of their gains will be undermined. Both the first and second groups of the Ad Hoc Commission are now emphasizing that the new idea of the Ad Hoc Commission is to ensure the comprehensive security of the country. This new idea is added to the old "idea" of the Ad Hoc Commission, that the principal course of politics should be reviewed, or that Japan's international contributions should be increased. In the new year interview in 1981 I stressed that Reagan had been elected by only some twenty-odd percent of the votes of the American people. Later that year, large-scale demonstrations took place against his policy; the economic crisis has seriously deepened and the deficit issue has worsened and many contradictions have emerged. And the Japanese Government has belatedly tried to...

—It has tried to follow suit to Reagan...

Yes, it has followed suit, saying with elaborate pretence, that Japan must respond to the call of the United States. What can this be called but a ruinous policy for the state.

Our demand for a drastic reduction in the military budget is not just an extension of our past demand. If a limited nuclear war should break out, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces would have to play a part in such a US-made war. To use our resources to reinforce these forces would mean spending the

Japanese people's money for their own atomic bomb death—what a ridiculous idea!

I read a book recently by Hisao Maeda, ex-head of the first research office of the National Defense College, in which he stressed from their viewpoint that it is ridiculous for Japan to be concerned about the United States criticism, that Japan is having a free-ride on the security treaty; that Japan has provided the United States with an unsinkable aircraft carrier and that the best way to assure the safety of Japan is to get rid of the security treaty.

Now that even the Socialist Party of Japan is approving the Security Treaty and the Self-Defense Forces, in line with the agreement between the SPJ and Komeito, it is all the more important for the Japanese Communist Party to call on the people to rise in a resolute struggle against the fearful concept of limited nuclear war and nuclear annihilation. We have taken an initiative for such a movement and are participating in it. This is the historic mission of the Party.

Another point to be made is that the Ad Hoc Commission on the so-called "Administrative Reform" has become more evidently than ever the source of all the difficulties in the living of the Japanese people of many strata.

"Has Big Business Become His Imperial Majesty?"

—On this question, there are many independent movements taking shape in workshops, towns, villages and campuses, offering great possibilities for development.

One recent feature is that the decline in personal consumption which follows the two successive years of decline in consumer spending in real terms has brought about a serious recession in the consumer market, which in turn has led to a shortfall in tax revenue, requiring an increase in deficit-covering national bonds. By contrast, the major companies have reported the sharpest increase in profits in these past ten years, with the aggregate declared income of the 50 largest enterprises in fiscal 1980 reaching about 4,600 billion yen, up 52% on the previous year, an increase rate that is more than twice as high as the average of big corporations. But at the same time more than 1,000 medium and small companies have gone bankrupt, each with liabilities of more than 10,000,000 yen, in each of the past 75 months. Wherever we go, the same honest and serious complaints can be heard from people of various strata, charging that the difficult conditions have grown worse since the announcement of the "administrative reform" plan.

So, along with the failure of the "nuclear umbrella" theory, the Ad Hoc Commission line is doomed to fail because its aim is the blatant exploitation of the people in the interest of Japanese big business and the United States, using that phony slogan, "administrative reform". True administrative reform should aim at the correction of injustices and corruption, and the establishment of an effective and democratic administration to serve the people's needs.

Although members of the Ad Hoc Commission were selected by the Diet to give it the appearance of democracy, the initiative of the Commission has been taken over by big business, and Premier Suzuki has obediently accepted the all-power instructions of this big-business-led Commission. Premier Suzuki's reputation is that he is the most docile of all successive premiers in relation to business circles. When he wanted recently to take up the issue of reserves for retirement allowances as one way to increase corporate taxes, he shrank from the attempt when it was condemned by business circles.

——Business circles have become His Imperial Majesty, haven't they?

They certainly have!

Miscalculations in "Reorganization Of Labor Front" Led by Domei

In addition to the failure of the "nuclear umbrella" theory and the Ad Hoc Commission, the spotlight is on the failure of the "Committee for Promotion of Unification" of the trade union movement. At first the Sohyo leadership thought they could easily persuade trade unions to accept the Domei-led "basic plan", while excluding the Conference of Trade Unions for a United Front (CTU-UF). But more and more workers have come to realize that this is a maneuver for a deceptive reorganization of the labor front, similar to the prewar Great Japan Industrial Patriotic Association. Although two Sohyo conventions have been held, it was not possible to reach a conclusion, and in an enlarged meeting of councilors, the Sohyo leadership forced a dubious decision on trade unions by deceptive means, which nobody could understand, by taking advantage of the confusion, showing that things could not be forced to go as they had hoped. This was a severe blow to the plot to use the labor movement to help step up military expansion and promote the interests of big business, in total disregard of people. In this respect, the agents of the ruling class (in the labor movement) made a serious miscalculation.

Another point to be made in connection with this attempt at the reactionary reorganization of the labor movement is that the anti-Communist, pro-LDP SPJ-Komeito-DSP coalition line and its constituent, the SPJ-Komeito agreement, have come to the point of failure. This is another feature of the present situation.

In its rightward moves, the Komeito never lags behind the Democratic Socialist Party. It has trend as far to the right as it can in its attitude toward the Republic of Korea, the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Self-Defense Forces, and even to the aged-people health insurance bill, designed to abolish free medical care for the aged. In our 15th Party Congress, we exposed the anti-progressive, anti-people nature of the SPJ-Komeito agreement, criticizing the SPJ for its rightward degradation. Now the failure of this agreement has become so explicit that no sincere observer can fail to see it.

We have now pointed out four failures: the "nuclear umbrella" theory, the Ad Hoc Commission "administrative reform" line, the rightist line of reorganization of the labor front, and the agreement between the SPJ and Komeito. These four failures are very important results in the 1981 situation, in that they have revealed the fundamental contradictions in the reactionary rule at home and abroad, and are now the focus of the people's fundamental criticism.

The Japanese Communist Party has resolutely led the way in revealing and opposing the true aims of the Ad Hoc Commission line, with its big-business-oriented and subservience-to-the-US politics. Now the urgent task is to hold discussions with the people of all strata on the questions of peace and livelihood, dealing with the serious concerns of the people, and developing grass-root movements through every stratum of the people to resolve their deep discontent and realize their demands. It is now the historical moment for us to organize an offensive of the entire people to counter the maladministration.

A new and important task of our movement for the new year is to force these four issues into complete failure, developing the grass-root movements in every walk of life in the same spirit as used in the peace movement.

Are There True "Leftwingers" in the SPJ?

——After the election of the SPJ Chairman, there is no evidence yet of a resolute attitude toward the Komeito. What is your thinking on the SPJ at present?

In the JCP meeting of prefectural committee chairpersons held before the election of the SPJ chairman, I said that we should not place our hopes on any candidate for the SPJ chairmanship, because the election would be held within the framework of the agreement between the SPJ and Komeito. The result of the election showed that fewer votes were polled by Mr. Muto and Mr. Shimodaira, both of whom are most earnest supporters of the SPJ-Komeito agreement. Mr. Asukata expressed no support for abrogation of this agreement. In fact, he is the very man who signed the agreement. Mr. Asukata was the first SPJ chairman to openly scrap the agreement signed between the JCP and the SPJ. He has often said that the SPJ should be responsible for the SPJ-Komeito agreement, because it was signed as a bipartisan accord. It should be recalled that the statements we signed with the late Mr. Narita (SPJ former chairman) or Chairman Asukata on the joint efforts for the establishment of a progressive united front or the unity of broad progressive forces, were also accords signed on the responsibility of the two parties (the JCP and the SPJ——ed.) They were officially-signed undertakings. But the SPJ scrapped them without prior notice, and even when JCP Secretariat Chief Tetsuzo Fuwa asked the SPJ Secretary General to meet him to offer explanations, the SPJ ignored this, brazenly charging that the responsibility for the breakdown of the JCP-SPJ agreement rested on the JCP. When the Socialists signed the SPJ-Komeito agreement, they put up the phony argument that such an agreement would prevent the Komeito from moving to the right. But the Komeito's subsequent actions have exposed the groundlessness of this SPJ argument. It is this same Mr. Asukata who must take the total responsibility for this SPJ position. Although the commercial press call Mr. Asukata a leftist, I have to say with regret that there are no leftist current in the SPJ now.

This is evidenced by the fact that there is no SPJ group openly calling with certainty for rejection of the SPJ-Komeito agreement line. It is a great misfortune for the Japanese progressive forces, but there are many honest rank and file members of the SPJ, as well as others who join in concerted actions with the JCP in local districts for various tasks, who now understand the anti-progressive role of the SPJ-Komeito agreement. What has taken place since the signing of the SPJ-Komeito agreement? In local government head elections in 1977, election districts in which the SPJ and JCP established a joint struggle represented 50% of all districts with candidates who ran on the JCP ticket, or with JCP support or recommendation. But in 1981, after the SPJ-Komeito agreement was signed, this figure fell sharply to 16%.

One observer says that the SPJ-Komeito agreement will have little effect, because, as long as the SPJ adheres to the "non-armament and neutrality" slogan, it will lead to the suicide of the SPJ to follow suit to the Komeito in approving the Japan-US Security Treaty and recognizing the Self-Defense Forces as constitutional. This is the reason why the same observer says that the SPJ-Komeito agreement will be of little effect, and is destined to be shelved. But even if the agreement is indeed of little effect and is shelved, the problem is that as long as the SPJ shows no intention of abrogating the signed SPJ-Komeito agreement, it is not ready to return to the position of progressive unity. Seen historically, the SPJ has a great responsibility for staying within the framework of the anti-communist line, which of course, the LDP approves. As long as this situation continues, it is necessary that we criticize the SPJ.

When the JCP does criticize the SPJ policies and line, which aim at splitting the progressive forces, the SPJ usually labels the JCP "sectarian" or "self-righteous". But it would be rejection of the very raison d'être of the JCP for us to keep silent when the SPJ follows the line of exclusion of the JCP.

On its part, if the SPJ wants to grow, it will not be able to go on pretending ignorance about the anti-progressive nature of the SPJ-Komeito agreement. It is certain that the Komeito will readily arrange for its constituents to sell votes to the SPJ at election time, not only in order to keep the SPJ within the present framework, but also to increase the number of those within the SPJ who are eager for a joint struggle with the Komeito. But I am confident that such a maneuver will and must fail and be defeated, because the Japanese people are now waking up and their consciousness is being heightened, and their vitality in struggle is growing.

DIFFERENT DEMANDS AND MOVEMENTS IN DIFFERENT STRATA OF THE PEOPLE AND DIFFERENT FIELDS OF ACTIVITY

—Such a possibility is suggested by the development of mass movements in the past year.

Certainly. In last year's new year interview with Akahata, I expressed the hope that the Progressive Unity Forum would have been joined by approximately two million people by the end of the year. Now far more people, some 3.9 million, have participated in the Forum. The Forum has been established in all 47 prefectures, and a great effort is now being made to build conferences in major cities and at district level throughout the country as the first anniversary of the inauguration of the National Conference for Progressive Unity is coming near. More than 100 conferences (including preparatory conference) have been established in cities, wards, towns, villages and counties.

Turning to the trade union movement, the Conference of Trade Unions for a United Front (CTU-UF) has increased its membership from 1.2 million at the beginning of last year to 1.5 million now. It is now striving to become a 2-million-strong class-conscious organization, with strength necessary for a truly national center of trade unions. Among unorganized workers, new organizations such as "Kizuna (Bonds)" and "Yuai-kai (Friendship Association)" have been formed, and such creative activities are going on. Other movements are also being developed under the slogan "Less Military Spending; Better Living, Welfare and Education".

In the peace movement, 3,678 Japanese scientists active in the first line issued a statement on December 15 saying, "Now is the time to seek peace——a statement of scientists for the abolition of nuclear weapons and to prevent war". Photo exhibitions of the atomic bombings have also been held all over the country, and the peace movement is being developed in many forms.

Among women, a fund-raising campaign using cans bearing the label "Protect Children from the Danger of Nuclear War" is under way. Other creative movements, such as a movement for folding paper-cranes (*orizuru*) while talking about peace, have been launched.

A movement is being carried on to abolish wage and other discriminations against women. Good results have been reached in not a few workshops, such as the Tokuyama branch of

the Moji Customhouse, and Fuji Photo Film Co. in Kanagawa.

A "massive movement to protect the business of small and medium enterprises and the living of workers" was carried out in Osaka and other prefectures as a joint struggle of workers, small and medium enterprisers, traders and producers. The movement was joined by eight organizations of small and medium enterprisers, including democratic associations of traders and producers and the West Japan Committee of Small and Medium Enterprisers, and the West Japan Conference of Small and Medium Industries, and 12 trade unions of small and medium enterprise workers (including the All Osaka Metal Industry Trade Union), plus the Osaka Prefectural Government Workers Union. The movement achieved results in improved subcontract terms of trade, and others. Similar movements were also undertaken in Tokyo, Kanagawa and other prefectures.

In youth and student movements, the "Central Youth and Students' Liaison Council for a Bright Progressive Japan" appealed in these words, "Let us think of the Japan-US Security Treaty, the Constitution, Conscription and Our Youth". This movement has expanded into the holding of one thousand and several hundred rallies through the country, scores of peace concerts and other various forms, and the Liaison Council itself enrolled many new members in the course of its actions. A struggle of students against the planned raising of university fees has also made rapid progress, with united actions participated in by some 100,000 students on November 12.

Marking the 1981 International Year of the Handicapped, various efforts aimed to make known the real conditions of the handicapped were made, facts mainly unknown to a wide public. To win proper public attention to the conditions of handicapped persons even after the International Year has passed, the movement must continue to urge the government to adopt a state-budget-supported ten-year program in accordance with the recommendation of the UN General Assembly.

Along with the Struggle against Ad-Hoc-Commission-Led Budget

The aged-people health insurance bill, aimed at elimination of free medical care for the aged, was not approved in the last extraordinary session of the Diet, but carried over to the next ordinary Diet session. This was the result of the great people's movement that collected signatures opposing the bill, more than 1,450,000 of which have been handed over to the JCP. In the next ordinary session, the aged-people health insurance bill will come up to debate for the third time. Great importance must be given to this struggle, as part of the battle against the Ad Hoc Commission line.

The agricultural crisis is sharpening, following two years of poor crops due to cold weather damage, a substantial reduction in paddy fields, and stagnant prices of agricultural products. In last year's campaign to raise the rice price for producers, the slogan "Oppose Big-Business-led Administrative Reform" was carried in fore, and even agricultural cooperative associations, which have been controlled by the LDP, are now taking part in this struggle. This will be a crucial year for the governmental plan that aims to levy the same rate of tax on urban agricultural land as on housing land. Last year I held talks with representatives of Kanagawa Agricultural Cooperative Association. Urban agriculture must be protected, not only for improving the ratio of self-supply of foods, but also to prevent disasters and preserve nature in city areas.

Looking at the struggle for a fair and democratic "*dowa*" administration ("Dowa" means assimilation of "*buraku*" people through the abolition of social discrimination——ed.), severe

social condemnation was directed in Kita Kyushu City at the unfair land business and evasion of taxes. The JCP led the struggle against such corruption, and, fortified by this struggle, the JCP candidate was returned in the by-election for the Fukuoka prefectural assembly, held in November.

The struggle against mal-revision of school textbooks has also been gathering momentum, and in the face of wide public opposition, the maneuver to remove the folk story, "*Kasakojizo*", from a textbook was defeated. On November 13, a great rally against mal-revision of school textbooks was held, with the participation of about 20,000 people, including writers, men of culture, teachers and parents.

The campaign for increased subsidies to private schools is also gaining momentum, with some 10 million signatures collected from all over the country.

We see that one of the features of the situation last year is that the struggle against the Ad Hoc Commission "administrative reform" line made significant progress, linked to different demands and movements of the people of different strata. The concerted actions against the Ad Hoc Commission line, held on October 21 and November 12, were very successful, and the same struggle is being joined by more and more people all over the country, using various initiatives, including the establishment of the "Liaison Council of Different Circles Against the Ad Hoc Commission Line and For Protection of the People's Living and Rights"; this struggle is drawing in even a number of local governments. The Ad Hoc Commission line is evident in the preparation of the 1982 draft budget, aimed at accelerated rearmament, service to the big companies, and intensified exploitation of the people. Thus, in developing the struggle against the Ad Hoc Commission line, it is important to link all this with the struggle against the draft budget.

60TH ANNIVERSARY AND TASKS OF PARTY BUILDING—GROWTH OF JCP DETERMINES RATE OF PROGRESS

—As we will have the 60th anniversary of formation of the party this year, we feel greater responsibility and more hope for results from our strenuous efforts, I think. Please tell us about the role of the party, and the prospect and tasks of party building.

We have stressed that the determinants in the rate of Japan's progress, or for the speed of growth of the progressive forces, are the growth of the JCP and its strengthening in both quality and quantity. This year this will be more important than ever because of the nature of the situation of Japan at this moment. The lines of the ruling forces, comprising the US, Japanese business circles, and the Liberal Democratic Party, are in deep and wide contradiction with the people, arousing greater than ever the criticism and fighting energy of the masses. But the pro-LDP lines adopted by almost all political parties other than the JCP allow the support basis for the LDP to survive, placing even greater responsibility on the JCP than formerly.

Note that the JCP consistently opposed wars of aggression in the prewar dark days, and in the postwar days it heralded the movement for Japan's national independence; that is why the responsibility of the party now is even greater.

During the past year, we have not only stressed the role of the JCP in general terms, but in practice we paid special attention to the expansion of party strength, and in particular, to organ paper activities, as the way to increase the influence of the JCP in our daily struggle for choosing between alternatives of progress or reaction; subservience to US imperialism or

the protection of Japanese sovereignty and winning national independence; either politics oriented to big business or to the working people. In the mass movement also, where our party and party members are involved, as I have said, we made self-sacrificing activities hand in hand with the people.

In building party strength, the number of members rose by nearly 20,000 last year. Every prefectural organization of the party has recovered and exceeded its membership level at the time of the last Party Congress. Although a considerable number of incumbent assemblymen were not returned in the intermediate local elections—a weakness we have always warned about—the increase of the JCP among Japanese political parties in the number of local assembly members was the highest last year.

We are glad to see that our "Women's Forum" magazine has been increasing its circulation month by month ever since the initial number, and now holds the position of a democratic women's magazine upholding the tradition built up by the prewar "Working Women".

In organ paper circulation, too, our paper Akahata far exceeds all political party organs in Japan. Considered internationally also, its circulation is on top of all communist party papers of the capitalist world. However, while we gained 510,000 subscribers during the past year, this was offset by a loss of over 400 thousand subscribers, resulting from our loose personal connection with such subscribers, and our irregular delivery and fee-collecting services. Total circulation is still below the level at the time of last Party Congress, which up till then was the highest ever; we have a long way yet to reach the goal of "500,000 party members and 4 million organ subscribers", which was set by the Congress. This is the reason why this task calls for special efforts. This has been our call all through the year, and not only in general terms, but with a close and specific check on every field of organ paper activities. This is the first time in the history of the party that we have ever put such stress...

Significance of the "Organ-Paper Revolution"

—It is even called an "organ-paper revolution".

Yes, it is an organ-paper revolution. In my Presidium Report to the 4th Central Committee Plenum of the 8th Party Congress, I also stressed, in addition to the significance of the organ paper both within and outside the party, the importance of regular delivery of the paper and collection of subscriptions, emphatically pointing out that any weaknesses in these services are not trivial business problems but are ideological. With the passage of time our organ paper activities on the whole have greatly improved. But at the same time we arrived at the clear understanding that if we are to lift Akahata circulation well above the current 3 million level, the only way we can break that barrier is to be bold enough to firmly uphold the basic lines of the past, drastically checking and rectifying all organ paper activities where necessary which are not in accord with the basic party line. When we set about this work, we found the bald fact was that copies that should have been delivered to subscribers had not actually been delivered, and subscription dues had not been collected. In order to correct these errors, all available means were mobilized, supported by three organizational measures by the party: organization of expansion promoting teams, fee collection teams, and delayed and missed delivery elimination teams. An all-party campaign was thus launched.

Fortunately, from the time of the national activist conference of the JCP last October till now, one third of all party

district committees have exceeded the circulation levels of the last Party Congress time, and one quarter of all prefectures have done the same, offering very positive and hopeful results. My deepest respects go out to those comrades who did so well in these struggles over the year end and to all the Akahata subscribers who cooperated with us.

Now this year, when the next Party Congress is to be held, and which marks our 60th anniversary of the party foundation, this spirit must be maintained in order to reach the goal without delay. This will be significant not merely in terms of advance or retreat of the JCP. It is the serious international and domestic situation, such as I have outlined, that will give the most important historic significance to our efforts. We have a lofty mission that is global in scope for normalization of the communist movement, to make progress toward the attainment of world peace and save Japan from nuclear war. We have the task also of protecting the people from the government's increasingly arrogant pretense of "administration reform", and bring about a progressive united front by correctly developing mass movements in many fields in Japan.

Ideological Party Strength to Withstand Political Monsoons

Beyond the political significance of attainment of this goal is the importance of the fundamental idea, that a communist party exists to serve the masses of the people. In mass movements we never deviate at any time from the spirit of service to the masses. But if copies of our papers are not delivered and subscriptions remain uncollected for a few months or even years because of failure to visit the subscribers, this betrays the party's day-to-day services to the mass movements. Attempts to excuse this by reason of special difficulties in maintaining regular issues of the papers, or on any other grounds or habits, means trying to avoid branding this a serious ideological error. It was a major step forward in ideological party building that we made clear the seriousness of this problem.

To succeed in this buildup, an essential factor is intra-party education. The spirit of an "education-based party" should be strengthened further this year. New member education is a crucial point, and our elementary education, which is really the basic course, is another. The latter is not merely elementary; it is rather the basic course for all party members. "Elementary" may give the impression that it is something a full-fledged communist need not take in real earnest, but this would not be correct. I see it as the basic course. It is important that we emphasize our so-called elementary course as basic, in addition to some special courses for district committee members, branch heads and specific categories of students, and involves self-study tasks, too. It is especially important that we study the current situation and the trends of day-to-day development, as seen from the clear viewpoint of the vanguard, making this knowledge our own. These factors are all essential if we are to push ahead with conviction, however the political monsoon blows from day to day. Study, education, is our principal weapon in going ahead and fighting our way through the flood of tens of millions of newspapers and other media channels of television and radio and still keeping our heads above water. To conquer through all this, all party members should carefully read Akahata and other party publications.

At the meeting of prefectural committee chairperson I said, "The group that studies is strong". I could illustrate this with many cases; I repeat, to study is of primary importance in the complicated circumstances of today. About the problem of Poland, Ryugen Hosokawa and another man, in irresponsible

television discussions, assert that the people of Poland are all opposed to communism. This is not true. Instead, what is under criticism there is the result of bureaucracy and the lack of independence, both of which conflict with the true nature of socialism. In order to be able to maintain this conviction we need to study more than ever, so as to grasp the accomplishments of our party, questions of the world communist movement, and the politics of Japan and the world.

Let Us Make Akahata the Proud Hope of Japan

I have repeatedly stressed that, since the party is an organization in which all members join their efforts with the freshness of their own new-member days, the atmosphere must be such that the full expression of whatever members want to say is possible, and that democratic operation is guaranteed at all levels of party life, including branches, district committees, and all other meetings.

These are the three keys: thoroughgoing implementation of lines, thoroughgoing implementation of education, and democratic organization and discipline, which I proposed at the national activists conference, and which should be promoted further this year. We can say that the problems and the approach to their solutions on the subject of the organ paper, the most difficult question, have been clarified, and we can now envisage clear prospects. In fact, a number of district committees have already reported success during the short while since the national activists conference I referred to, arousing great hope in us. Although it is not an easy path to take, it is the criterion for measuring our daily step-by-step advance or retreat, in the field where our most trying responsibility and endeavors are found. Let us bring this meaning to our minds, and do our best. Fortunately, the strong attempt to improve

Akahata editorially last year was so good that in my opinion, it has never been conducted more thoroughly and constantly.

—With discussions going on all over the editorial office again and again without let-up...

For a long time I have been emphasizing certain points about Akahata. At the 4th Plenum of the 8th Congress of the party, for instance, I stressed three points: "unification of leadership and popularity", "unification of a multifaceted and systematic approach", and "unification of accuracy and speed". To achieve such unification in a skillful and correct way is never easy.

Now, however, the editorial office seems to have come rather close to the target by study and special efforts. The enriched contents of the paper are to a considerable extent supporting the entire party's efforts for an increase in subscribers, I understand. I look forward to seeing that Sunday Akahata will also take further strides in improving its contents. Let's do our utmost to make Akahata an indisputably proud hope of Japan.

—As we begin this new year, we of the editorial staff will renew our efforts.

MEMORY OF MR. HIDETAKA TEZUKA

—Finally, Chairman Miyamoto, about Hidetaka Tezuka, your old friend who died last year, please give us some memories you share in relation to party work in those earlier days.

Last year, my old comrade and friend Hidetaka Tezuka, a writer, died, and I took that occasion to reread his works. One of them, called "Lice", a novel which he wrote when he was only 23 or so, describes the situation where young people who were called for underground activities are engaged in mimeographing and handprinting, where party members come to do various works.

Underground Activities and Bean Jam Buns

When Tezuka died, I visited his family after the funeral. A comrade who accompanied me at that time was a resident near his house, and he told me that Tezuka was proud of the food in Setagaya district where he lived, and used to strongly recommend bean jam buns in particular. So I bought bean jam buns in memory of him on my way back, and ate them for the first time in more than a dozen years. I found them very nice and sweet. They were low priced and had plenty of bean jam in them. They were very welcome to the other people around me, too.

And then I found in his book "Lice" a scene where a party member who visits the people doing the mimeographing overnight, hardly sleeping, gives them some bean jam buns to eat. To another Japanese confectionary in Setagaya, selling very tasty *ohagi* (rice dumplings covered with bean jam), Tezuka went and gave words of encouragement, urging them never to lower their quality, I heard. I felt that here his diligent character is revealed by his writing.

Compared with the old days, the movements of today have difficulties which we could hardly imagine then. At that time it was inconceivable that a socialist country would suffer many drawbacks. In those days, we were able to hold the simple belief that the only country of workers and peasants was the

Soviet Union. In this respect we now have difficulties such as we did not have then. But now at any rate we can enjoy the victory of actual elections. In those old days, not even one communist candidate could run an election to the Diet or even the local assembly, you know.

Time When We Can Feel It Is Worthwhile Fighting and Living

I have come to realize that our 400,000 and more comrades are really excellent people from all Japanese strata. Moreover, we have a solid Party Program, sure analyses of the situation, and well-conceived lines. We are now living in a great time, when the party can carry out genuine historic communist party tasks, and in this sense it is a time when we can really feel the fight is worthwhile, and as a communist, life is worth living.

In the old days, those who intended to join the party, even with the determination never to yield to despotic politics, often had first to face persecution and poverty, and even sacrifice the bond with their parents in one way or another. Today, even though there are various new current ordeals, is in a time when grand changes have taken place. In this sense it is a time of worthwhile fighting and living. This is what I felt more keenly than ever when I read Tezuka's works on the occasion of his death.

When I read last year's new year interview again, I saw that what I said then has generally proved to be correct, and is supported by developments. In this year, the historic 60th anniversary year of the party's foundation, a variety of commemorative events are planned. But the primary project for us to uphold the glorious tradition and meet the hopes of the people, is our work in creating history along the lines of the party. I would like to see a big leap forward also in the next

general election.

—*Thank you very much for this long interview.*

(*Akahata*, January 1, 1982)

III

Autobiographical Record

HISTORY OF MY FIFTY YEARS

A Memorandam

Going back fifty years to look at the past brings me to the time I entered high school. I was born in October 1908. I am writing this in 1975, which, in the Japanese calendar is called the "fiftieth year of Showa", the era of the emperor, but my view of history does not agree with this time division based on the Tenno (Emperor) system; but this half century, these fifty years of Showa, covers the greater part of my years.

Three Years in Matsuyama

I was born in a farming village of Yamaguchi Prefecture facing the Inland Sea, Mitsui-mura, Kumage County, now known as Mitsui, Hikari City. I finished my primary school education there, and after four years at Tokuyama Middle School, at the age of sixteen I was admitted to Matsuyama High School. I had been invited to join the judo club of the High School widely known in high school judo circles, and I was also expecting something of the southern country, where Soseki Natsume placed the hero of his novel "*Botchan*". The most I achieved in judo was to win a gold medal in the championship of the under-eighteens, sponsored by the martial arts society of Ehime Prefecture. But as my health was not good I quit the club, failing to meet the expectations of the leaders. Mr. Ozaki, head teacher of the club, was a graduate of Hokkaido University and I clearly remember singing the famous college song, "Our town is now under March purplish clouds".

In the autumn of 1926, my second year there, on November 13, a general assembly of students was called suddenly, where we passed a resolution calling for the resignation of our school principal, Mr. Sutejiro Hashimoto, charging that he could not be trusted to maintain the school traditions. When the school authorities rejected this, the students met in the auditorium two days later and decided on a walk-out. I was a member of the strike committee representing the second-year class of the A course, Faculty of Letters. The preceding principal at Matsuyama High School , the very popular Mr. Yui, had developed school traditions that prized freedom and self-government, but the man who followed him, Mr. Hashimoto, who had been student superintendent of the Eighth High School, in his new position introduced one new policy after another. For example, he made one unreported absence into two absences, or he changed the rules governing dormitories from "sound co-operative life" into "where students are disciplined", leading among students to loss of trust in the teacher. His actions fitted into the ideas of Education Minister Ryohei Okada in the Wakatsuki Cabinet, who intensified military training and exercised thought control over students, attempting to sweep the remnants of "Taisho democracy" out of high schools. The students assembled again at the site of the former castle on Shiroyama (Castle Hill). All the students, with no defections, joined the walk-out, supported by the old boys' association, the parents committee, the press and several other groups. For about half a year, with not one student punished, they all stayed away until the next August when finally Mr. Hashimoto was transferred. It is said that our strike had a great influence on the student movement ever since.

After the strike, together with Morinao Ono and Yoichiro Hirata, both of Matsuyama High School, and Michio Kihara, we published a literary circle magazine which we called "Hakua-ki" (Cretaceous age). Kihara had been a friend of my middle school days and was then a student of Waseda University. The magazine, issue by issue, became increasingly directed toward the proletarian culture movement, but funds were short, so we had to stop publication with No. 6. As an acknowledged contributor of "Hakua-ki", I was asked to write essays for "Bungei Sensen" (Literary Front).

Several of us formed a social science study group and with enthusiasm took to reading social science literature, including Marx, Engels and Lenin, with many words deleted due to censorship. I had to pay for my schooling by tutoring, but in those days high school students could get books on credit, and this helped.

During school holidays when I returned home, I found my mother worried because someone from the local police station had been making enquiries about me in the neighborhood. When it comes to talking about "reds", there was a house in the village near the primary school I attended where Shoichi Ichikawa, one of the first members of the Japanese Communist Party, was born. The frightened people of the village spoke about him almost in whispers, saying "I hear one of the villagers has become a shameful man."

When I was a boy, my father was running a small grocery store in the neighboring Shimada Village, dealing in rice, fertilizers and groceries, but affected by the panic following the First World War, plus poor management, I suspect, our household was virtually bankrupt around the time I entered middle school. Much of the furniture was attached, and an auction of attached articles took place in front of our house. My parents, who did not want me to have to endure these conditions, put me in the care of my mother's parental home in Tomita Village, Tsuno County, where I lived for about a year while attending middle school. During these years I had begun deeply to consider the problem of poverty. I read Kropotkin's "An Appeal to Youth" and Takuboku's poetry, and became concerned about social subjects reported in the press. I talked to my mother about the circumstances of our house, and how conditions were related to the social structure, claiming that it was wrong to fear those called "reds". Gentle woman that she was, my mother tried to persuade me, calmly using the argument, "If social change is as inevitable as you say, the world will change even without your sacrificing yourself." Though I found it painful to disobey my parents' wishes, nothing they said could change my mind.

I took up activities again on coming back to Matsuyama. The members of our group rented a house and lodged together. We opened a branch office of the Proletarian Paper and put up our sign. We kept contact with the leaders of the People's Party, at that time the local proletarian party, and established contact with the nationwide student organizations. What was known as Fukumoto-ism was widespread at that time, and a visiting organizer came to Matsuyama from the students social science association, freely using technical terms from Fukumoto's popular book, "Social Mechanism and the Process of Change". My parents were managing somehow or other, and I was troubled about whether I should go on to university or not, and have my expenses paid out of their poverty. But they were very eager to send me to university, and I wanted to go to Tokyo, so I took the entrance examination for Tokyo University and was enrolled in the Faculty of Economics.

Before and after "Literature of Defeatism"

In 1928, when I came up to Tokyo, Sekki (Red Flag), the organ paper of the JCP Central Committee had been established illegally, but I had had no opportunity to read it yet. That year the All-Japan Council of Proletarian Arts Organizations (NAP) was formed, and the publication of "Senki" (Fighting Flag) began; but what is known as the March 15 suppression began, and the Public Order Maintenance Law was revised, adding an urgent imperial ordinance of the death penalty or life imprisonment for organizers and leaders of the organization.

One of our relatives, who understood the financial conditions that nearly prevented my parents from sending enough money for my schooling, arranged for me to lodge with an engineer of the Mitsui Mining Company, a distant relative of my mother's. I occupied a small shed attached to a storeroom almost as a houseboy, and attended the university at Hongo. I bought myself a university uniform which I wore summer and winter for two years. I rarely attended lectures at the university, but joined a seminar on "Capital" by Assistant Professor Moritaro Yamada. Among the members was Kei Hoashi. Assistant Professor Yamada, still young, was very logical in the lectures, and at the end of a seminar would sometimes invite us to Hakujuji coffee shop just in front of the university.

On March 5, 1929, Representative Senji Yamamoto of the Labor-Farmer Party from Kyoto was assassinated by a right-wing gangster at an inn in Kanda. On March 8 his funeral was held at the Imperial University Young Buddhist Hall at Hongo 3-chome, surrounded by double and triple rows of police. I attended as a citizen.

When I found that the magazine "Kaizo" was inviting entries to a prize novel and literary essay contest, I took up again a short essay I had written on the suicide of Ryunosuke Akutagawa, which had appeared in the last issue of "Hakua-ki", planning to make it into a complete essay. The prize money, 300 yen, was another motive for entering the contest, for I wanted to live on my own as soon as possible, greatly obliged though I was to my distant relative. Living costs for one month were thirty to forty yen in those days. I could not afford to buy a complete set of the works of Akutagawa, so I borrowed them from a member of the "Hakua-ki" group, Hidekane Kozakura, son of a Buddhist priest in Nagoya and student of Waseda University. In the spring holidays we lodged together and cooked our own meals at his father's small villa at the seaside of Yoshida-cho, Hazu-gun, Aichi Prefecture (now Yoshida Kira-cho). There I finished my essay on Ryunosuke Akutagawa, which I called "Literature of Defeatism". I used these words to conclude it, "We must step over the literature of defeatism and the nursery-bed of limited class feelings", an expression of my own determined feeling. It was spring-time, in my 20th year.

With the first prize money from my essay I was able to board at Hongo Kikusaka. I had no personal acquaintances in literary circles nor any contact with those engaged in the proletarian literary movement at that time. The only exception was Takeo Takahashi, whose "Let Him Die" won a prize in the "Kaizo" contest, who came to my apartment and asked me to take part in a literary magazine named "Bungaku Toin" (Literary Partizan) which he was planning to publish together with Hiroshi Hayami, Fukashi Asami and others of Waseda University; I agreed to write an essay for it. Now and then I contributed to the Imperial University Paper at the request of Jun Nitta, who was on the editorial staff. What still concerned me was the struggle of the working class and the interested and sympathetic middle-class intellectuals, on which subject my essay "Sympathizing Writer" appeared in "Shiso" magazine. About that time Hidetaka Tezuka, who came from the same province and my senior at Tokuyama Middle School, invited me to join the activities of "Senki" (Fighting Flag). From what he said I assumed that he was active in association with the organization of the Japanese Communist Party. I was surprised at this because I had thought of him as just a quiet son of a doctor. "Senki" had changed from the initial organ of NAP into a general publicity magazine of the class struggle. It had often been banned, and Takashi Nogawa, whom I knew by introduction to be its editor, was working somewhere in a secret place.

The papers reported that Shoichi Ichikawa from my province had been arrested in the wholesale April suppression of 1929. The next year, Assistant Professor Moritaro Yamada, the lecturer of a seminar on "Capital", was also arrested in what was called the "communist sympathizers case". When it was reported that the Communist Party led by Seigen Tanaka was responsible for the armed demonstration in Kawasaki, I could not help feeling some doubt and distrust. I did not know for sure how far the party organizations were being rebuilt. I had Tezuka deliver Sekki to me and began to read it. There I found slogans such as were seldom mentioned openly, "Down with the Tenno System", a call for an agrarian revolution demanding, "Land to the peasants!" and "End deprivation of workers' rights". Making use of the printed copies of lectures I had bought, I took the final examination and graduated from the university, and my parents expected me to get a secure job. In a letter, my mother said now that I was a graduate of Tokyo University, an offer had been made for my marriage to the daughter back home of a high-tax-paying member of the House of Lords, asking if I would accept, but I didn't even go home.

Literary Movement and Underground Activities

I joined the Japanese Communist Party in May 1931, recommended by Hidetaka Tezuka and Kenji Ikue (who later wrote "Process" in NAP; was called into the army and died in the Pacific War.) I became a member of the Proletarian Writers' League and wrote essays for NAP and Proletarian Literature, while in popular journalism I wrote an essay on

Hideo Kobayashi which appeared in "Kaizo", and a literary review for Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun. Because of an essay I wrote for the party organ, I was called to the censorship section of the Metropolitan Police Board; a police inspector who cross-examined me tried to force me to commit myself, and write what had not appeared in my essay. In party activities, I belonged to a group in the Proletarian Culture League, and was also a member of the Central Agitation Propaganda Department.

In September 1931 Japan's war of aggression against the North-eastern region of China and Manchuria began. In the October 5 issue of Sekki the Japanese Communist Party declared that this war was not a mere incident but a war of plunder against China, urging the public to engage in an anti-war struggle. The anti-war struggle was also stressed in the cultural movement. But the social-democratic parties, though they had claimed in the beginning to stand for three anti-isms (anti-fascism, anti-communism and anti-capitalism), now increasingly opposed communism, and switched to support of the war.

In the spring of 1932, a nationwide attack was made on party organizations in proletarian cultural groups and their supporters. Yuriko Chujo and I had married earlier that year and lived in Hongo, but she was arrested at home by police from Komagome Police Station. She was also a member of the party. As I approached the house, I saw signs of police waiting for me, so I kept away. I was in charge of the literary review of "Chuo Koron" magazine at that time, so I called the editorial department to tell them that I would not be able to continue the series. Takiji Kobayashi, Ryokichi Sugimoto, Hidetaka Tezuka and others had to go underground. At about that time Korehito Kurahara was arrested while engaged in underground activities. In all, in that spring, some four hundred people were

arrested. The press, in its usual tone, referred to it as, "Bolshevik Movement by Writers Exposed". Yuriko was set free 82 days later. It was apparent that the arrested party members of the Writers' League had not admitted anything in spite of harsh cross-examination by the police.

Engaged in underground activities, I undertook the reconstruction of the cultural movement, keeping in touch with party organizations. I had no fixed address but as I had lodgings as a salaried man, it would be thought unnatural for me to have so few personal effects. One day, while I was sitting at breakfast with other boarders in a lodging I had moved to a short while before, I was surprised to find one of them working for the Metropolitan Police Board, so I left the house in a hurry. It cost me a lot for transportation and coffee in making contacts on the streets; the party provided me once in a while with some twenty or thirty yen, so I was troubled always with a shortage of cash. Dairiki Konno, a young poet of the Writers' League, kept me in touch with Yuriko and other people working openly. One day Konno left me a message, saying that Yuriko had received a call from me, asking her to come at once because I was in trouble. He was anxious, wondering what was wrong. It was clear that the call was just a trap by the special political police, attempting to lure her out so that they could follow her to my hiding place. It happened that Yuriko did not know my address and was not trapped by these tactics.

Yoshimichi Iwata, a member of the reconstructed Central Committee, was leader of the Agitation and Propaganda Department. I had never met him, though he was my senior at Matsuyama High School. He held that the political standard of the party would rise with theoretical standards and political experience. A new political program known as the 1932 Theses was announced that year in Sekki, setting out the line of "a bourgeois-democratic revolution first, and then a socialist revolution". The main slogans adopted were, "Oppose War and the Tenno System", and "People's Revolution for Land, Rice and Liberty". With all the various arguments and progress so far, Iwata said, he was determined to follow the Theses that had been adopted. In October that year Iwata was arrested by the Kanda Police, and carried out of the prison, dead, a little later. Sekki carried the picture of the brutally killed Iwata showing his thighs black and blue from internal bleeding.

The Sano-Nabeyama Betrayal

On the tenth of June 1933, I was surprised to find the space of four columns given to one item as top of the day's news. It said that Sano and Nabeyama, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the court of first instance, had issued a statement recanting their former position. The statement first of all appealed for a halt to fighting the Tenno system. It followed with a pseudo-rational justification of Tennoism, and finished with a pledge of support for the Japanese invasion of China, affirming that it was a progressive war. Having confirmed the fact, shock quickly turned to resentment as I realized they were clearly despicable traitors. The successive arrests of comrades forced us to go underground. At that time I was a member of the leading committee of the party, with Noro and others all underground activists. In condemning Sano and Nabeyama as contemptible traitors, Noro and I held the same conviction, that the only motivation for their statement was the desire to be released from prison as soon as possible.

The "conversion" of Sano and Nabeyama was made full use of in the attempt to persuade and discourage other communists then in prison. Recantation even became a sort of vogue. But there was also encouraging news of Shoichi Ichikawa and Kyuichi Tokuda, who were defying the temptation to recant

and waging their battle in prison. We called a regular leading committee meeting and in the name of the JCP Central Committee, resolved that Sano and Nabeyama be expelled from the party for their treachery, to be announced in Sekki. Sen Katayama, Kenzo Yamamoto and Susumu Okano (Sanzo Nosaka) also sent a message from the Comintern, joining us in the fight against Sano and Nabeyama.

Unmasking Spies, and Resistance under Torture

Party activities, both open and underground, had been suffering from the continuing arrests and imprisonments. Tokko (special political police) adopted provocation and espionage as their most effective means. What was known as the "Omori Gang Case" (armed robbery at Omori Branch of Kawasaki Hundredth Bank) in 1932, which was reported to have been committed by a Fund-Raising Bureau of the Communist Party, was in reality a plot by one Matsumura (alias for Mitsunobu Iizuka), who was proved to be a notorious spy of the secret police. Not only with direct oppression and arrest, but with indirect espionage and provocation they tried to damage the prestige of the Communist Party to deprive it of people's support.

In February 1933, Takiji Kobayashi had been arrested by one of these spies, Ryukichi Mifune, when he was getting in touch with a comrade on a street. He was tortured to death, just as Yoshimichi Iwata had been, at Tsukiji Police Station. The fight against espionage and provocation thus became an inevitable part of the class struggle, and as magazines published by the Comintern repeatedly affirmed, should be maintained systematically for the establishment of party discipline and for upholding the right way both in policy and organization. At that time, Eitaro Noro was working under real difficulties, one leg being artificial, and his lungs seriously affected by tuberculosis. I often noticed that he was out of breath after even a short walk, and had to recover by sitting on a dustbin by the roadside, if there was one about. So we decided to rest him from activity for a while, but no sooner had we decided this than he was taken by the police on his last mission, on the 28th of November.

Satomi Hakamada, who had joined us after being released from Osaka Prison, sometimes suggested the possibility that Tatsuo Obata and Kenzo Oizumi were police spies, and the arrest of Noro made us even more suspicious of their real identity. An investigation committee was established, and as a the matter of fact reconfirming that the severest punishment in such a case must be expulsion from the party, we set about their examination in a temporary location. In the course of the investigation, both confessed to being spies, and to having kept in contact with the Tokko of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board. One day, during a break in the investigation, Obata suddenly went berserk and we had to wrestle him down. After a while he suddenly became quiet, to our immediate relief. But Obata's extraordinary quietness soon claimed our attention. One of us tried artificial respiration, and I myself applied the judo technique of resuscitation. But Obata did not recover consciousness. It was a wholly unexpected and unfortunate incident, which played into the hands of the Tokko, who made maximum use of it in a full-scale attack, calling it a "lynch-law murder case" resulting from a factional struggle within the Communist Party. We decided to abandon such methods of investigation to avoid any repetition of such an incident. At least it had become clear that they had been police spies infiltrated right into the heart of the party, and their expulsion was made public through Sekki.

Soon after this incident, while I was trying to make contact with a comrade, I was arrested on the street, surrounded by a dozen police led by Masuharu Ogino, who had belonged to the Tokyo City Committee of the party, and had been suspected of being a spy. I was sent to Kojimachi Police, where I met Mori, a section chief, Yamagata and Nakagawa, both inspectors, and others of special political police. Their first words were, "You might be ignorant of the torture of Metropolitan Police; we are proud to be number one in the world. You would like to know how it goes? I have found and kept aside for you a very good oaken truncheon." They set me on a chair and bound my hands behind the back of the chair. Then they began hitting me on the thighs again and again. When I became unconscious, they poured water over me. One of them bragged, "You shall have a proletarian funeral like Iwata and Kobayashi. You want that, don't you?" Though their tortures went on for a long time, I did not utter a word. When they stopped, I could not stand on my feet. The prison guards carried me out and threw me into a cell. That was on the 26th of December. Snow flakes were flying in through the window high up in the wall of the prison, but I was given neither quilt nor blanket. The pain of torture and the cold kept me awake all night.

This was not of course the end of the torture. But as I refused to speak, they changed their tactics, saying, "Now let's have a long-term contest." This meant protracted torture. They gave me no bed-clothes and tried to keep me awake day and night. Outside the prison, long lantern parades were celebrating the birth of the Crown Price to the Emperor. One day my mother came to see me. When she saw me, she muttered, "You've changed." After the long torture my face had swollen up and I was completely transformed from the son she had known.

I was moved to Metropolitan Police, where I developed a high temperature, and was sent to the Prisoners' Hospital at

Ichigaya, where it was diagnosed as scarlet fever. The wounds from the torture seemed to be the cause of the fever. For about the next year, I was sent around to several places, from the Ichigaya Prisoners' Hospital to the Shinagawa Police, then back to Metropolitan Police, and lastly to the Fuchu Police. While I was in custody at Shinagawa I was able to leave the cell to hang out my washing, and once I tried to climb the fence to escape. But a guard noticed me and held me from behind, so I lost the chance, from which I earned the soubriquet, "light-foot". At Chofu they fettered my legs and kept me in a solitary cell for two months. I devised an exercise I could do while in fetters and practised this in the cell. One year of this miserable life passed without access to books or the opportunity to bathe. At every grilling investigation they tried to force me to submit, but I refused to sign even one line of the confession they tried to extract from me. I remained completely silent even on the identity interrogation by the prosecutor. Though the right to keep silent was not guaranteed by law in those days, I had made up my mind to remain mute neither in the police nor in the preliminary examination, however hard they might torture me. I was then 25.

Ichigaya-Sugamo

Though it was enclosed by a high concrete wall, Ichigaya Prison was an old-fashioned two-story wooden building.

Neither in detention nor in prison was any access to current news possible by ordinary means. The only exception was "Hito" (Man), a newspaper published by the Prison Association, of about twelve half tabloid pages, issued for prisoners. Though this was a prison version of a right-wing newspaper advocating nationalist policy, I could still guess through it how the war was going and what was the policy of the Government.

We were sometimes allowed to hear current news as well as admonitory lectures through the prison broadcasting system. Each prisoner was also allowed to keep up to three books at hand, besides dictionaries. But books on the socialist movement, needless to say, were forbidden. Even literary works such as Dostoevski's important novels, "The Possessed", "The House of the Dead", "Crime and Punishment", were refused because their titles seemed to suggest something dangerous. I planned to build up systematic knowledge on history and biography. I did not care about the dim light of the small lamp hung from the high ceiling and lit only during the evening.

Letters containing information about the situation or even about the party were strictly forbidden. But listening to the talk of the prison warders I was able to guess many things such as the names of those who had lately been sent to Ichigaya Prison. From these sources and others, I gathered that the suppression of the party was raging more and more severely. I requested as many book-catalogues as possible to be sent in, because they were not counted as books. Among the catalogues I received I found one advertising foreign books published by Maruzen Book Store. On my request I was permitted to get a copy of "Road to Unite China", in English. The Japanese government had established a spurious state, "Manchuria", in Northern China and maneuvering to "unify" the whole of China under the name, "Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere". The inspector must have misunderstood the contents of the book, thinking from the title that it might be in accordance with the nationalist policy. But in reality it was a speech given by a representative of the Communist Party of China at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. It gave a detailed explanation and proposal for creating a united front, which the Communist Party of China then had in mind, to defend China against the Japanese invasion. I devoured it avidly, and after my long forced ignorance, enjoyed the opportunity to learn what was really happening in Asia at that time, the opportunity to have access to a phase of the lively process of world history. As for Europe, I was eager to learn among other things about the issues of the Popular Front in France and the Spanish Civil War.

Outside the prison, the Proletarian Cultural Movement also seemed to have been annihilated. While I was in Prison, Yuriko was frequently arrested. Once, while I was in Ichigaya Prison Yuriko was under arrest, so I could have nothing sent in. I was left unable to pay even for my minimum daily expenses. While one was detained pending verdict the prison authorities kept all one's belongings. The amounts of the money one spent were recorded on one's card, to be balanced later by the authorities. At that time I was literally penniless and could not even use my card. In January 1936, when Yuriko's father, Seiichiro Chujo died of illness, I could not even afford to send a telegram of condolence to her family.

In June 1938, I learned by telegram of my father's death in his native village. He had long been suffering from cerebral hemorrhage, but used to sit, when he felt well enough, at the counter of a small store my mother and brothers were running. Just before the news of his death I had received a letter from my mother telling me he had given up that habit after my arrest, because he was ashamed and wanted to avoid observation.

In June 1937, I was moved to the newly built Sugamo Prison. In fact it was fairly modern, but the cell was still only the size of a three-mat room. The window was a little lower than at Ichigaya, but it had no curtain. In mid-summer the sunlight came in direct through the glass, and it was not uncommon for prisoners to faint from sunstroke. The court authorities often changed my preliminary judges, and whenever a new judge was

appointed, he came to question me. But I remained stone-mute to everyone. One judge showed me a signed confession made by Torao Miyagawa, who had been head of the Agitation Propaganda Section of the party after the death of Iwata. The record had an illustration showing even the place where I used to sit in party meetings. The judge read the record aloud, to induce me to confess, using it as a temptation; "even a member above you has done this; why should you be so obstinate?"

In November that year, the Japan-Germany-Italy Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. The news made me dread the growth of the anti-communist movement and the accelerated preparation for the Second World War. In June 1941, the German Army invaded the Soviet Union; in September Leningrad was under siege, news that left me thunderstruck. The domestic political system was being reformed; all the labor unions had been unified under the Great Japan Industrial Patriotic Association the Social Masses Party had been dissolved back in July 1940. In October 1940, "Hito"carried two big news items with pictures; one used the heading, "Brilliant Opening Ceremony, Start of the Imperial Rule Assistance Movement—Solemn Oath of Self-Sacrifice and Loyalty", and the other was about the ceremony celebrating the 2,600th Year of Kigen (from the legendary accession of Emperor Jimmu).

World War II and the Jail Hospital

Over the radio, the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese air force on December 8, 1941, was called a "great victory", and the first page of the prison paper, "Hito", carried the declaration of war by the Emperor. There was loud talk over the prison radio about the good fortune of the Emperor's family and the victory of the Emperor's forces. I felt that World War II, which began in China, had at last reached the final stage. It meant the imminent self-destruction of Japanese militarism. One after the other came reports of the Japanese forces, landing operations on the Malay Peninsula, the occupation of Singapore, Manila, and Java. My heart ached as I thought of the people's increasing suffering, and the increasing day to day oppression and persecution of conscientious anti-war people. As soon as war was declared against the USA and UK, as many as 200 pacifists were arrested. I knew that Yuriko was arrested because her sister-in-law told me that she would be sending things in to me in place of Yuriko. Later, while in Sugamo Prison, Yuriko fainted from sunstroke in the middle of summer, and lost consciousness. Her condition was so serious that she was released from prison. She was not able to see, and the recovery of her eyesight took a long time, with continuing aftereffects.

"Hito" claimed that Germany was at an advantage, and expected the Axis powers of Japan, Italy and Germany to emerge victorious. But judging from the military balance between the Allied and the Axis powers, I felt sure that the fascists would be defeated. It was certainly an unexpected setback that the Soviet army suffered at the beginning of the war, but I was sure that Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union would meet the same fate as Napoleon's. Semi-seriously some of the prison warders urged me to recant, pointing to what they called Hitler's defeat of the Soviet Union, to which I responded with only a laugh.

As the war developed, young warders could not escape the call to join the forces. Off they went to the front day after day. My two brothers had also been called up. Outdoor exercises for prisoners, as provided under the prison law, often had to be cancelled. Poor meals were the rule under prison regulations, boiled rice, sixty percent of which was really barley, with a few vegetables worth "less than 5-sen a day", food becoming much poorer. Finally sorghum and rice was often served. I had lost more than ten kilograms and my bottom bones pained me as I sat on the hard floor.

In the following days people were sent to prison for violation of the Public Order Maintenance Law, not only communists, but liberals, men of religion and even government officers. One day I heard a new jailbird replying to a warder writing a report on his personal history at his desk near my cell, "I am an officer of the Cabinet Planning Board". It was a familiar voice to me, so I peeped out through the peephole of my cell. It was Kei Hoashi in blue prison clothes. I had never met Jun Tosaka before I was sent to this prison. I once met him in the medical treatment room of the prison and we gave each other a "good luck" greeting.

Our treatment grew worse. In Ichigaya my health was ruined from one year in prison. Two or three times every night the sweat poured out of me and when I had a high fever with a bad cold I had to change my clothes again and again. Finally I had to put on just my *haori* (Japanese half coat) until at last there was nothing dry to put on, so I had to wrap myself up naked in bed. The fever continued, so I earnestly asked for a prison doctor to examine me, but he treated me as a malingerer and did not even allow me to lie down on the floor. The fever continued until eventually trouble at the upper part (apex) of my lungs was diagnosed and I was removed to a prison hospital. I had suffered from appendicitis and typhoid fever, and in 1937 suffered an intestinal hemorrhage from tuberculosis. My weight fell to 40 kilograms, and most of my hair fell out due to general debility.

In the prison hospital seriously ill patients died without receiving any nursing care. Those approaching death were moved from mixed to solitary cells, and close at hand I could hear the groans of the dying. When it was found they were dead, penal servitude prisoners serving as male nurses took them away at once, sometimes just announcing "the dish is ready". I knew from the way they treated me that they thought it was only a matter of time for me too. One of the warders who peeped at me through the watch-hole complained in a mutter to himself, "He is still alive." A public prosecutor, informed that I was dying, came to the prison and said, "It would not be good for us to let you die here. I would allow you to die in a hospital if you collaborated with me in completing your record. It would be important for you as well as for the Communist Party that you should make the record as your will, though I don't urge you to recant, as you are very stubborn." He just urged me to complete the record.

But I made no response to his urgent plea. I took it for granted that I would challenge in court the oppression under the Public Order Maintenance Law, the unreasonable charge and their demagogy in the spy interrogation case, but in this situation I refused on principle to respond to his demand for my record. So I continued to refuse. I thought that even if I should be killed, the revolutionary movement would understand my attitude, which was to make the best possible struggle and stand by my principle. But shortly after I had decided this, my intestinal bleeding stopped, and I began little by little to get better. When I was in a solitary cell of the prison hospital, a member who had recanted was put in the adjoining cell. He was completely abject in his attitude toward the prison officers. For some ten years the interventionists in the Communist Party of China had been charging that the leading members of the Japanese Communist Party were oppotunists or revisionists, and Socialist Party of Japan Diet members were collaborating with them. When later I found the name of that coward among SPJ Diet members I could not repress a bitter smile, thinking of his attitude in that prison hospital.

To Abashiri

In May 1945 there was a big night raid by the American Air Force. The air-raid warning was sounded without stopping, and the bombs began to fall. The warders changed the original cell keys for provisional ones to be able to unlock the doors quickly in an emergency, but they did not change the keys of my cell. A bomb fell on part of the prison hospital, but the fire did not spread throughout the building. Through the window of my cell I could see the red glare in the sky reflecting the big fires all around.

At the barber's in Sugamo Prison I sometimes met a man by the name of Branko Vukelić, a reporter from Yugoslavia, one of the members of the Sorge-Ozaki group, then on trial. Watching for an unguarded moment, we were able to talk to each other in my broken English. He spoke open-heartedly to me when he learned I was a member of the Communist Party. "I knew beforehand when the war between Germany and Soviet Union would start, and I made it known to the Allied Forces, and was able to contribute to the anti-fascist struggle." "So," he said clearly, pointing to his neck for execution, "I am ready for my fate." He seemed to be proudly waiting for his death, ready to die as an anti-fascist fighter. He escaped the scaffold, but was sent to Abashiri as a prisoner under an indeterminate sentence a year before I was sent there, and died of illness.

In June 1944 my trial began. It had been delayed because of my illness. Outside the court there were no support organizations as at the time of the March 15 and April 16 events. Yuriko, who was forbidden to write and had not yet recovered completely, worked at side jobs, such as translation. She barely made enough money to pay for making copies during my trial. Attorneys refused to work for me, saying that as I refused to recant they could not work for me unless appointed by the Government, not by the defendant. Some of them were famous attorneys. So in the public gallery there were two attorneys, including Mr. Eizaburo Morinaga, Yuriko and some special political police. For the first time in this court I made myself clear in keeping with my principle. I demanded justice for the aims of the Japanese Communist Party, and exposed the injustice of the Public Order Maintenance Law. I protested in detail about the demagoguery of the spy investigation case, and the unreliable reports of other defendants involved. On the way to the court I saluted the town from the prison van, raising my braided hat. Some streets refreshed my memory of the time when I was working as part of the underground organization ten years earlier. The streets had been devastated by the war, at which I was very shocked. The court could not but agree that we had not murdered the spy during our investigation, but the ruling on the whole was nevertheless unjust. I appealed to a higher court on receiving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment.

In May 1945 my appeal was rejected and I was condemned to penal servitude. My first prison job was attaching wires to labels. Always hungry, I felt famine pressed close on my heels, but when the meal seemed to be a little bigger than usual I felt easier. We had no heaters in the prison, so the midwinter cold pierced me to the marrow, clad as I was in a cotton shirt and a red outfit of prison clothes. When I am asked what was most painful in prison I answer without hesitation that it was the starvation and the cold. My analysis of the world situation proved to be right, with the Axis powers, Japan, Italy and Germany, being driven back on every front, with the historical defeat of the fascist powers approaching the end as day followed day. The defeats of the forces of Hitler and Mussolini on the German and Italian fronts made even the prison warders very uneasy. Some prison officers came to me secretly to ask how the war was going.

In June it was decided that I should be sent to another prison, called "pushing out". It was the Abashiri Prison. I had to walk to Ikebukuro Station carrying my trunk on my back like a turtle shell. House after house had been burnt out by the air raids, the streets completely devastated. It was cold in Abashiri (in northern Hokkaido). My old-style cell was always dark, with only a small window high up in the wall, and a big barred door, where I had to work as a sewing hand, patching up prisoners' clothes. Then I heard that Tatsuji, my first younger brother who was with the troops at Hiroshima, was lost in the attack with "a new type of bomb". He left a young wife and two infants to mourn his death. I was in Abashiri when the war ended and the Public Order Maintenance Law was abolished. On the 9th of October I was set free after my twelve years in prison. I was then 37 years old.

The Party in Legal Activity

I got off alone at Ueno Station and went to the house in Hongo where Yuriko had rented rooms on the second floor. I had received a telegram from the party while in prison, telling me to come as soon as I was set free to the party's office in Kokubunji. It was an ordinary small house where I found a big number of visitors. For the first time I met there Tokuda, Shiga and other leading members, but not Satomi Hakamada. Tokyo was literally burnt to the ground. Everyone was short of everything, and living conditions very severe. Three million Japanese had died in the war; every family and family branch had lost members and bore the scars of war. It was now, I felt deeply, that the people needed a strong, active communist party, which had fought dauntlessly against evil politics and the war in trying to establish a new Japan.

Even while I was in prison I had thought we should carry on party activities openly, such as issuing Akahata (Red Flag) in the name of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party. I felt sure that the party outside the prison had been completely destroyed, but those of us in prison were upholding the flag of the party as members of the Central Committee. This meant that the Central Committee of the Japenese Communist Party had not been totally destroyed. It was a great pity that Shoichi Ichikawa had died in prison, but I hoped that among the released comrades there would be at least a few members of the Central Committee who had not recanted. But in fact there were less than three.

The 4th Congress of the party was held on the second floor of a one-time cinema house in Yoyogi in December 1945, the place then used as headquarters of the party. Members were elected to the Central Committee and Kyuichi Tokuda became the General Secretary of the party. I was Chief of the Agitprop Section and Chief Editor of "Zen'ei", the central journal of the party. It seemed that a new era had dawned at last, because now we had the legal right to criticize the Tenno system, in whose name we had formerly been brutally suppressed. In the first issue of "Zen'ei" I wrote a "Criticism of the Tenno system". Conditions had changed for Japan's ruling system with the occupation of Japan by the American Forces, something such as we had never before experienced as a people. We were duly impressed to learn that the Emperor had gone to MacArthur's residence to meet him.

As editor of "Zen'ei", I often saw the real nature of the oppression of the American authorities. Our articles in "Zen' ei", demanding an all-inclusive peace and an early end to the occupation by complete application of the Potsdam Declaration, were censored and erased by GHQ. When I sent galley proofs I was often called and ordered to erase parts of the articles. Censorship under the Tenno system left ommissions blank, but the American censorship meant recomposition of disapproved parts.

In December 1947 the 6th Congress of the Japanese Communist Party was held, and the party platform called for the complete independence of Japan. I was the reporter to handle this subject, and in the closed meeting of representatives held before the Congress, I insisted that our purpose should be to establish the overall independence of Japan, without the oppression of the occupation forces, and that the occupation was contrary to the Potsdam Declaration. In our formal Congress meeting we could not prevent members of the occupation attending and inspecting our work. The party also called for the establishment of a people's democratic front in order to establish overall independence and democratic freedom. As the person in charge I went to the labor unions, such as the National Railway Workers' Union and various kinds of democratic organizations and appealed directly to leading members of these groups. This led to the formation of a united front, named League for Defense of Democracy. It was made up of more than ninety bodies representing eleven million people, the biggest united front organaization in the history of Japan.

Relating to the 1950 Split in the Party

On June 6, 1950 while at Fukuoka City I heard the news that all the Central Committee members of the JCP had been purged from public office by the Yoshida Cabinet on orders from General MacArthur, so I hurried back to Tokyo. I went immediately to party headquarters, and tried to make contact with the members of the Political Bureau, including General Secretary Kyuichi Tokuda, but our talks failed to reach any useful conclusion. Then I claimed that during the 20-day period of grace legally allowed for political action, further measures for the future should be discussed by the Political Bureau or the Central Committee. I then repeated my claim to party headquarters, but could not convince them of the correctness of my proposal. Meanwhile, Provisional Central Leadership, with Etsuro Shiino, member of the Control Committee, as chairman, was formed, and it was rumored that there were some former Political Bureau members who had been dissociated from us who were behind it.

Since the 6th Party Congress in 1947 our party had made unquestionable advances in various ways, with the peace movement, the democratic national front movement and the election campaigns. When the Katayama Cabinet failed, our party won 35 seats in the general election in January 1949. But at the same time, the anti-communist oppression policy became more intense, it being charged that the Shimoyama and Matsukawa cases had been committed by members of the JCP, and the red purge from a wide range of offices began. In July the following year, Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) was established with the intention of making it an anti-communist national center of the labor movement, part of the policy of GHQ, and the next month (August), an order was issued to break up Zenroren (National Liaison Council of Trade Unions), which took the working class position.

Adding to all this, the JCP was facing a big internal crisis. An exact programmatic perspective on the after-war situation had not yet been elaborated, though it had been explored. Kyuichi Tokuda was a leading activist, full of fighting spirit, but with his ego-centric leadership strengthened, which later characterized as patriarchal, and Ritsu Ito, a wartime degenerate, and others, usually centered around Tokuda and Takaji Nishizawa, Tokuda's son-in-law, the regular democratic management of the party center was seriously obstructed.

The Cominform criticism which appeared in January 1950 had a positive side, in that they made much of anti-imperialist struggle but the Cominform attitude was clearly an expression of great-power chauvinism. But the party leaders at that time, including myself, greatly influenced by the experience of the Comintern period, could not free ourselves of the submissiveness toward the Cominform, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and so on. At the same time many members were aware and worried about the patriarchal and unscientific foibles and flaws of the party leadership at that time. The situation was such that our disagreement grew more intense, but in the 18th and 19th Plenums of the Central Committee we reached a certain conclusion, and pledged ourselves to unite, but the unity could not be maintained for long.

I was a member of the Political Bureau, and Chairman of the Control Committee, but at the end of January 1950, it was proposed that I should go and stay in the Kyushu District for a long time to lead the party organizations there; this was proposed by Tokuda and approved by a majority after discussion by the Political Bureau. I disagreed with the proposal, but followed the decision. At the same time I felt the greater danger was that the unity of the party center may be destroyed. I regret that my apprehension turned out to be true, occasioned by the oppression of MacArthur. The party in fact split largely into two currents—one current which accepted the condition on the score of MacArthur's oppression, and the other which opposed it, from which an intense internal struggle began. On June 25 the Korean War began, to which the oppression was the prelude. It was about this time that Yuriko died suddenly from some unexpected illness, in January 1951.

I had formed a National Unity Committee and set about trying to recover the functions of the Central Committee, following MacArthur's purge, and a considerable part of party organizations all over the country took this direction. In August 1951, the organ paper of the Cominform carried a resolution of the Fourth National Conference attacking the Unity Committee. At the conference the party organizations led by Tokuda decided their "military line". The Moscow Broadcast, the People's Daily and other media reported this. It meant open support for one side of the divided party. We halted activities and dissolved the organizations. At that time we had not yet freed ourselves of the tendency to regard the criticism of the Cominform as irresistible, in addition to pressure of the Soviet and Chinese parties. I was reluctantly forced to think that the continuance of activities under these circumstances could not lead to an improvement. The failure, however, of the ultra-left adventurists gradually became clearer to everyone. In the general election of 1953, the number of the votes cast for the Japanese Communist Party fell to 650,000, one-sixth of the previous election.

About that time I wrote a commentary on "the Collected Works of Yuriko Miyamoto", published by Kawade Shobo Publishing Company. Though I had no connection with party organ, I felt so disgusted at sectarianism in "Peoples' Literature" (Jinmin Bungaku) and "New Japan" Literature (Shin Nihon Bungaku) that I wrote strong criticisms as a literary critic. I called them "Criticisms of a Critic", appearing in two volumes.

On a certain day in the following year, 1955, a messenger I knew only by sight came and told me that Shigeo Shida and others would like to see me. Shida had been engaged in the underground movement since the split of the party and was thought to be very close to Tokuda. I went that day to a big house in a Tokyo suburb, often changing cars. There I found Takaji Nishizawa and others in addition to Shida. They told

me that Tokuda had died in Beijing, ultra-left adventurism had been a mistake, and Ritsu Ito had proved an unreliable element in certain developments in the matter, and proposed a plan to hold the 6th National Conference.

For the Unity of the Party and a Party Program

After the 6th National Conference, as one of twenty leaders of the party, I busied myself with straightening out the confusion in the party since 1950, and preparation for the 7th Party Congress, with the aim of achieving the literally regular unity of the party. I moved from the upstairs room of my brother-in-law at Hongo to a house at Suginami, and married Sueko Omori (my present wife) who was the former secretary of Yuriko, and was helping me with what I was doing on Yuriko's collected works. The party had been seriously damaged both politically and organizationally. There were mountains upon mountains of difficulties to be overcome in going over the former split and establishing a new course. Literally without rest, days and nights were spent in a succession of conferences, the preparation of plans, and an official trip to the provinces to resolve some difficult questions. But most serious was the condition of the Tokyo District party organization. There were many leadership members in the district who, as a prior consideration, insisted that a close inquiry should be made into the responsibility for the 1950 question, so I often had to attend the Tokyo Conference on behalf of the Central Committee. At the Tokyo Conference in January 1958, when, due to a cold, I had high fever and severe coughing, I couldn't leave in such an atmosphere. On coming home late, I coughed up blood and sputum, so went for examination to a nearby doctor, who diagnosed it as acute pneumonia. I was advised to take a long complete rest, but was obliged to begin preparation for the 7th

Party Congress even during convalescence. We published a magazine called "Unity and Progress" and organized whole party discussions on the programmatic and 1950 questions.

In the 7th Party Congress in 1958, in discussing a new program, one opinion was that we should strive for a socialist revolution through the process of a people's democratic revolution; the other opinion was that we should aim immediately for a socialist revolution. In the ensuing debate the meeting was thrown into disorder. I had to report on the proposals, but repeated catcalls and howls disrupted proceedings. About two-thirds of the delegates agreed on the proposed program, but instead of deciding by a majority vote it was resolved that in view of the importance of the question discussion of the program question should continue until the 8th Party Congress, with only the policy plan and action program decided. The new Central Committee elected Sanzo Nosaka a Chairman, and I was elected General Secretary, and appointed as the responsible for the subcommittee on the program question.

At the end of that year, my mother died suddenly of apoplexy at the age of 76. She had suffered from a great deal of trouble, with me in prison, her husband ill for a long time and now dead, one of my two brothers in the army and the other killed in the war. When I was released from prison, I had gone to my home town after an absence of thirteen years, and held a speech meeting; glad at my being free, my mother repeated "Good luck, good luck!" In every election she became an ardent supporter. At the end of that year she was to come and live with us, and was looking forward to seeing her grandson, my son, born that summer.

The year 1960 was the year when the Japan-US Security Treaty was revised by the Kishi Cabinet, and the opposition movement, centered on, the National Council for Prevention of Revision of the Security Treaty, which brought in a hundred

and scores of organizations, including the Japanese Communist and Socialist Parties, Sohyo, and many others opposed to the treaty, waged a great struggle, with a succession of united actions. Local joint struggle organizations reached a total of some 2,000 throughout the country. I often had to go to Sohyo headquarters to consult General Secretary Iwai.

In the course of the struggles, the ranks of the Communist Party was becoming stronger and clearer. What I took into consideration as a member of the leadership was the need to ensure fairness in the personnel administration, and the need to publish an exact policy appropriate to the occasion, under collective leadership. I felt this keenly on examining the party history since the war.

Happily, many party leaders worked devotedly in concentrating on the new leadership, and not sticking to the issue of the split of the past. Mass movements and a steady advance in the election campaign began, with the strength of the party growing. The convictions of many members had been strengthened in the crucible of the struggle against revision of the Security Treaty, realizing how the presence of US imperialism should be situated in the perspective of the liberation of Japan, that is, the rightness of the definition in our program—a new democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly revolution, opposed to the rule of our two enemies, US imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital. So the 8th Party Congress in 1961 was able to agree on a new program with the support of all delegates. For the next ten years, the progress of the JCP was speeded up as a result.

The Way to Sovereign Independence

In 1959, as chief of the party delegation, I attended the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in talks with Suslov and Kuusinen, delegates of the CPSU, we reached agreement that the Southern Chishima should be returned when Japan becomes independent and neutral. Coming back, I had talks at Zhengzhou with Mao Zedong, who told me quite unexpectedly that it was not right that in the 1950 question the CPC had sided with Stalin's intervention in what was an internal question of the JCP. On my way home from this visit, as I was drawing near to Tokyo by plane from Hongkong, I was deeply impressed with my memory of the comradely solidarity and frankness of the international communist movement, and filled with deep emotion that the future of the movement was bright and rosy. But in the 1960 Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of 81 countries, I realized very clearly from the intense discussions how severe was the way to unity.

In May 1964, the CPSU leadership with Nikita S. Khrushchov as First Secretary, because the JCP did not agree with the CPSU on the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, began open intervention in the JCP by articles and by radio, praising to an extreme people like Shiga, Suzuki and others, who had been expelled by the JCP for their divisive activities. We immediately counterattacked openly. The US bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam began about then. The CPC opposed the inclusion of the Soviet Union even in united action against the American aggression in Vietnam. We were involved in arguments with the Soviet Union on a number of issues, but our opinion was that the Soviet Union should not be excluded in so far as it supported the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the struggle against US imperialism.

Holding that it was urgent not only for Asian history but also for the world that communist parties in Asia should exchange views on this matter, we formed a delegation and made a round of calls on Vietnam, China and Korea. I saw

President Ho Chi Minh for the second time after Moscow, and in spite of his somewhat unruffled manner, I found that he was worried about the disunity of the international communist movement. In Vietnam and Korea we issued joint statements based on earnest discussions. But when I had an interview with Mao Zedong, our opinions were divided on how to deal with the Soviet Union. In accordance with Mao's wish we decided not to publish the results of the talks, but during the later "Great Cultural Revolution" in China the substance of the talks was unilaterally and distortedly circulated from the Beijing side, and attacks and abuse on the JCP began. Openly supporting Takaji Nishizawa and his set, who had been expelled from our party because of their splitting activities in concert with China's intervention, they attempted to subvert the leadership of our party. Even against this we maintained a firm attitude in refusing to allow their great-power chauvinist intervention, and made a necessary open counterattack. The lesson of the 1950 question inscribed in our memory the viewpoint of genuine unity in international solidarity and sovereign independence, which was brought home to everyone throughout the party.

Dreams of the Underground Era And the Reality of Today

During these 15 years since 1960 the share of votes for the LDP has decreased from 57.6% (1960 House of Representatives election) to 39.5% (1974 local constituencies for House of Councilors election). Despite all its maneuvers, the LDP has lost the majority support of the people, due mainly to the contradiction between them and the politics serving the financial circle in subordination to the United States. During this same period the number of JCP members has multiplied some 10 times, and the circulation of the party's organ paper about 40 times; JCP Diet members have increased from only a few to about 60, and party members in local assemblies have risen to more than 2,800. In local politics, governments in which the JCP is a ruling party have increased to more than 180, with a combined population of over 40 million. We now have many capable young staff members and activists. While I was working underground and then in jail, I used to dream of future days when the party would be able to work openly. Thinking of that time, I find that my dream has become a reality. Certainly history has moved, and it is a new era.

But attacks and interferences by foreign parties, which I had not dreamed of, have occurred. I have never thought that the day of progressive politics could come smoothly. Many barriers and taboos remain. The old prejudices against scientific socialism——communism——are deep-rooted. Though we were once accused of being traitors, and charged with being un-Japanese, we challenged the big taboos, such as the Tenno system and the war of aggression. Because we criticized the US occupation forces, which was also taboo, we were called militarists, and purged from public office. We also challenged other taboos and opened wide the window of freedom of thought and speech. An irrational taboo, however tough it may seem to be, must ultimately fail. This is my heart's conviction, born of this half century of history.

Our party has always been a true friend of the National Buraku Liberation movement. But contrary to the aim that all human beings are equal, the Asada group in the National Buraku Liberation League has habitually discriminated against any people who do not support their group, and has attacked them with violence, on the false charge that all Japanese, except the Buraku people themselves, discriminate against the *buraku* (socially segregated community). Under no circumstances could we agree that such people should be subject to a

taboo. Last November the teachers of Yoka High School in Hyogo Prefecture were brutally attacked in the gymnasium for a long time, till many of the teachers were seriously injured. The principal of that school and the education committee concerned supported this barbaric action plan, called "impeachment". Though the police knew about the crime, they did nothing, until ten days later they had to begin the arrest of some of the criminals. This is an incredible, dark, pre-modern side of today's society, to which even the mass communication media could not refer directly, even after the crime. Since last August this trend has especially cast shadows on the administration for "Buraku harmonization" in the Tokyo area. It is obvious that from now this will continue to be an obstacle to the formation of a national progressive united front.

I had often sat at the same table in a TV debate with Kakuei Tanaka, when he was General Secretary of the LDP. "But for the Communist Party, a united front of opposition parties would be nothing to worry about," he said clearly in front of me, and repeated it in the election campaign. In keeping with this LDP strategy, the LDP, Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party, and even including the right wing of the SPJ, worked together in the Kyoto gubernatorial election in April 1974, the first experiment in an anti-communist coalition. The Japan-Germany-Italy Anti-Comintern Pact and the aggressive wars based on it brought immeasurable suffering on mankind all over the world, including the Japanese people, which they accepted as a judgment of history. But anti-communism itself has been used to hold a privileged reactionary regime in power and stop progress by all possible means.

It was in this situation that I said in the introductory speech at the national activists conference held last October, "The safety and interest of more than 99% of our people, excluding a few privileged people, the monopolies of big business, and the corrupt privileged leaders, and those who support subordination to the United States, are objectively linked to the way of a democratic and independent Japan to serve the people, even though today some may be supporters of the LDP or the Democratic Socialist Party or Komeito." Many troubles and difficulties may lie in the way of our future, but for our way, to establish and develop an independent, peaceful neutral Japan of better living, to change the role of Japan from a war base in Asia to contribute to the peace and national independence of Asia, victory must inevitably come within this century.

(*Shukan Shincho*, January 2, 1975)

APPEDNIX 1

JOINT STATEMENT

On the visit by Comrade Kenji Miyamoto,
Chairman of the Presidium, Central Committee,
Japanese Communist Party,
to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Kenji Miyamoto, Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, visited the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the invitation of Josip Broz Tito, President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, from June 28 through July 5, 1978.

Chairman Miyamoto was accompanied by Koichiro Ueda, Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee; Hiroshi Tachiki, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee; Saburo Uno, member of the Central Committee; and other members of the JCP.

The talks between Chairman Miyamoto and President Tito were held in an atmosphere of sincerity, frankness, mutual confidence and understanding.

Chairman Miyamoto and his group had the opportunity of visiting and studying a number of enterprises and socio-political organizations, as well as leading bodies and organizations of the LCY in both the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Republic of Croatia. Wherever they went, they were given a warm and sincere welcome.

Presidium Vice-Chairman Koichiro Ueda, Presidium member Hiroshi Tachiki, Central Committee member Saburo Uno and some others of the Japanese group, and Secretary of the Presidency Stane Dolanc, Presidency member Alexandar Grlickov, Executive Secretary of the Presidency Vlado Janzic, Vice-Chief of the Department for International Relations and Connections of the Presidency Zvonko Grahek and some others of Yugoslavia participated in a separate meeting.

Chairman Miyamoto thanked President Tito for his invitation, and expressed his satisfaction in being given this opportunity to visit the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. President Tito expressed a welcome to Chairman Miyamoto on his visit. It was emphasized that this visit and meeting are of great importance for the development of friendly relations between the JCP and the LCY.

Information and views were exchanged on urgent social and political developments both in Japan and in Yugoslavia, and the domestic and international activities of the two parties. Various measures to ensure the continued development and fruitful expansion of cooperation between the JCP and the LCY were studied.

Among other things, Chairman Miyamoto talked about the postwar development of the JCP and recent developments in the Japanese situation, especially the counter-offensive being waged by the reactionary and anti-communist forces because of the remarkable advance made by the JCP and progressive forces over the past twenty years. He spoke also of the united-front movement to overcome the counter-offensive and achieve a progressive change in Japanese politics, and the struggle to safeguard and increase the number of progressive local self-governing bodies. He referred specifically to the importance of the struggle for abrogation of the Japan-US Security Treaty, stressing that to break free of the Japan-US military alliance would mean to come out from under US imperialism's "nuclear umbrella".

Chairman Miyamoto, emphasizing the importance of combining the maintenance of working-class power with socialist democracy, expressed his positive interest in the Yugoslav experience in socialist self-management as manifestation of this in Yugoslavia, and wished the LCY every success in its activities.

President Tito talked about the activities of the LCY, the experience of building socialism on the basis of the system of socialist self-management, and especially the achievements of the latest 11th Congress of the LCY and the strengthening of the cohesion of the LCY. President Tito wished the JCP every success in its struggles for peace, independence, democracy, progress and socialism in Japan and elsewhere.

In the exchange of views of international problems, it was confirmed that the views of both sides were either in full accord or very close.

In the international communist movement, the currents of autonomy and independence of the parties are growing stronger and stronger, in making decisions and carrying out their own domestic and foreign policies, and are spreading. In party-to-party relations based on the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other parties, the responsibility of each party for the struggles of the working class and people of its own country, mutual respect and voluntary and equal cooperation and solidarity. The JCP and the LCY are firmly convinced that only on such a basis can successful and beneficial cooperation between the parties and the autonomous development of the revolutionary movement in each country be achieved.

As historical experience has shown, the diversity of paths and forms of struggle for socialism and socialist construction, the autonomy of those engaged in the struggle, and equitable cooperation and solidarity between them are objective laws of the development of socialism as a world process.

Both sides are convinced that there is no such thing as a universal model, and they will not allow any attempts in the international communist movement to impose a line or model for socialist construcion of a particular party, or to intervene in the internal affairs of another party, or to reestablish a "center".

The two sides emphasize that all disputes and conflicts between independent states must be resolved peacefully by discussion.

In view of the increasing danger of the arms race both uniformly stressed the importance and the urgency of general disarmament, and especially the task of concluding an international agreement for a complete ban on nuclear weapons. Both pointed out the great significance of mobilizing the broadest sections of the masses and building international public opinion to achieve disarmament and ensure that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes only.

Both sides hold that in view of the process of the recent United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, convened on the initiative of the non-aligned countries, for the settlement of this complicated world issue the United Nations is the proper and only forum.

Both sides confirmed that the non-aligned movement, which has made a spectacular advance since the first summit conference held in Belgrade in 1961, has been playing an ever more important role in the present international situation.

Non-aligned policy is now an important force in the struggles against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, military blocs, racism, hegemonism and all other kinds of subordination.

The Japanese side expressed its belief that transformation of Japan into a neutral country through the abrogation of the Japan-US Security Treaty and its participation in the summit conference of non-aligned countries would make a great contribution to the strengthening of the non-aligned movement.

The two sides express full support for and solidarity with all peoples and forces struggling against imperialism and colonialism and for peace and freedom, national independence, democracy and social progress.

Chairman Miyamoto and President Tito confirmed with pleasure that friendly relations between the JCP and the LCY are developing fruitfully, and agreed to develop this bilateral cooperation further in the future.

The visit by Japanese Communist Party Presidium Chairman Kenji Miyamoto to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has resulted in deepening mutual understanding and friendship between the JCP and LCY. It has also contributed to the strengthening of the forces of peace, independence, democracy, progress and socialism throughout the world.

Belgrade, 5th July, 1978.

(*Akahata*, July 6, 1978)

APPENDIX 2

JOINT STATEMENT

On the talks between the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party and the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1979)

Talks between the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party, headed by Comrade Kenji Miyamoto, Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the JCP, and the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, headed by Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, were held in Moscow from December 17 to 24, 1979.

From the Japanese side, those comrades taking part in the talks were also Vice-Chairmen of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee, Tomio Nishizawa and Koichiro Ueda; member of the Standing Presidium and Deputy Chief of the Secretariat of the JCP Central Committee, Mitsuhiro Kaneko; members of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee Toshio Sakaki and Hiroshi Tachiki; member of the JCP Central Committee Saburo Uno; and also from the Soviet side were member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M. A. Suslov; alternate member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, B.N. Ponomaryov; members of the CPSU Central Committee V.G. Afanasyev and P.N. Fedoseyev; Deputy Head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee R.A. Ulyanovsky; and Head of a Sector of the International

Department of the CPSU Central Committee I.I. Kovalenko.

The atmosphere of the talks was comradely, friendly and frank, and the two delegations carried on an extensive and all-round exchange of views on questions of relations between the two parties, current international problems, including the present situation in Asia, questions of relations between the two countries and peoples, problems of the international communist movement and other issues of mutual interest.

First of all the two delegations confirmed the agreement reached at the preliminary talks on past problems that resulted in the disruption of normal relations between the two parties, and over a lengthy period had obstructed normalization. It was again confirmed that relations between the two parties must be developed by strict observance of the generally recognized norms of relations between communist parties: viz: independence, equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and solidarity in solving common tasks.

Both sides expressed confidence that the agreement of this time on questions from the past in the relations between the two parties will be of positive significance also to the unity and development of the movement for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs and other social movements in Japan.

The JCP delegation spoke about the situation in Japan, party activities and achievements, and future prospects.

The CPSU delegation spoke about the situation in the Soviet Union, party activities and achievements in various fields, and prospects of the future.

The delegations of the two parties discussed problems of the international situation, and were in agreement to acknowledge the following: intrigues of imperialist aggression, centering on the United States, are continuing in Asia, Europe and other regions; there is clear advance of the forces for peace, national independence and social progress as the main direction of development, and which finds expression in the deepening crisis of world capitalism, the successive collapses of reactionary dictatorships and military regimes in various parts of the world, and the growth of anti-imperialist forces, the increase in the number of non-aligned states, and the development of the struggles of peoples of various countries; the historic mission of the three main revolutionary forces, the socialist countries, the working class and people of capitalist countries, and the national liberation movements, is becoming more important than ever.

The strengthening of solidarity between the anti-imperialist progressive forces of the world in line with the basic direction of opposition to the policy of aggression and oppression by international imperialist and reactionary forces has become of greater importance. For that both sides stressed the special significance of defending the principles of peaceful coexistence such as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and mutual benefit as well as the right of nations to independence and freedom, the impermissibility of any act by anyone whatever that seeks privilege or hegemony, and the strict observance of the principle that disputes must be settled by talks.

Both sides pointed out the danger of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and particularly emphasized the need and urgency to greatly develop the struggle for the relaxation of international tension and general disarmament, above all, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Both sides condemned the intrigues of the Japan-US reactionary forces for making Okinawa and other parts of Japan into a nuclear base, as well as the plan of the NATO countries to deploy new nuclear missiles, positively evaluated the proposal that countries participating in the European Conference of Security and Cooperation should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear arms against each other, as put forward by the Warsaw Treaty countries, and pointed out the special importance of developing a movement of the widest range of the popular masses and mobilizing international public opinion to attain the goals of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, disarmament and world peace.

It was noted by both delegations that US imperialism, suffering from the serious defeat in Indochina, is striving to recover from its relatively weakened position in Asia, including Japan, and pressing ahead with the strengthening of its military position based on the Japan-US military alliance, for which purpose many maneuvers are being made. To support the Japan-US aggressive military alliance and the revival and strengthening of Japanese militarism, regardless of the source from which such support may come, means aiding the plots of the forces of imperialism and reaction, and tramples down the desires of the peoples of the different countries striving for world peace and national independence.

The two delegations confirmed that Indochina is a present new focal point of international confrontation between the forces of imperialism and aggression and the anti-imperialist and peace forces; and further, that it is a common task of the international anti-imperialist and peace forces to provide political and economic support for the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Both sides express warm solidarity with the peoples of the three countries of Indochina, who won national independence against the various wars of aggression and domination by imperialism; and which now, in the face of new difficulties and problems, are building a new society, in pursuance of a policy of national self-determination, peace, good-neighborliness, and friendship. The refusal to engage in peaceful talks and the military invasion across the borders into the western and northern areas of Vietnam, must be resolutely condemned as an outright act of hegemonism, completely foreign to socialism.

Both sides support the Korean people's struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. The two parties pointed out that the attainment of this aim requires the withdrawal of the US forces from South Korea.

Both sides support the efforts for a just and comprehensive settlement of Middle East problems, which should be resolved not by making a separate deal, but by the participation of all concerned parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Both sides reiterated their support for and solidarity with all peoples of the world struggling against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, and against apartheid and the reactionary forces; for national self-determination, peace, democracy and social progress.

In order that the people of each country, in the existing complicated international situation, may effectively promote the truly independent and democratic undertaking of transformation and construction of its own country, based on the right to national self-determination, both sides oppose both "the export of counterrevolution" and "the export of revolution". This is not in contradiction to active support and solidarity with the peoples in their struggle against imperialist aggression and oppression, and for national independence.

During the talks the delegations of the JCP and the CPSU exchanged views in a comradely and frank way on problems between their countries and peoples.

Both sides recognized that the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR is necessary for the friendly development of relations between the two countries on a stable long-term basis, frankly expressed their views, and agreed that

the exchange of views would continue in the future. Improvement of relations between the two countries is in accord with the far-reaching interests of the two peoples as well as being in the interests of peace and security in Asia and throughout the world.

The Japanese side made several proposals relating to problems of fishing, the harvesting of kelp and visits to graves of relatives. The Soviet side expressed its approval to study the questions raised by the delegation of the JCP in its consideration of the interests of the peoples of both countries.

Proceeding from the accord reached between the two parties, it was agreed by both sides that, when necessary in the future, issues of mutual interest to both, and questions concerning relations between the two parties and countries would be discussed. Having discussed the question of further interchanges between the two parties, both sides agreed to put into practice the plan for interchanges.

Both sides confirm that each party has the right to independently decide in its choice of road of social progress, transformation, transition to socialism, and building socialism and communism in its own country, based on the historical conditions and concrete situation of the country, and guided by the principles of scientific socialism, communism. In this, no outside interference whatsoever is permissible.

It was stressed by both sides that the development of solidarity in the international communist movement on a principled basis is of great importance to strengthen solidarity of the world anti-imperialist forces for the defense of world peace and the sovereignty of the peoples from the imperialist policy of aggression and interference.

The talks between the JCP and CPSU have brought to an end the long-standing unnatural relations between the two parties, and have opened up a new road for the development of friendly relations between both the parties and the peoples. The conviction is held by both sides that these talks are of great importance also to the cause of world peace and progress, and for the international communist movement.

(*Akahata*, December 25, 1979)

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In 1932, he married Yuriko Chujo, a famous novelist, who died in 1951. He married Sueko Omori in 1956 and has two children. His leisure pursuits are *Shogi* (Japanese chess) and walking.

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